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Abstract
This dissertation examines the thought of Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin in
critical constellation with German Idealism, specifically G.W.F. Hegel and F.W.J.
Schelling. I explore how Adorno and Benjamin deconstruct and refashion Idealist
notions, while also providing the post-Idealist theoretical armature to read Idealism in
speculative directions. Through this mosaic, I pose questions regarding the actuality of
philosophy, considering how thought might open itself towards a fuller spectrum of
experience, while nonetheless remaining systematic, creating new (inter)disciplinary
models of philosophy which tarry with the para-philosophical domains of art and nature.
In the first part of this project, I provide a critical exegesis of Adorno, whom I locate as a
fundamentally “post-Idealist” thinker, one who works through, while extending, German
Idealism’s central problematics. I elaborate Adorno’s impossible hope for philosophy in
relation to crisis, elaborating ruin, conflict, and “natural history” as the motivating
elements of Adorno’s negative dialectic. I then survey Adorno’s contestation of
philosophy’s absolute autarky by way of disciplinary conflicts with sociology and
psychoanalysis, along with the ur-conflict Adorno opens between philosophy and artaesthetics. The second part of this project takes up the early writings of Benjamin
(~1928), whom I position as elaborating an expanded, though nonetheless transcendental,
philosophy of experience via a meta-critical expansion of the Kantian program into the
domain of language (which comes to be understood in a mimetic and medial sense).
Though Benjamin’s attempts to found a novel “coming philosophy” began with Kant, the
limitations of the (neo) Kantian epistemic conception of philosophy led Benjamin to enter
the “force-field” of post-Kantian Idealism, developing his own mortuary romantic
conception of philosophy, via the speculative potentiation of the Frühromantiker, Goethe,
and the Baroque poets. In summation, I present a reading of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel
centering on notions of allegory and natural history, ideas which provide the foundational
contours of his natural-historical philosophy of transience. Part three of this project takes
up the work of Schelling and Hegel respectively, thinkers whom I read “without
absolutes,” that is, as theorists that problematize the final unity of philosophy by way of
nature and aesthetics. I explore Schelling as a thinker for whom the “original diremption”
of nature continually troubles the constancy of thought, resulting in a negative dialectical
mode of organization in which autonomous members threaten any possible philosophical
system. My final chapter elaborates my own ruined reading of Hegel, which
methodologically follows the (Hegelian) interventions of Bataille. I elevate nature and
aesthetics as “phantasmatic domains”—or prisms—which can be employed to
productively refract the Hegelian program, reading his (supposedly) panlogicist corpus
against the grain.
Keywords: Frankfurt School, German Idealism, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin,
G.W.F. Hegel, F.W.J. Schelling.
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Summary for a Lay Audience
How might philosophy—along with the humanities more broadly— help us think about
ourselves and our time in provocative, imaginative, and speculative ways? Amid current
crises of ecology, politics, and economy, and as the world returns to a “new normal,”
what might philosophy and its history teach us about our existential situation along with
our possible relationships to the (natural) world? This dissertation considers such
questions by way of the writings of Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) and Theodor W.
Adorno (1903-1969), thought in constellation with German Idealism, specifically G.W.F.
Hegel (1770-1831) and F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854). In interrogating the “actuality” of
philosophy, these thinkers question the proper form and purview of philosophy,
considering philosophy’s relationship to other disciplines and para-philosophical domains
such as aesthetics and nature (Hegel, PS, 27; Adorno, AP, 120, 126-7). For these
theorists, to think following crisis entails fracturing philosophy in new modern directions,
considering modes of intellectual grounding that allow philosophy to be opened towards
the plethora of possible “experiences.” These thinkers envision open models of
rationality, seeing philosophy as an interdisciplinary dialogue that continually tarries with
insights from other spheres. This dissertation, Transient Constellations: Adorno,
Benjamin, and the Actuality of Idealism, examines the modes by which the twentiethcentury Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School poses questions of philosophy’s actuality
anew. Taking up and rethinking German Idealism’s tendency to form overarching
philosophical systems, the Frankfurt School allows the humanities to be thought in new
critical and interdisciplinary directions. This allows one to consider the relation between
“the system” and categories such as nature, history, art, and experience. Further, does the
Idealist architectonic, as it is expressed in thinkers like Hegel, necessarily have a
panlogicist “dominating character,” or can it be refashioned for critical purposes (Adorno,
ND 26-28; AT, 64- 65)? How might the humanities relate themselves to nature and the
physical sciences differently? This dissertation places German Idealism—an
interdisciplinary and speculative model of thought—in constellation with Benjamin and
Adorno, examining how the latter intervene upon, and amend, Idealist categories through
considerations of history, nature (“natural history”), art and aesthetics, experience, and
their very style of philosophizing. Such engagements allow Benjamin and Adorno to
forward their own “coming philosophy”: a critical interdisciplinary model for the
humanities based on a new relationship to history, experience, and the (natural) world.
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It's been a prevalent notion. Fallen sparks. Fragments of vessels broken at the Creation.
And someday, somehow, before the end, a gathering back to home. A messenger from
the Kingdom, arriving at the last moment. But I tell you there is no such message, no
such home—only the millions of last moments . . . nothing more. Our history is an
aggregate of last moments.
Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 151.
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Preface: Crisis and Philosophy
“There is a great difference between writing the history of philosophy and writing philosophy.” Deleuze,
Difference and Repetition, xv.

In the “Preface” to his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807)—supposedly written as
the conquering Napoleon arrived in Jena—Hegel asserts, “ours is a birth time and a
period of transition to a new era,” a modern age awakes in which “Spirit has broken with
the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined” (PS, 6). Hegel calls upon philosophy to
become “actual” for this new modern era, taking the Kantian imperative of
enlightenment upon itself, such that “it can lay aside the title of ‘love of knowing’ and be
actual knowing,” and “philosophy can be made serious business” (PS, 27, 41). For
Hegel, “actuality” [Wirklichkeit] is opposed to “reality” [Realität] and should be thought
in terms of the Aristotelean distinction between “potentiality” and “actuality,” whereby
becoming “actual” entails an entity coming to embody its form (SOL, 478-488; EL, 21335). To become “actual” necessitates philosophy becoming worthy of itself, living up to
its own form, becoming “mature,” and learning to speak its own language. Following
Kant’s imperatives for enlightenment, philosophy must “dare to know”: heroically
employing its voice in public, dispensing with a reliance on previous forms
(“Enlightenment,” 54-55). Hegel challenges and expands Kant’s imperatives, providing
what Adorno later termed an “enlightened critique of enlightenment,” daring to think the
project of enlightenment in terms of a general economy, meta-critically extending
philosophy in an immanent reflection of reason upon itself (DE, xvii-xix). This
movement, of the immanent self-reflective reflection of philosophy, or “meta-critique,”
is one of the fundamental motifs of German Idealism (Beiser, Fate, 4-7) and is enacted
in various ways by all the thinkers in this project—theorists who continually expand,
while reflecting upon, the “infinite” project of enlightenment (Kant, “Enlightenment,”
57).
Hegel saw the tumult and upheavals of his age as occasions for the critical
renewal of thought: The French Revolution (and the resulting Terror) overturned
previous political assumptions, providing an imaginative horizon for novel political
theorization, while new advances in the physical and social sciences delivered a catalyst
for a new “modern” mode of “rational” thought (Comay, Mourning, 1-14; Marcuse,
Reason, 3-16; Pinkard, Hegel, 23-26). Though he is modern, Hegel is not one of
Benjamin’s avant-garde “new constructors” who sought to dispense with the auras of
xii

tradition wholesale (SW 2: 733). Instead, Hegel carefully undertook a critical excavation
of the ruins of previous philosophical forms, arranging them in a historical mosaic as
precursors in the development of his own modern system of thought. Philosophy must
emerge from the previous forms which it nonetheless conducted its formative Bildung
within: “like a phoenix from the ashes” (PN, 444-5). Despite their apparent
developmental or panlogicist character, Hegel’s texts remain fragmentary “ruins.”
Although Hegel wants to herald in a new modern mode of thought, he is also an
intellectual hoarder. Hegel is one who “lingers” and cannot let go of certain forms of
life; even when they are supposedly passed: “Hegel cannot decide when the past is past”
(Rajan, Writing,” 140). This tension, between moving on and lingering, is encapsulated
by the Hegelian notion of “Aufhebung” (“sublation”), which means at once destruction,
along with preservation as something higher.
Continuing this Hegelian “darkening of enlightenment,” two years later (in
1809), and deeply marred by disaster and ruin following the death of his wife Caroline
Schlegel, Schelling penned his Freedom essay, commencing the period of his “middle
work,” which sought to probe of the metaphysical abysses of both nature and Spirit
(Lyotard, Heidegger, 5; Rajan, Deconstruction, 130). Schelling’s middle corpus
attempted to reckon with the “deep melancholy spread over all life,” such that “one
might say that the Godhead sits enthroned over a world of terrors” (FE, 63; WA, 49). In
elaborating such a “tension between system and life,” Schelling makes crisis, or
negativity, the animating force of philosophy (Snow, 3). Such a diremptive
understanding of thought is echoed in his 1821 “On the Nature of Philosophy as
Science,” which describes the history of philosophy in terms of an “asytasy” or “chaos”:
a resistance to system that is manifest throughout previous forms of thought (210-1).
With Schelling’s embrace of struggle, the freedom of enlightenment is no longer
understood as some optimistic unfolding of providence, but an “abyss” which threatens
to engulf philosophy, and with it, any stable notion of the philosophical subject.
Schelling’s work likewise registers the shocks to philosophy dealt by the French
Revolution, along with the advances in the life sciences, considering insights from the
emergent disciplines of biology and chemistry in relation to philosophy, all in an attempt
to create an organic model of philosophy, one able to express the “original duality” of
the natural and spiritual worlds (FO, 88-9). Schelling’s transference of strife into the
xiii

heart of the absolute has troubling consequences for any possible philosophy of Spirit,
and throughout Schelling’s middle work, the autogenetic pathologies of this absolute
duality continually erupt, overcoming any attempt at philosophical closure. Schelling
forces philosophy into a dialogue with its abject and unconscious moments, fracturing
and opening thought in relation to crisis.
A century later, Benjamin interrogates the (systematic) possibility of philosophy
in relation to Modernity, diagnosing a multifarious crisis of “experience,” which in the
modern context “has fallen in value” (SW 3: 143). Hitherto, philosophy had neglected
the ephemeral and singular nature of experience in favour of the generalizable level of
the concept (as in Kant), and Benjamin’s early writings sought to programmatically
develop new models of “absolute experience”: “deduced in a systematic, symbolic
framework as language” (SW 1: 96). The crises of Modernity provided philosophy with a
Nietzschean “second innocence,” an opportunity to “start from scratch...to make a little
go along way,” embracing new avant-garde models and methods of thought, opening
philosophy towards a plethora of new experiences and domains (SW 2: 733).
Despite the optimism of his avant-garde programs, Benjamin should be
considered a thinker of failure. From the miscarriages of his Habilitation on Baroque
Trauerspiel, to his inability to “finish” his magnum opus (The Arcades Project), along
with his many botched attempts at marriage and friendship, and untimely death (in
1940). Benjamin the melancholic is one who emphatically dwelled under the “sign of
Saturn,” affirming ruin and transience (OT, 152-6). Failure is not simply a predicate with
which to describe the enigmatic Benjamin, but rather, provides the proper allegorical
intuition through which to illuminate the ornate contours of his transient metaphysics of
natural history. Benjamin describes the Baroque playwrights as creating not plays, but
“ruins”: texts which deliberately hurled themselves upon the wreckage of history.
Benjamin’s own fragmentary texts embrace such natural-historical transience. For
Benjamin, history becomes a storehouse of failed projects through which the criticphilosopher is able to sift, taking up the utopian impulses of the past in constellation with
their present via their “weak messianic” power (SW 4: 390).
In his 1960s writings, in the wake of the horrors of the Second World War, and as
the world seemed poised to lapse into further conflict, Adorno forwards his own spectral
“necrology” of philosophy with his 1966 Negative Dialectics: “philosophy, which once
xiv

seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed” (ND, 3). After
the failure to “realize” philosophy in twentieth- -century Marxism, philosophy survives its
own abolition as a “vestige of freedom,” providing kaleidoscopic “message[s] in a
bottle,” which preserve the heterotopic promise of a differential order of things (CM, 10;
Adorno & Horkheimer, Manifesto, 101).1 For Adorno, despite the failure of philosophy to
shape the world by way of praxis—to “change the world” as opposed to merely
“interpret[ing] it” (Marx, “Theses,” 143-4) —it should not be dispensed with; instead,
one must approach philosophy critically, view its history as a series of ruined models
which can be refashioned in relation to the disasters of the present. According to Adorno,
capitalism presents philosophy with a crisis of unique gravity, and thought must marshal
the full array of its resources in response. However, Adorno’s materialism does not
necessitate the rejection of its Idealist basis. One must strive to think Idealism “without
absolutes,” that is, as a ruin, without absolute closure or final synthesis, and as a critical
trove of potential philosophies of Spirit. Adorno figures the narrow “critical path” that
remains open to the life of the mind amidst the grim political-existential horizons of late
capitalism. As he writes in “Why Still Philosophy” (1963):
Traditional philosophy’s claim to totality, culminating in the thesis that the real is the
rational, is indistinguishable from apologetics. But this thesis has become absurd. A
philosophy that would set itself up as a total, as a system, would become a delusional
system. Yet if philosophy renounces the claim to totality and no longer claims to
develop out of itself the whole that should be the truth, then it comes into conflict with
its entire tradition. This is the price it must pay for the fact that, once cured of its own
delusional system, it denounces the delusional system of reality. No longer is it then a
self-sufficient, stringent network of argumentative justification. The state of philosophy
in society, which philosophy itself should scrutinize rather than deny, corresponds to its
own desperate state: the necessity of formulating what nowadays under the title of ‘the
absurd’ is already being recuperated by the machinery. After everything, the only
responsible philosophy is one that no longer imagines it had the absolute at its
command; indeed, philosophy must forbid the thought of it in order not to betray that
thought, and at the same time it must not bargain away anything of the emphatic
concept of truth. This contradiction is philosophy’s element. It defines philosophy as
negative. Kant’s famous dictum that the critical path is the only one still open to us

Adorno describes philosophy as providing a “vestige of freedom” within the context of instrumental
rationality: “If philosophy is still necessary, it is only in the way it has been from time immemorial: as
critique, as resistance to the expanding heteronomy even if only as thought’s powerless attempt to remain
its own master and to convict of untruth, by their own criteria, both a fabricated mythology and a
conniving, resigned acquiescence on the other of untruth. It is incumbent upon philosophy, as long as it is
not prohibited as it was in the Christianised Athens of late antiquity, to provide a refuge for freedom.” (CM,
10). As I will argue in 2.3, for Adorno, the (autonomous) work of art likewise provides such a vestige of
freedom.
xv
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belongs to those propositions constituting a philosophy that proves itself because the
propositions, as fragments, survive beyond the system that conceived of them.
Admittedly, the idea of critique itself hearkens back to the philosophical tradition that
today lies in ruins. (CM. 7)

Following crisis, the only “responsible” philosophy is one without absolutes, one
that affirms critique, particularity, and transience against the grand unities of past
systems. Philosophy must become a natural historical practice, opposing the
compensatory (or “apologetic”) narratives of progressive enlightenment, and denouncing
the “delusional system” that is the capitalist economic ideological order (ND, 300-7; NH,
260). Adorno’s thought attempts to crystalize the dissonant disasters of the twentiethcentury into the very form of philosophy, and as such, his “negative dialectic” is a tragic
project, one “knowingly pledged to failure,” an attempt to “get outside [of philosophy]
using the same conceptual language that blocks all exits” (Esposito, 8).
For Adorno, in response to the historical dissonance of the twentieth-century,
philosophy— “a cause deemed obsolete and superfluous by the spirit of the ages”—can
no longer be undertaken in a typically Idealist manner; it can no longer affirm holistic
notions of system, or notions of the “good life” undertaken via individual Bildung (CM.
5). However, neither should philosophy uncritically adopt the new “attempted
breakouts” of fundamental ontology (exemplified by Heidegger), or positivism, but
rather, thought must hold to the ephemeral possibility of critique (Lectures ND, 65-75;
CM, 7-12).2 Within the reified “administered world” of capitalist exchange society, in
which philosophy becomes a “specialized discipline, one purified of all specific
content,” one cannot reach nostalgically for a past “golden-age,” attempting to make
philosophy great again through some triumphant return to fundamental grounding:
“Restoration is as futile in philosophy as it is anywhere else” (CM, 47, 6). For Adorno,
philosophy lives on under the proviso that it “ruthlessly criticize[s] itself,” upholding the
transient ground of critique as a historical path-forward for philosophy (ND, 3). That is,
after crisis, philosophy must work through its own history, a “post-Idealist” sentiment
that animates Adorno’s post-war thinking.

2

The positions of ontology and positivism should be seen as ideal-typical foils against which Adorno
elaborates his own philosophical positions and are thus referenced in virtually all his texts. According to
Adorno, both models of philosophy deny the material historical genesis of ideas, and thus ideologically
uphold the status quo.
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Adorno highlights “critique” as a route forward for philosophy, enlisting critical
contestation as a means to move thinking onward. Critique presents “the unity of
problems and arguments” and in so doing, “has laid the foundation for...the productive
unity of the history of philosophy,” and within such a “progressive continuity... [of]
critique even those philosophers whose doctrines insist on the eternal and timeless
acquired their temporal nucleus, their historical status” (CM, 8; AT, 195). Echoing
Benjamin’s historical-critical philosophy, criticism extracts the temporal “truth-content”
of previous systems, which it crystalizes and imports into present constellations of
concerns.
Despite his unrelenting pessimism as a theorist, Adorno is not a nominalist
nihilist who longs for the abolition of philosophy. Adorno’s model of criticism contains
within itself a minimal utopian impulse and is animated by a longing for a more open
and empathetic relationship between philosophy (or the subject) and the object:
The critique of the current philosophies does not plead for the disappearance of
philosophy nor for its replacement by separate disciplines such as social science. It
intends both formally and materially to promote precisely that manner of intellectual
freedom that had no place in the regnant philosophical movements. A thinking that
approaches its objects openly, rigorously and on the basis of progressive knowledge is
also free towards its objects in a sense that it refuses to have rules prescribed to it by
organized knowledge. (CM, 13)

To preserve utopia, which for Adorno remains one of the key thoughts of German
Idealism, one must think against thought, denouncing the compensatory and ideological
modes of philosophy which uphold the world as it is. Adorno expresses his regulative
utopianism in terms of a reconciled relationship with nature, a “free” and “open”
relationship to objects that does not dominate particularity by way of subsumptive
categories. Philosophy must take a step back, recognizing its minority character, along
with its historical situation as a “useless” object, and in so doing it figures a vestigial
image of a resolved relationship to the natural world: “Only a thinking
that...acknowledges its lack of function and power can perhaps catch a glimpse of an
order of the possible and the nonexistent, where human beings and things each would be
in their rightful place. Because philosophy is good for nothing, it is not yet obsolete”
(CM, 15). Philosophy returns to its minority position: because it is “good for nothing,”
because it is only idle speculation, philosophy is able to live on.
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At the conclusion of the essay, Adorno is hopeful that philosophy could once
again reclaim its genuinely speculative vocation: “Philosophy should not with foolish
arrogance set about collecting information and then take a position; rather it must
unrestrictedly, without recourse to some mental refuge, experience [zu erfahren]” (CM,
17; Eingriffe, 28). The renewal of this possibility of speculative “metaphysical
experience,” of the movement of philosophy beyond the purview of the concept by way
of transformative events and encounters, is one of the key contributions of both
Benjamin and Adorno’s work. To become “actual,” to become meta-critically aware of
itself, philosophy must open itself to a broader array of experiences, to disciplines and
domains which challenge its constitutive assumptions.
***
How might philosophy—along with the humanities more broadly— help us think
about ourselves and our time in provocative, imaginative, and speculative ways? Amid
current crises of ecology, politics, and economy, and as the world returns to a “new
normal,” what might philosophy and its history teach us about our existential situation
along with our possible relationships to the (natural) world? This dissertation considers
such questions by way of the writings of Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) and Theodor W.
Adorno (1903-1969), thought in constellation with German Idealism, specifically
G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) and F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854). In interrogating the
“actuality” of philosophy, these thinkers question the proper form and purview of
philosophy, considering philosophy’s relationship to other disciplines and paraphilosophical domains such as aesthetics and nature (Hegel, PS, 27; Adorno, AP, 120,
126-7). For these theorists, to think following crisis entails fracturing philosophy in new
modern directions, considering modes of intellectual grounding that allow philosophy to
be opened towards the plethora of possible “experiences.” These thinkers envision open
models of rationality, seeing philosophy as an interdisciplinary dialogue that continually
tarries with insights from other spheres.
As thinkers of “Spirit” [Geist], all four theorists understand philosophy in a
holistic and encompassing sense, refusing to limit reason to any single faculty or
discipline; instead, they work to theorize philosophy in a speculative and
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interdisciplinary manner (Cassirer, 865-7).3 As Benjamin programmatically asserts, the
task of a future “coming philosophy” necessitates the systematic articulation of the full
spectrum of “experiences” [Erfahrungen], beyond the narrow sphere of “possible
experience” permitted by Kant (SW 1: 100-10).4 Such a program is enacted in various,
though overlapping, ways by all the thinkers examined in this project; Hegel, Schelling,
and Adorno facilitate a porous (though oftentimes contestatory) interaction between
philosophy and other disciplines, philosophizing with nature, art-aesthetics, history,
experience, and theology, allowing such marginal domains the ability to deterritorialize
philosophy. For this constellation of thinkers, to consider philosophy as “actual” entails
an opening of philosophy (or Spirit) to a broader range of experiences, considering how
they might fit within, or upset, the stability of the philosophical system. As such, these
thinkers participate in an (un)timely interrogation of the “humanities of tomorrow,”
imagining ways in which the humanities (and social sciences) can continue the “infinite
task” of enlightenment amidst current catastrophes (Derrida, University 24; Kant,
“Enlightenment,” 57).
The following project is a response to a problematically narrow contemporary
understanding of “philosophy” as a discipline (particularly in the Anglosphere), along
with the more general reified vision of the university, with its disciplinary silos and
facile mission statements of “excellence” and “global learning” (Readings, 3, 11-14, 21-

The German “Geist” connotes at once “mind” or “intellect,” along with the more objective-normative
domain of “spirit”: “the ‘I’ that is ‘We,’ and the ‘We’ that is’ I’” (Hegel, PS, 110). The term is employed
throughout Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807): a text which describes the differing manifestations
of spirit throughout history as it progresses to more refined forms of self-awareness. For Magee, spirit
describes something akin to “human nature,” the “unique form of consciousness posed by human beings”,
which can be thought both in terms of individual consciousness and objective social-normative structures
(226, 227-8, 168-75). I employ the English “Spirit” to refer to the German “Geist” throughout this project.
4
Erfahrung in German connotes a more durational form of experience, in which one is said to have “had an
experience,” to have located a particular event within a larger narrative, context, or story. Following
Benjamin, I emphasize the linguistic-narrative elements of such durational experiences, in specific relation
to one’s “ability to share experience [Erfahrung]” (SW 3: 143; GS II: 438). Fahren, in German means “to
travel,” a further valence contained in the term. Erfahrung is opposed to the more immediate, lived
“Erlebnis”: instant everyday experiences of life that one has on a daily basis. According to Jay, “Erlebnis
contains the root for life (Leben) and is sometimes translated as ‘lived experience’... [and] is often taken to
imply a primitive unity prior to any differentiation or objectification... located in the “everyday world” (the
Lebenswelt)” (11). Benjamin describes Modernity as an epoch in which “Experience [in the sense of
Erfahrung] has fallen in value,” an era in which standardized “information” has replaced meaningful
experiences [Erfahrungen], or “the ability to tell a story”; that is, traditional duration forms of experience
[Erfahrung] have been eradicated in favour of the reproducible shock experience of everyday life
[Erlebnis] (SW 3: 143; GS II: 438; see further, Jay, Songs of Experience, 329, 334-7, 340-1, 347).
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43). The speculative and imaginative character of Adorno, Benjamin, Schelling and
Hegel emerges more forcefully within such a bleak disciplinary context, and against the
current backdrop of capitalist social relations, which further serves to foreclose
imagination, while bolstering the positivist deferral to the authority of the physical
sciences. Within the current phase of capitalism there is immense pressure to simply
conform and cynically accept the status quo: one feels increasingly subjected to what
Adorno termed “the spell” of the capitalist order of things, a “second nature” of “selfevident natural laws” which stifles the imagination, presenting one with a world of
alienated conventions, against which one is seemingly impotent to act (ND, 316, 345-6;
CM, 13; Lukács, Novel, 63-4; Marx, Capital, 899). As Mark Fischer has aptly
articulated, such a “capitalist realism” structures the fantasy space of one’s desires such
that it becomes easier to imagine an apocalyptic catastrophe (what Fisher terms “the end
of the world”), rather than a change in the political economic order— “the end of
capitalism” (1-12, 16-21). These sentiments are mirrored in the Hegelian Marxism of the
early Lukács, for whom such a brutal realism is the logical conclusion of the life-world
of capitalism run amuck: a world which appears “reified” [Verdinglichung]—literally
made to appear “thing-like”—due to the compensatory conventions of “bourgeois
thought,” modes of thought which occlude the historical nature of the world (Lukács,
Consciousness, 110-147). Capitalism makes genetic categories appear as a “second
nature”: a mythological domain un-malleable by human thought or action (Lukács,
Novel, 64).5
This generalized reification of social relations—or with Adorno, the
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Such an ideological transformation in the structure of power can also be understood in the terminology of
Deleuze (of “New Societies of Control”), who describes new systems of control as simultaneously
“liberating and enslaving” (4), creating a smooth or “modulating” (5-6) network of control, in which power
is no longer simply disciplinary (as in Foucault’s “old economy of power” 23-31, 219-28), but permissive,
enabling new forms of freedom which in reality exacerbate one’s subservience. In a similar manner, for
Foucault, in The History of Sexuality, sexual emancipation is not de facto emancipatory unless one
considers (genealogically) the meshes of power subtending such subject positions (4-13, 18-20, 44-49).
Such critiques of ideology should further be supplemented via Žižek, who describes twenty-first century
ideology as “cynical,” in that—contra the conventional Marxist model of “false-consciousness,” which sees
domination in a negative sense, as the “super-structural” manifestation of class oppression –it operates
through a structuration of one’s fantasy space, through an inscription of “the real” itself, conditioning the
possibility of how we imagine, dream, and consider to be possible (Sublime, 24-33). That is, ideology
functions at the very moment in which one cynically imagines oneself to be outside of it, existing in some
“post-ideological” end of history. In reality, Capital continues to deeply structure the space of one’s dreams
and desires.
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pervasiveness of “identity thinking” (ND, 11-12)—has foreclosed any genuine exchange
between the various faculties of knowledge, scuttling the possibility of a shared vision
for the humanities, or the continuation of the university’s inaugural projects of
enlightenment and emancipation. The university has become organized according to
what Adorno termed an “academic division of labour,” a streamlined “Taylorism of the
mind,” or “academic industry,” in which “no theory escapes the marketplace” (DE, 2013; CM, 10; ND, 3-4; cf. Kant, Conflict, 23). As proclaimed by Benjamin, “capitalism” is
a “cultic religion”: a belief system in its own right, which “creates guilt, not atonement”
(SW 1: 288-291). Capitalist mantras of efficiency, flexibility, liquidity, and globalization
are worshiped for their own sake, and all other “values”—such as those espoused by the
humanities—are subservient to such dogmas. Within the university, such a general
“siloing” of disciplines exiles any genuine collaboration between disciplines, and when
“inter-disciplinarity” is permitted, it is legitimated under neo-liberal doctrines of
“innovation” or “collaboration,” and with the further proviso that it does not call into
question the established order of the university.
What would it mean to imagine alternative, and truly critical, models of
intellectual organization? Is it still possible to imagine collective research projects
organized under speculative and unconditioned headings, as opposed to their efficacy to
some established aim? Could one imagine a future for philosophy which moves (even
negatively via critique) beyond the atomized divisions of the contemporary intellectual
environment, one which strives to philosophize in a holistic manner, incorporating
insights from the physical and social sciences, along with other “spiritual” productions,
such as the reception and production of art, or a diversity of other domains such as
language and history? What would it mean, following Derrida, to imagine a “new
humanities,” along with a new university “without condition,” that is, one untethered
from service to the state, capital, or any established aim (University, 25)? To theorize
after Hegel, how can philosophy move beyond “mere edification,” or its service to some
practical aim, to become “actual,” taking up the imperative to think in a “scientific” and
interdisciplinary manner (PS, 5-7, 27)? What would it mean to follow Schelling, who in
his On University Studies, imagines philosophy as a guiding “vision” of the “universal
and absolute” in all things (6-8), providing speculative insight into “the whole” beyond
diverse strivings (8, 24-5)? Can theory promote interdisciplinary models of thought
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which encourage speculative, experimental, and reflexively critical relationships
between the various faculties of knowledge, while imagining alternative models of
intellectual grounding and relationships to the natural world?
Within the discipline of philosophy, neoliberal market pressures have led to
increased specialization, reinforcing disciplinary compartmentalization, which in turn
has led to a generalized decrease in methodological inquiry: a refusal to question what
philosophy is, or what it might be as a discipline. Within the market-oriented “university
of excellence” (Readings, 21-43), or what could more recently be termed “Zoom
university,”6 philosophy departments seem content with their “minor” place within the
diminishing humanities. Or they have come to be driven by practical aims such as
“ethics,” the receipt of grants, or the elucidation of technological advances: justifying the
emergent fields of neuroscience and artificial intelligence. Contemporary (analytic)
philosophy eschews the history of philosophy, or selectively permits historical analysis
only when it fits its preconceived secular, positivist, and anti-metaphysical narrative.
Philosophy is presented as some a-historical formal exercise, independent of historical
genesis, or unconscious and archeological levels. Historically, according to Kant’s
organization of the university, the philosophy faculty should contain two departments:
the first, “historical knowledge” should encompass history and the humanities more
broadly (along with the natural sciences), while the second, “pure rational knowledge” or
the critical domain of “pure reason,” should involve pure mathematics and a priori
philosophy, interrogating questions of “nature” and “morality” (Conflict, 45). It is as if
contemporary philosophy refuses to acknowledge such a reciprocal relationship, wishing
instead to wholly excise the “historical” genesis of knowledge, along with any serious
interdisciplinary treatment of insights provided by the broader humanities, or the
physical and social sciences.
The speculative and unconditioned thought of these theorists is in itself a gesture

I coin the term “Zoom University” to describe the growing technological reification of all elements of the
intellectual process. Though such processes have been ongoing for much of the 20/21 st century, they have
been accelerated via the global pandemic and the movement of the university online. Thinkers such as
Kittler have aptly described the role of medial “discourse networks” or “systems of writing”
(Aufschreibesysteme) in shaping the communicated message, and today one might consider the extent to
which our digital Aufschreibesystem shapes our thinking and interpolates us as subjects (see further Kittler,
Discourse, 298, 369-72).
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of resistance to the capitalist status quo. With Adorno, to think otherwise than such
instrumental “identity-thinking” is a gesture of resistance: a form of praxis that de-reifies
reality, revealing the plasticity of the world with respect to human theory and action (AP,
130-3; CM, 261). In renewing “speculative thought,” philosophy becomes a space of
resistance to the brute realism of the status quo (Hegel, PS, 36-40). Adorno compels
philosophy to examine its own concepts and categories to determine those moments
which ideologically entrench existing social relations, negatively elucidating the
possibility that philosophy could uphold a different reality.
Instrumental conceptions of philosophy are unable to respond meaningfully to
current crises. Climate catastrophe (Malm, 1-21), “Late capitalism” (Jameson, PostModernism, xxi, 1-6), “Liquid Modernity” (Bauman, 1-16), or “Burnout society” (Hann,
8-11): any way one wants to frame it, today it is self-evident that we exist in an age of
multiple interrelated crises. Though it is common to herald such crises as “changing
everything” (Klein, 2-65), ushering in a “new state of exception” to which theory must
respond, these thinkers provide (un)timely reminders of the perpetuity of crisis: “That
things are status quo is the catastrophe” (Benjamin, Arcades, 473; SW 4: 392). As
Benjamin repeatedly reminds critical social theory: “the tradition of the oppressed
teaches us that the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception, but the
rule,” with the task of theory being a “bring[ing] about the real state of emergency” (SW
4: 392). The ruin of history is continually eliciting crises which serve as new occasions
for the critical renewal of thought.
External and internal crises have always presented philosophy with an
opportunity, or event, for critical reflection. Roberto Esposito (in his A Philosophy for
Europe, 2019) locates a “crisis dispositif” (2-4, 19-29) subtending a diverse array of
twentieth century systems of thought: from the “German Philosophy” (63-108) of the
Frankfurt School, through to “French Theory” (post-structuralism and deconstruction
[109-154]), culminating in 1960-70s “Italian Thought” (155-200). For Esposito,
“Philosophy and crisis illuminate each other, in a grip that makes one the filter for
recognizing the other”; that is, political and historical crises—along with methodological
predicaments internal to philosophy as a discipline—present new imperatives and
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occasions for thought (4).7 In opening itself to existential risk in the face of crisis,
philosophy is forced to tarry with its own conditions of possibility, enacting a
consideration of its own limits and possibilities, along with its status as a discipline. To
follow Heidegger apropos of Hölderlin, “where the danger... grows, the saving power
also” (“Technology,” 340-1): the risk of crisis provides a critical event for reflection, and
for the experimental renewal of philosophy.
Such a sentiment is shared by all the thinkers in this project: with Benjamin,
critical historiography must “seize the past as it flashes up in a moment of danger” (SW
4: 391); for Adorno, the constitutive failure of philosophy, along with the historicalpolitical crises of the twentieth century, serve as opportunities for a critical return to
philosophy (ND, 3). The motif of “struggle” animates much of Schelling’s early
Naturphilosophie and his troubled “middle work”— “where there is no struggle there is
no life” (FE, 63; FO, 18; WA, 90-1)—as his texts attempt to quell the ur-crisis of nature
by way of the philosophical system. Likewise, for Hegel, philosophy must “win its
truth...in utter dismemberment” through a protracted process of “tarrying with the
negative,” incorporating death and destruction into the very form of philosophy (PS, 18).
These theorists develop “ruined” thought models, focalizing transience, non-identity, and
negativity as the conflictual animus for thinking.
For all of these thinkers philosophy should not be sheltered from crisis; instead,
catastrophe should be seen as the negative engine of thought. Accidents and disasters are
not something to be shied away from, but rather, serve as opportunities for the critical
reanimation of philosophy. In the face of crisis, none of these thinkers advocate some
nostalgic or conservative return to the authority of tradition, but rather, an opening of
philosophy in interdisciplinary directions, striving to incorporate a broader range of
disciplines, experiences, and para-philosophical domains.
Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (FE)
exemplifies such an expanded and interdisciplinary model of philosophy. In the preface
to the four essays that he includes with FE in his 1809 text, Schelling describes his aim

Describing the unique vantage of philosophy in relation to crisis, Esposito will write, “philosophy may be
in a better position than other types of discourse to recognize the directions events are taking...philosophy
can illuminate the contours of an era even before they have settled into a solid figure...philosophy is
capable of grasping them together as a whole” (2).
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as articulating “the spiritual (Geistig),” or “ideal” portion of his philosophy—which will
chart the realm of freedom—with “complete determinateness” (4), allowing his Idealism
to become “actual.” This “ideal” domain emerges in tension with the “real” moment of
his thought charted by Naturphilosophie or the “philosophy of nature” (3-4). What is
essential is Schelling’s movement beyond Kant’s narrow “subjective Idealist”
conception of reason, with its transcendental location of reason within the concepts and
categories of the human subject. Instead, Schelling imagines “reason” (or philosophy)
“absolutely”: as interacting productively, and in a reciprocal relation, with the natural
sciences, along with the range of experiences provided by history and religion.
This constellation of theorists imagines novel relationships between philosophy
and “the real,” opening thought by way of the natural world and the material social
realm. However, none of these thinkers privilege any pure “origin” for thought: be it the
empirical domain probed by the (social) sciences, or some pure phenomenological
givenness (or “sense certainty” with Hegel, PS, 58-66). Through this constellation, one is
able to imagine new disciplinary relations for philosophy, models that place philosophy
in a porous relationship with respect to other disciplines: one in which theory “burgles”
insights from other domains (Adorno, AP, 130), allowing philosophy’s concepts and
categories to be contested from without, while nonetheless remaining autonomous in its
own right.
These thinkers transpose struggle and crisis into the very form of philosophy,
developing self-supporting and dynamic modes of philosophical grounding. To think
differently means to write differently, considering alternative and speculative formal
understandings of the philosophical system. German-Idealist-Romanticism refused to
shy away from such a methodological questioning of philosophy by way of its own
history, continually inviting “conflict” into the heart of knowledge as a means to contest
the methodological stability of thought. That is, German Idealism inaugurated a “metacritical” reflection of “reason” upon itself (Beiser, Reason, 1-7), while repeatedly
extending “critique” into a broader array of domains and disciplines.8 Incorporating such

Beiser defines “meta-critique” as the unifying sentiment of “post-Kantian” philosophy (roughly between
1781-93 or the decade following the publication of Kant’s CPR), an ethos which sets the stage for the
emergence of both German Idealism and Romanticism. Broadly stated, meta-critique examines “second
order” claims (with Kant’s critique of the possibility of knowledge constituting the “first order”), such as
xxv
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methodological dissensus into philosophy necessitates the embrace of alternative formal
models: hypothetical “trial arrangements,” constellations, mosaics, thought experiments,
“outlines,” “remarks” [Zusätze], models for thinking that allow individual entities to
exist in themselves via identity-in-difference. Even the proto-typical “finished” works of
Hegel and Schelling remain essayistic “drafts” [Entwürfe: “outlines,” “projections”],
shot through with countless additions, reconfigurations, and “speculative remarks” (that
Hegel in particular added to his lecture-texts). Adorno, following Benjamin, forwards the
essay as the proper form for philosophy: a model of thinking that embraces the
provisional and transient as modes of intellectual organization. Both Hegel and Schelling
trouble the stability of the philosophical architectonic with their organic models of
philosophical grounding, coupled with the plethora of empirical detail they attempt to
encyclopedically mediate. Schelling—a thinker whom Hegel chastised as continually
“beginning again from the beginning” (History 3, 515)—embraced an essayistic and
experimental mode of philosophical presentation, one in which philosophy attempts to
theoretically “outline” the dynamic processes of the natural world. Likewise, Hegel’s
texts are continually troubled by various speculative “accidents”: moments and spheres
to which he allots a “separate freedom,” such that they are able to threaten the static
stability of thought (PS, 18-9). Even Hegel’s finished texts seem to overrun themselves:
the triumphant arrival of “absolute knowing” does not usher in some end of philosophy,
but rather, affirms contingency and process, the “dash,” such that philosophy is
compelled to continue at its supposed “end” (Comay & Ruda, 6-8; Rajan
“Encyclopedia,” 7-9).
As we find ourselves blown backward into the “new normal,” and as we continue
to exist within the horizon of climate catastrophe, what can we imagine, or expect, for
philosophy? What opportunities and challenges do our current crises of ecology,
technology, economy, and politics present for philosophy? To follow Marx, this project
does not propose to write “recipes for the kitchens of the future” (Capital, 99): to
provide programmatic statements, or manifestos, as to what philosophy should be, or

the possibility of epistemology, or more broadly, how something like metaphysics is possible (Reason, 115). I take such a notion to mean the immanent analysis of “reason” according to its own standards and
categories.
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how such crises should be (politically) answered. What is proposed is an indirect, or
negative, consideration of our current crises in relation to Hegel, Schelling, Benjamin
and Adorno. Through a reflection on these thinkers from the past, and the ways in which
they understood philosophy, insight may be gained as to how philosophy might
understand itself as “actual” today. As Hegel provided mediated “histories” of
philosophy, experimentally employing the intellectual tradition as anticipating his own
project, one can likewise conceive of the history of philosophy as a contested and
experimental space through which to affect an epigenesis of philosophy (following
Benjamin, SW 4: 389-397). The constellation of thinkers presented in this study refract a
variety of divergent and imaginative possibilities as to what philosophy could be as a
discipline, or practice, and can serve to renew a meta-critical interrogation of the limits
and possible scope of philosophy today.
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Introduction: On the Actuality of Philosophy
“Philosophy is the most serious of things, but then again it is not all that serious.” Adorno, ND, 14.

This dissertation, Transient Constellations: Adorno, Benjamin, and the Actuality
of Idealism, examines the modes by which the twentieth-century Critical Theory of the
Frankfurt School poses questions of philosophy’s actuality anew.9 Taking up and
rethinking German Idealism’s tendency to form overarching philosophical systems, the
Frankfurt School allows the humanities to be thought in new critical and interdisciplinary
directions. This allows one to consider the relation between “the system” and categories
such as nature, history, art, and experience. Further, does the Idealist architectonic, as it is
expressed in thinkers like Hegel, necessarily have a panlogicist “dominating character,”
or can it be refashioned for critical purposes (Adorno, ND 26-28; AT, 64- 65)? How
might the humanities relate themselves to nature and the physical sciences differently?
This dissertation places German Idealism—an interdisciplinary and speculative model of
thought—in constellation with Benjamin and Adorno, examining how the latter intervene
upon, and amend, Idealist categories through considerations of history, nature (“natural
history”), art and aesthetics, experience, and their very style of philosophizing. Such
engagements allow Benjamin and Adorno to forward their own “coming philosophy”: a
critical interdisciplinary model for the humanities based on a new relationship to history,
experience, and the (natural) world.
Adorno begins his 1931 lecture, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” with the assertion
that philosophy must dispense with the illusion “that the power of thought is sufficient to
grasp the totality of the real” (120). That is, if philosophy is to be relevant (“actual”), it

Throughout these considerations the term “Frankfurt School” will be both contested and employed. The
intellectual genre grouping simultaneously connotes certain shared philosophical perspectives, relating to
material social critique and interdisciplinarity, though it also denotes dissensus, a holding together of
divergent intellectual research programs, such as the methodological divergences between thinkers such as
Marcuse and Adorno, or Benjamin’s peripheral participation. In this project, the philosophical-critical
perspectives of Benjamin and Adorno will be located as the unique philosophical legacy of the “school,” a
view anticipated by the work of Susan Buck-Morss (Origin, ix-xiv, 20-3) and continued in my MA Thesis,
The Correspondence(s) of Benjamin and Adorno, which sees the correspondence(s) between Benjamin and
Adorno as inaugurating the philosophical armature of Critical Theory. I employ the term “Critical Theory”
to represent the broad contours of the program of the Frankfurt School, emphasizing a self-reflexive
employment of “theory” to textual and political-social objects. The term was first coined by Horkheimer, in
his 1936 “Tradition and Critical Theory” (see, 188-190, 197-206, 236-43). I likewise employ “German
Idealism” to encompass the thought of Hegel, Schelling, Kant and Fichte.
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must no longer aim at representing the world in a final systemic manner, but rather
should attempt to “distort existing reality” through the practice of critique, exposing the
possibility that reality could be (constructed) otherwise (ND, 74). For Adorno, such a
failure does not necessitate the wholesale rejection of Idealism, but rather a “workingthrough” of its categories via an immanent criticism that determines their historical nature
and their possible critical reorientation towards contemporary concerns (Adorno,
“Working,” 89). Instead of striving to grasp the “totality of reality” by way of rational
categories, philosophy should strive—through the creation of critical “historical trial
arrangements” or constellations—to “break the spell” of the capitalist order of things,
revealing the constructive possibility of alternative philosophical relationships to the
world (AP, 131; Adorno-Benjamin Correspondence, 282-3; CM, 13; Buck-Morss, Origin,
25-28).
Likewise, in 1918 Benjamin asserts the task of his “coming philosophy” as the
articulation of a broader notion of experience along systematic lines: an opening of the
Idealist architectonic by way of “experience” and an engagement with language that
creates alternative modes of thinking the philosophical system (SW 1: 100-10). For
Benjamin, this meant rejecting traditional academic disciplines (and the university) in
favour of a new model of the humanities which engaged actively with the natural
sciences, history, and experience. It should be emphasized that, despite their avant-garde,
or modernist proclivities, along with their experimental employments of “historical
materialism,” neither Benjamin nor Adorno advocate a rejection of Idealist philosophy or
its central notions wholesale. Instead, both thinkers fashion experimental historical
perspectives through which to read the philosophical tradition “against the grain” (SW 4:
392).
The relationship between German Idealism and the Frankfurt School is more
complicated than it first appears, and this dissertation works to problematize simplistic
models of intellectual historiography. Despite the centrality of the Germanic
philosophical tradition for both Benjamin and Adorno, little scholarship in the Englishspeaking world has probed the complicated affinities between the two movements of
thought, seemingly remaining content to rehearse conventional tropes regarding the
“Marxist” basis of the Frankfurt School, along with canned derisions of Idealism as
“panlogicist” or “metaphysical.” As such, the “positive” understanding of philosophy
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developed by both Benjamin and Adorno is generally neglected in favour of a negative
image of Critical Theory, which emphasizes their destructive and avant-garde
interventions upon the tradition at the expense of their respective theses for a “coming
philosophy.” As will be argued, Adorno’s late work (Negative Dialectics [1966] and
Aesthetic Theory [1969]) is squarely within the sphere of Idealism, and his writings from
the 1960s provide a “post-Idealist” prism through which to reflect on the IdealistRomantic tradition in relation to the atrophies of the twentieth-century.10 Such a postIdealist perspective, in which the aporias of Idealism are problematized, extended, and
reflected upon, will be elevated as the overarching standpoint of this dissertation more
broadly, enacted by Adorno and Benjamin, but also Hegel and Schelling through their
gestures of self-critique and the speculative accidents that arise in their work.
This constellation of theorists can be read as renewing a formal methodological
questioning of philosophy: a “meta-critique” in which philosophy is compelled to
immanently reflect upon itself (Beiser, Reason, 1-15). I supplement such meta-critical
notions via a Romantic hermeneutic elaborated in relation to Benjamin, whereby
“critique” or “criticism” comes to mean “something objectively productive, [something]
creative out of thoughtful deliberation” (SW 1: 142). That is, criticism should be seen on
an equal footing with the object of critique, with the critic coming to be seen as the
“extended author,” critically supplementing the work by way of its “post-history” (SW 1:
1: 152-3). Benjamin and Adorno in particular (and to some extent Hegel and Schelling)
renew a robust dialogue between philosophy and art, moving beyond the traditional
subsumption of aesthetics to philosophical clarity. Through such critical interventions,
these theorists propose new relationships between thought and the world, understood to
encompass both “first” and “second” nature, or the natural world and the socio-political
realm of convention. These thinkers provide methods to philosophize with the para-

Throughout these considerations, “post-Idealism” will be taken to mean a critical “working through” of
the central problematics of the German Idealist-Romantic tradition (Adorno, “Working,” 89-90). “Post”
should not be taken in a negative sense, as the overcoming of Idealism, but rather, as the immanent metacritical reflection on its central tenets, reflecting on notions such as freedom, “Identity, dialectic, [and]
system” (Rajan, “Introduction,” 14). Both Adorno and Benjamin inhabit the Idealist field of concerns, a
tradition which they inherit and further problematize. Indeed, Hammer has positioned Adorno’s Aesthetic
Theory as continuing the “post-Kantian problem of how freedom can be made actual” (Modernism, 208, 312); that is, Adorno continues to work through Idealist questions relating to freedom (and related
questions), in a manner akin to Hegel and Schelling.
xxx
10

philosophical domains of nature and aesthetics, all the while renewing the critical power
of thought as a means to shape reality.
German Idealism provides a “whole architecture of philosophy” (Derrida, Points,
212, cf. 213-5): a polyphony of models through which to conceive of the philosophical
system. Both Benjamin and Adorno understand Idealism in an expanded sense, viewing it
as a storehouse of thought models through which to reinvigorate thought. Beiser has aptly
distinguished between the “subjective-critical Idealism” of Kant and Fichte and the
“objective-absolute Idealism” of Hegel and Schelling (Idealism, 355-61, 554-60).
“Subjective Idealism” sees reason as situated within the concepts and categories of the
subject, while the latter, “absolute” form, understands reason in a broader sense, as
manifesting in domains such as history, nature, and human normative structures. The
critical perspectives of Adorno and Benjamin allow one to “rhizomatically” probe the
ruins of previous philosophies, redeeming critical elements therein and refashioning them
in the service of new thought models (Deleuze & Guattari, Thousand, 3-25).
These thinkers all move beyond the restricted borders of the Kantian
“architectonic” understanding of philosophy, along with Kant’s “subjective Idealist”
conception of reason, which sought to unify experience (in terms of its “possibility”)
under the categories of the subject (“the transcendental unity of apperception”). This
constellation deconstructs and redeploys the Kantian program, demonstrating the
philosophical tradition as a contested site that can be continually read against itself.
Further, I argue that German Idealism as a movement should be seen as a meta-critical
working through of the Kantian program. Such meta-reflections consider the Kantian
enlightenment in a manner that recognizes it as radically modern, yet also questions how
it might be expanded or arranged differently. Pushing against Kant’s subjective policing
of both aesthetics and nature, these theorists, contesting the conventional repression of
each domain in the philosophical tradition, imagining interdisciplinary modes of
philosophy which dialogue with such spheres. In their movement beyond Kant’s
architectonic subjective Idealism, these thinkers consider alternative formal modes of
philosophical grounding, envisioning avant-garde arrangements of the philosophical
system that allow the actuality of philosophy to be theorized in a novel manner.
At the conclusion of his Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Kant describes his
“architectonic” conception of philosophy as an “art of constructing systems” under the
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“government of reason” (CPR, 691). Thinking architecturally, Kant conceives of
philosophy as an integrated whole into which all the parts fit, and where the completed
“system”—or “architectonic of pure reason”—outlines “the unity of the manifold of
cognitions under one idea” (CPR, 691), that is, according to the final (“cosmopolitan”)
ends of reason (CPR, 695). Though the project of reason is not absolutely completed with
the CPR, Kant enlists future thinkers to make this “footpath into a highway” (CPR, 704).
Reason and the corresponding practice of critique act to “police” the various moments of
the system, ensuring each accord to its place within the architectonic (CPR, 114-5). At
this early stage in the critical project, Kant envisions two fundamental aims for “reason”:
“The philosophy of nature pertain[s] to everything that is; that of morals only [to] that
which should be” (CPR, 695), the philosophy of nature and moral are then unified in the
categories and the “spontaneity” of the subject. None of Hegel, Schelling, Benjamin or
Adorno cast off Kant as simply false due to his limitations, but instead seek to metacritically invade and supplement his program, providing a continual epigenesis and future
for transcendental philosophy (Malabou, Epigenesis, 36-8).
Schelling experimentally unbinds Kant’s antinomy between freedom and nature,
transforming such polarities into the “ideal” and “real” moments of the “absolute.” By
dissolving Kant’s rigid divisions in favour of an organic and unconditioned model of
philosophy, Schelling allows the various “parts” of the system autonomy with respect to
the “whole.” Post-Kantian absolute Idealism refuses to localize “reason” in a particular
site, choosing instead to deterritorialize its processes into both nature and consciousness,
seeing both subject and object polarities as different “potencies” of the same absolute
(Ideas, 30, 42, 49-50; Beiser, Idealism, 533). However, as Schelling’s Naturphilosophie
and “middle work” (roughly 1809-23) demonstrate, conceptualizing philosophy as a
reciprocally interacting organic system troubles the architectonic stability of thought,
instilling an inherent instability, or “Ungrund” (abyss), into the organization of
knowledge (FE, 68-70).
Through an immanent critique of both Kant and Schelling’s conceptions of
thought, Hegel develops his own “encyclopedic” model of philosophy in which
philosophy rationally orders insights from other disciplines within the organic and selfsupporting system of “the encyclopedia” (EO, 49-55). The final image of philosophy
appears as a “circle of circles,” which monadologically reflects the same (dialecticalxxxii

formative) processes present in particular domains or disciplines.11 Hegel’s texts claim to
be “circular” in their understanding of the process of knowledge formation, or Bildung, as
a progression which begins from particular-abstract (or “one-sided”) determinations,
which gain a fuller determinacy by tarrying with their own contradictions, only to return
to themselves with an absolute determinacy, understanding their place within the genetic
whole (SOL, 750-1; PS, 492-3). Yet Hegel’s corpus (along with Schelling’s) illustrates
the fundamental tension of German Idealism: on the one hand upwardly organizing itself
in terms of increasingly complex stages, but on the other hand rupturing this Aufhebung
through the ceaseless proliferation of various “accidents” (PS, 18-19), as Spirit takes
countless detours en route to the absolute (Rajan, “Encyclopedia,” 7-9).
The Frankfurt School inherits many key moments of the Hegelian encyclopedic
conception of philosophy, along with many elements of “absolute Idealism,” a tradition
which is read “without absolutes.”12 In unbinding the encyclopedia from within the
Hegelian program, they demonstrate the possibility of a “Hegelianism without reserve,”
to employ Derrida’s phrase apropos of Bataille (259-60), that is, the possibility of
bringing Idealism back with a difference, critically extracting autonomous moments, such
as Hegelian encyclopedism, or Schellingian Naturphilosophie, which are able to be
refashioned in speculative directions. Thinking philosophy without absolutes allows
philosophy to be opened to the complexity of experience, while entering into new (inter)
disciplinary constellations. These theorists create experimental Idealist models in which

Describing his encyclopedia as a self-reinforcing “circle of circles,” Hegel will write: “Each of the parts
of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle that closes upon itself; but in each of them the philosophical
Idea is in a particular determinacy or element. Every single circle also breaks through the restriction of its
elements as well, precisely because it is inwardly the totality and it grounds a further sphere. The whole
presents itself therefore as a circle of circles, each of which is a necessary moment, so that the system of its
peculiar elements constitutes the whole Idea—which equally appears in each single one of them” (EL, 39.
cf. EO, 51; PS, 18-19).
12
Throughout this dissertation I critically employ the term “absolute Idealism” to broadly gloss the thinking
of Hegel and Schelling. Following Beiser (Idealism, 355-74), absolute Idealism should be distinguished
from the critical Idealism of Kant and Fichte, in moving reason beyond the concepts and categories of the
epistemic subject, and considering reason as manifesting in nature, history, politics, art, along with the
structure of thought. However, I want to critically employ “absolute Idealism” as an Idealism without
absolutes. For Rajan, an Idealism without absolutes, “brings materiality into conjunction with ideality,”
where materiality “as an analogue to différance or heterogeneity,” “disturbs all absolutes” (“Introduction,”
2). Rajan focuses primarily on Romanticism as a practice which decomposes and hybridizes Idealism such
that it is able to reflect upon itself and its own trajectories towards Identity (“Introduction,” 2-3). In this
manner, I push back against the conciliatory and abstract moments of Idealism, focusing instead on those
speculative accidents which resist the triumph of thought. These gestures of decomposing Idealism within a
broader “general economy” will also be theorized by way of Bataille (Accursed, 9-44).
xxxiii
11

“accidents” or “members” which have gained “a separate freedom,” are introduced back
into the whole troubling the restricted economy of philosophy, and forcing a questioning
of its limitations (Hegel, PS, 18-19; Schelling, FE,18). They create what Rodolphe
Gasché has termed a “phantasmatology”: a counter-encyclopedia of perversions in which
philosophy is forced to tarry with its abject and downcast moments (Phantasmatology, 13, 210). These thinkers forward models of philosophy which are continually fractured by
way of their disregarded un-thought, creating systems of rationality which tarry with, and
risk themselves in relation, to accidents.
None of the theorists in this constellation returns to tradition in a nostalgic
manner. Instead, they view the history of philosophy as an immense speculative
laboratory of ruined models of thought. As Hegel narrated his own thought through the
history of philosophy, world history, the history of art-aesthetics, and nature, these
theorists conceive of past forms of thought as a continual site of speculative struggle, in
which past ideas have the power to “blast open the continuum of history” (Benjamin, SW
4: 389-97). That is, to follow Nietzsche, they renew philosophy by way of a “historical
sense”: through the critical interrogation of past concerns by way of the present (Will,
220; Use of History, 40-7, 69-73). One can sift through the “ruins” of previous
philosophies, like Benjamin’s “rag-picker” (SW 4: 48; Missac, 43, 61, 97), seeing that the
old Idealist systems “retain their validity as outlines of a world description” (Benjamin
OT, 7).13 As Adorno reminds us, “even those philosophers whose doctrines insist on the
eternal and timeless acquired [via historical critique] their temporal nucleus, their
historical status” (CM, 8). That is, via historical critique, previous philosophical systems
are opened to their historical “truth-content,” and are able to be judiciously invaded and
refashioned in relation to new constellations of concerns (AT, 195). Benjamin elaborates
on the manner in which certain historical epochs become “legible” or “citable” in

Describing the activity of the poet in terms of Baudelaire’s “rag picker,” a metaphor which can be
extended to describe Benjamin’s critical-historical method in general, Benjamin writes: “‘Here we have a
man whose job it is to gather the day’s refuse in the capital. Everything that the big city has thrown away,
everything it has lost, everything it has scorned, everything it has crushed underfoot he catalogues and
collects. He collates the annals of intemperance, the capharnaum of waste. He sorts things out and selects
judiciously: he collects like a miser guarding a treasure, refuse which will assume the shape of useful or
gratifying objects between the jaws of the goddess of Industry.’ This description is one extended metaphor
for the poetic method, as Baudelaire practiced it. Ragpicker and poet: both are concerned with refuse” (SW
4: 48).
xxxiv
13

constellation with each other: “The past has left images of itself in literary texts that are
comparable to those which light imprints on a photosensitive plate. Only the future poses
developers active enough to bring these plates out perfectly” (Arcades, 482, 462-3).14
Works have a “natural history,” they continue to live and metamorphose via their “pre
and post history,” or works that come before and after them (Benjamin, OT, 24-5).
Benjamin’s historical-critical understanding of philosophy should be
supplemented by what I will term Adorno’s “philosophical modernism,” that is, the
critical, or self-reflective employment of modern philosophical ideas. Adorno metacritically interrogates the emergent modern philosophical ideals of thinkers such as Kant,
within a more general philosophical-historical economy that considers the processes of
modernization philosophically.15 For Adorno, “modernism” conjures an evident aesthetic
valence, as “modern art” connotes those works of art which are conscious of their own
character as “semblance.” That is, “modern” works are those that demonstrate a selfawareness of the artistic processes of production, along with the ideologies at work
therein (AT, 132). In such a manner, a philosophical modernism is critically aware of its
historical transcendental conditions (be they material, linguistic, naturalistic), while
continuing to utilize “modern” philosophical ideals. Hegel, Adorno, Benjamin, and to
some extent Schelling, can be considered philosophical “modernists,” as none wholly

Describing this “now of recognizability,” in which past historical epochs become “legible” in
constellation with the concerns of the present, Benjamin writes to Horkheimer (describing his Arcades
project): “If the pretext for the book is the fate of art in the 19 th century, this fate has something to say to us
only because it is contained in the ticking of a clock whose striking hour has just reached our ears” (BC,
509).
15
To explicate Adorno’s philosophical modernism, I adapt and supplement J.M. Bernstein’s formulation of
“political modernism,” a term employed to describe Arendt and Adorno, both of whom “stage a critical
debate on the social and critical dimensions of Modernity” (Rensmann & Gandesha, 1). For Bernstein (in
“Political Modernism,” 56-77), “critical modernity” (or “modernism”) encompasses three intersecting
valences (21, 56). The first consists in the forces of “modernization”: the social and political
transformations wrought by the modernization process. Such dynamics encompass “modernization” in the
broad sense: the transformation of traditional forms of life by the disruptions of technology and market
forces. Related to this is the second valence of the constellation referring to the new emergent “Ideals of
modernity,” which encompass the normative projects and concepts that arise out of and in response to the
modernization process. These include ideals such as autonomy, enlightenment, critique, human rights, and
dignity before the law, along with the public use of reason. Many of these ideals are crystallized in the
writings of Kant, though they have a long pre-history (for instance in Rousseau) and are supplemented
extensively by post-Kantian Idealism- Romanticism. Finally, the third valence, “modernism,” entails the
“critical” or “self-reflexive use of modernity” and its ideals (21, 56-7), that is, a mode of thought that is
meta-critical with respect to modernity and its emergent ideals, one that is self-aware of the problematics
wrought by modernization, along with an understanding of the limits and proper employment of “modern”
philosophical ideas.
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dispense with the meta-narratives of Modernity (for some “post-modernity), but rather,
all are committed to modes of thought which continually reflect upon, and critique,
Modernity and its emergent ideals.
This project locates Adorno and Benjamin within the German Idealist-romantic
“force-field” (Adorno, NL I: 13): within a shared constellation of concerns relating to
questions of the philosophical system, dialectics, and notions of (inter)disciplinarity.16
However, this project should be distinguished from a mere influence study by way of the
methodology of “the constellation,” which reciprocally illuminates German Idealism and
Critical Theory by way of each other, refusing to reduce Adorno and Benjamin to passive
inheritors or active Marxist de-mystifiers of the Idealist tradition. I present Adorno and
Benjamin as critical progenies of the Idealist tradition, while demonstrating the
possibility of reading Idealism “after” Critical Theory, examining the post-historical
epigenesis of Idealism’s central notions. It thus also employs the historical-philosophical
methods of Benjamin and Adorno to provide novel insights into the work of Hegel and
Schelling. Far too often, German Idealism is derided as “panlogicist”— an excessively
metaphysical program which attempted to articulate all of reality rationally— even to
some extent by Benjamin and Adorno. Against such caricatured readings of Idealism, I
present Hegel and Schelling as always already self-troubling and critical thinkers who
provide pioneering approaches to the philosophical system, and as such, provide
innovative approaches to the organization of knowledge, allowing for (inter) disciplinary
constellations of philosophy with other disciplines. These thinkers open the “restricted
economy” of the philosophical system in terms of a “general economy” which includes
the philosophical system alongside its phantasmagoric “accidents” (Bataille, Accursed,
19-28).17

Adorno conceives of intellectual positions as “force-fields” of philosophical and material-social
trajectories. That is, one must consider the philosophical content of a work in relation to its broader
material-historical “truth-content,” while not reducing either aspect to the other. Describing this in his
lectures on Kant, Adorno writes: “I should like to urge you to conceive of philosophy as a force-field, as
something in which the abstract concepts that come into contact with one another and constantly modify
one another stand in for actual living forces” (Kant, 4).
17
Though not part of the Frankfurt School or German Idealism, the writings of Bataille will be employed
throughout this dissertation to clarify and elaborate several important ideas. Specifically, in relation to
notions of negativity and transgression, along with the creation of a para-Hegelian “phantasmatology,”
Bataille’s work can be read in critical constellation with these thinkers.
xxxvi
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The core of this project builds on my Master’s thesis—The Correspondence(s) of
Benjamin and Adorno (2016)—continuing my sustained critical engagement with the
work of Benjamin and Adorno. In both projects, I advocate reading Benjamin and
Adorno in conjunction, seeing them as working out a shared philosophical project that
would provide the transcendental conditions for an expanded philosophy of “experience”
[Erfahrung]. Both thinkers seek to open traditional philosophical notions of “system” so
as to encompass a greater degree of possible objects, imagining interdisciplinary
conceptions of philosophy which incorporate insights from domains such as aesthetics,
sociology, psychoanalysis, history, and technology. This should not be taken to suggest
that Adorno and Benjamin are wholly similar, or decodable by way of each other; in fact
one of the most profound forms of correspondence is “(dis) correspondence” (Arnott, 7,
42). However, their respective oeuvres provide important “prisms” through which to
refract their corresponding ideas along with the philosophical tradition more broadly. 18
Throughout this project it will be demonstrated that one can speak of an “Adornian” or
“Benjaminian” approach to (the history of) philosophy, models which proceed by
refashioning their respective models of immanent historical critique.
Latent in this project is a dissatisfaction with the current HabermasianHonnethian “communicative-reconciliatory” paradigm of Frankfurt School Critical
Theory.19 Though Honneth has done much to revitalize inquiry into the Frankfurt
School’s “first generation,” particularly with respect to Lukács and his concept of
“reification” (21-29), Habermas has summarily rejected the work of his teacher Adorno
(Communicative, 366-92; Modernity, 266-70, 276, 284-92). Habermas’ interventions
have further reoriented the direction of critical social research towards the terrain opened

18

The relationship between Hegel and Schelling can likewise be thought in terms of (dis) correspondence.
At times Hegel appears to brutally disagree with Schelling, as in his famous critique of Schelling as a
mystical intuitionalist for whom “all cows are black” (PS, 9). However, Ng, and many others have drawn
attention to the key role of Schelling in Hegel’s formulation of the “speculative identity thesis” (between
subject and object) (71-73), a thesis which subtends Hegel’s mature writings as well (65). Hegel’s influence
on Schelling can be clearly seen in many texts from the latter’s middle period, notably, Schelling’s revised
formulation of “the copula” (FE, 13-14), and the “rotary dialectic” of the 1815 Ages of the World (102-3).
19
Habermas has redirected the theoretical orientation of critical theory from a negative critical interrogation
of instrumental rationality, embodied by texts such as the Dialectic of Enlightenment, to a positive
“communicative” dialogical model of critical theory, which understands reason as inter-subjectively arising
out of deliberative acts within particular life worlds. Honneth has further clarified such a paradigm in
relation to questions of “recognition.” For a more detailed description of Habermas’ relationship with his
supervisor, Adorno, see, Wiggershaus (537-566).
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by his own “communicative” approach to Critical Theory: one which sees “reason” as
fundamentally intersubjective and communicative (Communicative, 1-21).20 Such
interventions have further served to occlude the true Idealist basis of Frankfurt School
Critical Theory. This project does not advocate a wholesale rejection of the Habermasian
paradigm of Critical Theory, though a thorough immanent critique of such a paradigm is
beyond its scope. Instead, via critical exegesis, I performatively demonstrate the
continual efficacy of the “first generation” of Frankfurt School Critical Theory,
articulating a vast array of concepts and thought models latent in the writings of
Benjamin and Adorno. In a similar manner, Hegel and Schelling, along with the tradition
of German Idealism more broadly, should not simply be cast aside as metaphysical,
dogmatic, or statist, but rather, should be seen as speculative terrain in which to articulate
new possible understandings of the philosophical system, along with its relation to
marginal domains such as nature and aesthetics.21
In summation, this dissertation has a few core aims which will be articulated here
for reference throughout:
1. To provide a critical exegesis of the writings of Benjamin and Adorno, whilst
demonstrating the continued relevance, and ongoing nature, of the debates
subtending their work. Even within the current paradigm of Frankfurt School
critical theory (of Habermas and Honneth), it is argued that much still remains to
be unearthed within the writings of Benjamin and Adorno, specifically with
respect to their positive imperatives for a “coming philosophy.” I advocate for
new speculative readings of Benjamin and Adorno, excavating the subterranean
potential futures latent in their writings, relating to issues of metaphysics, media
theory, philosophies of nature, and political theory.
2. To demonstrate that Adorno, Benjamin, Hegel, and Schelling have much to tell us
about how one might conceive of philosophy as “actual” today: providing models
through which to renew a formal methodological analysis generally absent from
contemporary philosophy. I argue that these thinkers provide valuable “prisms”
through which to reflect on formal questions related to the philosophical system.

20

More remains to be said regarding the relationship between Habermas and other thinkers in this project,
notably Schelling and Benjamin. Habermas famously criticizes Benjamin’s “consciousness raising”
anarchistic model of political resistance, while simultaneously positively appraising Benjamin’s early
theory of language as a precursor to his own (see “Consciousness Raising,” 92, 110-114, 123-124). In
Chapter 5 on Schelling, I critically employ Habermas’ dissertation to illuminate Schelling’s thought.
21
In such a manner Adorno and Benjamin move decisively against their contemporaries, Husserl and
Heidegger, who see twentieth-century crises of philosophy as arising from the metaphysics of German
Idealism (See Being and Time, 19-27).
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3. To demonstrate the possibility of reading German Idealism “after” Critical
Theory, that is, after its critique, or “without absolutes.” This project continually
argues that Hegel and Schelling are not simply outdated dogmatic thinkers, but
rather, highly self-critical theorists who provide dynamic models for the
philosophical system, along with interdisciplinary and speculative understandings
of philosophy as a practice. These theorists also demonstrate complex and
dynamic futures for transcendental modes of philosophical grounding.
4. To show that art, along with its criticism via aesthetics, has much to say to
philosophy. In varying ways, all these thinkers (though specifically Adorno and
Benjamin) contest the “fate of art” in the history of philosophy: resisting its
“subsumption,” or deficiency with respect to philosophy. This constellation of
thinkers argues that art (along with its reception-critique, which can be broadly
glossed as “aesthetics”), contains a plethora of thought models, and novel ways of
interacting with the world. As such, art should not be seen as mere “imitation” (as
for Plato), nor the simple occasion for subjective judgment (as for Kant), but
rather as a form of thought in its own right, a prism through which one can reflect
on philosophy.
5. To suggest that nature—understood as a dynamic and self-generative “other” to
Spirit —deserves similar consideration in its own right. As with art, it is common
to subsume the “tangle” of nature to a position of service within the unfolding of
philosophy, refusing to give the ambiguities and complexities of the natural world
their proper due. Both Hegel and Schelling theorize an organic and naturalistic,
though non-reductive, starting point for philosophy, while Adorno and Benjamin
elaborate a “natural historical” metaphysics of transience. Broadly stated, this
project advocates for philosophical models which enter into dialogue with the
para-philosophical domains of aesthetics and nature.
Theory and Relation to Scholarship
“There is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a
document is never free from barbarism, so barbarism taints the manner in which it was transmitted from
one hand to another. The historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from this process of
transmission as far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain.” Benjamin,
“Theses on the Concept of History,” SW 4: 392.

The constellation of thinkers presented in this project is meant to open a metacritical space in which questions of philosophy’s actuality can be reflected upon and
experimented with. This project utilizes the constellation to expose philosophy to its own
“margins” (Derrida, “Tympan,” ix- xxix), exploring Idealism in constellation with
Benjamin and Adorno: how they are indebted to Idealist categories and provide a means
by which such categories can be critically refashioned. Such a mosaic posits Adorno and
Benjamin as emblematic of Critical Theory, with Schelling and Hegel embodying distinct
notions of absolute Idealism. The method of the constellation allows terms such as
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“Idealism” and “Critical Theory” (or “the Frankfurt School”) to be understood in an
expanded sense, as porous vis-à-vis their own “margins.” Idealism should be seen in a
permeable relationship to Romanticism: the former designates a set of philosophical
problematics (“identity, dialectic, system”), while the latter denotes a broader intellectual
and artistic milieu which informs such considerations (Rajan, “Introduction,” 14).
Likewise, the “Frankfurt School” can be understood loosely as an assemblage of
divergent thinkers, and intellectual viewpoints, not as a uniform or homogeneous school.
In existing scholarship,22 the connections between German Idealism and
Benjamin and Adorno have been taken up in piecemeal fashion and in ways that
overemphasize the “critical” (or negative) character of Critical Theory as a project, thus
failing to account for its positive ambitions as a new model for a “coming philosophy,” or
a new productive model of the humanities. In Adorno’s case, Hegel (in specific relation
to Marx and Lukács) has been overemphasized at the expense of Kant and other absolute
Idealists such as Schelling.23 Further, the full complexities of Adorno’s Hegelianism have
yet to be explored, particularly with regard to his interventions in the aesthetic domain.
More generally, Frankfurt School Critical Theory has been understood (by S. Jefferies,
M. Jay, R. Wiggershaus, J. Rose, S. Buck-Morss) as a Hegelian-Marxist turn occurring in
Weimar Germany, which ignores the role played in its development by (Neo)Kantianism, absolute Idealism, and the broader German Romantic milieu.24 While

22

A more detailed analysis of scholarly debates surrounding each thinker will be undertaken within the
individual chapters of this dissertation.
23
Though the focus of this dissertation is on the constellation of Schelling, Hegel, Adorno and Benjamin,
reference will be made to Kant throughout. As post-Kantian thinkers, these theorists meta-critically invade
the Kantian program in various ways, demonstrating the continuing efficacy of Kant—and his method of
the transcendental—for the thought of nature, aesthetics, experience, and language.
24
Throughout these considerations, the term “(Neo) Kantianism” will be employed to describe a narrow
subjective-epistemological conception of philosophy, one which sought to purify Kant of his metaphysical
excesses, providing philosophy with a sure scientific basis in epistemology. Such a view can be contrasted
with the “objective Idealism” of Hegel and Schelling, which, also responding to Kant, embraced the
necessity of a broader metaphysical understanding of reason. Though Neo-Kantianism’s main historical
proponents where Herman Cohen, Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer, such an epistemological conception of
philosophy has wide reaching implications, inaugurating the broader “deflationary” trajectory of
philosophy in the twentieth-century. Neo-Kantianism was the “predominant philosophical movement in
German in the final decades of the 19th century (1860-1914),” deeply shaping the later Weimar intellectual
milieu of Benjamin and Adorno (Beiser, Neo-Kantianism, 1). Responding to what they termed a “crisis” in
philosophical grounding, the Neo-Kantians attempted to return philosophy to its sure basis in the “theory of
knowledge [Erkenntnistheorie]” or epistemology, which entailed “the examination of the methods,
standards and presuppositions of the empirical sciences,” along with a more general positivist “alignment
of philosophy with the new natural sciences” (Beiser, Neo-Kantianism, 6). From Kant, these thinkers
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Benjamin’s engagement with the Idealist tradition has been recognized in certain ways,
generally in relation to Kant (by P. Fenves, D. Ferris, H. Caygill, and, J. McCole),
research has eschewed the relationship of his conception of criticism to systematicIdealist thought, specifically thinkers such as Hegel and Schelling. Further, as I will argue
in Ch. 3., Benjamin’s engagement with Kant should be considered “post-Kantian” in the
Idealist sense, continuing the meta-critical interventions of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.
Likewise, with respect to the Frühromantiker (or “Early Romantics”), though the
contours of Benjamin’s engagement have been charted (by B. Hansen & A. Benjamin
[Eds.], J.L. Nancy and P. Lacoue-Labarthe, Ferris, and McCole), the emergence of
Benjamin’s own destructive version of Romantic criticism—as elaborated in his
Trauerspiel study, and essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities— has yet to be fully
presented as an immanent critique of central tenets of both Idealism and Romanticism.25
Simply put, Adorno and Benjamin are generally not read philosophically, and are instead
marginalized as mere aesthetic theorists, or idiosyncratic (Marxist) cultural critics.
Against such stereotypes, I advocate a return to their work as a vital space in which to
pose questions regarding the “actuality” of philosophy.
These thinkers develop a mortuary Romantic vision of philosophy, in which
allegory, transience, disaster, and ruin triumph at the expense of the symbolic totalities of
the philosophical system. Not only do I foreground the presence of such a melancholic
metaphysics in Benjamin and Adorno, centering analysis on their notion of natural
history, but I argue that such an optic can be employed to analyze Hegel and Schelling as
well, reading Hegel as a ruin and Schelling as a thinker of the diremptive fecundity of
nature. This melancholic pathos allows these thinkers to be read “without absolutes,” that
is, as self-reflexive and self-troubling thinkers who provide the resources to think both
the philosophical system along with its possible transgression.

preserved “the Kantian dualisms between essence and existence; understanding and sensibility; the leading
role of a critical and analytical method in philosophy; and the need for philosophy to follow rather than lead
the natural sciences” (Beiser, Neo-Kantianism, 3). For more on the movement see, Beiser, The Genesis of
Neo-Kantianism.
25
Through this dissertation I alternately employ the terms “Early Romantics” or Frühromantiker, to
describe the specifically German Romantic movement based primarily in Jena. See, Nancy & LacoueLabarthe, The Literary Absolute (1-17, for a timeline of the movement see, 23-5).
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Formally, most scholarship has thought influence in a limited sense (as one
thinker’s explicit use of the thought of another) and has thus failed to account for the
implicit relations existing between thinkers, or the potential for productive affinities to
arise between thinkers when they are speculatively placed in relief. Benjamin’s
conception of criticism remedies this with his formulation of “the constellation”: a
collection of divergent historical elements (or thinkers) arranged in a mosaic and
mediated through an immanent “Idea,” which gives these respective elements a different
sense than they have in isolation (OT, 10-13, 27). Benjamin describes such tensioned
assemblages of pasts and presents as containing the capacity to “make the continuum of
history explode”: estranging one from quotidian philosophical-historical assumptions,
while employing traditional models of thought to intervene upon the present moment (SW
4: 395). Particularly with respect to the “Frankfurt School,” scholarship generally
presents a linear developmental narrative which progresses through the various
“generations” of Critical Theory, with one generation overcoming its predecessors.
Against such narratives, I (re)turn to the methods of Benjamin and Adorno as a vital
space for the ongoing articulation of critical social theory, while revitalizing inquiry in
the tradition of “German philosophy.”26
Further, given the proclivity in scholarship to view German Idealism as an epoch
of dogmatic metaphysical bombast (from within both the continental and analytic
tradition), Idealism as a whole (and with respect to the Frankfurt School) is generally
seen in a negative light.27 Adorno’s relationship to Hegel is generally cast in a purely

Esposito, in his Philosophy for Europe, defines the specificity of “German philosophy” (63-108)—
exemplified largely by the (first generation) Frankfurt School, though also Hegel and Nietzsche—as a
certain “thought from the outside,” a dwelling on the transcendental homelessness that arises when thought
loses the purity of its Greek origin (4-6).
27
A more detailed refutation of such problematic caricatures will be undertaken in the chapters of this
project dealing with Hegel and Schelling (Ch. 5 & 6). The wholesale erasure of the tradition of Idealism
from many philosophy departments based upon such problematic assumptions should not be considered
“philosophical” in any sense of the word, and as such, readers of Idealism should not be forced to justify
Idealism to people who refuse to deal with it on a textual or argumentative level. Hammer has noted the
continued actuality of Idealism in relation to contemporary debates surrounding naturalism and the
philosophy of science (“Introduction,” 1-6), and his edited collection demonstrates the immense potential
for new critical interpretations of such a tradition. Žižek has continually demonstrated the efficacy of both
Hegel and Schelling with regard to an array of contemporary problems, seeing Schelling as a “vanishing
mediator” between the concerns of Idealism and the quantum theory of the twentieth-century (Indivisible,
1-9); and more recently, positioning Hegel in dialogue with contemporary debates in neuroscience and the
philosophy of mind (Wired Brain,7- 27).
xlii
26

disparaging manner, locating him as a negative (Marxist or “left Hegelian”) critic of
Hegel, who sought to fracture Hegelian “identity thinking” by way of the negative
dialectical primacy of “non-identity” (ND, 5, 8, 12). Though Adorno is unquestionably
critical of Hegel, and the “dominating character” of Idealism more broadly (ND, 11, 2226), focusing solely on Adorno’s negative interventions misses the complexity of Adorno
(and Benjamin’s) model of immanent critique, one in which the critic immanently
unfolds the text according to its own logic(s).28 Likewise, throughout Benjamin’s early
writings he continually works to “rescue,” via immanent critical reconfiguration, key
motifs and ideas from a diverse array of thinkers (Kant, Goethe, the Frühromantiker, and
the Baroque poets): notions such as “allegory,” “elective affinity,” and “natural history,”
which Benjamin arranges in mosaic such that they are able to gesture beyond themselves
and enter into broader philosophical conversations.
This project is in line with contemporary deconstructive-speculative readings of
German Idealism, which push back against notions of Idealism as panlogicist, presenting
instead modes of theorizing Idealism “without absolutes” (Rajan, “Introduction,” 1-14).
This project also moves against excessively “deflationary” readings of Idealism
(particularly with respect to analytic “post-Kantian” readings of Hegel), which wholly
disregard Hegel’s holistic “encyclopedic” conception of philosophy, instead narrowly
focusing on a single text, generally the Phenomenology or the Logic, as the “rational”
kernel of Hegel’s thought (for a critique of such views, see Comay & Ruda, 24, 14-15;
Hammer, “Introduction,” 1-6). Against such reductive readings of Hegel and Idealism
more broadly, this project follows “revised metaphysical” interpretations of Hegel’s
corpus such as those of Beiser, that is, commentators who view Hegel’s work in a holistic
though nonetheless critical manner, demonstrating the continuing efficacy of his insights
for domains such as aesthetics and the philosophy of nature (Hegel, 3, 6-7). This
dissertation also follows thinkers such as Catherine Malabou who continually envision

Throughout these considerations, “immanent critique” will be broadly understood as the immanent
evaluation of a thinker (or text) according to its own criteria or logic: the critical unfolding and
deconstruction of a work according to its own elements or tensions. For Zuidervaart, “Immanent
critique...tests each position to see whether its claims about the known are consistent with its own criterion
of knowledge” (xviii) and marks the overwhelming sentiment of Hegelian and Post-Hegelian thought,
including Benjamin and Adorno (xix). Both Adorno and Benjamin’s models of immanent critique will be
elaborated in more detail in Ch. 1 and 3 of this project.
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new plastic “futures” for the Hegelian project (1-5, 7), though I advocate Hegel be seen in
an immanent critical continuum with his “post-history” (Benjamin, OT, 27), most notably
the work of Adorno.
With respect to Schelling, this project inhabits the critical space opened by the
novel scholarship of Jason Wirth, Iain Hamilton Grant, Tilottama Rajan, and Slavoj
Žižek. These theorists have not only resurrected Schelling scholarship in the
Anglosphere, but they forward Schelling’s corpus as containing a plethora of “postIdealist” thought models, through which to think questions of (inter)disciplinarity, the
philosophical system, along with a whole constellation of issues related to nature and
ecology (and their relationship to philosophy). Within the contemporary horizon of
climate catastrophe, thinkers such as Schelling provide a means to philosophize with
nature, contesting the autarky of philosophy by way of the dynamism of the natural
world.
Today it is far too common to treat German Idealism as a “dead dog”: an epoch of
speculative pretentiousness with little to say to contemporary concerns. Within our
secular “post-metaphysical” age, theory approaches Idealism backwards, moving through
its post-historical criticism in the Frankfurt School.29 These post-historical readers of
German Idealism continually illustrate the extent to which the German-Idealist-Romantic
sphere of concerns remains a fertile space for scholarship, not an epoch that should be
simply disregarded. The “post-idealist” philosophical perspectives of both Benjamin and
Adorno demonstrate the continuing efficacy of key moments in the Idealist tradition.
Though there are undoubtedly problematic and outdated moments in German Idealism,
Benjamin and Adorno’s texts provides a plethora of critical thought models through
which to view Idealism, and with which to continually interrogate its central
problematics.

Habermas defines a “post-metaphysical thinking” as an approach to the philosophical tradition which at
once recognizes the importance of the Western tradition of metaphysics, while also seeking to critically
renew such a tradition by ridding it of its metaphysical modes of grounding. Habermas wishes to found
thought instead on intersubjective and deliberative modes of reason (vii-iii). For the main themes of postmetaphysical thought, see Ch. 3. “Themes in Post-Metaphysical Thinking” (28-51).
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Overview of the Individual Chapters
Each part of this project, along with the individual chapters contained therein,
should be considered discrete essayistic arguments which “monadologically” mirror
broader trajectories, such that, if arranged in a mosaic, they present a cohesive
argument.30 Accordingly, the dissertation is divided into three main parts (of two chapters
each), though the first two parts (on Adorno and Benjamin) can be heuristically grouped
under the heading of the “Frankfurt School.” The third part, on German Idealism, takes
up the writings of Schelling and Hegel. Such a formal arrangement is intended to provoke
reflection in the reader, interrogating what it might mean to read German Idealism “after”
Critical Theory. That is, how might the “post-historical” writings of Benjamin and
Adorno provide new translations of German Idealism, allowing the philosophical
tradition to be though as “actual” in speculative ways?
Part 1: Adorno
Beginning with Adorno’s writings from the 1960s— specifically the cycle of
production surrounding Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory (1960-9)—I elaborate
the post-Idealist perspective animating this dissertation more broadly. In this constellation
of texts, Adorno questions the very possibility of philosophy after the catastrophes of the
century. My first chapter, Ruin, Disaster, Natural History: Adorno and the (Impossible)
Possibility of Philosophy positions Adorno as one who theorizes the university (and
philosophy) “in ruins”; that is, Adorno returns to philosophy—in a transcendental
manner—while positing “the disaster” as the “groundless ground” (Ungrund) atop which
philosophy is conducted. According to Adorno, if philosophy is to be considered “actual”
in the face of such disasters, it must incorporate natural history into the very form of
thought, tarrying with finitude and negativity, which as concepts and affects serve as the
motor of Adorno’s negative dialectic.

Leibniz first formulated the idea of reality being composed of infinite “monads,” or ideal centers of
reflection, which mirror within themselves an image of the whole of reality (68-81). Throughout this
project, this term will be inflected by way of its “post-history” in Benjamin. In his “Epistemo-Critical
Prologue” Benjamin defines his linguistic idea as a “monad” (OT, 27): as a “micrological” particular which
reflects the same trajectories as the whole. For Benjamin, the task of (immanent) criticism entails the
grouping of phenomena together as “ideas,” which monadologically mirror large ideas, or present a
historical epoch micrologically. Each chapter in this project similarly reflects broader trajectories, yet they
can also be considered autonomous “accidents” (Hegel, PS, 18-19) which can be read against the whole.
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My second chapter, Adorno and the Actuality of Philosophy: Inaugurating a
New Conflict of the Faculties, examines the conflictual disciplinary relations Adorno
elaborates between philosophy and the domains of sociology and psychoanalysis, along
with the more fundamental negative dialectical relationship between philosophy and
aesthetics. I also explore the prefiguration of this notion of conflict within post-Kantian
Idealism: analyzing the (inter) disciplinary relations of Kant, Hegel and Schelling. For
Adorno, art and aesthetics—or the reception and production of art—provoke a “shudder”
in the constitutive subject of philosophy. Adorno employs aesthetics as a means to
provide a critical commentary on rationality, importing alternative logics and formal
imperatives into philosophy, while reflecting on the possibility of new philosophical
relationships to the natural world.
Part 2: Benjamin
These chapters elaborate the antinomical trajectories of Benjamin’s early writings
(~1928), locating him within the post-Kantian field of concerns. I read Benjamin’s early
writings (up to his 1925/8 Trauerspiel) as micro logically rehearsing the movement
beyond Kant—by way of an immanent meta-critical expansion of the Kantian program –
undertaken by many in the post-Kantian Idealist generation, notably Schelling, Hegel and
the Frühromantiker. Chapter 3, Benjamin’s Systematic Intentions: Towards a
Transcendental Philosophy of Experience, examines Benjamin’s “Program” for a
philosophy of the future, charting his opening of the Kantian transcendental by way of
experience and language. Benjamin elaborates what I term a transcendental philosophy of
experience [Erfahrung]: a model of philosophy which seeks to do justice to the
polyphonic continuum of experiences in the world, moving beyond Kant’s reduction of
experience to its mere possibility. Such a philosophy is made possible by Benjamin’s
mimetic understanding of language, which is able to translate (and mediate) the full
continuum of experience. I further position Benjamin’s thought of experience within the
emergent (German) constellation of media theory, analyses which remain efficacious for
contemporary considerations of media(tion).
My fourth chapter, Benjamin’s Mortuary Philosophy: Towards a Natural
History of Transience, examines Benjamin’s movement beyond (neo) Kantianism due to
its impoverished epistemological conception of philosophy, and his entrance into the
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post-Kantian Idealist Romantic field of concerns. Benjamin’s engagement with such
Romantic notions—understood broadly to encompass the Frühromantiker, Goethe, Hegel
and Schelling— provides an occasion for him to theorize his speculative philosophy of
criticism, along with the metaphysical doctrine of natural history subtending his thought.
My analysis culminates in a reading of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel as a mortuary Romantic
text, foregrounding notions of allegory and natural history as keystones of his philosophy
of transience.
Part 3: German Idealism
In these two chapters on Schelling and Hegel respectively, I return to German
Idealism after Critical Theory, utilizing the theoretical perspectives of Benjamin and
Adorno to read Idealism “without absolutes,” that is, in a critical and self-fracturing
manner. Though both Benjamin and Adorno deconstruct and refashion Idealism, these
chapters demonstrate Hegel and Schelling to be always already self-troubling thinkers
who propose forceful and interdisciplinary understandings of the philosophical system,
opening thought by way of encounters with the para-philosophical domains of aesthetics
and nature.
In chapter five, Philosophy with Nature: Schelling and the “Original
Diremption in Nature itself,” I examine the originality of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie
in relation to conventional enlightenment philosophies of nature (as typified by Kant).
Schelling is one who strives to philosophize with nature, that is, one who allows the
processes of the natural world to “arise philosophically.” I then take up texts from
Schelling’s anxious “middle phase”—notably The Freedom Essay and the (1815) Ages of
the World—texts in which the abyssal ground of nature threatens any possible
philosophical artifice.
In chapter six, Hegel as a Ruin: Avenues of “Phantasmatological” Inquiry
(Aesthetics, Nature), I present my own “ruined” reading of Hegel, one following after the
“phantasmatological” interventions of Bataille and Hegelian Marxism. Hegel’s
philosophy of nature, along with his aesthetics, will be examined as phantasmatological
offshoots—or “accidents” —which trouble the stability of Hegel’s encyclopedia, serving
as “prisms” through which one can reflect on the Hegelian project more generally. These
domains demonstrate the varying ways in which Hegel’s project can be read beyond
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itself, along with the possibility of a critical cross pollination between aesthetics and
nature, such as is demonstrated by Adorno’s dialectical image of “natural-beauty.”

xlviii

1

Part 1: Adorno
“The only philosophy which would still be accountable in the face of despair, would be the attempt to
consider all things, as they would be portrayed from the standpoint of redemption...It must comprehend
even its own impossibility for the sake of possibility. In relation to the demand thereby imposed on it, the
question concerning the reality or non-reality of redemption is however almost inconsequential.” Adorno,
Minima Moralia, 247.

Part one of this dissertation focuses on Adorno’s writings from the 1960s: the
cycle of production of texts, lectures, and essays that culminated in Negative Dialectics
(1966) and Aesthetic Theory (1969/70). Within this constellation of texts, Adorno
existentially questions the possibility of philosophy in relation to the disasters of the
twentieth-century, demanding how, in the face of such atrocities, philosophy could say
anything meaningful at all. As a theorist, Adorno never let a good crisis go to waste:
philosophy must tarry with the negativity of crisis, confronting its own constitutive
finitude by incorporating “conflict” into the organization of knowledge, while attempting
to “write” the disaster of history via reflexive considerations of the form of philosophy.
These chapters examine Adorno’s novel theses regarding the “actuality” of philosophy in
the face of catastrophe, considering his speculative and experimental imperatives for both
philosophy and the proximate practice of aesthetics. As one who interrogated the
possibility of philosophy in relation to historical events, Adorno remains shockingly
modern, a point further underscored by his proximity to a vast array of twentieth-century
theorists (such as Blanchot, Deleuze, Foucault, Rancière, and Lyotard). This dissertation
commences with Adorno so as to frame the question of philosophy in relation to crisis,
and in order to elaborate the “post-Idealist” perspective animating these considerations
more broadly.
Adorno is what I will term a “post-Idealist” thinker: one who critically
interrogates the German Idealist legacy, immanently working through its problematics
and central notions, considering questions of autonomy and the philosophical system,
along with the relation between philosophy and para-philosophical domains such as
aesthetics and nature. Adorno’s “negative dialectic” should not be localized to a specific
text, but rather, should be seen as the overarching post-Idealist sentiment of his thought, a
mode of thinking Idealism “without absolutes.” The following chapters (1-2) chart
Adorno’s nebulous “negative dialectic,” along with the metaphysical notion of “natural
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history” subtending it. Beginning with ruin and the disaster, these chapters theorize
Adorno’s imperatives for both philosophy and art following crisis, considering the main
valences and disciplinary implications of Adorno’s negative dialectic. Despite Adorno’s
(Marxist) sensitivity to historical particularity, he remains squarely within the postIdealist transcendental tradition, though for Adorno the “groundless ground” (Ungrund)
of transcendental thought has become the disaster. Such an Ungrund leads Adorno to the
elaboration of his negative dialectical model of philosophy, which favors ruin, allegory
and transience over the absolute closure of the philosophical system. In pragmatic terms
this leads Adorno to put the disciplines into conflict—a conflict already present in Hegel
and Schelling—and one sharpened further by Adorno’s invasion of philosophy by
aesthetics, and the “counter-sciences” of sociology and psychoanalysis.

3

1

Ruin, Disaster, Natural History: Adorno and the (Impossible)
Possibility of Philosophy

1.1

Adorno’s University in Ruins
“Spiegel: Professor Adorno, two weeks ago, the world seemed in order…
Adorno: Not to me.”
“Who’s Afraid of the Ivory Tower,” May 5, 1969, Der Spiegel.

On April 22, 1969, amidst the tumult of the student protests, Adorno entered the
lecture hall at Goethe-Universität in Frankfurt am Main (renamed “Karl MarxUniversität by the occupying students) to deliver, or rather to participate in, what would
be his last lecture. Supposedly, this lecture was to preface the main themes of his
forthcoming course, “Introduction to Dialectical Thinking,” which would describe
Adorno’s “subject-object” model of dialectical cognition.31 Implicitly, giving such a
course amidst the political-revolutionary tensions of the 1960s represented Adorno’s
attempt to uphold the primacy of “theory” over and against the “passport stamp” of
political praxis (Lectures ND, 53-4). The story at this point is well known: before the
lecture could commence the German mandarin was met with immediate resistance by the
student occupiers, who attempted to entice Adorno into public “self-criticism,” under the
newly graffitied inscription, “If Adorno is left in peace, Capitalism will never cease.”
Adorno attempted to be democratic by inviting the students to explicate the motivations
for their actions, along with their intentions for the remainder of the lecture. In response
he was met by the infamous “Busenattentat” (breast assassination), whereby three female
students approached the podium, bore their breasts, and showered Adorno with flowers.
Visibly shaken by the incident, Adorno collected his materials and promptly left the
lecture hall and the university more generally, traveling to the Swiss Alps to continue
work on his Aesthetic Theory. After a heart complication suffered on the Matterhorn,

Such a model is elaborated in two essays, “On the Subject and Object” (245-58) and “Marginalia for
Theory and Praxis” (259-78), both of which are collected under the heading “Dialectical Epilegomena” in
Critical Models (1969).
31
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Adorno would die on August 6, 1969.32 At the end of Adorno’s life, the university
ostensibly lay in ruins, with philosophy seeming an impossible, or pointless exercise.
It is far too easy to stereotype Adorno as some outdated elitist: some antiquarian
who was sexually repressed, who hated jazz and horoscopes, along with all popular
culture. Adorno is lampooned as one who could not personally or theoretically survive
the 1960s, a view which the “Busenattentat” seems to confirm. However, a more nuanced
analysis reveals Adorno as a tragic figure, one engulfed by the same trajectories his work
diagnosed: the growing specter of a positivist instrumental rationality, new forms of
authoritarian “identity-thinking,” and the continuing destruction of nature by
enlightenment and capitalist narratives of progress (ND, 11-12, 22-24, 67; AT, 64-72; DE,
1). In their correspondence on the efficacy of the student protests and the movements of
the 1960s more broadly, Marcuse urged Adorno to view the students’ actions as
revolutionary situations in which “theory is pushed further by practice”; against this
Adorno sought to maintain the purity of “Critical Theory” as an unconditioned
intellectual perspective not to be exhausted by its particular manifestations (AdornoMarcuse, 125).33Adorno further advocates that the theory-practice relation itself be
criticized, casting a new import on theory as a practical political act: “In my writings, I
have never offered a model of any kind of action or for some specific campaign. I am a
theoretical being who views theoretical thinking as lying extraordinarily close to his
artistic intentions” (“Ivory Tower,”15).34

For a comprehensive overview of Adorno’s “last lecture” see, “Death” (474-480) in Müller-Doohm,
Adorno.
33
In correspondence with Marcuse, Adorno diagnoses the students’ actions as containing a “regressive
character,” with their dogmatic and uncompromising insistence on “practice” over theory. As he writes,
“the barbaric inhumanity of a mode of behaviour that is regressive and even confuses regression with
revolution; the blind primacy of action; the formalism which is indifferent to the content and the shape of
that against which one revolts, namely our [critical] theory” (Adorno-Marcuse, 132). And further,
describing his own position as the dialectical unification of theory and practice: “dialectics means, amongst
other things, that ends are not indifferent to means” (Adorno-Marcuse, 132). In his May 5th interview with
Der Spiegel, Adorno clarifies that he is not a priori opposed to political practice; however, he stresses that
politics (and praxis) must take into account the socio-historical context in which any action would take
place: “the value of so-called individual actions is delimited by an emphasis on social totality” (“Ivory
Tower,” 16).
34
Adorno describes the importance of a theoretical perspective within the total ideology of “practicality”
throughout his work. As he asserts in his interview with Der Spiegel: “I still believe that one should hold
on to theory, precisely under the general coercion toward praxis in a functional and pragmatized world.
And I will not permit even the most recent events to dissuade me of what I have written” (“Ivory
32
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Against calls to man the barricades or to return to some authentic state of nature
free of domination, Adorno stridently upheld “theory” against practical “pre-censorship”:
“Thinking is a doing, theory a form of practice” (ND, 143-4; CM, 261). Adorno
diagnoses this constant need to “be practical,” or to evaluate things pragmatically in
terms of their use, as a symptom of capitalist ideology. Following Lukács, Adorno saw
capitalism as not simply a material mode of production, but rather, as a system of
thought, or a “spell,” which generalized a certain logic of “exchange-value,” making the
world appear as “reified,” a “second nature,” a Baroque horizon of capitalist realism
(Lukács, Consciousness, 83-92; Novel, 64; ND, 4-6). To escape such ideological
antinomies, one must think differently (or dialectically), recognizing the critical selfreflection of thought upon itself as a form of praxis.
Despite Adorno’s reputation as a cynical “resentment thinker”—a brutal pessimist
content to dwell in the “grand hotel abyss,” or one who undermines the normative
tradition of the enlightenment—Adorno’s work provides a plethora of models by which
to think the university, or the organization of knowledge “in ruins” (Sloterdijk, xxxivxxxviii; Lukács, Novel, 22; Habermas, Modernity, 266-70, 276, 284-92).35 Adorno strove
to think through the possibility of philosophy, along with the disciplinary organization of
the university, in a manner that did justice to both the historical dissonance of the
twentieth-century and the tradition of German Idealism-Romanticism. As will be argued
throughout these chapters, the fundamental gesture of Adorno’s post-Idealism—which
immanently works through the German-Idealist-Romantic legacy—lies in its
commitment to key aspects of both the Kantian and Hegelian program, oftentimes in
negative dialectical contradiction with each other. Following Bloch, the aim is “to let

Tower,”19). Describing the act of thinking as a form of resistance, Adorno writes in his essay “Marginalia
to Theory and Practice”: “Whoever thinks offers resistance; it is more comfortable to swim with the
current, even when one declares oneself to be against the current” (CM, 263).
35
Readings describes his “ruined” model of the university in a manner that forcefully echoes Adorno’s own
views: “we should not attempt to bring about a rebirth or renaissance of the University, but think its ruins
as the sedimentation of historical differences that remind us that Thought cannot be present to itself...The
University is not going to save the world by making the world more true...dwelling in ruins is not despair or
cynicism; it is simply the abandonment of the religious attitude toward political action” (171). Readings’
model is not animated by nostalgia for some past golden age, nor some authentic model of the university;
instead, it recognizes that “the past is not erased but haunts the present” (169-70), seeing the tradition as a
critical site through which to reflect on the present.
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Kant burn through Hegel: the self must remain in everything; though it may first
exteriorize itself everywhere” (Spirit, 187, cf.165-87). In reading these thinkers in
experimental tension, Adorno unfolds a speculative mode of philosophy which combines
the epistemic modesty of the Kantian transcendental subject with an analysis of social
totality provided by Hegel (and Marx). Such a post-Idealist reception of the tradition
informs Adorno’s broader understanding of the university, an institution he reads in a
“ruined” manner by inaugurating a new conflict between various faculties of knowledge.
Adorno thinks the university as what Readings calls a “ruined institution” (169),
one which refuses to territorialize knowledge in a universal or systematic manner;
instead, a ruined university makes critique, or negativity, the motivating factor in the
distribution of knowledge. A ruined model is not driven by some nostalgia for
authenticity, nor for the desire to make the university great, unified, or whole again, but
rather, by a commitment to what Readings calls a “community of dissensus” (178-193): a
desire to “teach the conflicts” (127), refusing to cover over the tensions—and the
continual contestatory dialogue—involved in the humanities and the “scene of teaching”
(154-5). A “ruined” understanding of the university is one which gives “an account of the
production and circulation of knowledge that imagines thinking without identity, that
refigures the university as a locus of dissensus” (Readings, 127). That is, it affirms a
perpetual conflict between the various “faculties” of knowledge. Such sentiments are
echoed by Rancière (in Dissensus, 2002), who positions politics and art as forms of
“dissensus” with respect to quotidian “distributions of the sensible,” disrupting the logic
of identity and consensus by way of materiality, provoking reflection as to how one
might re-territorialize the domain of “the sensible” differently (1-2, 36, 141, 207).36 For
Adorno, philosophy must enter into a similar conflict with quotidian assumptions:
contesting the discursive norms of various disciplines and forcing a philosophical
questioning of their suppositions and methods. However, philosophy itself is not exempt

36

More remains to be said regarding the relationship between Rancière and Adorno. Rancière should be
seen as continuing Adorno and Benjamin’s post-Idealist (and post-aesthetic) interrogation of philosophy, in
which the aesthetic and philosophy are placed in constellation, opening a reciprocal dialogue between the
two domains. Rancière follows Adorno, Lukács, and Benjamin in positioning art (and aesthetics) as playing
a leading role in imagining new political distributions of reality and sensibility.

7

from such critical examinations and must continually engage in meta-critical evaluation
of its assumptions and relationship to the world. It is this renewal of a conflictual
understanding of the organization of knowledge—in which methodological reflection is
not external, but rather, an internal presupposition of knowledge—that places Adorno
squarely within the German Idealist force-field of concerns.
For Adorno, philosophy must actively put itself at risk, examining how it could
possibly “live on” after “the point to realize it was missed” (ND, 3): after the historical
atrocities of the twentieth-century, along with the failure of Marxist attempts to
“actualize” Idealist promises of freedom (Metaphysics, 101; ND, 358-372).37 Philosophy
wins such an afterlife with the proviso that it “ruthlessly criticize itself” (ND, 3),
interrogating the role of its own concepts and categories in oppression, while imagining
models of thought that are continually self-fracturing, critical, and non-concurrent. Such a
negative prohibition on positive “utopian images,” or a generalized “Bild verboten,” in
which thought does not posit itself positively, but rather negates existing reality, is a key
feature of both Adorno’s philosophy and his aesthetics. Such critical gestures present a
guarded form of utopianism, one which holds open the possibility of “something more,”
which can only be grasped via “determinate negation,” or “negativity” (Adorno & Bloch,
16, 12-13). Adorno’s model attempts, through the complete negation of existing reality,
to refract a fragmentary image of utopia—espousing theoretical “messages in a bottle”
(Adorno & Horkheimer, Manifesto, 101)— holding fast to the possibility of a more
perfect form of reason, along with a non-dominating relationship to the natural world
(ND, 373-75; AT, 61-75). Preserving such vestiges of utopianism should be seen as one
of the key lineages of twentieth-century post-Idealism, participated in by Adorno,
Benjamin, Lukács, and Bloch.
Adorno’s vital commitment to (re)imagining philosophy, along with the territories
of the university, positions him within post-war questions of university reconstruction, as
one who attempting to theorize a new university, “without condition” (Derrida,

For More on Adorno’s thinking as an “afterimage” of twentieth-century Marxism see, Hutchins, “The
Passing Away of Nature” (6-36, 105-110) and Cutrone, “Adorno’s Marxism” (1-10, 41-77, 201-83, 395411).
37
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University, 24-5). That is, Adorno sought to return philosophy to its unconditioned
speculative vocation, envisioning a model of philosophy unbeholden to market or
political imperatives. Adorno actively revitalized the public use of reason in Adenauer’s
Germany, giving well attended public lectures (from 1958-69), and had much to say
regarding possible relationships between philosophy and emergent media (such as
television and radio), along with the potential for new interdisciplinary constellations
between philosophy and nascent disciplines such as sociology and psychoanalysis
(Jenemann, vii-xxxv, 47-104). Virtually all of the main motifs of Negative Dialectics are
provisionally figured in Adorno’s prolific lectures, such that one could say he “carried
out his education in public” (Hegel, History 3, 513). Adorno not only participated in
German university modernization, but made prominent contributions to the post-war
public sphere, the most notable of which was his timely, “The Meaning of Working
Through the Past” (1959), which as a radio address, attempted to publicly “work
through” in psychoanalytic fashion, the traumas of the century and the German guilt
complex.38 In his “Philosophy and Teachers” (1962), Adorno rails against mechanical
notions of the “professional philosopher,” arguing that “philosophy fulfills itself only
where it is more than a specialty,” returning to the holistic sentiments of Idealism as
exemplified in Schelling’s On University Studies (CM, 21-22, 34-5).39 Employing a
fractured notion of Geist, Adorno follows Hegel in imagining the “actuality” of
philosophy anew, speculatively moving beyond the confines of epistemology, while
envisioning new possible disciplinary organizations (PS, 27, 39-41).

In this radio–address Adorno attempts to work through the “guilt complex” surrounding national
socialism in post-war Germany. Adorno begins by drastically asserting that the past “lives on” surviving in
“fascist tendencies” and ways of life within democracies (CM, 89-90). Describing the trauma of the
historical past, Adorno proclaims, “One wants to break free of the past: rightly, because nothing at all can
live in its shadow, and because there will be no end to the terror as long as guilt and violence are repaid
with guilt and violence; wrongly because the past that one would like to evade is still very much alive”
(CM, 89). Adorno closes his address with the hope of a reconciled relationship with history: “The past will
have been worked through only when the causes of what happened have been eliminated. Only because the
causes continue to exist does the captivating spell of the past remain to this day unbroken” (CM, 103).
39
Describing his spiritual affinity with Schelling’s work, Adorno writes, “it is most astounding that the
situation in 1803, when the German philosophical movement had reached its height does not differ so much
in regard to the issues here under discussion in the present day when philosophy no longer exercises such
authority” (CM, 24-5).
38
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Adorno continually upsets any stable relationship between “the faculties,” which
can be understood in a dual sense, encompassing both knowledge and the university
(following Deleuze, Kant, 3): provoking a perpetual conflict or dissensus within the
organization of thought, while embracing novel and experimental constellations of
disciplines. Adorno turns the resources of German Idealism in a critical manner, reading
the philosophical tradition “against the grain” (Benjamin, SW 4: 392): a modernist
approach to the practice of philosophy which arranges concepts and ideas in a mosaic of
“non-identical” tension, self-reflectively employing modern philosophical ideals. In
addition to ND and AT, Adorno’s main philosophical works are on Hegel, Kierkegaard,
Husserl, and Kant, thinkers whom he speculatively invades, opening their work to
historical-material circumstances, while not wholly reducing them to it.40 As Adorno
asserts apropos of Hegel, though such a remark could be extended to describe Adorno’s
avant-garde approach to the tradition more broadly: “No reading of Hegel can do him
justice without criticizing him...it is not the worst reader who provides the book with
disrespectful notes in the margin” (Hegel, 145). Critical philosophy, for Adorno, is the
continual writing of such “disrespectful” marginal notes.
Adorno remains committed to a transcendental conception of philosophy
(O’Connor, 15). For Kant, transcendental philosophy investigates the a priori “conditions
of possibility” for knowledge and is “occupied not so much with objects as with the mode
of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a
priori” (CPR, 133). However, like his (seemingly unknown) contemporary Foucault,
Adorno works to historicize the transcendental, thinking it from the standpoint of genesis,
providing an “epigenesis” of transcendental thought, while opening philosophical
grounding by way of an interaction with the constellation of empirical particularity,
history, and other disciplines (Malabou, Epigenesis, 36-8). As Adorno writes, “what is
the substantial meaning that we are left with in Kant? The answer lies in a revision of the
concept of the transcendental...consider[ing] all the things that do not come within the
compass of the transcendental” (Kant, 210). Adorno considers the transcendental

40

These texts are, Hegel: Three Studies (1963), Kierkegaard: The Construction of the Aesthetic (1933),
Against Epistemology: A Meta-critique. Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological Antinomies (193437/1955-56), and his Lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1959).
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conditions of knowledge in a manner that gives space to material-social forces (or
ideology), and history, in the production of thought.
Like Foucault in The Order of Things (1966), Adorno contests the autarky of
philosophy by way of “counter-sciences” (for Adorno, sociology, and psychoanalysis)
that lead the “human sciences,” back to their “analytic of finitude,” “un-mak[ing] that
very man who is creating and recreating his positivity in the human sciences” (Order,
379). Adorno simultaneously examines alternative and contestatory relationships between
the “faculties” of both the mind and the university, a notion which Deleuze also
deterritorializes in Kant (Kant, 3-10, 68). Instead of a model of knowledge based around
some centralized or unifying principle—be it nationalism, “culture, Bildung, or
excellence” (Readings, 3, 11-14, 21-43)—for Adorno, systems of knowledge and
disciplines of thought are continually placed in conflict with each other, without
definitive resolution, provoking reflection in one domain by way of another. Most notable
is the conflict Adorno locates between aesthetics and philosophy, presenting insights
from both domains in a mosaic of tension, though Adorno also develops conflictual
relationships between philosophy and the spheres of sociology, psychoanalysis, and
historical materialism, all of which open philosophy to its own conditions of precarity
and finitude. These disciplinary conflicts will be explored in more depth in the following
chapter (2.0).
Employing the resources of the philosophical tradition—specifically those of
German Idealism-Romanticism—Adorno endeavors to theorize novel relationships
between philosophy (or the humanities more broadly) and the domains of “first and
second nature,” that is, the natural world along with the historically encoded domain of
cultural conventions. As a thinker of “Spirit” (Geist)— “the I that is We and the We that
is I” (Hegel, PS, 110; cf. Cassirer, 874-880)—Adorno strove to move beyond siloed
understandings of intellectual inquiry. Adorno worked to philosophize in a holistic and
interdisciplinary manner, and in so doing, (re)considered philosophy’s actuality as a
discipline: theorizing its relationship to the natural world and other faculties of
knowledge in experimental directions. However, Adorno equally contests the final
autarkic triumph of philosophy endemic to the Hegelian program – “the whole is the
false” MM, 50)—continually critiquing such absolute unities by way of critical
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“accidents” which disrupt philosophy’s final unity (PS, 18-19). This meta-critical or selfreflexive understanding of philosophy is central to German Idealism, which centralizes
such a “thinking of thinking of thinking” (Benjamin, SW 1: 127-9), and Adorno
deliberately returns to such a conflictual understanding of philosophy. As a post-Idealist
thinker, Adorno speculatively reinvigorates the Idealist tradition, demonstrating that
thinkers such as Kant and Hegel, should not be derided as limited, or metaphysical, but
rather provide a plethora of thought models, or prisms, through which to (re)imagine
disciplinarity, along with the relationship of philosophy to politics and the natural world.

1.2

Adorno’s Writing of the Disaster: Crisis and the Possibility of Philosophy
“Art has to offer something other than stylized despair.” Ben Lerner, 10:04, 130.

According to Adorno, things are bad and getting worse. His pessimism stands
unmatched in the history of philosophy, with the possible exception of E. Cioran or A.
Schopenhauer. But it is Adorno’s Idealism that leaves him disappointed. One can
imagine the type of jeremiads our contemporary late capitalist crises would elicit from
him, though his work remains shockingly prescient, diagnosing many of the pathologies
of Western thought that are now explicitly jutting to the fore: crises of economy and
ecology (and their interrelation) being the foremost.41 Adorno begins and ends with the
catastrophe: there will be no triumphant exertions of philosophy or exultant work of art,
simply a ruin to which everything must (re)turn. Paradoxically, a fragile hope—or
negative utopianism—exists when one looks at such negativity squarely, as Adorno
maintains a minimal faith in the “impossible possibility” of enlightenment and its
promises of emancipation (MM, 247). Animated by his own experience of exile, Adorno
fractures Idealism by way of the crises of the twentieth-century: the failures of the

The thought of Adorno has rightfully been recognized as an important forerunner to the environmental
movement (in the West), providing important “thought models” with which to think through notions of
ecology and environmental philosophy that deconstruct static notions of “nature” and criticize the violent
nature of western enlightenment (Cook, Nature, 1, 121-154; Vogel, 7-8). Against the grain of previous
scholarship, which has largely been content in pointing out affinities between the Frankfurt School and
environmentalism, I forward Benjamin and Adorno as delivering the metaphysical promise of “natural
history ,” which de-reifies contemporary notions of “ecology” and “nature,” allowing one to think concepts
of nature as “actual” in dynamic new ways—theorizing new metaphysical relations between subject, object,
nature, history, and technology.
41
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Marxist project, along with the rise of modern totalitarianism, which he broadly collects
under the heading of “Auschwitz.”42 Crisis, failure, and negativity become the animating
motors of his thought: “The splinter in your eye is the best magnifying-glass” (MM, 50).
Adorno employs a Romantic aesthetic of ruination, emphasizing fragmentation, or “nonidentity,” against tyrannical “identity thinking,” whilst utilizing his trademark acerbic
irony or “melancholy science” (ND, 11-12, 162-3, 326-30; MM, 15). Such a sardonic
form of thought attempts to do justice to Adorno’s remark apropos of Kafka: “If there is
hope ...it is in those extremes rather than in the milder phrases: the capacity to stand up to
the worst by making it into language” (Prisms, 254).
Given Adorno’s continual resistance to the imperialism of conceptual thought, he
repeatedly turns to aesthetics—a domain supposedly surpassed by Hegel en route to
(philosophical discursive) “absolute knowledge”—in order to expand the purview of
reason, while criticizing its twentieth-century instrumental manifestations. Adorno’s
1933 Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic critically redeems the “aesthetic sphere”
from its position of subservience to religion and philosophy (in the Hegelian project),
presenting it as an arena of natural-historical ciphers, which are in turn read as allegories
through which to reflect upon philosophy (23, 64-5, 87, 93, 126-7; Buck-Morss,
Dialectics, 116-7). Fundamental to Adorno’s recovery of philosophy is a permeable
relationship between philosophy and art (or aesthetics). In Hegel, aesthetics is
(purportedly) a mere moment in the coming to self-identity of philosophy, while for
Adorno, art and its philosophical supplementation in aesthetics play a fundamental role in
imagining new more porous models of rationality.43

42

By Auschwitz, Adorno does not simply mean the brute historical occurrence of the camps, but rather a
more general destructive logic emerging out the dialectic of enlightenment. As he asserts in his Lectures on
Metaphysics: “by [Auschwitz] I mean not only Auschwitz but the world of torture which has continued to
exist after Auschwitz and of which we are receiving the most horrifying reports from Vietnam—through all
this the concept of metaphysics has been changed to its innermost core. It is therefore impossible, I would
say, to insist after Auschwitz on the presence of a positive meaning or purpose to being…The affirmative
character which metaphysics has in Aristotle and which it first took on in Plato’s teaching, has become
impossible” (Metaphysics, 101).
43
A key characteristic of Adorno's work as a philosopher is how often he writes on the arts, literature and
music (Wiggershaus, 66-95). Beginning his career as a musician, Adorno never abandoned his passion for
all things beautiful and aesthetic. Further, the ruined aesthetic (of AT) is the culmination of his philosophy,
demonstrating a fungible relationship between philosophy and aesthetic-critical writing, in a manner akin to
many in the tradition of French Theory. As I will argue, in Ch. 6, the self-identity of Hegel’s philosophy is
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Adorno stages a primary conflict between philosophy and material social reality
which he broadly glosses as “society.” Particularly in his post-World War Two writings,
Adorno stresses “the disaster” (to follow Blanchot) as a transient historical a priori for
philosophy: a recognition of the perpetual inadequacy of thought (either philosophical or
aesthetic) in the face of historical material givenness. 44 This disaster has always already
occurred, the only question that remains is how one is to comport oneself. Such a
catastrophic a priori is staged most aptly in Adorno’s 1961 essay on Beckett, “Trying to
Understand Endgame” (Versuch, nach Endspiel zu Verstehen, NL 1: 241-75), which
allegorizes Beckett’s Endgame (1958) to dramatize the post-WW2 situation of aesthetics
and philosophy. Reading Beckett’s text in conjunction with Adorno’s critical reading of it
provides an allegorical illumination of the bleak interiors of Adorno’s thought,
demonstrating the ephemeral possibility of both aesthetics and philosophy as a response
to crisis.
Beckett’s sparse narrative is read by Adorno to describe the “dialectic of
enlightenment”: the disenchantment and destruction of nature, and a situation in which
the “wholly enlightened world is radiant with triumphant calamity” (Adorno, DE,1). The
philosophical “will to truth” (Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie,” 46-7; Will, 220-31, 307327)—its drive for transcendent or eternal meaning—is parodied by Beckett’s somber
mourning play: “What is eternal and enduring for Beckett is the infinite catastrophe, it is
only the fact that the earth is extinguished, though I never saw it lit” (Adorno, NL II:

similarly fractured by aesthetics, which he tries to recuperate philosophically (though ultimately fails).
Adorno (and Benjamin) should be seen as much more radical in their invasion of philosophy by way of art
and aesthetics.
44
For Blanchot, in The Writing of the Disaster (1980), the disaster is the “limit of writing” (7), that which
undermines (or “de-scribes” [7]) the very possibility of its representation. Blanchot’s fragments interrogate
the impossible possibility of writing catastrophic historical events (such as the Holocaust), events which
call for representation, yet also demonstrate the impossibility of ever providing such an adequate
representation. More remains to be said on the relation between Adorno and such thinkers of historical
judgment, such as Blanchot, Lyotard (in The Differend and Heidegger and ‘the Jews’) and more recently G.
Agamben. A tertiary aim of these chapters is to place Adorno in constellation with a large array of
contemporary theorists, while recognizing his surprising proximity to many in the tradition of French poststructuralism/deconstruction—namely Foucault and Derrida. Thus, in addition to his unique post-Idealist
perspective, Adorno also provides valuable theoretical lenses through which to address contemporary
(theoretical) concerns.
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273). The bare setting of Endgame,45 with its presupposed a priori disaster, presents the
spectator with the objective historical situation of both philosophy and art: they exist
within a reified context in which there is “no more nature,” in which the subjugations of
enlightenment have been wholly successful, and in which the totality of the real has
become a rational nightmare (Beckett, 11; Adorno, NL II: 245, 275). Faced with such
circumstances, to hold to something like transcendent meaning (in either philosophy or
art) would be nonsensical. If hope exists in such a ruined situation it is fleeting, a
“firework” (AT, 81), or “ciphers, readable as traces” (Kierkegaard, 126, xx, xxii), that is,
in allegory and the minor gestures of criticism.
Beckett’s Endgame begins with the disaster. Nothing more will happen, the
characters must only come to an awareness of what has fatedly transpired: “The end is in
the beginning and yet you go on (pause)” (Beckett, 69). As the characters attempt to play
out their own “endgames,” following that in chess,46 narrative tropes break down and
decay as language degenerates to mere sound and eventually an “act without words” (8791): “let’s play it that way...and speak no more about it” (Beckett, 84). The play seems
unable to end. A great exhaustion pervades: the characters are impotent to die (in the case
of the parents), powerless to exit (in the case of Clov), or unable to finish their soliloquy
(in the case of Hamm)—all of which amount to the same thing. Adorno presents

Endgame is set in a grim context—a “bare interior [with] grey light” (Beckett, 1)—framed by two small
windows (through which the external disaster is seen). Hamm sits in the center, covered in a sheet; his
“assistant” Clov, motionless beside the door; with the two parents (who do not speak) condemned to trash
cans behind the main actions (also covered with sheets). Adorno draws attention to the allegorical absurdity
of the setting: “The localization of Endgame in that zone mocks the spectator with the suggestion of
something symbolic, something which, like Kafka, it then withholds” (NL II: 251, 239). The characters
continually refer to some crisis beyond the stage, which cannot be seen directly, but informs the action:
“The end of the world is discounted, as though it could be taken for granted” (NL II: 245).
46
The chess motif (of an “endgame”) can be used to illustrate Endgame’s navigation of necessity and fate:
a game of chess can be broken into three segments—openings, middle game, and endgame—as the game
advances fewer and fewer possibilities exist. Oftentimes during the “endgame” one is compelled to play out
the moves even though the end (the death of the King) is known in advance: “The end is in the beginning
and yet you go on (pause)” (Endgame, 69). In Endgame, the death of the (blind) king (Hamm) and the
extinction of all life is foreshadowed throughout: only 4 “pieces” remain on the board. The parents, as
pawns, are seen as disposable—literally residing in trash cans. Klov is similarly taken out of play towards
the end of the play, leaving only Hamm, who eventually sputters into silence. Beckett’s Catastrophe (1982)
stages a similar play of ending by literalizing the Greek katastrophien (“downturn”) to lampoon the final
act of dramatic action and cathartic culmination (71-81). For the motif of chess as it relates to Benjamin’s
work, specifically the chess playing automaton in his “Theses on the Concept of History” see Comay
“Benjamin’s Endgame” (251-291).
45
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Endgame as staging an “epilogue to subjectivity” (NL II: 259), with Hamm portraying a
diminished Hamlet— “the last liquidated drama of the subject” (NL II: 267)—who
gesturally acts out, or “Plays what he no longer is” (NL II: 267). After the catastrophe,
so- called “man” can no longer be referred to with certainty: “Endgame destroys such
illusions. The individual himself is revealed to be a historical category...something
transient in himself” (Adorno, NL II: 149).
Adorno’s reading of Endgame proceeds along two intertwined vectors which can
be unpacked in terms of form and content, though Adorno’s critique (and his aesthetics
more broadly) seeks to deconstruct such a hard distinction. Following Benjamin’s
description of the entwinement of form and content in terms of “the pocket,” along with
Adorno’s repeated imperatives regarding the primacy of an analysis of form, a robust
distinction between form and content must be problematized (AT, 142, 221, 257;
Sociology of Music, 197).47 Maintaining the distinction for heuristic purposes, Adorno
describes “form” as “sedimented content,” a “monadological representation” of a work’s
natural-historical conditions (AT, 5; Robinson, 186-193, 197-9). Art responds to the
“puzzles” of “empirical reality”—or the historical-technological material conditions of
their time—and must be read critically in relation to these, while not being wholly
reduced to them (AT, 4-5). In terms of content, Beckett’s work stages the imperialist
character of enlightenment rationality, allowing the spectator to experience the grim
teleology of instrumental reason. With respect to form, Beckett demonstrates the proper
“grey” response of art to the disaster (AT, 81): artistic mechanisms appear outmoded and
exhausted, as his works mourn (and stage) their own inadequacy as language deteriorates
into stuttering and noise. Beckett provides a grim testament to Adorno’s formalist
imperative: “the unsolved antagonisms of reality return as immanent problems of form”

Benjamin describes the reciprocal “folding” of form and content via the metaphor of a folded sock— “a
pocket”—wherein one moment cannot be unpacked without collapsing the whole. As he writes in Berlin
Childhood, “It taught me that form and content, veil and what is veiled, are the same. It led me to draw
truth from works of literature as warily as the child’s hand retrieved the sock from ‘the pocket’” (SW 3:
374). Adorno similarly deconstructs such a hard distinction, as in the Sociology of Music he describes the
need for a mode of listening that would see “society”—or social forces—as crystalized in musical forms
(197). Throughout AT, Adorno likewise emphasizes that form should be seen as a coagulation of historical
content, the “solution” to specific natural historical aesthetic problematics (6, 173). Adorno also repeatedly
advocates for considerations of form as prolegomena to philosophy. See “Theses on the Language of the
Philosopher” (35-39).
47
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(AT, 6). Beckett’s text, along with Adorno’s critical supplementation of it, stages
Adorno’s modernist understanding of both philosophy and art. Neither art nor philosophy
can express reality directly in terms of content. Instead, each must strive to refract the
real through a reflection on form: mirroring the crises of reality through formal
interventions.
The “content” of Beckett’s play and Adorno’s philosophy as a whole is the
disaster. Endgame is not a play about character development, individual existential
meaning, or the plot, but rather, it is the catastrophe that is given the first and last word. It
is about the disaster. Adorno and Beckett elaborate imperatives for philosophy and art
following disaster: figuring the ephemeral hope for both domains amidst the crises of
Modernity, capitalism, politics, and ecology. In the context of Endgame, Adorno is
highly critical of the responses of existentialism (specifically the French employment of
Beckett’s work by Sartre, [NL II: 241, 249]), which upheld the possibility of existential
freedom, along with an agential notion of the subject in the face of the catastrophe.48
Further, as Adorno points out throughout his oeuvre, existentialism does not write in an
“existential” manner: despite its lived and absurdist topics (on the level of content), it
refuses to incorporate such existential themes on the level of form (ND, 49-51; AT, 242;
Sherman, 75-78).49 Beckett’s work spoofs the subjective agency of existentialism, “In
Beckett history swallows up existentialism,” which “itself is parodied; nothing remains of
its invariant categories but bare existence” (NL II: 243). Beckett lampoons existentialist
attempts at writing the catastrophe: existentialism’s “invariant categories” must cleave to
the greater facticity of historical givenness. Against existentialism, Adorno holds to the
mute language of art—and the critical thought images of aesthetics—as vehicles which
allow “suffering to speak” (ND, 17): art critically mourns its own situation as a “useless

Despite Adorno’s criticisms of Sartre, the two thinkers converge on several points, most notably in their
shared attempt to think through a revised dialectical conception of philosophy in light of the events of the
twentieth-century. See, Sherman, Sartre and Adorno (1-13, 75-77, 237-80). Adorno’s main criticisms of
Sartre come in his 1962 essay “Commitment” (NL II: 76-94) in which he criticizes Sartre’s understanding
of the committed writer (in What is Literature?), advocating instead for his own modernist primacy of the
autonomous work. In ND (49-51), Adorno critiques existentialism more broadly for lapsing into Idealism
by way of its primacy of subjective freedom, ignoring the facticity of its historical-material context.
49
For more on the notion of an “existential writing,” or a form of writing which embodies the plethora of
existential experience [Erfahrung], see V. Cristache, Bastard Reasoning (2018), specifically, Ch. 1, “What
is an Existential Writing?” (43-80) and Ch. 6, “On Second Reading” (257-301).
48
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object” (within the capitalist marketplace), presenting a refracted heterotopic image that
things could be otherwise. As Adorno writes: “If the Subject is no longer able to speak
directly, then at least it should…speak through things, through their alienated and
mutilated form” (AT, 118, 78). In terms of the politics of art, Adorno prefers the
responses of aesthetic modernism, counterposed to “committed”50 or explicitly political
art, the former of which commences with a questioning of art’s formal mechanisms and
their adequacy in the face of given reality: it provokes reflection without lapsing into
mere propaganda (or the identity thinking of the “culture industry”).51
Adorno positions Endgame as satirizing enlightenment notions of “progress”
which would see Kant’s “crooked timber of humanity” made straight by enlightenment
self-mastery (“Universal History,” 46-47). Instead, for Adorno, enlightenment became
enamored with its own ideals, hopelessly tortured by its repressed other, mythology: “the
telos of the dynamic of every-same is the disaster; Beckett’s writings look this in the eye”
(AT, 224; NL II: 241-2; cf. DE, 1-34). Following Hegel, “enlightenment” remained
dialectically entwined and defined in opposition to its other, “superstition” (PS, 329-55),
a struggle which turned over into the “terror” of the French Revolution—enlightenment
became what it opposed, domination (PS, 357-62). “Universal history” is a history of
control and imperialism, the enlightenment taming of nature has few possible outcomes:
“No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading
from the slingshot to the megaton bomb” (ND, 320).52 However, Adorno sees critique as
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For Adorno, committed, or political art degrades art to mere propaganda which denies the thoughtprovoking critical aspect of the work of art: “commitment often means bleating what everyone is already
saying or at least secretly wants to hear” (NL II: 93). Stressing the migration of politics from committed to
autonomous art Adorno will write: “This is not a time for political works of art, but politics has migrated to
autonomous works, and nowhere more so than where these seem politically dead” (NL II: 93-4). For more
on Adorno’s notion of political art, see his 1962 essay “Commitment.” NL II: 76-94.
51
The term “culture industry” arises from Adorno and Horkheimer’s infamous “The Culture Industry:
Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” and describes “Entertainment [a]s the prolongation of work under late
capitalism” (DE, 109). That is, in late capitalism, popular culture acts as a mechanized industry which
produces standardized commodities for standardized consumers (DE, 95, 103, 112, 125). I wish to extend
this definition to encompass works of art which fail to provoke critical reflection in spectators, or works
which foreclose the possibility of aesthetic supplementation.
52
On this point one might offer a rejoinder to Adorno, specifically related to the fatalist determinism of his
descriptions of the disaster: does Adorno deny humans the same agency that could provide the key to their
emancipation? Further, throughout the 1960s Adorno championed a conventional “apocalyptic” narrative
of the nuclear catastrophe (exemplified by the Dialectic of Enlightenment): reason dominates nature, we are
unable to see the mythological elements of this, we (as nature) are also dominated, thus are own reason will
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continuing a cosmopolitan project of reason: “rationalization is not yet rational...so long
as progress deformed by utilitarianism does violence to the surface of earth” (AT, 64).
Art, along with its philosophical interpretation (in aesthetics), must play a leading role in
in providing a “running commentary on reason,” allowing for philosophy’s reimagination and possible expansion (Hammer, Modernism, 44). In this manner, Adorno
redeems a minimal notion of progress, one animated by a simple ethical sensitivity in the
face of the disaster: “progress would be the very establishment of humanity in the first
place, whose prospect opens up in the face of its extinction” (“Progress,” 128).53 Art and
philosophy must also play a negative role in denouncing compensatory ideological
utopian visions. Adorno describes “the affirmative moment of art” as a “utopia as well as
the lie that utopia is here now” (Sociology of Music, 224). Beckett’s text denounces the
progressive hopes of enlightenment, but in so doing holds open the possibility of a more
perfect model of reason. It is a narrative of progress based on “natural history,” which, as
will be elaborated throughout this project, stresses, ruin, incompleteness, and particularity
against the violent abstractions of “universal history” (ND, 300-7).

inevitably, destroy itself through the creation of new techniques for the domination of nature. Especially
with respect to our current climate crisis, such theses have been empirically borne out. However, the
problem is that we are still here, living on in Adorno’s so-called disaster. Though many will argue the
worst is still to come, we still must live and exist within our present crisis. Put otherwise, the disaster
should not be externalized as some final eschaton or telos we are moving towards, but rather as an
immanent process occurring and being acted out today in a gradual manner. Such apocalyptic rhetoric of
climate catastrophe has been criticized by thinkers such as Anna Tsing from the anthropological domain.
Her work seeks to chart the “patchy” networks and collisions of late capitalism, those moments which
manage to live, despite the disaster. For Tsing (in The Mushroom at the End of the World), such
overarching critiques of progress occlude an awareness of “third nature” (vis-à-vis Adorno and Lukács),
and the “patchy” networks of late capitalism—the new modes of life and temporality created through
human and species interaction with their environment. Tsing’s provisos lead to to further questions as to
how one may most aptly write or conceptualize the disaster, along with the possible limits of pessimism as
a philosophical perspective. Describing here own notion of “third nature” as a rejoinder to the LukácsianAdornian notion of “second nature” (world of capitalist convention), Tsing will write: “My book offers
‘third nature,’ that is, what manages to live despite capitalism. To even notice third nature, we must evade
assumptions that the future is that singular direction ahead. Like virtual particles in a quantum field,
multiple futures pop in and out of possibility; third nature emerges within such temporal polyphony. Yet
progress stories have blinded us. To know the world without them, this book sketches open-ended
assemblages of entangled ways of life, as these coalesce in coordination across many kinds of temporal
rhythm” (Mushroom, xii).
53
Describing his refashioning of “progress” around the notion of critique, Adorno writes: “Progress means:
to step out of the magic spell, even out of the spell of progress, which is itself nature, in that humanity
becomes aware of its own inbred nature and brings to a halt the domination its exacts upon nature and
through which domination by nature continues. In this way it could be said that progress occurs where it
ends” (“Progress,” 134).
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Formally, Adorno’s essay “Versuch, das Endspiel zu Verstehen” provides several
imperatives for the practice of philosophy. In German, “Versuchen” (along with der
Versuch) has a vast constellation of meanings covered over by the English rendering
“Trying”: connoting at once “to attempt,” “to try,” “trial,” “to experiment,” and
“essay.”54 In this way, one could render Adorno’s text “Essay on understanding
(Endgame)” in which what is aimed at is not some final reading of Beckett’s text, but
rather, a parody of the notion of “understanding.” Throughout the essay, Adorno
illustrates that what is in crisis in Beckett’s work is the stability of this “understanding”
itself: “Understanding [Endgame] can mean nothing other than understanding its
incomprehensibility” (NL II: 243). Understanding is not something arrived at once and
for all, but rather, an ongoing and reflexively critical exercise of supplementation:
“Understanding and criticism are one” (AT, 262). Both the philosophical and literary
dimensions of such a critique of “understanding” should be noted: with regard to the
latter, Adorno refuses a final interpretation, or “understanding,” of Beckett’s text; while
with regard to the former, Adorno questions the a-historical stability of philosophy,
opening thought’s eternal categories to the transience of history. Adorno’s essay form is
inaugurated by a shattering of the fixity of the understanding, grounding thought upon the
unstable ground of subjective precarity (and pathology).
Great works of art—such as those of Beckett, Kafka, Schoenberg, and Beethoven—
do not provide catharsis, or a stable message which can be straightforwardly decoded, but
rather, they provoke a “shudder” [Erschütterung] in the stability of the subject: “The
shock aroused by important works... is the moment of being shaken. The recipients lose
their footing” (AT, 245). Such a “shudder” is “radically opposed to the conventional idea
of experience [Erlebnis] and provides no particular satisfaction for the I... Rather, it is a
memento of the liquidation of the I, which, shaken, perceives its own limitedness and

The French verb “essayer” (along with the substantive “essay”) contains the same connotations as the
German “Versuchen,” eliciting at once “to try,” “to experiment,” along with “essay.” Montaigne—the
thinker of “the essay” par excellence—puts this affinity to the test, opposing the subjective precarity of the
essay to the stability of metaphysical or scientific thought: “I study myself more than anything else. That is
my metaphysics, that is my physics” (“Of Experience,” 816). For more on the critical potential of
Montaigne for critical social theory see, Horkheimer, “Montaigne and the function of Skepticism” (in
Philosophy and Social Science, 265-312).
54

20

finitude” (AT, 245; GS 7. 363: 4320-1). Authentic works demonstrate the possibility of
what Adorno terms “metaphysical experience” [Erfahrung] that is, monumental
experiences (or “events”) which—opposed to the “conventional idea of experience”
[Erlebnis]— prompt a critical reflection upon the constitutive elements of philosophy,
provoking the formulation of new modes of judgments which strive to “use the concept in
order to reach beyond the concept” (Lectures ND, 95). Philosophy must critically follow
art, while not wholly reducing itself to it, employing aesthetic allegories to transcend the
limitations of discursive modes of thinking (ND, 15). For Adorno, in light of the disasters
of his century, philosophy can no longer proceed as a conventionally systematic
endevour. Instead, it must fracture its stability on the level of form, becoming
“essayistic”: “[the essay] thinks in fragments, just as reality is fragmentary, and finds its
unity in and through the breaks and not by glossing them over” (NL I:16). Essayistic
thought does not commence with the stable grounded subject, but rather, it begins with a
subjectivity that has been made to “shudder,” one that has had the experience
[Erfahrung], of “the liquidation of the I.” Philosophy must begin with the experimental
“essay(er),” incorporating crisis into the very form of thought, coming to terms with its
constitutive finitude. The disaster must be formally staged, not presented as some mere
thematic moment in the content of the work. Adorno underscores this “tentative
experimental” quality of philosophical inquiry, which must strive after “changing trial
arrangements”: “I believe that what characterizes philosophical thinking is an element of
the tentative experimental and inconclusive, and this is what distinguishes it from the
positive sciences” (AP, 131; Lectures ND, 5).
According to Adorno, “Auschwitz has irrefutably proven the failure of culture”
(ND, 359). One cannot return nostalgically to some golden age, going “back to culture,”
in a traditional sense, nor can one placate oneself in any authentic culture unmarred by
the horrors of the twentieth-century. Auschwitz provided the “Lisbon earthquake” for
philosophy (to adapt Voltaire on Leibniz): if something like the Holocaust was possible,
one does not live in the “best of all possible worlds” (Metaphysics, 105; ND, 361). In
terms of thought, for Adorno, philosophy could no longer rest content in a-historical
abstraction. Instead, it must “look the negative in the face” (Hegel, PS, 18), attempting to
theorize from crisis as opposed to in abstraction from it. Responding to what Esposito
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terms the “crisis dispositif” (2-4, 19-29) uniting much of twentieth-century thought,
Adorno sees philosophy as always already shot through and refuted by the atrophies of
the century. As such, Adorno’s philosophy becomes a “tragic” enterprise: a “necrology,”
which “lives on” despite the a priori awareness of its inevitable failure (AT, 4; ND, 3;
Esposito, 8-9).
Throughout his aesthetics, Adorno repeatedly describes what I will term the
“(hetero)-autonomous” character of the work of art: great modernist artists (such as
Beckett or Kafka) understand the historical index of the “autonomous work,” and as such,
mourn the inadequacy of the medium to ever provide a complete articulation of its
object.55 For Adorno, art and philosophy can exist after crisis, provided they come to
terms with their own “death” (Hegel, A, 11). Adorno repeatedly emphasizes the naturalhistorical situation of autonomous works within “society,” while not wholly reducing
such works to their material historical context (AT, 17, 225-60). Great artists, such as
Beethoven, but also Kant and Hegel, possess a bourgeois duality: they are unquestionably
shaped by their historical context—providing situated “solutions to problems,” to the
“puzzles” posed by the artistic material of their particular historical epoch (Sociology of
Music, 213; AT, 5)—while also transcending their situation, delivering generalizable
concepts of freedom through their labour on artistic forms. Great autonomous works
project a transient image of a reconciled humanity—via an emancipated form of “social
labour”—the freedom of great works foreshadowing a greater concept of freedom in
reality: “absolute freedom in art... comes into contradiction with the perennial unfreedom of the whole” (AT, 1-2, 200, 224-5, 227, 236, 77; CM, 10). Adorno similarly
describes philosophy as a “vestige of freedom” against the un-freedom of the capitalist

Describing the antithetical relationship of art to society, Adorno writes: “Art’s a-sociality is the
determinate negation of a determinate society” (AT, 226). Further, elaborating the “un-social sociability”
of art with respect to society: “[Art] becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this
position only as autonomous art. By crystalizing in itself as something unique to itself, rather than
complying with existing social norms and qualifying as ‘socially useful,’ it criticizes society as merely
existing” (AT, 225-6). However, Adorno should not be considered a crude materialist who reduces all
culture to its economic conditions. In relation to music’s relation to society, Adorno speaks of autonomous
music bearing the “mark of Cain,” that is, of being invariably shaped by its historical-material context,
while not wholly reducible to it (Sociology of Music, 204-5). Composers such a Beethoven, demonstrate a
freedom in art that anticipates its utopian realization in reality: “the freedom of art, its independence of the
demands made on it, is founded on the idea of a free society, and in a sense anticipates its realization”
(Ibid., 221, 209). For more on autonomous art as a figure of autonomous humanity, see AT (1-2).
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whole (CM, 10). Philosophical criticism seeks to capture such utopian impulses, or
notions of freedom, dormant in previous forms of art (or objects)—as Benjamin did with
the detritus of nineteenth-century Paris in The Arcades—employing past conceptions to
critically intervene in contemporary reflections.
The negative dialectic follows art (and aesthetics) while not being wholly
reducible to it, and one can thus see the natural-historical situation of art as mirroring that
of philosophy (ND, 15). Art (as a lower domain of Hegelian absolute spirit) provides a
framework through which philosophy can understand its useless situation in late
capitalism. Negative dialectics stresses the perpetual inadequacy of conceptual cognition:
philosophy can never do full justice to its object, and critical reflection must aid
philosophy in coming to terms with this constitutive lack, leading to a recognition of the
fundamental “primacy of the object” (ND, 5, 183-97). Adorno accentuates negative
philosophies and forms of art which emphasize their discordance, or tension with extant
reality, perspectives “that distort existing reality” via critique, revealing the “impossible
possibility” of a differential order of things (MM, 247).
Animated by crisis, philosophy must a priori abandon the possibility “that the
power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality of the real” (AP, 120). Instead,
philosophy should strive to “distort existing reality” through the practice of critique,
creating “thought-images” or “prisms” through which to reflect upon, while refracting,
existing reality, such that it might be imagined in alternative directions (ND, 56-57; MM,
247).56 For Adorno philosophy can be thought of as “actual,” provided it dispense with
its Idealist systematic intention of grasping the totality of “the real” by way of

Describing his model of the negative dialectic via the motif of the “prism,” Adorno will write: “To want
substance in cognition is to want a utopia. It is this consciousness of possibility that sticks to the concrete,
the undisfigured. Utopia is blocked off by possibility, never by immediate reality; this is why it seems
abstract in the midst of extant things. The inextinguishable color comes from nonbeing. Thought is its
servant, a piece of existence extending—however negatively—to that which is not. The utmost distance
alone would be proximity; philosophy is the prism in which its colour is caught” (ND, 56-57). Elaborating
this negative dialectical perspective, while describing his immanent model of utopianism, Adorno
concludes his essay “Critique”: “the false, if known determinately refracts an index of what is right and
better” (CM, 288). Adorno is further emphatic that “Philosophy cannot survive without linguistic effort”
(ND, 56); that is, through the creation of dialectical linguistic images philosophy “expresses” reality
negatively: “Dialectics—literally: language as the organon of thought...to attempt a critical rescue of the
rhetorical element, a mutual approximation of thing and expression, to the point where the difference
fades” (ND, 56).
56
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(“rational”) conceptual thought. Philosophy should instead endeavor to expose “the real”
in experimental directions, exploring the possibility of differing intellectual relationships
with the natural world through kaleidoscopic approaches to the intellectual tradition.57
Adorno’s early lectures, “The Actuality of Philosophy” (1931) and “The Idea of Natural
History” (1932), demonstrate his novel commitment to a truly dialectical-historical model
of philosophy. In characteristic fashion, Adorno’s own philosophical commitments are
elucidated negatively through an immanent critique of his philosophical contemporaries,
notably the phenomenological ontology of Husserl and Heidegger, along with the
aesthetic criticism of Benjamin and Lukács (NH, 255-64). For Adorno, philosophy cannot
appeal to any a-historical “givenness”: some pure origin of thought, be it “nature,” or
transcendental consciousness, which Adorno broadly glosses under the heading “myth”
(NH, 253). Nor can philosophy commence in a purely historical manner, following
Nietzsche or historical materialism, simply asserting all philosophical concepts to be
historical instantiations of “discourse” (NH, 256-7). Instead, Adornian philosophy begins
dialectically by mediating “nature” and “history” by way of their identity-in-difference,
locating a shared notion of “transience (Vergänglichkeit)” subtending both terms (NH,
262-264). Moving against ontology, or any “natural” starting point for philosophy,
Adorno begins with what Schelling termed “the groundless ground” (FE, 68-70): a
natural-historical transience subtending both nature and history (NH, 252, 260, 262-3,
268-9). Adorno’s embrace of transience turns the constitutive precarity of philosophy into
a strength, grounding philosophy on a historical allegorical awareness, resisting the
foundational mythologies of philosophy (as will be argued in 1.3).
In his essay “Cultural Criticism and Society” (“Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft,”
1951), which opens the collection Prisms, Adorno questions the meaning of “cultural
criticism,” exploring the relationship between cultural critique and social malaise by way
of a deconstruction of the positions of the “transcendent” and “immanent” critic.58 These
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Adorno deconstructs and rethinks the Hegelian Dopplesatz (double-dictum, [Right, 20]) between the
“real” and “rational,” examining new modes by which each term can influence the other, or how thought
can influence reality, and reality can in turn influence philosophy.
58
Adorno himself favours the latter position: the critic must employ an immanent perspective which allows
for further reflection (and hence “unfolding”) of the work—the success of critique should be judged to the
extent it is able to provoke further reflection with respect to the work. For more on Adorno’s immanent
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critical theses can be extended to describe Adorno’s general provisos for any philosophy
following the disaster, one transformed into the minoritarian practice of criticism. In this
way (for Adorno) “cultural criticism” should be rendered as “philosophy.” “Transcendent
criticism” approaches the object or text of criticism with pre-established static categories
which are simply “applied” to the text, while “immanent critique” works within the text,
immanently (re)fashioning critical perspectives using the textual means at hand and
employing dynamic historical hermeneutic categories. Following these theoretical
considerations, the text concludes with Adorno’s (in)famous disclaimer regarding “poetry
after Auschwitz,” as he writes:
The more total society becomes, the greater the reification of the mind and the more
paradoxical its effort to escape reification on its own. Even the most extreme
consciousness of doom threatens to degenerate into idle chatter. Cultural criticism
finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture and barbarism. To
write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even the knowledge of
why it has become impossible to write poetry today. Absolute reification, which
presupposed intellectual progress as one of its elements, is now preparing to absorb
the mind entirely. Critical intelligence cannot be equal to this challenge as long as it
confines itself to self- satisfied contemplation. (Prisms, 34; GS: 10.1. S: 30)

Adorno’s statements invite and provoke a polyphony of interpretations, none of which is
the literal reading (that one should not write poetry),59 and one should note the violence
done Adorno’s broader argument when the statement— “to write poetry after Auschwitz
is barbaric”—is presented in isolation. Adorno’s polemic—especially in constellation
with Benjamin’s assertion “There is no document of culture which is not at the same time

model of critique, see “The Essay as Form,” which will be explored in greater depth later in this chapter
(1.4.1). Hegel also employs a philosophical understanding of immanent critique, in which his dialectical
method positions systems of thought as moments in the broader unfolding of truth, as he writes: “Effective
refutation must infiltrate the opponent’s stronghold and confront him on his own ground; there is no point
in attacking him outside his territory and claiming jurisdiction where he is not” SOL, 512. Hegel
continually distances himself from the “empty formalism” of previous philosophies (namely Kant and
Spinoza), who, according to Hegel “want to have cognition before we have any is as absurd as the wise
resolve of the Scholasticus to learn to swim before he ventured into the water” (EL, 34). Against such
views, Hegel forwards his own dialectical model of thought which necessitates a performative unity
between method and content (PS, 52-53, 56-7, 487, 88; cf. SOL, 31-36). See further, Ng (96-9, 121). For
Adorno’s notion of immanent critique in relation to deconstruction and Derrida, see Dews (38-44).
59
Elaborating on this statement in his 1965 Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, Adorno will write: “I
would readily concede that, just as I said that after Auschwitz one could not write poems—by which I
meant to point to the hollowness of the resurrected culture of that time—it could equally well be said, on
the other hand, that one must write poems, in keeping with Hegel’s statement in his Aesthetics that as long
as there is an awareness of suffering among human beings there must also be art as the objective form of
that awareness” (Metaphysics, 110).
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a document of barbarism” (SW 4: 392)–gestures towards an awareness of the “barbarism”
at the heart of culture. Adorno and Benjamin continually remind us that the progress of
“enlightened” culture has in fact been a slaughter bench of barbarous domination:
“history is not the soil in which happiness grows. The periods of happiness in it are the
blank pages of history” (Hegel, World History, 79).60
Adorno’s claims should be read as imperatives for a negative poetics, one which
would jettison the idealistic or compensatory elements of poetry, and instead treat art
allegorically as “a ruin.” The cultural-historical impetus for Adorno’s proclamations was
Paul Celan’s 1948 “Death Fugue,” which (for Adorno) excessively harmonized the
experience of the camps, negating the potential for a transformative and dissonant
aesthetic experience.61 For Adorno, art (and philosophy) cannot return to culture as some
idealized eternal store of value, but rather, must begin with the recognition that “All postAuschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage” (ND, 367). One must
commence with the ruin of history and the catastrophe of givenness, with the “single
catastrophe,” or the “wreckage upon wreckage” that is seen by Benjamin’s Angelus
Novus (SW 4: 392). Following Benjamin, it is precisely this “fissured” or ruined quality
of the past which is of service to critical historiography: it is those incomplete, or nonidentical, moments that allow the past to be endowed with hope by way of the present as
they can become “citable” in relation to its concerns (SW 4: 389, 395-6). For Benjamin,
such occurrences are “the revolutionary moments in the occurrence of history. The places
where tradition breaks off—hence its peaks and crags, which offer footing to one who
would cross over them” (Arcades, 474). Such moments are “revolutionary” in that they
can enter into constellation with the “now,” “blasting open the continuum of the history”

Such theses are echoed by Brecht, in his poem “Questions from a Worker Who Reads,” which allows one
to theorize the dialectic of “culture and barbarism,” via its gloss of “culture” as driven by the barbaric
labour of the many: “Each page a victory//At whose expense the victory ball? //Every ten years a great
man, Who paid the bill? //So many reports// So Many Questions” (252-3).
61
Adorno seems to have objected to the poem’s lyrical quality, in which the form (of the fugue or waltz)
covers over the dissonance of the content (the gas chambers and camps). For Adorno, poetry must fracture
itself through paratactic gestures in order to emphasize its inadequate or incomplete quality with respect to
its content. For more on this, see “On Lyric Poetry and Society” (1957) and “Parataxis: On Hölderlin’s Late
Style” (1963/4). Despite the disagreement between Adorno and Celan with respect to “Todesfuge,” the two
share remarkable affinities on the relationship between aesthetics and the catastrophes of the twentieth
century and more remains to be said regarding the relation(s) between Adorno and Celan.
60
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revealing new potentials latent in the present moment when it cites the past in relation to
itself (SW 4: 395). Likewise, for Adorno, crisis provides an occasion through which to
reflect upon the tradition of philosophy, imagining how it might be cited as “actual” in
relief with his present moment.
According to Adorno, philosophy must enact a “critical self-reflection…before
the highest peaks of history” (ND, 3-4): thought must reflect on its own time and the role
that its categories play in upholding the world ideologically as it is, while warding off the
“wrong life” or various forms of totalitarianism through contestatory critique (MM, 1518; Butler, 55-61). 62 This requires that philosophy remain essentially open to
“metaphysical experience” [geistige(n) Erfahrung], that is, occurrences that prompt a
fundamental revision of its concepts and categories (ND, 361-408 // 39, 52, 61).63
Thought should attempt to express discursively what “lies outside of philosophy...
[which] must attempt to get outside itself while using the same conceptual language that
blocks all the exits” (Esposito, 7-8).
Adorno’s positions contain two materialist imperatives for thought that are
employed to short circuit Idealism: the first, that theory should take its cue from the real
material relationships of history and practice (following Lukács, Consciousness, 223255). The second, that philosophy has a compensatory, or ideological, function, which
affirms reality and social structures as they are, occluding insight into the material basis
of ideas, while obscuring the ability of labour (both physical and mental) to shape reality
otherwise than it currently manifests. For Adorno, it is a given that philosophy contains
subterranean elements of its material social circumstance, and the task of criticism entails
locating philosophical texts within a “force-field” of material social assumptions and
influences, while not wholly reducing thought to such forces (NL 1:13; AT, 205; Kant, 4).
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Further stressing the historical necessity of a turn towards historical materialism (from Idealism), Adorno
will write: “This course of history forces materialism upon metaphysics, traditionally the direct antithesis of
materialism” (ND, 365).
63
Forster describes metaphysical experience as the self-aware movement beyond the narrow
epistemological conception of philosophy, “Geistige Erfahrung rescinds the dissolution of experience in
epistemological inquiry by using the subject to recover the expressive element of epistemological concepts”
(90-1, see further, 83-4, 2). Adorno describes Negative Dialectics as the working of of a “Theorie der
gestigen Erfahrung” (ND [German], 39, cf. 52, 20, 55 171, 189).

27

According to Adorno, this second imperative beckons philosophical critique to
reflect on the moments within its methods and procedures which uphold the given status
quo as ideology, reading philosophy archeologically as a “cipher” to its material
historical circumstances and unconscious suppositions (Kierkegaard, 1-4, 126-127).
Adorno reads philosophical positions such as phenomenology or existentialism as
fetishizing unencumbered subjective agency, commencing with a “bourgeois interior” out
of touch with the historical-material movements of its time (Kierkegaard, 53-59, 92-3,
106-8; ND, 49-51). The systems of positivism valorize scientific objectivity—or a “view
from nowhere”—failing to consider the role of scientific discourse in upholding systems
of oppression (DE, 19, 23, 71-72; AT, 265-7; ND,140-141).64 Adorno’s Kierkegaard
study illustrates the materialist moment in his post-Idealism. Adorno is highly critical of
Kierkegaard’s “bourgeois” lapse into a “realism without reality” along with the
“objectless inwardness” of his existential decisions which, despite their claims to
philosophically articulate “individual experience,” remain out of touch with their naturalhistorical index (27-30, 40-9, 106, 115), Thus, despite his “attempted breakout” from the
bad abstractions of Idealism, according to Adorno, Kierkegaard remains a speculative
Idealist thinker. However, following Benjamin, Adorno emphasizes the “allegorical”
hope that exists in reading superficially “natural” elements in Kierkegaard’s texts such as
the Bourgeois “interior” (40-6), as “ciphers” or “traces” (126-7), which can be opened by
way of historical transience.65
For Adorno, history is a catastrophic ruin—a “slaughter- bench at which the
happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been

Describing positivism’s destruction of experience, Adorno writes: “The regimented experience
prescribed by positivism nullifies experience itself and, in its intention, eliminates the experiencing
subject...As a social phenomenon, positivism is geared towards the human type devoid of experience and
continuity, and it encourages [the subject] to see himself as the crown of creation” (The Positivist Dispute,
57-8).
65
The Benjaminian affinities of Adorno’s Kierkegaard study have been noted, most prominently by
Benjamin himself (SW 2: 703-5), who prophetically remarked apropos of the text: “This book contains
much in a small space. The author’s subsequent writings may someday emerge from it” (SW 2: 705; see,
Adorno-Benjamin, 20-26). As Benjamin decodes the historical sentiment of the Baroque by way of allegory
and natural history, Adorno deciphers Kierkegaard’s subterranean Idealism— “this world of images whose
labyrinths and halls contain Kierkegaard’s innermost experiences (SW 2: 704)—by way of his criticalhistorical analysis, such that “Kierkegaard’s inward spirituality is assigned a specific place in history and
society” (ibid.).
64
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victimized” (Hegel, History, 24)—and one which continually elicits ethical imperatives
for thought: philosophy has an obligation to write and think the disaster. As Adorno
proclaims, “to give a voice to suffering… is the condition of truth” (ND, 17). This is to
say: suffering, torture and crisis should not be rationalized, nor allowed to pass without a
philosophical response. Adorno will go further, claiming that the events of Auschwitz
have imposed upon thought a “new categorical imperative” (ND, 365, 285-6): one must
rearrange one’s thoughts, along with philosophical concept and categories, such that
atrocities such as Auschwitz will not repeat themselves. Instead of shying away from
crisis, for Adorno, philosophy must embrace historical dissonance as an occasion for the
critical renewal of thought. Crisis reminds philosophy that “rationalization is not yet
rational” (AT, 64): work remains to be done to develop models of reason that could enact
a real vision of utopia (ND, 11), while striving to reconnect humans with the natural
world (AT, 64-72).66

1.3

Natural History: A Philosophy of Transience (Adorno and Nature)
Nature
What have you done
For me
(that I could not do to you)?
Jeff Dergson, The Vestiges,13.

This section will examine Adorno’s constellation of “natural history”—or his
metaphysics of “transience as an originary history of signification” (NH, 263)—in
relation to which any possible philosophy after the disaster must be constructed. Adorno
formulates the dialectical image “natural history” to denaturalize previous conceptions of
the position of nature in the philosophical system, while providing the metaphysical
grounding for his own ruined understanding of philosophy. In his 1932 address to the
Frankfurt Kantgesellschaft, “On the Idea of Natural History,” Adorno develops his own
“ontological reorientation of the philosophy of history,” via the critical constellation of

The ethical-somatic moment of Adorno’s expansion of rationality should be highlighted. Adorno stresses
the “new categorical imperative” (ND, 365) imposed upon philosophy by the atrocities of the twentiethcentury, forcing it to become more empathetic and attuned to somatic embodiment and bodily suffering.
Describing Adorno’s expansion of reason, Bernstein writes: “for Adorno, to expand reason is to expand the
scope and character of cognitive life, of knowing. It is towards a more capacious sense of cognition and
thus reason that Adorno’s struggles with the concept leads us” (Disenchantment, 4).
66

29

“natural history” (259-260). Natural history serves at once as a dialectical heuristic—or
“historical image” (AP, 131)—through which to de-mythologize previous systems of
thought, while also providing the transient metaphysic (following Benjamin), or Ungrund
(following Schelling) upon which any possible philosophy of Spirit would be erected.
In the lecture, Adorno describes his aim as the dialectical mediation of “the usual
antithesis of history and nature”; that is, the two terms are decoded by way of their
opposition, and one is invited to consider the “natural” or pathological character of
historical processes, along with the historical construction of “nature” (NH, 252). In
denaturalizing terms such as “nature” and “history” by way of his “historical
philosophical method” (NH, 260),67 Adorno moves against the fundamental ontology of
Heidegger in vogue at the time, which hypostasized both history, by way of “Dasein’s
historicity,” and nature, by way of Heidegger’s longing for “equiprimordial” concepts
(see, Being &Time, 13, 141-3; NH, 256-9). As a dialectical heuristic, natural history
seeks to destabilize both nature and history, while positively providing a truly transientallegorical starting point for philosophy (NH, 263-265, 269; Pensky, 228-30). Following
Hegel, philosophy must attempt to dispense with all presuppositions—especially those
considered “natural” or “immediate”—instead commencing with the dialectical interplay
between nature and history, ideal and real, empirical and transcendental. Adorno’s
interventions can be seen as akin to Schelling’s revised version of “the copula,” in which
terms are shown to be mediated and defined by way of their opposition to each other:
“freedom” is demarcated and understood only by working through the tensions of its
opposite, “necessity” (FE, 13-17). For Adorno, history is the manifestation of natural
pathologies, while what is seemingly natural is historical through and through (NH, 2525). Such a “transient” starting point for philosophy allows Adorno to avoid the pitfalls of
conceptual subjugation enacted by static models of discursive “identity-thinking”: modes
of thought which favor sameness and reproducibility, suppressing difference and

For Adorno, such a method simply insists that “the[se] concepts did not fall from heaven” (NH, 260), that
is, that the meaning of such terms contains a historically sedimented dimension, or “truth content.”
Describing the critical heuristic power of natural history, Adorno writes, “For radical natural-historical
thought, however, everything existing transforms itself into ruins and fragments, into just such a charnel
house where signification is discovered, in which nature and history interweave and the philosophy of
history is assigned the task of their intentional interpretation” (NH, 265).
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particularity (NH, 263-7; ND, 5, 11). Natural history provides a rebuke to conventional
enlightenment historicism, which sees history as the manifestation of natural providence.
Instead, natural history provides a vision of history (and nature) centered on “ruin and
trauma,” on “allegory,” rather than “enlightenment” (Rajan, “Natural history,” 187-8;
Adorno, ND, 300-8).
Adorno’s metaphysical epistemological thesis of the “primacy of the object” (ND,
183-97) has further ecological efficacy for rethinking the concept of “nature,” which, for
Adorno, functions as a “mediated placeholder for immediacy” (AT, 62; Cook, Nature, 11
121). Adorno refuses to uphold “nature” as some authentic given, or primordial
substratum; instead, he dialectically mediates “nature,” by way of its opposite, “history”
(NH, 252-3). Thus “natural history” recognizes the reciprocal mediation of both terms
(along with that between subject and object), seeing both as subtended by an “original
history of transience,” or with Schelling, an Ungrund, or “groundless ground” (NH, 262263; FE, 29). Though there is an evident Hegelian basis for Adorno’s thought of nature—
specifically in his broader refashioning of “the concept,” which Adorno defines as a
dialectical opposition between “identity and non-identity” (ND, 11-12; Kant, 66) — his
philosophy of nature also draws heavily on the work of Kant, Freud, and Marx, while
entering into an implicit thematic affinity with Schelling with his contestation of mere
enlightenment understandings of nature (as will be shown in Ch. 5.).
Cook and O’Connor view Adorno as presenting a negative dialectic constellation
of Marx, Kant, and Freud in elaborating a “critical materialism” (critical being taken in
the Kantian sense), which continually undercuts “the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity”
by recognizing the irreducibility of nature to whatever the subject makes of it (ND, xx, 111; O’Connor, 15, 83-5, 118, 126, 173; Cook, Nature, 11, 30-3). The critical Kantian
moment in Adorno’s thought highlights the fundamental “block,” or “non-identity,” of
thought (the concept) in relationship to its object (nature), the recognition of the “primacy
of the object,” that “objects do not go into their concepts without leaving some
remainder” (ND, 5; Kant, 170-80; Cook, Nature, 30, 37). For Adorno, nature remains a
perpetual “indivisible remainder,” which can never be fully assimilated into thought. A
further Kantian element to Adorno’s thought lies in his maintenance of a modified
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version of the “thing-in-itself” (as “non-identity”), along with a recognition of the central
mediatory role played by the epistemic subject in the constitution of reality.
Adorno’s employment of Freud and psychoanalysis more broadly introduces a
notion of pathological-historical genesis into the static Kantian subject, providing what
Adorno terms a “remembrance of nature in the subject,” or with Schelling, a “natural
history of the mind” (DE, 32; Ideas, 30). Psychoanalysis provides a model for the “(non)
reconciliation” of the subject with “nature”—be it one’s own or the external world—one
must recognize that no such immediate access exists to either domain (Cook, Nature, 2527). The Dialectic of Enlightenment psychoanalytically maps the emergence of
enlightenment subjectivity as a sacrificial form of repression and mastery, both of
instincts (internal nature), and external nature (DE, 1-34).
In the famous gloss of Odysseus, Adorno and Horkheimer chart the interpellation
of “bourgeois” subjectivity as a form of mythological “sacrifice,” mirroring the
dominating character of the enlightenment more broadly (DE, 35-50; Cook, Nature, 6566; Sherratt, 80-96, 93-102). In a Hegelian reversal, enlightenment’s drive for sovereign
mastery begets its own negation, as the master is revealed as a slave to its own desire for
control: “reason” can only articulate itself through the subjugation of its “mythological”
other, nature (PS, 114-9). In recognizing the genesis of the enlightenment subject in terms
of “natural history,” one is able to chart the historical discursive “origin” of conceptual
thought; recognizing that, apart from their historical genesis, concepts also arise out of a
desire for the “control of nature” (DE, 1; ND, 11, 269-70). As in psychoanalysis, through
the recognition of such pathologies, one is able to gain a degree of mastery with respect
to them, marking a utopian opportunity for thought to relate to the natural world in more
substantial ways (Cook, 70, 79, 80-1; Sheratt, 50-69, 75). Yet, for Adorno, “maturity,” or
emancipation, will not entail some provincial community with nature, nor a wholesale
rejection of mastery, but rather, a “memory of nature in the subject” (DE, 32), a
“becoming conscious of the nature within ourselves” (Cook, Nature, 121). Thought must
come to recognize its pathological desire for domination, admitting that every philosophy
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will inevitably subjugate and striate the natural world (ND, 269, 22-27; Cook, Nature,
33).68
In this manner, a key insight of Adorno’s for a potential critical ecological
discourse lies in his investigation of the relation between the philosophical system—the
encyclopedic-architectonic form of philosophy practiced by Kant and Hegel —and the
subjugation of nature, or “particularity” (ND, 22-28; Zuidervaart, 84, 110; Vogel, 53-4):
“the system is the belly turned mind, and rage is the mark of each and every Idealism”
(ND, 23; cf. Nietzsche, Will, 314-5). Many have chastised the abstract formulations of
Idealism for being amenable to totalitarianism (most notably, Popper, 229-82), but
Adorno’s uniqueness lies in the location of a “dominating character” immanent to the
conceptual mechanism of philosophy itself: the schema of discursive conceptual
cognition (inaugurated by Kant) is one based on the exclusion of particularity (“nonidentity”) in favor of the general level of the concept (or “identity”). Such a centering of
philosophy around the concept is largely inherited by Hegel, who sought to elevate
Kant’s subjective transcendental exercise to the ontological level of conceptual “logic”
(SOL, 25-28; Ng, 10-15).
A unique facet of Adorno’s post-Idealism lies in his Hegelian insistence on the
conceptual-discursive nature of cognition: one has no access to the material or natural
world other than subjective categories. Despite his criticisms of the pathological nature of
enlightenment cognition, Adorno is emphatic that “necessity compels philosophy to
operate with concepts” (ND, 11-12, 5-7). Adorno’s critical upshot for the thought of
nature lies in his refusal to uphold any pure un-mediated realm of nature independent of
history, in the Hegelian parlance, no “sense certainty” independent of the conceptual
mediations of Geist (PS, 66). Adorno’s thought constantly resists the temptations of
“authenticity” or “origin”; instead, one must always begin in a mediated fashion, in the
middle, continually within the “circle of circles” (Hegel, EL, 39). In critically reflecting
on the essentially conceptual nature of thought, philosophy does not dispense with the

As will be argued in Chapter 5, Schelling similarly fractures the epistemic subject: revealing it as a
tensioned space of drives (or productive potencies), such that it is dethroned from its position of
sovereignty. Further, in his middle work, Schelling’s proto-psychoanalytic vision figures history as abortive
and crisis laden—as acting out God’s (natural) pathologies (Rajan, “The Abyss of the Past,” Par, 26-9).
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concept wholesale; instead it arrives at the recognition that “In truth, all concepts refer to
non-conceptualities” (ND, 11); that is, the concept is grounded—via “determinate
negation”—on that which it is not, or that which it differs from, within the broader
constellation of objects and linguistic expressions (ND, 18-19, 52-3, 162-66).69 Such an
employment of the concept under erasure highlights the performative nature of “nonidentity,” an ephemeral realm beyond the concept that can be approached experimentally,
in a manner akin to “semblance” in aesthetic experience: “In semblance, non-semblance
is promised” (ND, 404-5).
Adorno’s negative dialectic continually exposes the “identity-thinking” of
conceptual rationality, to its phantasmatic other—somatic “non-identical” particularity
(ND, 8)—forcing the concept to tarry with its negative relationship to the world. Adorno
follows Hegel’s meta-critique of philosophy as an exercise of “mere epistemology” (PS,
58-103), with “non-identity thinking,” connoting a mode of conceptual thought that is
aware of the limitations and proper scope of discursive cognition (Cook, Nature, 74).
Thus, despite his critiques, Adorno remains committed to a defense of conceptual thought
in tension with the sensuous and autogenetic realm of nature understood as a
constellation of moments— “non-conceptuality, individuality, and particularity” (ND,
8)—left out by the determinate nature of the concept.
Adorno should be seen as one who opens philosophical discursive cognition to
natural-historical particularity through an engagement with natural transience and
negatively by way of the “second nature” of the aesthetic domain. Despite his critiques of
Idealism, Adorno’s corpus as a whole demonstrates an immanent “working through” of
German Idealism refashioning its concepts so as to present possible “thought models,” or
“historical constellations,” through which philosophy can relate to the natural world in a
less oppressive manner. Broadly speaking, through practices of critical self-reflection (or
“Critical Theory”), thought can become aware of its destructive urges and endeavor to act
otherwise (ND, 1-5; 406-8; Zuidervaart, 163; Cook, Nature, 131- 132, 153-4).70 Adorno

Such an understanding of language bears an evident affinity with Derrida’s notion of language as
“Différance,” see “Différance” (3-19).
70
As Cook writes, “radical change presupposes a critical understanding of the tendencies and behaviors
that now thwart effective political action,” a task undertaken by self-reflexive “Critical Theory,” which
69
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critiques “subjectivist” systems of thought—such as positivism, subjective Idealism, and
phenomenology—which commence with “constitutive subjectivity” (ND, xx), positing a
primacy to the subject and its categories, thus unconsciously denying the dynamic and
historical character of both the natural world and human thought (ND, xx; Epistemology,
3-31). However, Adorno’s Schopenhauerian pessimism should lead to reservations as to
the extent to which thought could comport itself other than in a controlling fashion, as
Adorno seems to provide few points of hope, other than the mystical “immediacy” of
mimesis, or the deus ex machina of the (modernist) aesthetic (Vogel, Nature, 69-71, 80-3,
95-8; Taubes, 70-6).71
Against such stereotypes, throughout this dissertation I argue that the aesthetic
plays a crucial role in allowing philosophy to move beyond mere conceptuality,
introducing the sensuous realm and other modes of (aesthetic) experience into thought,
figuring the possibility of a more porous and sympathetic model of rationality (as I will
argue in 2.3). For Adorno, a key aim of the aesthetic lies in its “redemption of illusion”
(AT, 107; Zuidervaart, 178-216), that is, a fracturing of the concept by those provisional
domains it supposedly surpassed (such as art, nature, or religion), redeeming a notion of
surface, or (dialectical) immediacy by way of aesthetic experience. Throughout Aesthetic
Theory, Adorno extensively considers the relationship(s) between art, nature, and
philosophy (61-78; Cook, Nature, 45-6, 60-1), a relationship which will be explored in
more depth in Ch. 6. devoted to Hegel by way of Adorno’s notion of “natural–beauty”
(6.2.3.1). Adorno embraces nature’s “non-existence,” understanding its social
construction as a “mediated placeholder of immediacy,” and through such an essayistic
embrace of mediated second nature, hopes to save a space, so as to allow nature to

“plumbs our natural history, examining the trends and tendencies that now undermine effective practice”
(Nature, 131- 132, 153-4). Cook further calls for “a new form of language” which would “reflect the
longings of the oppressed and the plight of nature” (Nature, 88).
71
J. Taubes contrasts the eschatological visions of Benjamin and Adorno. For Benjamin “The drawbridge
comes from the other side. And when you get fetched or not, as Kafka describes it, is not up to you. One
can take the elevators up to the high-rises of spirituality—it won’t help...there is a prius, an a priori.
Something has to happen from the other side; then we see, when our eyes are pierced open. Otherwise we
see nothing... [Benjamin] maintains the Messiah and doesn’t let it drift into neutrality,” whereas “Adorno
can’t let go. He’s an aesthete, after all. Music then has a soteriological role. Neither Benjamin not Barth
could go for such naïve notions” (Political Theology, 76 cf. 70-5).
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flourish: “Through total mediation…a new immediacy, a new humanity would arise”
(Prisms. 250).
Adorno’s (and Benjamin’s) employment of “natural history” is “not concerned
with natural history in the traditional, prescientific sense of a history of nature, nor with
the history of nature where nature is the object of natural science” (Hullot-Kentor, 252).
It is rather an allegorical vision of history subject to “nature, ruin and trauma” (Rajan,
“Natural history,” 187). As an image it does not culminate in some enlightenment vision
of historical providence, nor in the straightforward self-organization of the great chain of
being. Natural history stresses the ruined, contingent, incomplete, and accidental
character of all intellectual constructions. Both Hegel and Schelling seemingly figure
nature (and other domains such as art-aesthetics, history, and philosophy) prodialectically in terms of a “series of graduated stages” (Stufenfolge), presenting an
evolutionary narrative of upward self-organization, as spheres evolve, becoming
increasingly complex (Schelling, FO, 53-6; Rajan, “Evolution,” 153, 162). However, it is
far too common to caricature the absolute Idealism of Hegel and Schelling in such an
evolutionary-teleological manner, a conception contravened by the fact that their work
provides a plethora of contingent natural historical moments—or accidents—which
“resist” such teleological narratives (Rajan, “Evolution,” 153). In this dissertation, I favor
such a natural historical, or mortuary, vision of Idealism which focuses on its diremptive
failures, rather than its overarching logical systems.
Much remains to be said regarding Adorno’s assertions of the “natural character”
of historical processes (see “World Spirit and Natural History,” ND, 300-58), a gesture
which brings his work into constellation with the Freud of Civilization and its
Discontents, whereby latent “nature” manifests in the pathological and destructive forces
of history (55-6, 77-82, 105-112). In the lineage of ecological thought, it is Adorno’s
critique of “the natural,” or the de-naturalizing of nature, that should be seen as
particularly efficacious: “nature” is not some mythological-fateful substratum— “what
has always been, what is fatefully arranged” (NH, 253)—but rather, a concept which has
a historical genesis. Following Marx, for Adorno, “all reification is a forgetting” (DE,
191); that is, in capitalist-modernity historical social relations are “naturalized” as
fetishes that mask their historical development, looming above the subject as a “second
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nature” (NH, 261-2, 268-9). In this way, an essential task of critical social theory entails
the construction of “changing historical constellations,” which allow for interpretations of
reality which estrange one from it, allowing one to grasp what is seemingly “natural” in
its historical genesis (AP, 127- 128). In general, such critiques of mythology are
conducted within “second nature,” that is, within the realm of convention, of sociocultural “mythologies.” What is needed is a further extension of this concept into the
realm of “first nature”: a decoding of the material-social forces latent in nature itself,
along with an analysis of the discourses we employ to speak and act with respect to such
a world. Put otherwise, one should read “first nature” as a cipher, as a sedimented site of
material-historical trajectories.72

1.4

The Negative Dialectic: The Impossible Possibility of Philosophy
“Philosophy can always go astray, which is the sole reason it can go forward.” Adorno, ND, 14.

Adorno describes the “negative dialectic” as an intellectual “laying of cards on the
table,” or a “methodological account of what I do in general” (ND, xix; Lectures ND, 5).
In light of such proclamations one can read the completed text of Negative Dialectics
(1966) as the crystallization of Adorno’s critical-social epistemology, while his prolific
output of texts and lectures (1960-6) sought to enact the method of the negative dialectic
through its application to a diversity of domains. The fact that many of the central
moments of Negative Dialectics are rehearsed or articulated elsewhere gives the text a
mosaic and composite quality: it maintains the fragmentary and incomplete quality of
“the essay” against the absolute closure of the philosophical system. Nancy has drawn
attention to the “speculative” character of Hegel’s “remarks” (Zusätze), which
continually proliferate against Hegel’s attempt to bind philosophy within the restricted
economy of “the encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences” (Speculative, 7-19, 75-101;
Hegel, EO, 51-55l).73 Hegel’s lectures—along with editions of his Logic and Philosophy

Two theorists who exemplify such a natural-historical reading of nature are W. Cronon, who exposes the
mythology of “wilderness” as a scene of imperialist domination (“Wilderness,” 7-28); and T. Ingold, who
reads the supposedly natural “landscape” as a rebus to history and human temporality (“Landscape,” 15274).
73
Occasioned by “the Remark that the Science of Logic devotes to the Aufhebung” (13), Nancy examines a
subterranean “economy of remarks” (48) subtending Hegel’s thought, such that each Hegelian text “gives
72
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of Nature—are shot through with such remarks, such that the final unity of his system is
troubled by way of countless possible detours.74 Negative Dialectics embraces this
“speculative quality” (PS, 22; Nancy, Speculative, 53-101) of philosophical cognition,
employing the fragmentary form of the constellation such that the various moments
differentially refract each other in singularity, while also (negatively) forming an aspect
of a broader mosaic-network.
In light of Nancy’s analysis, Adorno’s “negative dialectic” should not be seen as
an isolated text, but rather, as the animating method of Adorno’s writing. Thus, in its
articulation here, reference will be made to other texts and essays in order to elucidate its
central tenets. Adorno’s “anti-system” attempts “To use the strength of the subject to
break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity” (ND, xx). That is, Adorno
deconstructs the traditional enlightenment subject in an attempt to theorize the
relationship between systematicity and experience anew. Negative dialectics deconstructs
the polarities of “relativism and absolutism” (Lectures ND, 149) with respect to the
philosophical system: it contravenes the absolutism of the absolute Idealist systemencyclopedia (that would attempt to subsume the entirety of reality by way of the
concept), while it also moves against a relativist irrationalism that would dispense with
the system all together. As has been argued throughout, Adorno’s post-Idealism splinters
and re-appropriates conventional Idealist “concepts and categories,” while not dispensing
with them entirely (ND, 134-211). Adorno plays on the self-fracturing quality of
Idealism itself, favouring the “accident” (Hegel, PS, 18) or an Idealism without absolutes,
as opposed to absolute systematic closure.

rise to a multiplication of texts” (60). In this manner, though Hegel is often characterized as a thinker of
subsumption and conceptual imperialism, Nancy demonstrates the complex negative network of deferral
operating within the Hegelian encyclopedia, such that Hegel can be seen (equally) as a thinker of negativity
and speculative proliferation. Describing the uniquely “speculative” character of Hegel’s German language,
Nancy rephrases a remark from Hegel (of the Logic), “German has many advantages over other modern
languages; some of its words even possess the further peculiarity of having not only different but opposite
meaning so that one cannot fail to recognize a speculative spirit of language in them” (Speculative, 61).
74
Not all Zusätze were included by Hegel himself, as the published Encyclopedia (in Hegel’s lifetime) did
not include remarks. These were added (as adaptations of Hegel’s lecture notes) to the collected editions of
Hegel by his students Boumann (to the Logic) and Michelet (to the Philosophy of Nature), such that the
texts have a hybrid and collaborative character.
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In the first part of the published text (“Relation to Ontology: 1. The Ontological
Need. 2. Being and Existence,” ND, 61-133), Adorno forcefully rejects the “fundamental
ontologies” of his contemporaries, while criticizing the more general movement of
philosophy towards ontology. To follow Adorno’s fractured Idealism, one cannot claim
to grasp some fundamental substrate (or “Being”) independent of the subject’s categories:
ontology (as espoused by Heidegger in particular) hypostasizes the subject’s
epistemological perspective as a knowledge of the thing-in-itself (ND, 69-72). Such
critiques are continued in Adorno’s polemical text, The Jargon of Authenticity (1964),
which, though published separately, was originally intended for inclusion within ND, and
contains many relevant criticisms of ontology and the “jargon” of existentialist
philosophy.75 Adorno then goes on to articulate his own model of critical social
philosophy (“Negative Dialectics. Concept and Categories,” ND, 134-210), models he
then places in dialogue with Kantian ethics, and Hegelian historical philosophy
respectively (“Freedom: On the Meta-Critique of Practical Reason,” ND, 211-99; “World
Spirit and Natural History: An Excursus on Natural History,” ND, 300-60).76 The text
ends with essayistic fragments reminiscent of Minima Moralia, which articulate the main
motifs of Adorno’s nebulous notion of “metaphysical experience” (“Meditations on
Metaphysics,” ND, 361-408).77
Despite its daunting and tome-like quality, the completed text of Negative
Dialektik (1966) is a fragmentary and essayistic work in which the various sections are
arranged in a tensioned mosaic. Likewise, the relationship between ND and the
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For more on the complex relationship between Adorno and Heidegger, see Macdonald and Ziarek (Ed.),
Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions (2007).
76
Within these sections in particular, Adorno undertakes a sustained critique of the theory-praxis relation,
in specific relation to the Marxist primacy of practical-political engagement. (ND, 365-8; Zuidervaart, 4876). Adorno moves against “eastern bloc” communism, instead developing an Idealist model in which
philosophy criticizes itself, endeavoring to theorize the possibility of metaphysics after the failure of
Marxist programs (ND, 405-8).
77
In this way, the project of “negative dialectics” should be seen as encompassing not just Adorno’s 1966
published work, but also, his entire circle of production from 1958-69, including texts such as Aesthetic
Theory (1969), the Jargon of Authenticity (1964), Prisms (1962), Critical Models (1963/9), and Hegel:
Three Studies (1963), along with the surrounding lectures, Metaphysics (1965), Lectures on Negative
Dialectics (1965), Introduction to Sociology (1968), Problems of Moral Philosophy(1963), and Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason(1959). I further contend that the negative dialectic is also latent in Adorno’s 19312 lectures, “On the Actuality of Philosophy” (1931) and “The Idea of Natural History” (1932), lectures
which set the coordinates for his mature philosophy (see Buck-Morss, “Introduction,” 119).
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unfinished Ästhetische Theorie (1970)—or between philosophy and aesthetics more
broadly—cannot be finally settled, and the two domains remain in productive conflict
throughout Adorno’s oeuvre. In the following sections, several of the central features of
Adorno’s negative dialectical model of thought will be articulated. Firstly (in 1.4.1), the
aesthetic-linguistic “philosophical formalism” of negative dialectics will be described,
whereby it will be argued that, via an engagement with form, Adorno is able to present a
provisional rapprochement between philosophy and aesthetics (more about which will be
said in Ch. 2). Following such a formal analysis, the epistemic armature of the negative
dialectic will be presented as one that involves a deconstruction of the Idealist “subjectobject” model of philosophical cognition (1.4.2).
1.4.1 The Form of Negative Dialectics: “The Essay as Form” (On Writing)
“Instead of reducing philosophy to categories, the task in a sense is to compose it.” Adorno, Lectures ND,
150.

In what follows I will provide an interpretation of Adorno’s 1958 “Essay as
Form,” in correspondence with Benjamin’s early philosophy of language (up to the
“Epistemo-Critical Prologue,” of his 1925/8 Trauerspiel) and Lukács’ “On the Nature
and Form of the Essay” (1911). I argue that Adorno’s “Essay as Form” is a manifesto for
his essayistic “philosophical formalism,” or the correct model for a post-Auschwitz
philosophy. Adorno positions the essay (the form of his philosophy in general) against
the “universal and enduring” claims of the Idealist architectonic—with its encyclopedic
conquest of reality by way of rational thought. Against such absolute pretentions, the
essay employs a cunning awareness of “luck and play” (NL I: 4), emphasizing the
precarious and “finite character” of philosophical inquiry. As a historical entity, thought
is at risk to the same forces it seeks to describe. To follow Benjamin—whom Adorno
mentions as a quintessential “essayistic thinker” (NL I: 3)—philosophy must be erected
upon the historical transience of “allegory,” not the a-historical “symbol” (OT, 172,
188).78 For Adorno, such a fragmentary and essayistic model of presentation—with an
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Halmi (in Genealogy of the Romantic Symbol (2007)) glosses the enlightenment encyclopedia as desiring
the form of the symbol, that is, as aiming for timeless unity over against historical genesis and contingency
(27-33).
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emphasis on the precarity of the subject, and the “transience” of historical entities—must
take the place of the traditional Idealist philosophical system. However, such a model
does not necessitate the wholesale abandonment of the philosophical architectonic in
favour of some irrationalism, or some Heideggerian post-metaphysical “task of thinking”
(see, Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy,” 427-49). As Adorno is careful to note, “The
essay is both more open and more closed than traditional thought would like” (NL I:17),
it has a responsibility, “not only to authorities and committees; but the object itself” (NL
I: 6). Philosophy, for Adorno, should proceed immanently from the object, thus should
not be judged based on systematic coherence, but rather, on the extent to which it is able
to “unleash the power of the text [or object]” (NL I: 4). In this way, philosophy should
not be evaluated based on its architectonic completeness, or logical validity, but rather, to
the extent that it is able to provoke “reflection” with respect to its object, while eliciting
further subjective “shudders.”
Because of its inability to appeal to conventional modes of systematic authority,
philosophy is condemned to “work emphatically at the form of its presentation” (NL
I:18): thought must experiment with alternative models of intellectual grounding while
reflecting on its existence within language, conceding that thought takes place “in
language and not through language” (Benjamin, SW 1: 63). Such a linguistic-formal turn
places a new emphasis upon language as a transcendental condition for thought, which
must constantly consider the importance of “presentation” [Darstellung] in the practice of
thought, as opposed to simply deferring to the authority of the philosophical system or
deductive logic. Adorno follows Benjamin’s “Epistemo-Critical” linguistic method,
which is described in his Trauerspiel: “If philosophy is to preserve the law of its form not
as a mediating guide to knowledge but as a presentation (Darstellung) of truth, then it is
necessary to emphasize the practice of this form—not, however, its anticipation within
the system” (OT, 2; GS I: 203).
Along with Benjamin’s theory of language (which will be further discussed in
3.4), Lukács’ early writings serve as an important reference point in the development of
Adorno’s philosophical formalism, or model of philosophy as essay. In “On the Nature
and Form of the Essay,” which opens The Soul and Form (1911), Lukács seeks to
demarcate the fundamental “form” of the essay: “The essay has a form which separates it,

41

with the rigor of law, from all other art forms” (“Essay,” 2). For Lukács, the essay entails
a necessarily Platonic abstraction from the world of poetry, which knows no questions,
only the immanence of “life.” Poetry, as the “criticism of life,” experiences an imagistic
immediacy with respect to things, while “critics and Platonist[s]…reach out most
passionately for what lies behind the image”; violently disturbing this poetic immediacy,
the essay gets “at significance” (Ibid, 6). Through the discovery of “significance,” the
critic is able to arrange art and life within a broader progression of forms: “were one to
compare the forms of literature with sunlight refracted in a prism, the writing of essays
would be the ultraviolet rays” (Lukács, “Essay,” 7). In this movement of abstraction, the
critic ironically plays at the dialectic of “being accidental and being necessary” (Ibid., 1518): in turning away from life as it is “lived” and immersing themselves in downcast and
insignificant details, the critic attempts to speak of “life” through indirect and negative
means. Whereas poetry speaks of “life (and art)” the essay can only model “art (and life)”
retroactively after the fact—after the conclusion of the day’s events (Lukács, “Essay,” 10;
Hegel, Right, 23).
One can see in Lukács’ model the same nostalgia for a lost “golden age”—in
which existential “homelessness” would be alleviated—that pervades much of his early
work (see, Novel, 29-39). Though Lukács upholds the “fragmentariness [of the essay]
against the petty completeness of scientific explanation” (“Essay,” 17), he longs for the
great aesthetes of modern life who would reconcile soul and form, awakening “the
charnel house of dead interiorities” (Novel, 24). For Lukács the nostalgic, the mediation
of modern (capitalist) life is not something to be celebrated, but rather, mourned, as
Lukács reveals his final affinity with an Idealist-Platonism: “life, too, has its golden ages
and its lost paradises” (“Essay, 12”).79 Adorno rejects Lukács’ quest to rigidly define the
essay as a Platonism vis-à-vis life; for Adorno, no such ideal forms exist, only
fragmentary natural-historical constructions. According to Adorno, the writer of the essay

Adorno criticizes Lukács’ salvific narratives (via Benjamin) in his “Idea of Natural History,” decrying
that Lukács “can only think of this charnel house in terms of a theological resurrection, in an eschatological
context,” and further, “[Lukácian] second nature could only be brought back to life, if ever, by a
metaphysical act of reawakening the spiritual element that created or maintained it in its earlier or ideal
existence, but could never be experienced by another interiority” (NH, 252).
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must learn to be at home in “second nature” and mediation—to be a flâneur in “modern
life”—not, like Lukács, to long for its secret abolition, upholding a secret faith in the
return of the “golden age.”
The upshot of Adorno’s (and Benjamin’s) philosophical formalism80 lies in the
expanded notion of philosophical grounding it provides, allowing a divergent array of
particular “micrological” experiences to enter into discussion with philosophy,
challenging its categories in experimental directions. As Adorno writes, the essay “allows
for the consciousness of non-identity,” rebelling against the doctrine “that what is
transient, and ephemeral is un-worthy of philosophy” (NL I: 9-10).81 Instead, the essay
wants “to use concepts to pry open the aspects of its object that cannot be accommodated
by concepts” (NL I: 23). With this opening of thought towards transience, the essay takes
on a natural-historical character, embracing the precarious experimental nature of
philosophical constructions. Instead of the enlightenment domination of nature and “nonidentity” with its determinate categories, philosophy holds a historical mirror up to the urtransience of nature. As Adorno writes, “Spellbound by what is fixed and agreed to be
derived, the essay honours nature, by confirming that it exists no longer for people” (NL
I: 19). The essay turns its gaze towards the downcast, the derived, the “accident” (Hegel,
PS, 18), that which is historical, particular, and transient, moments discarded by the
traditional philosophical architectonic with its quests for eternal ideas and harmonious
systems (ND, 8-9). That is, philosophy attempts (following art) the “redemption of
illusion” (AT, 107; Zuidervaart, 178-213): it attempts to redeem the particular “nonidentical” moment beyond the reach of the concept, though immanently, from within
natural-historical forms. As with aesthetics, the essay immerses itself in the mediation of
“second nature” so as to catch a distorted glimpse of “first nature” (Paddison, 108). Such
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Philosophical formalism should not be taken in the literary critical sense, but rather, as a model of
philosophy which commences with an analysis of language, or form, as key analyses by Benjamin and
Adorno do. See further, Robinson, Adorno on Form (1-11, 67-69, 133-5).
81
The idea of a philosophy of “the downcast,” or the “dregs of reality,” is described further in Adorno’s
Negative Dialectics, where he writes: “The matters of true philosophical interest… are non- conceptuality,
individuality, and particularly—things which ever since Plato used to be dismissed as transitory and
insignificant” (ND, 8). Such a model is highly indebted to Benjamin’s “micrological gaze” (Adorno,
Prisms, 229, 240). Nietzsche also chastised previous systems of thought from the perspective of abjection,
“Philosophers are prejudiced against appearance, change, pain, death, the corporeal, the senses, fate and
bondage, the aimless” (Will, 220). See further, Buck Morss, Origin (74-6).
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a redemption of nature is not undertaken by incorporating such “non-identical” moments
into the concept, but rather, through the recognition of thought’s inevitable inadequacy in
the face of reality, a “shudder” of self-renunciation, respecting the fact that “objects do
not go into their concepts without leaving some remainder” (ND, 5).82 Through such
gestures of self-fracturing, or negation, philosophy is able to encounter alternative logics
beyond the scope of the concept, the most notable of which is “mimesis,” as Adorno
writes:
As opposed to the total domination of method, it [philosophy] contains the element of play
as a corrective that the traditional conception of it as a science would like to expunge. It is
the most serious thing of all, but is not as serious as all that. …To represent the thing it has
repressed, namely mimesis, the concept has no alternative but to incorporate some of it into
its own behaviour.” (Lectures ND, 187)83

The formal logic of “the constellation”—which arranges concepts in expressive
mosaics—allows for a new form of philosophical grounding which supports Adorno’s
expanded sense of philosophy. For Benjamin, through a careful attention to language (in
practices of poetics and translation), philosophy can attune an attentiveness to the
expressive and mimetic dimensions of language (as I will argue in 3.4.3). By arranging
concepts in constellation, philosophy is able to relate to the world in an expressive and
non-reductive manner, while not wholly dispensing the concept. Describing his immanent
conceptual logic, in which concepts arranged in “a mosaic” kaleidoscopically illuminate
each other, Adorno will write:
The alternative would be to assemble concepts in such a way that their constellation might
shed light on the non-conceptual…these concepts would not be fixed…in isolation from
the objects, but thrown in with them, abandoning the delusion that concepts that had been
created for themselves also existed intrinsically in themselves…This means that theory
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For Adorno, it is the method of dialectics that can best lead to this confrontation of philosophy with
alterity: “Dialectics represents the attempt to incorporate into philosophy whatever is heterogeneous,
philosophy’s other we might call it.” (Lectures ND, 57).
83
Nathan Ross (in his Aesthetic Experience) has noted the extent to which Adorno is indebted to Schiller’s
notions of “semblance and play” (31-64, 193-233), that is, through a playful encounter with the world as “it
seems” (semblance) one is able to encounter the world according to different logics other than discursive
cognition. Alluding to such a possibility in his lectures on metaphysics, Adorno will write: “One must, as it
were, include common sense and human triviality in metaphysical meaning; one must incorporate it in
speculation as the principle which ensures that the world merely is and not otherwise, if the depth of
speculation is not to be false, that is, a depth with confers an illusory meaning” (Metaphysics, 114). For
more on the relationship between Adorno’s work and Schillerian modes of aesthetic experience see, Ross
(46-47, 55-58, 174, 236-7).
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would cease to be a matter of subsumption; it would instead define the relation of the
different conceptual elements among themselves (Lectures ND, 192).84

Such gestures represent Adorno’s attempt to formulate a new logic of the concept, one
not based on “subsumption,” or the seizure of the object [Begriff—greifen], but rather,
one which is open to the object in its particularity, and hence is able to “define the
relation of different conceptual elements among themselves.” Adorno, following
Benjamin, attempts to re-awaken an expressive understanding of language (which I will
articulate in 3.4), whereby alternative logics, such as mimesis and semblance are allowed
a place in philosophy (ND, 18-19, 52-3, 162-66). Throughout these considerations
“mimesis” will be broadly understood as a constellation of expressive and non-discursive
logics left out of the traditional philosophical concept (as will be elaborated in 3.4.3).
Adorno’s caustic modernist prose should be seen as an attempt to open philosophy in
such mimetic directions, recovering an “aesthetic dignity of words”: “In order to posit a
new truth, there remains... no hope other than to place the words in a new configuration,
which would itself yield such a new truth” (Adorno, “Theses on Language”, 38).85
In these senses, Adorno’s considerations related to the formal elements of
philosophy represent a provisional rapprochement between philosophy and aesthetics,
given that philosophy is compelled to reflect upon its own formal conditions, that is, its
existence within language and mediation. More will be said regarding the critical power
of aesthetics in the following chapter (2.3) of these considerations. Following Benjamin,
the task of a coming philosophy entails the recognition of language as a transcendental
condition of philosophy (3.4); for Adorno, the essay form most adequately engages with
this mediated situation of thought.

Differentiating the constellation (or “essay”) from the conventional philosophical architectonic, Adorno
writes: “[In the architectonic] all...concepts are to be presented in such a way that they support one another,
that each becomes articulated through its configuration with others. In the essay discrete elements set off
against each other come together to form a readable context; the essay erects no scaffolding and no
structure. But the elements crystalize as a configuration through their motion. The constellation is a force
field, just as every intellectual structure is necessarily transformed under the essay’s gaze” (NL I:13).
85
Further describing the disenchanted linguistic context which the philosopher of language confronts (and
the possibility of “freedom” via linguistic allegorical reconfiguration), Adorno writes: “Today the
philosopher confronts disintegrated language. The ruins of words are his material, to which history binds
him; his freedom is solely the possibility of their configuration according to the force of truth in them. He is
as little permitted to think the word as pre-given as to invert a word” (“Theses,” 37). For more on the
linguistic element of Adorno’s thought, see Gandesha, “Aesthetic Dignity” (78-102).
84
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1.4.2 Negative Dialectics and Epistemology: On the Subject and Object
“Consciousness itself is the absolute dialectical unrest, this medley of sensuous and intellectual
representations whose differences coincide, and whose identity is equally again dissolved, for it is itself
determinateness as contrasted with the non-identical. But it is just in this process that this consciousness,
instead of being self-identical, is in fact nothing but a purely causal, confused medley, the dizziness of a
perpetually self-engendered disorder.” Hegel, PS, 124.

In this section, Adorno’s “subject-object” model of cognition will be elaborated
via an examination of his interventions upon the critical Kantian critical program (in his
lecture course, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 1959), alongside a reading of his 1963
essay “On the Subject and Object.” The development of a fractured negative dialectical
“subject-object” model of consciousness is one of the key aims of the negative dialectic,
and again reveals the extent to which Adorno is committed to upholding moments of the
Kantian and Hegelian program in productive tension, refashioning epistemic models from
the work of each. Adorno’s thinking apropos of the disaster elaborates a broad movement
of philosophy towards the “primacy of the object” [Vorrang des Objeckts]: philosophy
must move away from the “fallacy of constitutive subjectivity,” which posits that the
subject and its categories come first (as Kant does), towards the object, recognizing the
prior rank of something other than oneself and one’s conceptual givens (ND, 183-188 //
182-7, xx). In the paradoxical language of the opening of Negative Dialectics, philosophy
must use a minimal “strength of the subject” to move “beyond the subject” (ND, xx). In
Kantian terms, this entails coming to recognize logics other than those provided by the
transcendental deduction, such as those inherent in nature itself, alongside other reflective
encounters with alterity. However, for Adorno, such criticisms should not discount the
radicalism of Kant’s “Copernican turn”—the recognition that the mind does not conform
to objects, but rather “the object” is itself a construction of the subject’s categories—
which is why Adorno is careful to specify his intervention as an “axial shift” (ND, xx) of
the Copernican turn, and not a wholesale abandonment.86 Any student of epistemology,

Describing his own reorientation of metaphysics in relation to Copernicus’ astronomical insights, Kant
writes: “Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming
that objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the request of a possibility of an
a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This
would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the
explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the
observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars
at rest” (CPR, 110).
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specifically in its German instantiations, should maintain a minimal regard for the Idealist
position: how can one have access to “the object” (or the world in general) other than
through the categories of the subject?87 Adorno’s position is not to deny the subject and
its categories a central role in cognition, but rather, to emphasize the dynamic and
reciprocal character of the “subject-object” model of cognition: the subject and its
categories do not wholly encompass the object. Further, the subject must open itself to
transformative metaphysical experiences which come by way of the object. To follow
Hegel, “consciousness itself is the absolute dialectical unrest” (Hegel, PS, 124), that is, it
is the experience of having one’s categories and suppositions wrecked by the realities of
the world, or the absolute “conflict” between the empirical and transcendental domains.
Adorno remains an Idealist—though a materially and critically inflected one— and his
work should be seen as providing an Idealist-modernist rebuttal to those who would
summarily dismiss such a tradition.
Despite Adorno’s well documented allegiance to the Hegelian program, in the
domain of epistemology he also remains an eminent Kantian, as Adorno positions the
finitude of the Kantian subject in tension with Hegel’s absolute Idealism, criticizing both
by way of each other. For Adorno (particularly in his 1959 lecture course, Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason), Kant marks a watershed moment in the history of philosophy
as one who attempted to “salvage” something of classical metaphysics from the fires of
skepticism and empiricism. As such, Kant remains important as one who develops a
rigorously critical, though anti-foundational (in the sense of an ontology), system of
thought. It is within Kant’s work that Adorno—along with Horkheimer (Philosophy &
Social Science, 19-20)—dates the first emergence of the critical-enlightenment subject of
the Western tradition: the enlightened subject who was able to “use [its] own
understanding” exercising one’s autonomous reasoning power in a public manner (Kant,

Here I mean to put pressure on the charge of “correlationsim” with which Meillassoux criticizes much of
German Idealism. For Meillassoux, “correlationism” refers to “the idea according to which we only ever
have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from
the other’ (Finitude, 5). According to Meillassoux, deep temporal events and ontological crises of
extinction put existential strain on the subject-object relation. Adorno’s work in particular, though also that
of Hegel and Schelling, shows the dynamic manners in which this subject-object relation can be
experimentally recast so as to respond to Meillassoux’s objections.
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“Enlightenment,” 54). Further, Kant’s work, specifically during the critical period, can be
read as an epistemology of finitude or a doctrine of epistemic modesty, which preserves
the “noble feature of the thing-in-itself” (Kant, 129), recognizing the fundamental
“block” (Kant, 170-79), or “non-identity,” at the heart of cognition (ND, 5). For Adorno,
this recognition of “something more,” beyond the concepts and categories of the subject
presents cognition with a minimal negative utopic moment—through the recognition of
its own limitations, the subject is able to step back, allowing for other forms of
flourishing (Adorno & Bloch, 12-13). The recovery of such a minimal notion of
transcendence also occurs in Adorno’s discussion of the sublime (via the dialectical
image “natural-beauty”) which will be explore in more depth in 6.2.3.1 of these
considerations.
Adorno does not simply cast aside Kant in favour of Hegel, but rather, works to
examine and problematize the constitutive antinomies of the Kantian architectonic, such
as those between nature and freedom and the distinction between empirical and
transcendental.88 In the end, Adorno felt the Kantian attempt to grasp all that can be
known through a finite transcendental table of categories was a tragically noble, though
ultimately failed, endeavour. As Adorno states:
With this the Critique of Pure Reason represents the first great attempt in modern
times—or perhaps we should say the first and also the last great attempt, and one
doomed to failure—to master through mere concepts all that cannot be mastered by
concepts. And what the concepts express is that by establishing “identity” they are
simultaneously compelled to acknowledge the fact of “non-identity.” (Kant, 234)

As such, Kant’s various distinctions, positions, questions, and above all, his terminology
will play an important role in the formulation of Adorno’s own expanded notion of

Adorno describes the starting point of his own “dialectical conception of philosophy” as a problematizing
of the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental (or the concept): “If there is a point at
which the transition to a dialectical conception of philosophy is compelling, this would seem to me the
place to start. There is no empirical self without the concept, with those elements not reducible to mere
existence and objectivity” (Lectures ND, 148). As Adorno stresses throughout his oeuvre, the subject must
be seen as containing within it both social and spontaneous elements, neither of which can fully reduce or
ontologize the subject. In this way, the Adornian self, to follow Foucault, should be seen as a “empiricotranscendental doublet” (Order, 322). Elsewhere in Negative Dialectics, Adorno associates metaphysical
experience with a Kantian notion of freedom, a subject which acts “as-if” it is free from natural
compulsion: “Rather the possibility of metaphysical experience is akin to the possibility of freedom, and it
takes an unfolded subject, one that has torn the bonds as salutary, to be capable of freedom” (ND, 397).
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experience. Adorno, Benjamin, Schelling and Hegel all recognize this duality in the
Kantian program, criticizing his limitations, while maintaining a reverence for his
transcendental approach to philosophy, meta-critically harnessing the Kantian program so
as to interrogate philosophy in relation to marginal domains such as aesthetics and nature.
Fundamentally, Adorno opposes the comprehensive nature of the Kantian
architectonic—with its claim that it could account for “all possible experience”—and he
emphatically asserts that the whole idea that a “finite system of categories [could]
provide us with a pure system of knowledge” must be “scotched” (Lectures ND, 80-81).
Yet such a “scotching” does not necessitate the wholesale abandonment of the
transcendental, or other Kantian categories and ideas, but rather, a radical revision of the
relationship between transcendental and empirical, opening philosophy to an infinity of
“possible objects” through the creation of speculative constellations of ideas.89 Instead of
trying to grasp infinite ideas, or to explain the infinite by way of finite table of categories,
philosophy should open itself to an infinite mosaic of “possible objects.” For Adorno, this
amounts to an existential secularization of metaphysics, a critical attempt to force an
encounter of philosophy with its own existential precarity, compelling philosophy to
recognize the finite nature of its categories: “If philosophy should possess anything at all
it should be finite, not infinite” (Lectures ND, 80). Thought should move away from
attempts to grasp the infinite by way of the subject (or its transcendental categories),
striving instead to open itself to the infinite diversity of possible objects. As Adorno
writes, “philosophy should seek its contents in the unlimited diversity of objects”
(Lectures ND, 81), not as Kant does, in the formal analyses of the categories of the
subject. In such ways, Adorno aims at an opening and continual epigenesis of Kant’s
transcendental method (Adorno, Kant, 210).

Asserting the continued importance of transcendental philosophy, Adorno writes: “What I mean to ask is
what is the substantial meaning that we are left with in Kant? The answer lies in a revision of the concept
of the transcendental” (Kant, 210). Alluding to the importance of a changed concept of infinity in his own
reflections, Adorno will write: “The meta-critical turn against a first philosophy that I am trying to explain
to you from a number of angles is the turn against a finite philosophy that sounds off about the infinite and
simultaneously is unable to appreciate the infinity that constantly eludes it” (Lectures ND, 83). As I will
argue in the next chapter, Benjamin attempts a similar opening and expansion of the Kantian transcendental
(see SW 1: 100-10).
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Adorno is also highly critical (in a Hegelian manner) of the subterranean
metaphysical valences of the Kantian project, those moments in which Kant’s “salvage
operation” “turned into a metaphysics…a metaphysics that, by turning towards the
subject, seeks to salvage transcendence by concealing its existence at the heart of
subjectivity” (Kant, 222). Unconsciously for Kant, where God and transcendence once
were, “reason” now is. In moments such as this, Adorno sees Kant in line with the
tradition of metaphysics that sought to subsume empirical-material particularity by way
of a-historical categories.90 Further, following similar critiques leveled by Benjamin,
Adorno sees Kantian thought as annihilating the diverse domain of “experience,” as
philosophy becomes an abstracted “analysis of form” in which the content (or
experience) is degraded as “something accidental and contingent, something changeable”
(Kant, 44; cf. Benjamin, SW 1: 100-10). Exemplary of this is Kant’s “A Version” of the
“Transcendental Deduction” in which the particular “object” of experience is present
only under erasure, as a mere “Object=x,” which contributes nothing to consciousness
(CPR, 230-243). For Adorno, Kant’s denial of experience continues in the long lineage of
epistemic for-censorship, or “identity-thinking,” which favours sameness over difference,
or the oneness of the concept over the multiplicity of sensuous existence. Adorno
maintains the epistemic finitude of Kant, though within a broader theoretical general
economy, which contests the problematic elements of the Kantian program by presenting
Kant along with his disregarded phantasms.
Adorno’s philosophical interventions necessitate a broader reconfiguration of the
relationship between the “transcendental” and the “empirical,” or what Adorno terms the
“constituens and constitutum” of thought (Kant, 138-60). Adorno attempts to historicize
the transcendental: opening the constitutive categories of thought by way of experience
(Kant, 201). In fact, following Kant, the transcendental subject cannot be conceived
without the empirical realm of consciousness (provided by psychology), and Adorno’s
thought attempts to trouble this distinction in unique ways (without collapsing it):

Describing the latent metaphysical elements of the Kantian program, Adorno will write: “That
knowledge is one and the fact that this one has primacy over the many may be said to be the metaphysical
premise of Kantian philosophy” (Kant, 196).
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examining the moments when empirical or historical occurrences should call for a
revision and opening of transcendental categories.
The unique contribution of Adorno’s thought lies in its ability to maintain
conventional (Idealist) philosophical categories, while opening them towards alterity and
the object. Adorno simultaneously recognizes that such a turn towards “the object” does
not necessitate the wholesale abandonment of “the subject,” but rather, a fracturing or
“shudder” of its constitutive stability. Here Adorno differs from Benjamin, who
constantly advocates an allegorical immersion in the object, and consequently enacts the
total evacuation of the subject as a unique aura, becoming a “post-humanist” avant-garde
thinker. In his eulogy of Benjamin (“Portrait of Walter Benjamin”), Adorno will assert
that Benjamin “conceived the downfall of the subject and the salvation of man as
entwined” (230). As Adorno asserts, in contrast to Benjamin, in his essay, “On Subject
and Object,” “The separation of subject and object is both real and semblance” (CM,
246), and thus must be regulatively maintained. For Adorno, one must simultaneously
move against the myth of a pure givenness: that some pure (human) nature exists
independent of historical genesis, while concurrently rejecting the reality of a pure
transcendental realm of concepts existing independent of natural-historical proclivities.
According to Adorno, what is essential is the maintenance of a constant tension, or “nonidentity,” between the two realms. In this sense, critical philosophy’s “attitude towards
systems” (ND, 20-22) does not strive for the wholesale abandonment of traditional
models of philosophical grounding, but rather, a “negation of the systematic impulse of
philosophy” (NL 1: 18): a movement back towards the critical (enlightenment) subject of
thought, though one endowed with a new constitutive precarity.91 That is, a subject that is
met with the shock or “shudder” that it is not wholly master over nature or “the object.”
Adorno critically reminds theory of the role played by subjective categories in the
maintenance of existing (political) reality. Following Lukács, Adorno argues that the
“Critique of society is critique of knowledge and vice versa” (CM, 250), and further,
“The subject’s reflection upon its own formalism is reflection upon society” (CM, 247).

91

In his Lectures on Negative Dialectics, Adorno describes the migration of the critical power of the
philosophical system to the essayistic wit of the individual: “The power of the system must be capable of
being transformed into the criticism of the individual” (34).
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For the early Lukács, the world appears as a “reified” “second nature” due to the static
and a-historical “antinomies of bourgeois thought” (Consciousness, 110-49; Novel, 64-5).
According to Lukács, this hex of capitalist social relations can only be broken through the
dialectical messianic praxis of the proletariat, which engages in “de-reification” through
political action (Consciousness, 205). However, for Adorno, under later forms of
capitalism, the proletariat no longer exists as a localizable entity, hence such a critical dereification must be undertaken theoretically via self-reflexive “Critical Theory.” One
must reflect upon oneself (psychoanalytically), recognizing the social determinants of
one’s subjectivity, along with the fact that enlightenment rationality has positioned the
subject as an “armoured animal” against nature (CM, 252). For Adorno, “the subject”
must be seen in a dual sense: primarily as a site of domination, yet also as containing
within itself the capacity for self-reflection, or critique, through which it is able to
develop new relationships with alterity. Describing such a dual capacity, Adorno will
write, the “Subject in its self-positing is semblance and at the same time something
historically exceedingly real. It contains the potential for the sublation of its own
domination” (CM, 256).92 It is such a manner that in ND Adorno describes his thought as
utilizing the “strength of the subject” to move against the oppressive nature of
“constitutive subjectivity,” employing a minimal subjective agency against subjectivity,
critiquing the ideological components of oneself (ND, xx). In light of Adorno’s
considerations, it is essential that philosophy be (re)thought formally, such that it become
more porous and inclusive with respect to aesthetics and other counter-scientific, or
marginal domains. As has been argued throughout this chapter, such a critical opening

In a Nietzschean manner, the subject must come to terms with its “dominating character” in relation to
natural particularity and engage in willful acts of self-renunciation and self-critique. Reason must come to
terms with its desire to dominate its mythological other, along with its dialectical entwinement in such a
relation. As Horkheimer writes (echoing closely Adorno’s sentiments) in the conclusion of his Eclipse of
Reason (1947): “The disease is that reason was born from man’s urge to dominate nature, and the
‘recovery’ depends on insight into the nature of the original disease, not on a cure for the latest symptoms”
(119). Further glossing this dialectic of enlightenment, “Now that science has helped us to overcome the
awe of the unknown in nature, we are the slaves of social pressures of our own making. When called upon
to act independently, we cry for patterns, systems, and authorities. If by enlightenment and intellectual
progress we mean the freeing of men from superstition and belief in evil forces, in demons and fairies, in
blind fate—in short, the emancipation from fear—then denunciation of what is currently called reason is
the greatest service reason can render” (126).
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will allow for encounters with a broader array of “experiences,” which in turn will allow
philosophy to develop more apt models of judgment and thought.
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2

Adorno and the Actuality of Philosophy: Inaugurating a New
Conflict of the Faculties
“This conflict cannot end, and it is the philosophy faculty that must always be prepared to keep it going.”
Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, 55.

2.1

The Conflicts of the Faculties: Disciplinarity in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel

“The modern world is in general a world of antitheses, whereas in antiquity, except for individual stirrings,
the finite and the infinite were united under a common veil. The spirit of the modern era tore this veil and
showed the one in absolute opposition to the other.” Schelling, On University Studies, 67.

Adorno’s desire to renew philosophy in relation to crisis positions him as a
thinker of the university: one who develops a theory of negative mediation between the
various faculties of the university, provoking an interdisciplinary conflict within the
organization of knowledge. The contours of this theory of negative mediation should be
located within Adorno’s larger post-Idealist intervention in the tradition, which seeks to
experimentally work through German Idealism, extending while criticizing both the
“absolute Idealism” of the Hegelian program, along with the “subjective Idealism” of the
Kantian project. Adorno’s post-Idealist specificity lies in this desire to combine a
modified Hegelian encyclopedic perspective with a fractured Kantian understanding of
the philosophical subject, following Bloch to “let Kant burn through Hegel” (Spirit, 187).
This section explores Adorno’s “conflict of the faculties” in relation to Kant’s, Hegel’s
and Schelling’s theses on the organization of knowledge, exploring the ways these
thinkers (de) territorialize relationships between the various faculties of the mind and
university.93 Adorno installs a “conflict” at the heart of knowledge, whereby the various
faculties are (un) bound in speculative directions, and disciplines such as aesthetics,
philosophy, psychoanalysis, and sociology are placed in an interdisciplinary dialogue. By
bringing the faculties of knowledge into conversation in a negative dialectic, Adorno
motivates an immanent understanding of Idealism “without absolutes”: that is, a selffracturing or reflexively critical understanding of German Idealism’s central tenets
(Rajan, “Introduction,” 2). Adorno’s critical (inter) disciplinarity continues a disciplinary
questioning (or meta-critique) already taking place within German Idealism, an

Though references to Schelling are sparse in Adorno’s corpus (see ND, 15 61, 74-77,155, 174, 202; AT,
61,72, 77, 130 344), thematically, the two thinkers are extremely close; and as I will argue in Ch. 5 on
Schelling, both thinkers elaborate a negative dialectical understanding of philosophy.
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intellectual movement utilized by Adorno as a speculative site through which to inquire
into philosophy’s “actuality” (Hegel, PS, 27; Adorno, AP, 120-1).
Post-Kantian German Idealism is committed to a conception of absolute
knowledge thought in terms of both its “real” and “ideal” moments, articulating notions
of “reason,” along with related concepts such as “freedom,” “dialectic,” “logic” and
“system,” in both a subjective and objective sense. Absolute Idealism sees rational
processes not just exhibited in the categories of the mind (as Kant does), but also
manifested in domains such as nature, politics, and history. Readings glosses the basic
achievement of post-Kantian Idealism as “hav[ing] articulated and instituted an analysis
of knowledge and its social function” (62); that is, Idealism explores the ideas of reason
as they are worked out in domains such as politics, the arts and sciences, along with the
ontological domain relating to the structure of reality itself. Readings further argues that
the unique and lasting contribution of Idealism lies in its “Mak[ing] the university into
the decisive instance of intellectual activity” as the institution which carries forward the
“life” of reason: both in a systematic manner in terms of Wissenschaft (the domain of
“research”), and in terms of the process of its formation (or “Bildung”), which is enacted
through teaching (55). One sees such a tension, between the system and the processes of
its acting out, or between genesis and structure, through much of Idealist thought, most
notably, as I will argue, in the work of Hegel and Schelling (Ch. 5 & 6.). In this way, the
thinking of the German Idealists specifically with respect to the university, but more
broadly as well, is not simply “statist” or “metaphysical,” but is in fact fraught with
tensions and irreconcilable differences, and as such, can be problematized in speculative
and interdisciplinary directions.
As will be argued throughout this project, Kant should be seen in a doubled sense:
in one sense, territorializing philosophy as a restricted system of reason, while in another,
providing means to deterritorialize and problematize his own divisions. To follow
Derrida, Kant is “a hinge” that simultaneously “opens” while “closing off,” one “body of
thought to another.”94 In one sense, Kant participates in the “subjective Idealist” policing,

The notion of “the hinge” (brisure) first occurs in relation to Derrida’s discussion of “the trace” (in
Grammatology, 65-73), connoting those moments of différance which demonstrate that “writing can never
be thought under the category of the subject” (Grammatology, 68-9). This gap conditions the possibility of
94
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or marking off, of philosophy for the possibility of “practical reason” (or ethics); in
another sense, Kant can be seen as a “hinge” to later Idealist-Romanticism, speculatively
opening the possibility of new philosophical relations. As will be argued throughout this
project, Adorno, Benjamin, Schelling and Hegel all locate such a duality in the Kantian
program, employing particular moments of Kant to move past his bureaucratic
intellectual division of labour. In what follows, I will briefly sketch the Kantian
restricted economy of philosophy, while exploring the ways in which such an economy
can be opened and problematized.
Deleuze has described Kant’s philosophy as being constituted by differing
“relationships between the faculties” (of knowledge, desire, and judgment—
corresponding to the three critiques), which can be speculatively de-territorialized in
avant-garde directions (Kant, 10, 68). This analogy can also be extended to the relation
among actual university faculties and disciplines, demonstrating a complex conflict
between “reason” (or philosophy) and its employment in the traditional faculties of
knowledge, law, medicine, and theology (Conflict, 25-8, 31-45), with a hope that such a
reified understanding of the university can be likewise unbounded in interdisciplinary
directions. For Kant, in the Conflict of the Faculties (1798) the “conflict” in question
evokes a parallelism between the “faculties” of the mind and the distribution of the
university, charting a “division of labour” (Conflict, 23) between the various faculties of
the university along with the faculties of knowledge (reason, understanding, imagination,
judgment). Prima facie, Kant’s policing of the diverse faculties of knowledge in the
critical project also extends to the organization of knowledge more broadly, such that the
university comes to be organized according to an “intellectual Taylorism,” or “academic
industry” in which each faculty, or discipline, plays a specific role which cannot be
transgressed (Adorno, DE, 201-2; CM, 10). The critical project is steeped in a “legalism”
which seeks to erect “reason” as judge, jury, and executioner, while determining the

deconstruction (Grammatology, 72). Rajan draws attention to Derrida’s later retranslation of the term in
relation to Foucault and psychoanalysis (“The Hinge—Today,” Resistances, 78-84), in relation to
“intellectual history,” as a means to describe the “Opening and closing off of one body of thought by
another” (Deconstruction, 20-1). In Kant’s case, one might consider those moments in which he, in trying
to define (or “close off”) philosophy in a restricted economy, unwittingly allows for (or “opens”) the
possibility of the later speculative invasions of German Idealism.
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“legal and illegal” relationships between the faculties of the mind along with those of the
university (Conflict, 47-61). As Kant writes, “This conflict cannot and should not be
settled by an amicable accommodation, but calls for a verdict, that is, the decisions of a
judge (Reason) which has the force of the law” (Conflict, 55).95 Deleuze draws further
attention to the “legitimate and illegitimate” employment of the various faculties, and
describes the task of Kant’s rational project as a directing of thought (specifically reason)
away from “false problems and internal illusions” (namely excessive speculation beyond
the bounds experience), towards a “higher interest” or harmony of the faculties (Kant, 2527).
In the Kantian university, philosophy, as the “lowest faculty,” persistently levels
critiques (in public) against the pretensions to dogmatism of the other faculties. For Kant,
the university, following the mind, should be ordered “according to reason,” which is the
“unique terrain of philosophy” (Conflict, 31, 35): philosophy employs its unique faculty
of reason in order to pass judgment upon the other faculties in public, ensuring
comportment towards rational ends, notably the realization of a cosmopolitan ethical
future for humanity (“Universal History,” 41-2, 45, 51-3). Kant accords a primacy to
these ethical and cosmopolitan interests of reason against the speculative cognitive
interest described in the Critique of Pure Reason (Nietzsche, Will, 24-8).
In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781/7), the understanding with its concepts
bounds sensations and their intuitions, while the understanding is itself subservient to
reason, which provides it with ends. What is essential is that the faculties conform to
Kant’s “division of labour,” and must relate to each other along pre-established
channels.96 With such a sadistic division of faculties according to the “higher ends of
reason” the pernicious character of Kant’s “public use of reason” juts to the fore

Despite this claim, Kant also asserts the “infinite task” of the conflict is to aid in the realization of human
freedom and cosmopolitanism: “This conflict cannot end, and it is the philosophy faculty that must always
be prepared to keep it going” (Conflict, 55).
96
Despite this drive towards rational ordering, Deleuze also notes that Kant allows for the possibility of
“illegitimate” relations between the various faculties, such as those which occur in judgments of the
“sublime,” in which reason overrides the interstitial imagination, acting directly upon sensations (CPJ, 140143; 145; 147). See, Deleuze, Kant (24) and Rajan, “Introduction” (4).
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(Deleuze, Kant, 4; Adorno, DE, 66-7, 74-5, 98).97 Foucault intervenes upon Kant’s
“What is Enlightenment?” (1783) with his text of the same name (1984) to illuminate this
new “enlightened” form of domination: “Obey, and you will be able to reason as much as
you like”; that is, do not practice the “blind and foolish obedience” of early despotism,
instead participate in a more “enlightened” form of totalitarianism: “adapt the use they
make of their reason to these determined circumstances; and reason must then be
subjected to the particular ends in view” (“Enlightenment,” 36).
Despite this, Foucault repeatedly demonstrates the radical efficacy of Kantian
enlightenment as a means to “give form to our impatience for liberty,” providing a means
for “the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the
possibility of going beyond them” (“Enlightenment,” 50). Politically, Kant’s imperative
of enlightenment (“Sapere aude”) remains a central rallying cry for Adorno, as for
Foucault, who sees enlightenment in a radically anarchist sense as an “art of not being
governed,” in which one gains autonomy through intellectual resistance to techniques of
power (Foucault, “What is Critique?” 45-49, 58-61). Or, following Adorno, through
critique one can gain “intellectual maturity” (Adorno, CM: 281-2).98
Though Kant is largely a thinker of “practical reason”—one who chose to “limit
knowledge in order to make room for faith” (CPR, 117)—there are a plethora of
moments in the critical project in which Kant seemingly transgresses his own boundaries
and his limitation of philosophy to mere “possible experience.” These domains, most
notably related to aesthetics and nature, can be deconstructed and read “against the

The “sadistic” character of Kantian rationality is described in the section “Juliette or Enlightenment and
Morality” of The Dialectic of Enlightenment (63-93). As Adorno and Horkheimer write: “Self preservation
is the constitutive principle of [Kantian] science, the soul of the table of categories...As long as one does
not ask who is applying it, reason has no greater affinity than with mediation; depending on the situation of
individuals and groups , it presents, either peace or war, tolerance or repression, as the given state of
affairs...Sade demonstrated empirically what Kant grounded transcendentally: the affinity between
knowledge and planning which has set its stamp of inescapable functionality on a bourgeois existence
rationalized even in its breathing spaces”(DE, 68-9). These considerations are developed further by J.
Lacan in “Kant with Sade” (645-670).
98
Arendt has also explored the political efficacy of the Kantian program, see, Lectures on Kant’s Political
Philosophy (22-27, 43-6, 76-77).
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grain,” continuing the critical project in experimental directions.99 Exemplary of this is
Kant’s discussion of “reflective judgment” (CPJ, 80-82), which seems to open the
possibility of an alternative logic of judgment other than that of the “schematism”
between the imagination and understanding as presented in the CPR (268-277). Or Kant’s
discussion of “The Sublime” (CPJ, 128-159), which has been argued— most aptly by
Lyotard — to contain the potential for the development of a new thought of (aesthetic)
experience.100 More broadly, Kant’s CPJ can be seen as meta-critically reflecting upon
his own strict delineation of philosophy, while providing the conceptual lexicon for the
speculative invasions of German-Idealism-Romanticism, but also for a diverse array of
twentieth-century thinkers, such as Adorno and Arendt, along with Lyotard, and Deleuze.
Deleuze specifically elevates the CPJ as a text which “uncovers a deeper and free and
indeterminate accord of the faculties” (Kant, 68), illustrating the potential of
interdisciplinary invasions of the Kantian project.
Schelling, in his On University Studies (Vorlesungen über die Methode des
Akademischen Studiums, 1803), pushes against the bureaucratic Kantian understanding of
both philosophy and the university, conceptualizing the vocation of philosophy in a
speculative and unconditioned sense. That which in Kant was permitted “regulatively” is
given a “constitutive” role in Schelling’s absolute Idealism, which does not oppose mind
to nature (or subject to object), but sees them as differences in degree, containing
differing “potencies” or levels of organization of the same absolute. Further, Schelling
(and Adorno) uncouple Kant’s stable relation between the empirical and the
transcendental, (re)imagining such a relation in reciprocally troubling directions. In
Schelling the strict Kantian delineation of the faculties (along with their conflict) is reterritorialized within a larger “organic unity” of thought: “in philosophy, nature and God,
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Such post-Kantian critical appropriations of the Kantian program were already being undertaken in the
immediate aftermath of Kant’s critical project (by Jacobi, Hamann and Herder), See Beiser, Fate (4-6, 1689, 127-164).
100
Lyotard has extensively commented upon Kant’s notion of the sublime, most notably in Lessons on the
Analytic of the Sublime (1991), and in relation to modern art, specifically the abstract expressionism of
Barnet Newman which is read as providing a framework through which to theorize new relations to
temporality. See The Inhuman (8-118, 135-144). More remains to be said about the polyphony of possible
connections between Lyotard and Adorno, an affinity which Lyotard himself recognized in “Adorno as the
Devil,” which elaborates his own engagement with Adorno’s aesthetics via the image of Adorno as “the
devil” in T. Mann’s Doctor Faustus (127-37).

59

science and art, religion and poetry are linked with each other from the beginning...The
subject of philosophy is primordial knowledge itself” (US, 75). Contra Kant, for
Schelling, philosophy does not have a strict delineation with respect to the other
disciplines, but rather, should animate intellectual inquiry with a youthful spirit which
“strive[s] for the one truly Absolute knowledge… until [it] has perfectly grasped the
whole as unity” (US, 69). Schelling underscores that both “science and art are moving in
that [absolute] direction” (US, 69). Beyond the negative Kantian understanding of
philosophy as “critique,” Schelling conceives of thought in an expanded sense as
“absolutizing” the insights from particular sciences; at the same time, in potentially
deterritorializing ways, philosophy is exposed to, and made to tarry with, the lifesciences, history, and religion: counter-scientific domains which contest its autarky.101
Schelling opposes the primacy of practical reason (or ethics) in the Kantian project,
decrying that “an alleged morality” (US, 71)—along with practical cries for “Action!
Action!” (US, 12)—were supposed by Kant (along with Fichte) to take the place of
genuine intellectual speculation and the development of a true “theoretical philosophy”
(US, 71). If for Kant, “Philosophy is the purely autonomous moment when knowledge
reflects upon itself” (Readings, 66), for Schelling (and other Idealist-Romantics),
philosophy becomes a theorization of the “organic unity” behind the diversity of
disciplinary strivings, a conquest of “the whole,” of the “spiritual bond that is missing”
(Hegel, PS, 2; Adorno, Hegel, 62).
Schelling’s On University Studies is heavily Frühromantik, seeing philosophy as
“absolutizing,” “potentiating”—or “quickening with freedom” (FO, 14)—various
disciplines such that they can participate in the broader unfolding of the absolute.
However, in Schelling’s early Naturphilosophie and middle work, the ur-productivity, or
“original diremption of nature itself,” continually contests the stability of the

Derrida describes Schelling’s critique of the Kantian project as a deconstruction of the autonomy Kant
accords to philosophy: “The criticism directed at Kant has two imports: the Kantian point of view gives the
philosophical discipline at once too little and too much. Too little: It limits it to being only one discipline
among others. Too much: it gives it a faculty. Schelling does not beat around the bush and proposes quite
simply that there no longer be any department of philosophy. Not so as to erase philosophy from the
university map, but on the contrary, in order to recognize its true place, which is the entire place” (Derrida,
“Theology of Translation,” Eyes, 72, cf. 170).
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philosophical system (FO, 205). Philosophy enters into contestatory relations with the
natural sciences and theology, as it speculatively annexes other disciplines in an effort to
reckon with the unstable dynamism of the absolute. As will be argued in Ch. 5, such a
conflict between nature and the philosophical system, as enacted in Schelling’s
Naturphilosophie and “middle work” (1809-1821), results in a negatively dialectical
conception of philosophy, which can be seen in relation to Adorno’s negative dialectic.
Moving beyond Kant, Schelling develops a formulation of philosophy that is not the
autonomous seat of reason, but rather, continually invades and tangles with other
disciplines and systems of knowledge. Adorno’s negative dialectic performs a similar
invasion—or speculative potentiation—of various disciplines: employing psychoanalysis
as a prism through which to analyze philosophy’s “natural history (ND, 22-23; DE, 3637; Cook Nature, 47-60, 107, 12); sociology as a means to open philosophy towards
“society” (or its material historical context, Sociology, 27-34, 44-6, 141-4, 152-3); and
aesthetics to short circuit philosophy’s totalizing ambitions (AT, 262), while exploring
novel relations with the natural world (AT, 64-72).
With Hegel, philosophy becomes a tragic encyclopedia that marks and eulogizes
the various “patterns of consciousness” [Gestalten]102 in their progression throughout
history, a process typified in The Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes,
1807. PS, 56; PG, 80). As Rajan states, “Going beyond Kant, who tried to unify the
liberal arts under the rubric of philosophy as method, Hegel claimed a greater specificity
for philosophy by introducing ‘Idealism’ into ‘all the sciences’” (“Introduction,” 4).
Hegel’s philosophy can be considered “encyclopedic,” given its proclaimed task of
systematically organizing other disciplines in their progression towards “absolute
knowing.” Such a historical progression is mirrored logically in Hegel’s dialectic—or
“triadic logic” (PS, 29-30; EL, 38-9)—in which conflicts and antinomies are reconciled
or “sublated” [Aufhebung] within the larger “organic unity” of truth (PS, 2). As Hegel
writes, “The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essences
consummating itself through its development” (PS, 11). Hegel sees philosophy as a

Describing this in his PS, Hegel writes: “[Phenomenology], in terms of its content, is the Science
[Wissenschaft] of the experience of consciousness [Erfahrung des Bewußtseins] ...Thus the moments of the
whole are patterns/shapes [Gestalten] of consciousness” (PS, 56; PG, 80).
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mediatory practice, which traces or narrates the development of Spirit [Geist] through its
various instantiations. However, as many post-Hegelian thinkers have noted, such a
systematic logic erases particular conflicts in favour of a logic of “synthesis” or
“reconciliation,” which sees philosophy and history as the “working out” of reason,
violently subsuming particular dissonant moments.103 In this sense, the conflict of the
faculties is mediated by way of the larger “organic unity,” mitigating the “conflict,”
which is sublated and disappears in favour of unity and the final triumph of philosophy.
Despite the desire for reconciliation and unity that pervades Hegel’s thought,
Hegel’s system contains within itself a profound negative element, which “un-works” (to
evoke Blanchot’s term désœuvrement,) its own desire for systematic resolution or
culmination (Literature, 171-76). As Hegel writes in his Phenomenology:
The circle that remains self-enclosed and, like substance, holds its moments together, is
an immediate relationship, one therefore which has nothing astonishing about it. But
that an accident as such, detached from what circumscribes it, what is bound and is
actual only in its context with others, should attain an existence of its own and a
separate freedom—this is the tremendous power of the negative...but the life of Spirit is
not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather
the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter
dismemberment, it finds itself...Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the
face, and tarrying with it. (PS, 18-19)

Hegel’s project attempts to theorize philosophy, along with the university, as a holistic
organic system, while nonetheless giving a dangerous degree of autonomy to the
individual members: erecting a system which tarries with “death...and devastation,” along
with the particularity of experience, allowing a troubling array of contingencies into the
philosophical system. The possibility that an “accident” could gain a certain freedom is,
and must remain, a possibility for the Hegelian project as I will argue in my final chapter
on Hegel (Ch. 6). Perhaps more than any other thinker Adorno seeks to employ this
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In a Canadian context, such a conciliatory drive for reconciliation and recognition is exemplified in the
work and policy programs of (the Hegelian) Charles Taylor. Most notably his 1994, Multiculturalism and
the Politics of Recognition [Ed.] (see “Preface, ix-xii, “The Politics of Recognition,” 25-74), which
attempts to theorize (Canadian) multiculturalism through a Hegelian lens, locating a political-existential
need for a “recognition” of the various conflicting groups in the nation state (such as French and English
Canada). Taylor’s “Right-Hegelianism” covers over the negative and dissonant moments inherent in the
Canadian nation state, refusing to recognize difference out of a placatory drive for resolution. For an indepth critique of such Hegelian infused policies from an indigenous perspective and by way of Fanon, see
Coulthard, Red Skin White Mask, (25-31).
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“tremendous power of the negative,” and in so doing develops his own theory of negative
mediation, one which emphasizes the conflict of the faculties, rather than their unity, or
reconciliation. Adorno’s post-Idealism commences by rejecting Hegelian totality (“the
whole is the false” [MM, 50, 16-18]): uncoupling the organic unity of the Hegelian
project, turning towards “accident,” or those moments which are able to win a “separate
freedom,” marginal domains such as aesthetics or nature which are able to trouble the
unity of the Hegelian encyclopedia.

2.2

Adorno’s Conflict of the Faculties: Negative Dialectical Mediation
“Idealism is not simply untruth. It is truth in its un-truth.” Adorno, Against Epistemology, 234.

The following sections will chart three entwined valences of Adorno’s negative
dialectic in relation to the main senses of Adorno’s conflict between the faculties. Firstly,
Adorno’s historical-philosophical perspective instigates a conflict within the Idealist
tradition, positioning the “subjective Idealism” of Kant against the “absolute-Idealism” of
Hegel. The second sense motivates an originary epistemic conflict (via Kant and Hegel)
between mind and world, recognizing the “primacy of the object,” or the preponderance
of the world in tension with the concepts of the subject. The final sense transfers these
traditional and epistemic conflicts into the very organization of knowledge, placing
various disciplines in conflict with each other, while challenging the autonomy of
philosophy by way of what, borrowing Foucault’s term, we can somewhat approximately
call the “counter-sciences” of sociology and psychoanalysis (2.2.1-2.2.2). The final
section of this chapter (2.3) will chart the conflictual relation of identity-in-difference that
Adorno elaborates between philosophy and the production and reception of art (or art and
aesthetics).
Adorno’s philosophy elaborates a “changed concept of the dialectic” (Rose,
Melancholy, 97-104), one in which negativity or non-synthesis are emphasized in
opposition to reconciliation and unity. In terms of the organization of knowledge, Adorno
refuses to reify or standardize the conflict between faculties, continually opening
contestatory relations between the various domains of knowledge, such that “conflict” (or
negativity) becomes the unifying motif of thought and its organization. Such a reconstellated dialectic draws upon a vast array of thinkers (Benjamin, Marx, Freud,
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Nietzsche and Lukács), though fundamentally it stages a “meta-critique of Idealism”
(Jarvis, 148-74), confronting the epistemic modesty of the Kantian subject with the
encyclopedic ambition of a (materialist reading) of Hegel. Adorno describes the negative
dialectic as “seek[ing] to free dialectics from its…affirmative traits without reducing its
determinacy,” overturning the “traditional” notion (of Plato and Hegel) which sought to
“achieve something positive by way of negation” (ND, xix). By rejecting what he sees as
the “affirmative character” of Hegel’s dialectic (ND, 143-61)—which upheld a
speculative identity between thought and being, subject and object, “identity and nonidentity”—Adorno elaborates his own negative model of speculative non-identity,
founded on the “non-identity” between such terms, affirming difference against “the
antagonistic entirety of” Hegel’s organic unities (ND, 4-12).104
In terms of the tradition of philosophy, the negative dialectic involves the
deconstruction of various binaries within the Idealist tradition—notably subject-object,
transcendental-empirical, theory-practice, aesthetics-philosophy, nature-history, and
system-experience—which are then interrogated in relation to each other, though never
reconciled into some higher unity. In this manner, philosophy is fractured into a
precarious and fragmentary practice that can no longer hope to “settle” conflicts once and
for all: tension, conflict and “non-identity” will always prevail over reconciliation, unity
and “identity.” As a dialectical (materialist) thinker, Adorno never dispenses with the
historical-social mediation of particular objects. Through a “micrological” immersion in
particular objects, the critic is able to see the object as mediated within a social totality;
however, the object is not fully reduced to its presence within such a totality (ND, 18,
408; Prisms, 229, 240). Within a theory of negative mediation, or thought in the absence
of totality, objects are endowed with a “natural-historical” character: their seemingly
“natural” or independent existence is decoded as a historical rebus.

For a description of the “speculative identity thesis” as it pertains to Hegel (and Schelling), see Ng (65124). Broadly stated, Hegel posits an organic, or absolute relation, of “identity in non-identity” (76)
between “subjective subject-object” and “objective subject-object” (71). That is, subject and object are seen
as differing perspectives on the same absolute relation between subject and object. For Adorno, instead of
mediating the two polarities by way of a common organic identity, subject and object are recognized as
perpetually non-identical, as held together in their difference or “non-identity” (ND, 6-8). Put otherwise,
Adorno inverts the Hegelian primacy of identity towards non-identity.
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Adorno’s thought moves against Hegel’s “absolute spirit,” while refashioning the
Hegelian notion of “mediation”: instead of mediating (or “sublating”) difference by way
of a higher synthesis (Paddison, 108-121; Hegel, EL, 128-131), Adorno provides a
negative model of mediation, which can be understood (following Benjamin) as a form of
mediation through “the extremes” (OT, 38). Objects are not reducible to their position
within some larger unity (or organic “identity”), but rather, are understood in themselves
as “non-identities,” or differences, which continually disrupt the finality of conceptual
cognition (ND, 11-12). In a materialist vein, Adorno likens the command of particular
“non-identities” to the domination of all “use-values” by way of “exchange value” in
capitalist reproduction (ND, 143-61, 3). By rejecting Hegelian totality and notions of
synthesis at the outset, Adorno develops his logic of the constellation, which seeks to
mediate particular elements between themselves, arranging entities in mosaics and
constellations in order to realize a negative encyclopedia of knowledge without reference
to a determinate “whole” (MM, 50; ND, 162-166). Such a model is immensely indebted
to Benjamin’s formula of “the Idea”— “in which the unique and the extreme stand
together” (OT, 38-41)—a formula that will be explored in more depth in the following
chapters devoted to Benjamin (specifically sections 3.4 & 4.3.3.3).
Adorno short-circuits the absolute tendency of the Hegelian encyclopedia by way
of the Kantian primacy of the subject, an essential epistemic modesty that must be
continually maintained, expressing skepticism towards the possibility of a holistic
philosophical system. Epistemically, Adorno’s “negative dialectic” foregrounds a
constitutive finitude—a fundamental “block” at the heart of knowledge (Kant, 18, 17080)—contending that “objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a
remainder...the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived” (ND, 5). Adorno’s thesis
of the “primacy of the object” necessitates a commitment to a Kantian model of
perception, in which the world—or “possible experience”—is invariably shaped by
subjective concepts and categories.105 However, Adorno’s model of metaphysical
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For Adorno, in order to move against reification and undertake such a critical self-reflection, philosophy
must open itself towards precarity and particularity; that is, it must recognize the “primacy (or literally, the
prior-rank) of the object” [Vorrang des Objeckts]: that the world or experience is not fully exhausted by the
concept (ND, 183-188 // 182-7). Thought must enact an “axial turn” (ND, xx) of Kant’s Copernican
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experience dispenses with the Kantian “phenomena-noumena” distinction that would
separate out experience from its transcendental conditions. Instead, Adorno (following
Benjamin) aims to think “experience” beyond the Kantian schematism, that is, beyond its
degradation to mere “possible experience”— the determinate application of concepts to
possible cases. With such an expansive understanding of experience, Adorno employs a
Kantian “reflective” model of judgment, in which philosophy (via a “micrological gaze”)
absolutizes a particular moment (CPJ, 15-20).106
Though Adorno continues many Hegelian critiques of Kantian thought—notably
Kant’s denial of metaphysics while simultaneously begging metaphysical questions—he
also preserves key elements of the Kantian project, notably Kant’s doctrine of “reflective
judgment,” along with the supposition of an unavoidable subjective or “perspectivist”
starting point for philosophy (Nietzsche, Will, 267). Adorno contends that any
philosophical system—no matter its encyclopedic grandeur or “objectivity”—is
ultimately shot through with the same pathologies that beset the individual. Hence the
repeated employment of a Nietzschean infused model of psychoanalysis throughout
Adorno’s thinking, which continually presents the philosophical subject alongside its
pathological moments, or offshoots.107 Though Adorno repeatedly posits the “primacy of
the object” (ND, 183-97, 6-8) as an antidote to the Idealist “fallacy of constitutive
subjectivity” (ND, xx), he nonetheless remains committed to an irreducible and necessary

revolution, that is, a shift away from the mind and towards the object, without fully collapsing the Idealist
“subject-object” dichotomy. Adorno names this thought of contradiction, or “consistent sense of nonidentity,” dialectics (ND, 5). Such an ironic and distanced employment of language thinks “in
contradiction,” against thought, attempting to preserve a dissonant space of utopia (ND, 3-6; cf.
Epistemology, 1-7).
106
More remains to be said regarding the relationship between Adorno’s “micrological gaze” and the
Kantian notion of reflective judgment, which elevates particular elements without a prescribed rule. Adorno
explores such ideas in his essay on Kracauer’s “curious realism”—his critical model of sociologicalphenomenology (NL II: 59-75).
107
Much remains to be said apropos of Adorno’s relationship with Nietzsche, a thinker who plays a
subterranean role throughout Adorno’s oeuvre, providing it with its sharply historical-genealogical
sentiment. As Adorno curiously remarks in his lectures on moral philosophy, “It is not at all my intention to
score points off Nietzsche, since to tell the truth, of all the so-called great philosophers I owe him by far the
greatest debt, more even than to Hegel” (Moral, 172). Both thinkers continually seek to historically contest
the stability of origins underwriting philosophical truth claims, expressing suspicion of the philosophical
“will to truth.”
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moment of subjectivity in any philosophical program against the positivist or empiricist
“views from nowhere.”
The negative dialectic can be further clarified in terms of what Cook has termed
its “subjective and objective aspects” (Adorno-Foucault, 23-24). In terms of the
subjective epistemic dimension, negative dialectics maintains the tension between the
“subject-object”: upholding the imperative that objects are irreducible to subjective
categories, along with the recognition that any experience of “the object” will be
minimally mediated by the categories and pathologies of “the subject” (ND, 5). Negative
dialectics commences by recognizing that reality is always primary, or in excess of
philosophy’s conceptual categories (as Kant argued), while at the same time, it refuses to
uphold some pure unmediated “givenness”—or a “nature”—independent of the
mediation of the faculties of the mind (as Hegel would have it). In terms of the objective
dimension, Adorno metamorphoses this dialectical epistemic tension into antinomies
within the tradition of thought, and within the distribution of the university, accentuating
conflicts between aesthetics and philosophy, along with philosophy and various “countersciences.” Such domains fracture philosophy, revealing the “objective” antagonisms of
enlightenment and late-capitalist society— the “preponderance of the universal,” or those
pernicious abstractions which tower over the individual (Cook, Adorno-Foucault, 24;
Benhabib, 33-34)— while also beginning to formulate alternative thought models
through which to relate to the (natural) world. Philosophy must think in “contradictions”
in order to stress the contradictory nature of reality, with “dialectics” marking the thought
of philosophy against itself, a “dissonant” “guilt of what I am thinking” that provides a
“determinate negation of society” (ND, 4-6). Adorno’s negative dialectic—or model of
metaphysical experience (ND, 1-57)—should be seen as a refashioned form of subjective
transcendental Idealist philosophy (O’Connor, 15) enacted within a Hegelian framework,
which seeks to provide a new and expanded logic of the concept alongside a viable model
of objective social critique. Keeping with the Kantian parallel between the faculties of the
mind and university, the negative dialectic can be transposed into the organization of
knowledge more broadly, providing a conflictual and self-reflexive model for the practice
of social research.
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In the following sections, the final valence of Adorno’s conflict will be analyzed,
considering Adorno’s negative model of (inter) disciplinarity, a task which may seem
anathema given his persistent assertions regarding the “dominating character” of the
philosophical system (ND 26-28; AT, 64-65).108 Despite such provisos, I contend that
Adorno’s thought provides a post-Idealist negation of the controlling impulse of
philosophy, striving to “explode Idealism from within” in the creation of an “antisystem” that would allow thought to become “actual” in the face of the horrors of the
twentieth-century (Lectures ND, 22; ND, xx; 10). It is this questioning of the “actuality of
philosophy” in the face of material-social givenness that pervades Adorno’s “late
work,”109 specifically his Negative Dialectics (1966) and Aesthetic Theory (1970), texts
which elaborate Adorno’s mature response to crises of philosophy, history, politics, and
the ongoing subjugation of the natural world. The negative dialectic opens traditional
Idealist models by way of material-historical givenness, creating what Rajan terms an
“Idealism without absolutes”: an Idealism fractured (though not dissolved) by materiality
and non-identity, which allows Idealism to reflect upon its own pathologies and
pretensions to absolute identity and systematicity.110 Despite such a critical fracturing,
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Adorno speaks of a naturalistic desire for control, or domination, inherent in many Idealist categories,
which (out of fear of alterity) seek to reduce the plethora of objects to conceptual categories. For more on
the dominating character of Idealism, see Vogel (84, 89, 96-100, 112, 132); DE (1); ND (11, 67). For more
on the “control of nature” in Adorno, see ND (11, 67); DE (1-3).
109
Weber- Nicholsen, in Exact Imagination, Late Work..., (1997) elevates Adorno’s concept of “late work”
(along with “exact imagination”) as a figure for understanding Adorno’s aesthetics, though such a notion
can be applied to his post-World War Two writings more generally. For Adorno, “the essential feature of
late work [is] the disjunction of subject and objectivity, so that as a work becomes late it becomes
increasingly inorganic” (Nicholsen, 8). That is, “late works,” such as Beethoven’s final string quartets,
express (through subjective self-sacrifice) an exile, or alienation from one’s milieu—a discordance between
soul and form. “Late style” emphasizes the primacy of form and formal moments over and against the
expressions of the individual, conveying the death of the individual “allegorically” by way of the form of
the artwork: “Death is imposed only on created beings, not on works of art, and thus it has appeared in art
only in a refracted mode as allegory” (Adorno, “Late Style, 566). As Adorno concludes: “In the history of
art, late works are catastrophes” (Ibid., 566). More remains to be said regarding the relationship of
Adorno’s notion of “late work” to Benjamin’s notions of allegory and natural history. For more on “late
work” see Adorno, “Late Style in Beethoven” (1937), “Alienated Masterpiece: The Missa Solemnis
(1959),” along with Said’s 2004, “Thoughts on Late Style.”
110
To reiterate, an Idealism without absolutes “brings materiality into conjunction with ideality”; “as an
analogue to différance or heterogeneity, materiality...disturbs all absolutes” (Rajan, “Introduction,” 2).
Rajan focuses primarily on Romanticism as a practice which decomposes and hybridizes Idealism such that
it is able to reflect upon itself and its own trajectories towards “Identity” (“Introduction,” 2-3). One can see
an analogue in Adorno’s “meta-critical” reflection upon the German philosophical tradition, where thinkers
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Adorno maintains a degree of (negative) systematicity, and his work can be read as
providing experimental models of philosophical presentation and grounding (within the
tradition of Idealism). Thus, contra Deleuze and other meta-philosophical interrogators of
metaphysics in the twentieth-century, Adorno repeatedly resists the post-Heideggerian
movement of philosophy to ontology (ND, 61-128; Kant, 3). Instead, Adorno maintains a
minimal Kantian “subjective-Idealist” starting point for thinking, in productive tension
with a Hegelian speculative notion of experience and model of negative mediation. In the
following sections, the disciplinary implications of Adorno’s negative dialectic will be
considered.
2.2.1 Adorno and the “Counter-Sciences”: Opening the Transcendental
“Man, in the analytic of finitude, is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is a being such that
knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible.” Foucault, The Order of Things,
318.

Adorno does not dogmatically hold to traditional philosophical categories, nor
does he wholly “throw the baby out with the bathwater” (MM, 43-5); instead, he
endeavours to immanently work through Idealist categories in relation to the events of his
present. Following crisis, philosophy must fashion new critical perspectives to confront
the reification of both the mind and society, posing the fundamental questions of
philosophy anew, and inquiring as to the existential possibility of abstract thought in the
face of the disaster. In relation to crisis, Adorno does not appeal to some eternal value of
philosophy, nor to the enduring efficacy of a-historical concepts and categories; instead,
he continually emphasizes the “finitude of thought” (Lectures ND, 76-86; ND, 13-15).
That is, after the failure of the systematic Idealist project, philosophy must recognize its
own finitude, putting itself at existential risk in the face of material-historical givenness,
questioning its very existence, and interrupting the stability of its suppositions.111 Adorno

are decomposed into “force-fields” of material-social trajectories (while not wholly reducing them to such
forces), allowing philosophy to critically reflect upon itself.
111
Describing finitude and precarity as essential to philosophical thinking, Adorno will write: “The fact
that philosophy does not have any particular guaranteed object of study; it is possible to think
philosophically only where thinking can go awry, where it is fallible. The moment that nothing can happen
to philosophical thought, that is, the moment it finds itself in the realm of repetition, mere reproduction, at
that moment philosophy will have missed its mark” (Lectures ND, 85). For Adorno, philosophy must put
its constitutive categories at risk in relation to historical events: “I believe it is not an exaggeration to say
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responds by opening the transcendental (subject) and empirical/experiential (object)
polarities of philosophy, considering those empirical or experiential moments which
affect philosophy’s fundamental categories. Adorno’s notion of “metaphysical
experience” allows such an opening of thought, while remaining within a transcendentalsystematic framework (Lectures ND, 76-86, 183-210; ND, 361-408). Like Foucault,
Adorno problematizes static notions of the transcendental, opening it to history, society
and experience, contesting philosophy’s autarky by way of its margins.
Following both post-Kantian German Idealism and Benjamin, Adorno notes the
impoverished role played by experience within the Kantian architectonic. Instead of
attempting to determine the infinity of “all possible experience” by way of a finite table
of categories, “Philosophy itself [must] become infinite—namely not as something to be
fixed any longer in a restricted number of theorems as we find in Kant’s ‘system of
principles,’ but fundamentally open” (Lectures ND, 80). That is, philosophy must be
open to (historical) “experiences” [Erfahrungen] and events which should prompt a
fundamental revision of its concepts and categories: the articulation of a new permeable
relationship between these poles—of experience and systematicity (or the
transcendental)—is an important upshot of Adorno’s work. Such an opening of
philosophy to a broader array of experiences places Adorno fundamentally in line with
German Idealists such as Hegel and Schelling, who refuse to confine philosophy to a
mere faculty (as Kant purports to do), but rather, theorize reason in a polyphonic and
interdisciplinary way. Such a movement towards experience does not necessitate a
dispensation of the transcendental; instead, Adorno (along with Hegel and Schelling),
theorizes new (non-) identical relations between philosophy and experience.
With such a (re)turn to key elements of absolute Idealist philosophy Adorno
directly contravenes many of the intellectual conventions of his age, presenting an afterimage of Idealism after its supposed “failure” (with Hegel’s death in 1831).112 Broadly

that to this day the question of whether philosophy can exist without system has not been tackled with the
serious energy it calls for” (Lectures ND, 39).
112
Schnädelbach locates the “end” of Idealism (or “great philosophy”), and the broader “Age of Goethe” in
1831-2, the years of Hegel and Goethe’s death respectively (1). Following this period, European humanism
went through a protracted period of crisis and modernization, culminating in the 1933 dissolution of the
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stated, the intellectual currents of early twentieth-century Germany eschewed the
Idealism of Hegel and Schelling as hopelessly failed metaphysical programs, and instead
sought to return thought to its sure scientific basis in the (Neo) Kantian program, or the
fundamental grounding of a positivist, phenomenological, or neo-ontological perspective
(Bosanquet 199-201; Schnädelbach, 1, 8-10, 106, 67-71, 192- 217).
Opposed to Bosanquet’s lamentation of the movement from “post-Kantian
Idealism” to “Neo-Kantianism” (200), Schnädelbach presents a neutral Weberian survey
of the decline and splintering of Idealism between 1831 and 1933 (1-11). Beginning with
the 1830-48 political crises of German nationalism in the wake of the French-Revolution,
and the more general end of the “age of Goethe” (1831-2), Schnädelbach charts the
decline and splintering of Idealism. He surveys the decline of its absolute notion of
“system” (5-8, 27-9), along with the ascendancy of new disciplines such as “history” and
(social and physical) “science,” which replace Idealist notions, gaining their own
disciplinary autonomy (33-65, 66-109).113 Against these evacuations of philosophy,
Adorno remains fundamentally holistic and interdisciplinary in a Schellingian-Hegelian
sense, harnessing insights from emergent disciplines —notably sociology and
psychoanalysis—while nonetheless remaining eminently Idealist in his philosophical
temperament. That is, while Hegel and Schelling employ Naturphilosophie and aesthetics
as a means to fracture philosophy, for Adorno, philosophy enters into a tensioned
constellation with the emergent disciplines of sociology and psychoanalysis, in order to
bring philosophy back to its constitutive finitude. This additional focus speaks to
Adorno’s modernist intellectual temperament, as he renews the actuality of Idealism by
interrogating philosophy in relation to a constellation of specifically modern disciplines.

Weimar republic. Within this period (1831-1933), philosophy still took place, though Schnädelbach
interrogates “what, in a post-Idealist age, is philosophy, and how is what bears that name possible” (5).
113
For Schnädelbach, the period 1831-1933 saw the emergence of history (or “the age of historicism”) as
an autonomous and dynamic discipline (33-5). Thinkers such as Marx (39-40), Burckhardt (42), and
Dilthey (50-1), followed Hegel’s elevation of history, seeking to rationally articulate historical dynamics.
However, by the end of the century, thinkers such as Nietzsche expressed a disgust towards enlightenment
notions of progress (62-3). This period also saw the emergence of modern “science” (both social and
physical), undercutting German Idealism’s monopoly on the term (67), or a movement away from Idealist
Wissenschaft, to the more modern specialized understanding of the term “science.” Disciplines such as
sociology and psychology applied the methods of natural science to subjective spirit, while problematizing
the subject as a site of epistemic security (73-4).

71

Both Adorno and Benjamin act as “modernist mandarins,” moving against the “mandarin
orthodoxy” of their academic context, critically employing the Idealist tradition against
the academic grain (130-43).114 That is, Adorno at once fractures Idealism by way of
sociology and psychoanalysis, while also moving against his own academic milieu with
his return to absolute Idealist philosophy.
Adorno’s negative distribution of the university positions philosophy (or the
positivity of knowledge) in relation to its margins in a manner akin to Foucault’s
“counter-sciences.” For Foucault, such duplicitous domains continually emphasize the
finite and precarious character of any intellectual artifice—leading philosophy back to its
“analytic of finitude” (Order, 312-43)— while problematizing and opening the
interaction between the empirical and transcendental domains of thought.115 In the final
chapters of his 1966 The Order of Things (303-87), following his archeology of the
history of representation—from the Renaissance’s “prose of the world ” (17-45) through
to the Classical episteme’s tables (50-124), to Modernity’s abysses and depths (21794)—Foucault elaborates his own contestatory model of the human sciences, which has
been considered in relation to the organization of knowledge and the 1960s University
crisis by Rajan (in Deconstruction, 182-198). Foucault’s archeological model opens
discourse towards alterity while continually emphasizing the (un)making of the human,
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Ringer, in The Decline of the German Mandarins (1969), presents a survey of German intellectual
culture from 1890-1933, examining its relation to the economic and industrial conditions of the time.
Ringer charts the emergence of a Weberian “mandarin type”: an educated member of the upper middle
class, interpellated by a certain belief in Bildung, or mobility through vocational self-legislation, coupled
with a belief in Idealist notions of social progress. Such types entered into an inevitable conflict with
Modernity, constantly proclaiming a “crisis of culture, or “age of decadence” throughout the 1920s. Figures
such as Adorno and Benjamin can be seen as “Modernist Mandarins” (202-212) who attempted to harness
something of such a traditional culture in an immanent critique of culture by way of itself. For Benjamin as
a “modernist mandarin” (a term coined by Habermas) see McCole (20).
115
Deborah Cook’s Adorno, Foucault and the Critique of the West (2018) provides a provisional
groundwork for an interrogation of the work of Adorno and Foucault in dialogue, focusing on their
respective relationships to Marxism (“Is Power Always Secondary to the Economy?”, 31-61),
psychoanalysis (“Notes on Individuation” 61-92), along with their more general shared critique of the
dominating character of Western rationality. However, as Cook herself acknowledges, such a comparative
study will generate more questions and lines of inquiry than definitive affinities. Notably, Cook accords
little space to the early “archeological” writings of Foucault, many of which are published
contemporaneously with the development of Adorno’s negative dialectic, focusing instead on Foucault’s
later “genealogical” writings on power, disciplinarity, biopolitics and governmentality. More remains to be
said on Foucault’s relationship to the German Idealist tradition, specifically the spectre of Kant which
haunts his writings in both periods. For more on Cook’s text in relation to questions of intellectual history,
see my 2021 “Review” Cook’s text (80-4).
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demonstrating that “man is an invention of a recent date. And one that is perhaps nearing
its end; man may soon be erased, like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea”
(Order, 387; cf. ix-xiv, xv-xxiv).
Foucault highlights the role of “counter-sciences” in his project, discourses which
“ceaselessly unmake that very man who is creating and recreating his positivity in the
human sciences” (Order, 379). The counter-sciences continually demarcate the “frontier
forms of the human sciences,” leading the human back to their existence as an “empiricotranscendental doublet” within the “analytic of finitude,” where “man composed his own
figure in the interstices of that fragmented language” (Order,381, 386).116 Describing
such “counter-sciences” further, Foucault writes:
In relation to the “human sciences”, psychoanalysis and ethnology are rather
“counter-sciences”; which does not mean that they are less “rational” or
“objective” than the others, but that they flow in the opposite direction, that
they lead them back to their epistemological basis, and that they ceaselessly
“unmake” that very man who is creating and re-creating his positivity in the
human sciences. (Order, 379)

Foucault singles out psychoanalysis and ethnology (or structural anthropology) as
counter-sciences that act as an uncannier version of Kant’s philosophy faculty: they
critique the will to dogmatism of the other faculties (or Foucault’s “human-sciences”),
continually leading human thought back to its finitude and constitutive precarity. These
“counter-sciences” provide thought with an “inexhaustible treasure-hoard of experiences
and concepts, and above all a perpetual principle of dissatisfaction, of calling into
question, of criticism and contestation of what may seem, in other respects, to be
established” (Order, 373). As Rajan stresses, “Each human science has a corresponding
counter science,” exposing the human sciences’ “doubled and duplicitous relation to

Foucault describes the “analytic of finitude” as “a question of revealing the conditions of knowledge on
the basis of the empirical contents given in it,” undercutting “each of these positive forms in which man
can learn that he is finite is given to him only against the background of his own finitude” (OT, 319, 314).
The Kantian elements of such a re-fashioned “analytic” are highly evident, and Foucault seems to locate
Kant at the cross-roads of Modernity: “the end of metaphysics is only the negative side of a much more
complex event in Western thought. This event is the appearance of man” (Order, 319). In the modern
episteme, “man” emerges as a “transcendental empirical doublet,” endowed with a new transcendental
aesthetic (the anatomical physical moments of knowledge) and a new transcendental dialectic (the
historical, economic and social conditions of knowledge), as Foucault attempts to reoriented knowledge
around the finitude and historicity of the human.
116
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knowledge” (Deconstruction, 193). Further, each counter science is reflexively critical,
articulating itself upon another (counter) science by way of its “un-thought”: for
Foucault, psychoanalysis and ethnology continually contest each other. Rajan situates the
final section of The Order of Things in relation to the (French) university crisis of the
1960s, positioning Foucault as a thinker of “the university in ruins,” one who wants to
reorder the university, not around the critical human sciences but around the counter
sciences that remain uneasily on the fringes of the modern university” (Deconstruction,
195-6). In a manner parallel to Adorno, Foucault’s conflict of the faculties provides an
“exposure without synthesis” (Rajan, Deconstruction, 196), in which so-called “man” in
his positivity is both posited and unworked, archeologically questioning “not man
himself...but the region that makes possible knowledge about man in general” (Foucault,
Order, 378). In this way, neither Foucault nor Adorno provide explicit models for the
reorganization of knowledge, but rather, they forward a new “interdisciplinary sometimes
anti-disciplinary” conflictual animus in which knowledge comes to be organized
according to conflict: “Foucault’s ‘order’ is not a division by departments but a
movement between fields of knowledge that exposes them to each other” (Rajan,
Deconstruction, 197).
Likewise, Adorno’s work can be seen as an attempt to ground modern philosophy
in a new “analytic of finitude”: emphasizing the precarity of thought as opposed to
traditional comprehensive notions of the philosophical architectonic. However, where
Foucault leads modern thought back to the un-thought abyss opened by its “analytic of
finitude,” Adorno leads philosophy back to its transcendental material-social conditions:
in Foucault’s abyss stands Capital. Adorno decodes the foundational mythologies of
traditional thought, historicizing philosophy’s a-historical proclivities by the transience of
critique. For example, in Against Epistemology, Husserl’s “pure” epistemological
phenomenology is de-naturalized as a latent Idealism, which dominates alterity by way of
the primacy it accords to the perceiving phenomenological subject (3-5, 14-17, 47-88,
217-9). Adorno un-works the positivity of knowledge (or the autarky of philosophy) by
way of sociology and psychoanalysis, both of which continually open philosophy to the
material-social and unconscious dimensions of thought. Both emphasize the various
mediations philosophy finds itself entangled within, deterritorializing thought, and
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creating conflict with respect to theory’s foundational pretentions. The following section
will briefly gloss these sites as a potential space through which to think a speculative
notion of “counter-sciences,” while examining the complex ways in which the historicalmaterial constellation “society” is able to enter into thought. That is, both Adorno and
Foucault seek to “dissolve man” (Order, 379) as a positive entity, fracturing the positivity
of knowledge by way of counter-sciences (in the case of Foucault), and for Adorno, the
material natural history of the subject provided by sociology and psychoanalysis.

2.2.2 Sociology, Psychoanalysis: Theorizing Social Mediation (Cognition and
Society)
“In psycho-analysis nothing is true except the exaggerations.” Adorno, Minima Moralia, 49.

Adorno continually interrogates philosophy, art, and culture more generally, in
relation to “society,” by which he means (in simplified Marxist terms) the material
economic conditions (or “base”) of ideas. The uniqueness of Adorno’s Hegelian
materialism lies in his opening of ideas to their transcendental societal conditions, while
not wholly reducing them to their situation. As autonomous art is independent from,
while also being conditioned by, social material forces; likewise, the ideas of philosophy
are invariably marked by the social “force-field” out of which they arise. Adorno
positions sociology in disciplinary conflict with philosophy, with sociology presenting a
space in which “the real”—or the empirical material-historical realm— is able to enter
into a dialogue with philosophy. Psychoanalysis is similarly employed to present the
pathological moments inherent in “constitutive subjectivity” (ND, xx), that is, the abject
and unconscious disavowals which condition the emergence of epistemic subjectivity.
For Adorno, sociology and psychoanalysis are not external to philosophy, but rather,
fundamental moments in its critical reflection upon itself, through which thought is
opened to its unconscious conditions (by psychoanalysis), and material-social influences
(by sociology).
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Substantial research has already reconstructed the sociological dimensions of
Adorno’s work.117 As Adorno underscores in his undergraduate course, Introduction to
Sociology (1968), the foundational difficulty of understanding the “diffuse entity called
sociology” lies in the articulation of what the precise limits of its object of inquiry are,
given that “there is nothing… on earth… that is not mediated by society” (Sociology ,
65).118 That is “society”—understood as a constellation of material-historical forces—
permeates everything, from the realm of culture, through to the natural world. Though he
is a post-Idealist philosopher, Adorno’s thought always already contains a substantial
sociological-materialist dimension, in which seemingly natural or a-historical objects are

Most notable are Benzer’s (2011) The Sociology of Theodor Adorno, which provides a lengthy, though
fragmentary discussion of the main elements of Adorno’s sociology. For Benzer, it is precisely the
“anachronistic quality” (2) of Adorno’s theoretical sociology, in relationship to contemporary empirical
sociology, that makes his insights relevant. As such, Adorno can provoke theoretical reflection upon
contemporary sociological categories along with sociology’s ambiguous status as a discipline (231-43). For
Benzer, Adorno’s analyses bring awareness to the “doubled character” (234) of sociological research: one
must come to understand the total mediation of all objects and methods by the nebulous notion of
“society.” Benzer, further stresses the performative dimensions of Adorno’s “writing” of sociology (16297), describing the inseparability of form and content in Adorno’s sociology: in performatively “writing”
sociology, Adorno deconstructs and reflects upon the categories he employs. Gillian Rose’s The
Melancholy Science (1978), along with Hegel Contra Sociology (1981), represent her attempts to formulate
a Hegelian-Marxist approach to the social sciences. In Melancholy, Rose situates Adorno’s sociology
between the methodological antinomies of Weber and Durkheim, contradictions which Adorno attempts to
overcome in the development of his own dialectical approach to social research (105-11). Rose further
provides an extensive gloss of the use and abuse of the notion of “reification” as it applies to Adorno and
the tradition more generally (33-66). Eric Oberle’s Theodor Adorno and the Century of Negative Identity
(2018) provides an extensive analysis of Adorno’s wartime programs of social research, specifically the
chapters, “Critical Theory Goes to War: The Critique of Positive Identity and Positive Science,” and
“Negative Modeling: Objectivity, Normativity, and the Refusal of the Universal.” (131-241). The
Positivism Dispute (1981) provides a collection and summary of the “Positivismusstreit” [PositivismDispute] of 1961 between Karl Popper, Hans Albert, Adorno and Habermas related to methodological
questions of the social sciences (1-86, 105-122). Finally, Jameson (Late Marxism, 1-12) sees Adorno as
dialectically revolutionizing the social sciences, providing a powerful method by which to import ethics
into sociology (8).
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As Adorno repeatedly warns his students, a substantial difficulty of sociological study is its lack of a
deductive method: society must be understood as a mediatory constellation which must be inquired after by
“an agglomerate of disciplines” (Sociology, 4-7). In attempting to overcome the disciplinary division of
labour imposed upon it “from the outside,” sociology draws organically from philosophy, psychology,
psychoanalysis, economics, history, and political economy (Sociology, 109). However, Adorno is careful to
stress that sociology should not become a discipline which preaches “inter-disciplinarity on every corner”
(Sociology, 109), but rather, sociology has the more Hegelian task of studying universal systems of
mediation. In this way, sociology’s most proximate faculty is philosophy, and Adorno genealogically
locates sociology’s inaugural moments in a dialogue with the positivism of Comte (Sociology, 9-12).
Adorno’s comment, “there is nothing on heaven and earth not mediated by society” is a direct reference to
Hegel’s comments in The Science of Logic on the “mediated immediacy” of any philosophical starting
point (46-9).
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opened to their own history via critique: “the categories used are not only so-called
systematic categories developed from concepts, but are always also, and intentionally,
historical categories” (Sociology, 144). A sociology of music, for example, is not external
or pre-emptive to musical analysis, but rather an integral part of a critical approach to
music and “listening” (New Music, 22-25; Sociology of Music, x-xii, 1-20). Adorno’s
philosophical sociology seeks to expose the social historical dimension of both natural
attitudes and of objects more generally, a practice which has a substantial Nietzschean
dimension (Adorno, Moral, 172; Rose, Melancholy, 24-34). By exposing philosophical
“truths” as historical construction, or by contesting philosophy by way of its materialhistorical conditions, Adorno provides a means to employ materialism in an Idealist and
non-reductive manner. That is, Adorno locates thinkers in transcendental historicalmaterial force-fields, while not totally reducing them to their situation, and further
refashions elements their philosophy to interpret the historical dynamics of their material
situation, as Kierkegaard’s “bourgeois interior” is read to reveal the class relations of the
post-1848 era (see “Construction of Inwardness,” 24-46).
Adorno’s studies on Husserl and Kant also exemplify such materialist
interventions. He locates these thinkers materially, “in truth,” that is, as ciphers to their
historical “force-field,” while simultaneously redeeming elements of their thought in the
elaboration of his own negative dialectic. With respect to Kant, Adorno at once
appropriates key elements of his epistemology (as I argue throughout part 1), while
concurrently fracturing Kant’s thinking by way of its sociological and psychoanalytic
conditions. Adorno sees Kant as the height of a form of “bourgeois subjectivity,” with all
its repressions and class undercurrents, while nonetheless affirming Kant’s philosophical
contributions (Kant, 73-80, 110-116,170-80). Adorno further works to reformulate the
relationship between theory and practice such that the social-historical dimension is not
external to philosophy, in that philosophy must “apply” itself to the world in some
belated form of “practice,” but rather, following Lukács, theory is always already a form
of praxis.119 As Rose has pointed out, Adorno’s sociological analyses form an aspect of

Paraphrasing Lukács (of History and Class Consciousness), Adorno will write, “Thinking is a doing,
theory a form of practice” (CM, 261). For more on Adorno’s insistence on the “theoretical” nature of
“practice,” see “Relation to Left-Wing Hegelianism” (ND, 143-4).
119
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his re-imagined dialectic (Melancholy, 97-104), one which recognizes the social
dimension inherent in all cognition, seeing even the most “natural” elements stand as
social ciphers.120
Adorno is often accused of being excessively pessimistic or denying a priori the
possibility of (revolutionary) political action. Indeed, it does appear that Adorno provides
few avenues for theory to conceptualize a way out of the late capitalist charnel house in
which “there is nothing left un-maimed” (CM, 253). Adorno regulatively clings to the
existence of a negative utopian “something more” beyond the oppressive confines of
exchange society (Adorno & Bloch, 16), yet such a space will not be arrived at by way of
the wholesale rejection of “society,” but rather, through a recognition of the inherently
social dimension of all philosophical activity.
Adorno’s emphasis on the theoretical pole of social research does not necessitate a
wholesale rejection of empirical approaches to social analysis, as Adorno offers complex
models through which empirical moments are able to respond to and influence theory
(Benzer, 90, 117; Oberle, 131-207). Moving against positivism, for Adorno, empirical
and scientific facts are not self-evident and need to be situated within a theory of social
totality (in Adorno’s case, a theory of capitalist exchange society) that is able to mediate
and critically decode them. Adorno provides a plethora of examples by which one is able
to “philosophize” via empirical-material facts, “solving” (or interpreting) the “riddles”
presented by such facts philosophically (AP, 127). As Adorno articulates: “the idea of
science is research, that of philosophy is interpretation” (AP, 126); that is, “the point of
interpretative philosophy is to construct keys, before which reality springs open. The old
Idealism chose categories too large” (AP, 130).121 Critical philosophy must present
“changing trial arrangement[s], of constellation and construction,” the material for which

Positioning sociology as a moment in Adorno’s “changed concept of the dialectic,” Rose argues that,
“Adorno not only exposed antinomies in theoretical and empirical sociology but attempted himself to
adumbrate a theory of the individual and social change, and to conduct empirical research” (Melancholy,
99). In this way, Adorno is not against empirical social research, but rather the positivist fetishism of
“facts” and “objectivity.” Adorno likewise dialectically opposes “pure” theory that would be devoid of any
empirical-historical content.
121
On such points Adorno’s critical method is immensely indebted to Benjamin’s “Epistemo-Critical
Prologue,” to the extent that after reading the address, Benjamin (somewhat jestingly) accuses Adorno of
plagiarism, writing “I can subscribe to this proposition. Yet I could not have written it without some
reference to the introduction of my book on Baroque drama” (Adorno-Benjamin Correspondence, 8-10).
120
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it “burgles” from sociology, mediating such sociological “facts” in critical mosaics, while
also grounding speculative philosophy in historical material categories (AP, 130). Within
the AP, Adorno examines Lukács’ materialist interventions upon the Kantian “thing-initself,” which he decodes –via his own Hegelian Marxist theory of reification—as a
manifestation of “the antinomies of bourgeoisie thinking” (Consciousness, 121-50, 110148; Adorno, AP, 127-33). As Adorno continues, though “the mind (Geist) is…not
capable of grasping the totality of the real...it may be possible to penetrate the detail, to
explode in miniature the mass of merely existing reality” (AP, 133). Sociology provides
philosophy with such details, through which it may critically explode “the real.”122
For Adorno, sociological theory must be employed to group, or mediate,
empirical phenomena in “constellations of concepts,” allowing for the “ideal typical”
expression of larger social relations (ND, 162-66). Adorno describes the impossibility of
a precise designation of sociology which “cannot be defined or pinned down simply in
terms of its subject matter” due to the fact that “its central concept, the concept of society,
is itself not an object but a category of mediation” (Sociology, 103). Such statements are
clearly Hegelian-Marxist: for Hegel, individual consciousness stands in a mediated
relationship to the world by way of the normative life-worlds of objective “Geist” (PS,
65-66; cf. Horkheimer, Social Science, 4-5). While for Marx, “Capital” is not a fixed
entity, but rather “the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes
here…the phantasmagoric form of a relation between things” (Capital, 165).123 Adorno
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Horkheimer (and to a more limited extent, Adorno) placed a great import on the empirical moment of
social research, endeavoring to philosophize with empirical material data, and oversaw several empiricalhistorical research projects during his time as the director of the Institute (Social Science, 8-10, 14).
However, many of the Frankfurt School’s empirical research projects, such as “Studies on Authority and
the Family,” or the later “Authoritarian Personality,” were far too complex and difficult to implement due
to their complicated (theoretical) ambitions; they stand as “failed” studies and cast doubt on the openness
of Horkheimer and Adorno to empirical research methods (Wiggershaus, 149-156). In his essay on
Kracauer, Adorno describes the need to “play out” the antinomy between “theory” and “experience” “in
such a way that the contrary elements interpenetrate each other” (NL II: 64).
123
Rose (in Melancholy) notes that Adorno’s relationship with Marxism is ambiguous on this point, given
that Adorno has “no concept or theory of society or of a mode of production” (39), nor a theory of class or
class organization (111); instead, Adorno is interested in the materialist question of “the history or
formation of whatever a specific society regards as nature... what he calls second nature” (102). However, it
should be underscored that Adorno is immensely sympathetic to Marx’s employment of the commodity
form as a theoretical explanatory key to the social totality of capitalist society, this of course following
Lukács’ elevation of the commodity form to the sphere of culture in his analysis of “reification.”

79

follows Marx’s fracturing of Hegelian Geist: human normative relationships have been
replaced by the reified relations of “exchange society,” or “identity thinking.” Society
has ceased to be a mere system of mediation; instead it has become a mythical “spell”
[Der Bann], “a certain entwinement, which… leaves nothing out,” “a totality which binds
people together only by virtue of their alienation from each other” (Sociology, 30, 43;
ND, 3 // 140, 159, 237, 348). Capitalist social relations appear reified as “self- evident
natural laws” (Marx, Capital, 899, 925). For Adorno, “only theory could break the spell”
(Adorno-Benjamin Correspondence, 282-3), that is, by presenting the historical character
of mythological-natural relations, theory de-reifies the seemingly natural-objective world,
revealing it as plastic with respect to human thought and action.
This sociological-philosophical perspective incorporates reflexive self-critique
through which the researcher comes to understand the presence of social reality within
their own seemingly “natural” faculties (CM, 254-5). As Adorno asserts, “The more I
understand of society, the less I am able to participate in it” (Sociology, 3): the
sociological philosopher must be motivated by an oppositional animus to the world of
capitalist social relations. This engaged academic sentiment is echoed throughout
Adorno’s work, most succinctly in Minima Moralia, in which Adorno continually resists
the pressures of the “wrong life” through oppositional critique: “It is part of morality not
to be at home in one’s home” (MM, 15-18, 38-40; cf. Butler, 55-61, 69-71, 94-109).
In the “Dedication” to his 1945/51 Minima Moralia, Adorno describes the
importance of individual subjective experience in social analysis: “in an individualistic
society, the general not only realizes itself through the interplay of particulars, but society
is essentially the substance of the individual. For this reason, social analysis can learn
incomparably more from individual experience than Hegel conceded” (MM, 17). Given
Adorno’s dialectical notion of “society”—as a diffuse organic totality instantiated out of
the interplay of particular relations between “individuals”—it is evident that an analysis
of “the individual,”124 along with its pathologies, should play a substantial role in

For an analysis of Adorno’s perspectives on “the individual” in relation to Foucault and Freud, see
Cook, “Notes on the Individual” (61-92) in Adorno, Foucault, and the Critique of the West (2018). The
prevalence of psychoanalytic notions within Adorno’s oeuvre has been well documented: from his 1924-27
attempted habilitation under Hans Cornelius, “The Concept of the Unconscious in the Transcendental
124
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Adorno’s social analysis. Exemplary of this is Adorno’s disconnected mosaic, Minima
Moralia, in which each aphorism begins with Adorno’s own subjective experiences of
exile in America, which he then mediates (or “interprets”) in relation to the holistic
framework of capitalist social relations, utilizing his “melancholy science” to articulate
the shared experience of a “damaged life” (MM, 15-18). In the aphorism “Tough Baby,”
Adorno relates his own crisis of masculinity to the objective calamity undergone by the
individual under the conditions of modern labour (MM, 45-46). In “Do not Knock,”
Adorno describes his inability “to close a door quietly or discretely,” which he then
interprets in relation to the violent and inhuman relationships one develops to the reified
objects of capitalism (MM, 40). The aphorism then turns to a memorable description of
the “Fascist” nature of Los Angeles car culture: “which auto-driver has not felt the
temptation, in the power of the motor, to run over the vermin of the street – passersby,
children, bicyclists? In the movements which machines demand from their operators, lies
already that which is violent, crashing, propulsively unceasing in Fascist mistreatment”
(MM, 40).
In the tradition of theory, Adorno was a forerunner in the critical employment of
Freudian psychoanalysis (beginning in the early 1930s), and one can see psychoanalytic
motifs throughout virtually all of Adorno’s writings.125 As Rose argues, “[For Adorno]

Theory of the Psyche,” which would resolve the Kantian paralogism between the transcendental theory of
the soul and the empirical psyche (Rose, Melancholy, 117; Buck-Morss, Origins, 17-20), through to the
monumental empirical-psychoanalytic study, the Authoritarian Personality (1950), along with his various
post-war writings on societal repression and “working through” the traumas of the past. In Dialectic of
Enlightenment (1944), specifically its considerations of Sade’s Juliet and Odysseus’ confrontation with the
sirens, Adorno articulates the repressive character of civilization in a similar manner to the Freud of
Civilization and its Discontents, describing the human subject as emerging through an abjection of its
natural basis (DE, 7, 35-62). Throughout Negative Dialectics, in a Freudian-Nietzschean manner, Adorno
describes the desire to dominate “nature” (both inner/outer) at the heart of German Idealism. Both Kant’s
transcendental subject and Hegel’s conceptual sojourn (and its resulting encyclopedia) are driven by an
unconscious desire for the control of nature, the craving to dominate, that which is un-known, or other to
“spirit” (ND, 11 22-24, 178, 238 249, 354-358, 407; cf. Horkheimer, Social Science, 63-86). Finally, in
Aesthetic Theory, Adorno continually undermines the stable Kantian subject of judgment via its
pathological moments which are provided by way of Freud, examining a more complicated machinery of
aesthetic experience beyond the stability of the Kantian judging subject (AT, 9-13).
125
In his “Introduction to Sociology,” Adorno positions Freud as a thinker of mediation, one who
recognized the inherently social elements of individual cognition: “Freud came up against the fact that the
innermost core on which the psychology of the single individual rests is itself something general: namely
certain very general—though admittedly archaic—structures of the social context in which individuals are
contained” (Sociology, 115). It should be noted that Adorno is highly critical of the compensatory and
ideological moments of the Freudian project (Cook, Adorno-Foucault, 62) and seeks to politicize
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Psychoanalytic theory provided the way to examine the mediation between the individual
and society” and allows Adorno to explicate his “view that ‘the individual is at the same
time universal and particular,’ without diminishing the reality of either the individual or
society” (Melancholy, 122). Benzer goes further, arguing that psychoanalysis and
sociology cannot be disentangled in Adorno, as both posit the primacy of structure over
and against the subject (233). Such sentiments are echoed by Esposito: “Rather than
alternative poles, the individual and society are, each, an image reflected in the other, in a
regime of meaning that opposes them” (71). For Foucault, neither ethnography nor
psychoanalysis are “counter-sciences” in themselves, but each domain interrupts the
other, exposing each to its abyssal un-thought. Likewise, for Adorno, both
psychoanalysis and sociology must be employed jointly in a critical constellation so as to
contest the autarky of philosophy, while also being philosophically interrogated
themselves. For Adorno, psychoanalysis becomes necessary as a counter-science
precisely because the classical sociological theory (of Weber and Durkheim) failed to
offer any account of the individual other than by way of Neo-Kantian notions of
transcendental subjectivity, nor was it able to theorize the interpellation of the individual
by way of ideology—describing how universal ideology is realized in the particular.126
Psychoanalysis serves two major functions in Adorno’s work: firstly, it analyzes
the instantiation of the universal (or societal ideology) in the particular (the individual).
Secondly, psychoanalysis allows Adorno to view philosophy as dialectically entwined
with the desire to dominate the natural world, recognizing Idealism’s conceptual
[begrifflich] sojourn as a “belly turned mind,” a drive to “devour,” dominate, and “seize”
[greifen] all that does not conform to static categories (ND, 22-23; DE, 1-34; Cook,
Adorno-Foucault, 64; cf. Nietzsche, Will, 314-9). Describing this naturalistic vision of
philosophy, Cook writes, “Adorno sees reason, including its more sophisticated

psychoanalysis against Freud’s conservatism and complicity with capitalist social relations, understanding
the violence of psychoanalysis as a “a faithful mirror of capitalist society” (Esposito, 71). In this way,
orthodox psychoanalysis (as typified by Freud) must also be socialized and opened towards its margins by
way of sociological theory, as must orthodox sociology (as typified by Weber and Durkhiem) be open to a
broader understanding of the individual (and its pathologies) by way of psychoanalysis.
126
For more on an Adornian-Hegelian critique of such neo-Kantian models of sociological research, see
Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology (33-40).
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instantiations in science and philosophy, as an outgrowth of the instinctually driven
struggle to survive” (Adorno-Foucault, 70).127 Following the theses of the Dialectic of
Enlightenment (1945), “nature” has been deformed and inscribed by the “dominating
character” of Western rationality and thinking reason otherwise could allow “nature” to
appear and flourish materially in radically different ways.128 It should be noted that
Adorno does not advocate a dismissal of reason because of its naturalistic basis (as is
claimed by Habermas129), but rather, a psychoanalysis of philosophy, such that it
becomes aware of its problematic genesis. Following Freud, through an awareness of
such pathologies one can gain a certain freedom with respect to them, and Adorno hopes
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This second employment of psychoanalysis should not be seen as some crude evolutionary Darwinian
naturalism, but rather, as leading the subject back to its constitutive precarity—to its “natural-historical”
character. This is to say, the subject must recognize its heteronomous-autonomy with respect to the natural
world: the subject is not a purely natural or biological collection of cells or instincts, nor is it a purely
historical construction, but rather, the subject is constituted by a dialectic between the two domains which
cannot be reduced to either pole (Cook, Nature, 47-60). As the situation of Odysseus in Dialectic of
Enlightenment demonstrates, the constitution of “modern” subjectivity by way of the rejection of
mythological nature dialectically carries the kernel of myth within itself, and in repressing one’s own
“natural elements,” the subject paradoxically comes to be dominated by the ideological “second nature” of
(instrumental) reason (DE, 36-37). As Cook stresses, following psychoanalysis, through critique and selfreflection one can “become conscious of the nature within [oneself],” allowing one a certain minimal
distance and autonomy with respect to one’s natural pathologies (Nature, 121, 107). Cook continues,
drawing an affinity between critical theory and psychoanalysis: “Critical theory plumbs our natural history,
examining the trends and tendencies that now undermine effective practice” (Nature, 132).
128
Steven Vogel, in Against Nature, charts the vexing and contradictory concept of nature in Frankfurt
School Critical Theory. Vogel notes that Adorno moves beyond a totalizing Lukácsian social constructivist
conception of nature, presenting nature as “a great given fact, against which humans can do nothing” (68).
As myth, (first) nature constantly takes revenge in the reversal of the dialectic of enlightenment. However,
Vogel, following Habermas, notes the ambiguity of Adorno’s naturalist-materialism, which seems to speak
from an “interest” of nature which must be preserved by philosophical critique (8, 83, 3, 52, 61-7). For
Vogel, such an appeal to immediate nature seemingly contradicts Adorno’s Hegelian emphasis on
mediation, and as such a latent naturalism seemingly to undermine one’s capacities for ethical and
normative judgments and claims provided by the enlightenment (69-74). For more on Adorno’s ambiguous
relationship to “nature” see Cook, Adorno on Nature, 34-61.
129
Given that Adorno and Horkheimer seemingly posit some “authentic” conception of nature (or
“mimesis”), which has been deformed by the progress of enlightenment, for Vogel, they implicitly
undermine their own ability to make (enlightened) normative ethical claims (3, 52, 61-7), lapsing into what
Habermas would term a “crypto-normativism” (Habermas, Modernity, 266-70 276, 284-92). The term
“crypto-normativism” has been attributed to Habermas (in the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity)
apropos his criticism of Foucault (King, 288, 300-2). Broadly speaking, Habermas chastises Foucault’s
genealogical-historical method for its undermining of reason’s ability to make meaningful normative
ethical statements (266-93). Such statements are echoed in Habermas’ critique of Dialectic of
Enlightenment, though with respect to its “history of nature.” For Habermas, both historical-genealogy and
naturalism, pose problems for the expanded communicative notion of reason he is attempting to formulate.
Vogel has aptly articulated what a Habermasian philosophy of nature, based on principles of “discourse
ethics,” would entail (106-70).
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that through philosophical critique thought can be conducted in a less oppressive and
more inclusive manner. Psychoanalysis allows Adorno to probe the genesis of both
subject (history) and object (nature), examining their reciprocal entanglement, while
imagining a model of philosophy which is able to encompass naturalism in a nonreductive sense. Adorno is careful to stress that thinking will always entail a certain
lordship or opposition to mere nature for Kantian, normative ethical reasons, though one
must continually probe the unconscious naturalistic basis of such ideals (Moral, 100-9).

2.3

The Aesthetic after the Death of Art (and Philosophy)
“Aesthetics is not applied philosophy, but philosophy itself.”
Adorno, AT, 91.

The following sections will examine the central tenets of Adorno’s philosophy of
art—understood to encompass both the reception and production of art (or aesthetics and
art) —while exploring the formal imperatives Adorno’s negative dialectic presents to
philosophy. Adorno’s aesthetics continues his post-Idealist reflection on the IdealistRomantic intellectual tradition: thinking through its central problematics, while
continuing his overarching aim of mediating moments of the Hegelian and Kantian
(aesthetic) program in constellation. For Adorno, aesthetics is not some distinct sphere of
philosophy, but rather, should be understood as “philosophy itself,” a fundamental space
in which the meta-critical interrogation of philosophy can be conducted (AT, 91, 262).
Such a space allows new possible relations to be imagined between philosophy and the
natural world, forwarding a more sensuous, or porous model of rationality (AT, 64-6;
Hammer, Modernism, 40- 44). In this way, Adorno follows Hegel in considering
aesthetics as a form of thought in its own right, a provisional organization of “absolute
knowing,” though one which nonetheless occupies the same province as “religion and
philosophy” (Hegel, A, 94, 100). However, Adorno contests the final Hegelian triumph of
“absolute spirit” (in conceptual philosophy), fracturing Hegelian thought by those
“accidental” domains (such as art-aesthetics) it has supposedly overcome (PS, 18).130 For

As I will argue in the final chapter of this project (6.0), Hegel’s triumph over art by philosophy (and
religion) is not as straightforward as it first appears, as Spirit’ s “accidental” and (supposedly) overcome
domains continue to trouble philosophy’s final absolute triumph. Further (as will be argued), Hegel’s
discussions of art essentially invent the discipline of art history. Though at instances Adorno strawmans
130
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Adorno, Hegel’s dream of the absolute spirit—or the world ensnared in the net of
reason—has become the nightmare of instrumental rationality, dominating all
particularity by way of bad abstraction. Adorno attempts to reopen the fundamental
questions of philosophy by way of a conflictual dialogue between philosophy and
aesthetics, in which art and aesthetics are not seen as lower spheres overcome by reason
(philosophy), but as voluptuous sites from which to image a fuller, yet more sensitive and
empathetic, model of rationality. The constellation of thinkers presented in this project—
Adorno, Benjamin, Hegel and (to a more limited extent) Schelling—all contest what
Bernstein has termed the “fate of art” in the tradition of philosophy (1-17), conceiving of
art as a fundamentally philosophical space through which one is able to theorize by other
means, imagining alternative, or more “reflective” relations to the world and to other
disciplines. For Adorno and Benjamin in particular, art and aesthetics provide unique
“prisms,” through which to interrogate the historical events of their century, delivering
vantages which cannot be reached by a philosophy of the concept. In conceiving the
“actuality” of philosophy anew, all these thinkers employ art as an important interlocutor
for philosophy.
In this way, Adorno’s late Aesthetic Theory (1969/70) should be seen as an
essentially philosophical text, continuing the project of Negative Dialectics (1966), which
strives to elaborate new (formal) imperatives for thought in relation to the crises of the
twentieth-century. Adorno’s ruined and unfinished text provides the critical material
through which to (re)think the relationship between aesthetics and philosophy, containing
the resources for an expanded notion of reason which could also involve a divergent
comportment towards the natural world (AT, 64-72). As will be argued throughout this
chapter, Adorno does not advocate that philosophy totally give way to, or “imitate art”
(ND,15), nor does he advocate that art should cede to philosophy or aesthetics. Instead,
Adorno thinks art and philosophy in negative dialectical tension, utilizing the two
domains to critically interrupt each other. Hence the full sense of the prefatory quote
from Schlegel with which Adorno intended to open Aesthetic Theory: “what is called

Hegel as a conceptual totalizer, his own aesthetics is immensely indebted to Hegelian notions of art and
aesthetics (see, AT, 3).
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philosophy of art usually lacks one of two things: either the philosophy or the art” (AT,
366). Arranged in constellation, philosophy, art, and aesthetics, are able to critically
refract and supplement each other.

2.3.1 The Transient Possibility of Artistic Truth: Aesthetic Theory
“This surely means nothing less than that the foundation of art itself has been shaken, that an un-refracted
[unbrochenes] relation to the aesthetic realm is no longer possible. The concept of a cultural resurrection
after Auschwitz is illusory and absurd, and every work created since then has to pay the bitter price for this.
But because the world has outlived its own downfall, it nevertheless needs art to write its unconscious
history. The authentic artists of the present are those in whose works the uttermost horror still quivers.”
Adorno, “Those Twenties,” CM, 48; Eingriffe, 58.

Adorno’s oeuvre provides a polyphony of models through which philosophy can
undertake critical self-confrontation, notably: sociology, psychoanalysis, historical
materialism, along with art and aesthetics (or the production and reception of art). In this
section, the critical philosophical possibilities afforded by aesthetics will be examined.131
Much has been made of the impossible hope Adorno sees in the aesthetic dimension,
which contains within it the potential to “disenchant the disenchanted world,” providing a
“determinate negation of determinate society” (AT ,58, 226). Such statements bring one
to a major dilemma within Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory relating to the distinction (or lack
thereof) between art and aesthetics: is Adorno providing absolute imperatives for the
production of art, or is he offering aesthetic models by which to think art philosophically,
or to further philosophical reflection by way of art? These reflections favour the latter
course, which positions Adorno in constellation with thinkers such as Schiller, Schelling,
Hegel, and Nietzsche, along with Deleuze and Lyotard, theorists for whom the aesthetic
dimension contains new models of judgment and modes of philosophy more broadly,
safeguarding the possibility of logics other than those provided by conceptual discursive
cognition.132 Both Adorno and Benjamin collapse the hard distinction between art and

In the draft version of the proposed “Introduction” to Aesthetic Theory, Adorno describes how aesthetics
“presents philosophy the bill,” forcing it to engage in self-reflection: “Aesthetics presents philosophy with
the bill for the fact that the academic system degraded it to being a mere specialization. It demands of
philosophy precisely what philosophy has neglected to do: that it extract phenomenon from their existence
and bring them to self-reflection; this would be the reflection of what is petrified in the sciences, not a
specialized science located beyond them” (AT, 262).
132
For more on Adorno’s notion of “aesthetic experience,” particularly in relation to Hölderlin, Schiller,
Schlegel, and post-Kantian Aesthetics, see Nathan Ross, The Philosophy and Politics of Aesthetic
Experience (193-245).
131
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aesthetics, or artistic works and commentary on them, seeing works and their critical
reception-supplementation as fundamentally linked. Aesthetics should be seen in
conjunction with Adorno’s other contestatory domains (sociology and psychoanalysis),
spheres which emphasize the historical-material finitude of knowledge. Aesthetics
likewise challenges the autarky of philosophy, while imagining alternative relationships
with the natural world (more about which will be said in Ch. 6).
To follow Bernstein (in his 1992 The Fate of Art), Adorno should be seen as a
“post-aesthetic” thinker who sought to mend “the discordance of art and truth” (5, 1), one
who sought to overcome the exclusion of aesthetic considerations from the proper
philosophical domains of “truth” and morality, a scene as old as philosophy itself,
beginning with Plato’s expulsion of the poets.133 In striving to overcome this “aesthetic
alienation,” Adorno positions aesthetics in conflict with traditional philosophical
domains, provoking reflection within such spheres, while questioning the (co)constitutive
relationship between philosophy and aesthetics more broadly. Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory,
“seeks to trace the critical transformation that aesthetic discourse performs upon the
language of reason,” and it is “through such a reflection” that one can “comprehend how
art’s apparent unreason reveals the irrationality of formal, enlightened reason” (Bernstein,
Fate, 15). For Adorno, aesthetics demonstrates the philosophical possibility of the
“redemption of semblance [or illusion]” (AT, 107), that is, the inclusion of downcast (or
“non-identical”) domains beyond conceptual discursive “identity thinking” within
philosophical reflection (ND, 4-7, 11).134 Aesthetics grasps the possibility of a “truth of
sensuous particularity, and not the subsumption of one thing in the metaphysical
hierarchy” (Bernstein, Fate, 2). That is, aesthetics recognizes that truth claims could issue
from domains—such as art, religion or nature—spheres often thought to be overcome by
conceptual philosophy. However, aesthetics does not grasp such sensuousness by
fetishizing some immediate “sense certainty,” or pure experience, but rather, in a
mediated context in which first nature no longer exists, aesthetics refracts an image of
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See, Plato, The Republic, Books 3 &10 (66-102, 297-312).
As Bernstein writes, “[for Adorno the] experience of modern art is the suspension of identity thinking.”
(Fate of Art, 189). The Idea of Aesthetics as the “redemption of illusion” is central to Lambert
Zuidervaart’s influential 1993 text, Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion (see, 178-213).
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repressed “first nature” through the realm of convention or historical “second nature.”
Describing such a prismatic perspective, Adorno writes: “Art is the rescue of nature—or
of immediacy—through its negation, that is, total mediation. It makes itself like what is
free of domination by the limitless domination over its material” (AT, 288; Paddison, 58).
In playing at, or seeming like nature, art presents a dialectically refracted image of first
nature from within second nature, inviting one to consider the extent to which “nature” is
always already mediated, yet also how one might deal with the natural world in a less
dominating fashion. Pushed further, for Adorno, all interrogations of aesthetics can be
seen as inquiries into mediation: a questioning of the extent to which seemingly natural
(aesthetic) objects contain a social-historical index (Paddison, 101). Adorno also
repeatedly upholds the production of art as a utopian model of “social labour,”
elucidating a more caring relationship to the domain of objects and the natural world (AT,
42,167, 224, 236).135
With respect to the conflict between faculties, for Adorno, art provides a critical
site in which philosophy is able to reflect upon itself—considering both its form and
content—while becoming the more indirect practice of “criticism,” through which
philosophy is able to encounter alterity without lapsing into irrational caprice. Describing
this capacity of art in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno writes:
Art is rationality that criticizes rationality without withdrawing from it; art is not
something pre-rational or irrational which would peremptorily condemn it as untruth
in the face of the entanglement of all human activity in the social totality. Rational and
irrational theories of art are therefore equally faulty. (AT, 55)

After the disaster, poetry (and art more generally) is not only possible, but in fact
necessary, given that aesthetics provides a rational critique of the instrumental rationality
of late capitalist society, oppressive logics which directly contributed to such crises. By
providing a “running commentary on reason,” art and aesthetics demonstrate the

Describing art as a utopian form of practice, Adorno writes: “Only artworks that are to be sensed as a
form of comportment have a raison d’etre. Art is not only the plenipotentiary of a better praxis than that
which has to date predominated, but is equally the critique of praxis as the rule of brutal self-preservation at
the heart of the status quo and in its service. It gives the lie to production for production’s sake and opts for
a form of praxis beyond the spell of labour. Art’s promesse du Bonheur means not only that hitherto praxis
has blocked happiness but that happiness is beyond praxis. The measure of the chasm separating praxis
from happiness is taken by the force of the negativity of the art work” (AT, 12).
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possibility of a fuller model of rationality, one more attuned to the plethora of possible
experiences and the complexities of the (natural) world (Hammer, Modernism, 44).
Aesthetic objects serve as “prisms” that refract existing reality, and when mediated
through aesthetic reflection, kaleidoscopically demonstrate the possibility that reality
could be thought and constructed otherwise.
The enigmatic notion of “truth-content” [Wahrheitsgehalt] allows Adorno to
thematize the “non-identical” relationship between art and philosophy that arises via
aesthetic reflection (Noten, 14).136 Following Adorno’s writings on music, the truth
content of the work of art can be understood in terms of the dialectic between “the
composer” (or the creative subject) and the “musical-artistic material” (New Music, 3134; Sociology of Music, 213-8; GS 7: 45). The latter pole describes the natural-historical
character of the “raw-material” of music, recognizing that what is seemingly “natural” in
music is a historical accomplishment of the tradition, a cipher to the historical labour of
composition (Geuss, 118-9; Paddison, 110- 111). Works of art should be understood as
situated natural-historical “solutions to problems” (Sociology of Music, 213-5), that is, as
formal configurations of the materials and technologies of a given epoch (Robinson, 18693; AT, 43-44). The “truth-content” of the work is the solution to the historical demands
of the natural material synthesized within the individual work: “the interaction of the
socially mediated expressive subject with the objectivity of the historically mediated
musical material, as realized in the concrete structure of particular musical works”
(Paddison, 111; AT, 44 128-129, 191, 284). Particular works of art enact an experimental
natural-historical crystallization of subject and object, both of which are revealed to be
mediated by their (non) identity-in-difference, recognizing that there is no pure “natural”
artist independent of their presence within historical forms, and that there exists no purely
historical work independent of its particular actualizations.
The truth-content of the work, or its specific natural-historical configuration, can
only be grasped on the level of form via an immanent critical supplementation. For
Adorno, it is on the level of form that the artist’s particular response to the demands of
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Adorno refashions this formulation from Benjamin, which will be explored in greater depth in 4.1.3. For
more on “truth content” in Adorno’s work see Zuidervaart (xxii-xxiv, 32, 38-43, 192-203, 296-98);
Bernstein, Fate (244-61); Hullot-Kentor (83-84, 91).
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the aesthetic material is crystalized, and the critic must unfold these historically
sedimented dimensions of meaning within the object, refusing to locate meaning in
authorial intention, or subjective agency. Because of Adorno’s opening of “natural”
aesthetic notions to history, seemingly natural or arbitrary formal aesthetic choices
become historicized and politicized and one can read the presence of “society” in the
very “texture” of art (Sociology of Music, 218). For example, in his 1940 Philosophy of
New Music, Adorno will assert the “progressive” (27-99; Paddison, 98) character of
Schoenberg’s a-tonal experimentations, given their innovative response to the naturalhistorical demands of the musical material, while Stravinsky (despite his “modern”
veneer) represents a regression to an un-dialectical folk-like immediacy (New Music, 810, 105-110, 155-8; Buck Morss, Origin, 37-42). Similarly, Adorno demystifies
stereotypes of Beethoven as some subjective “genius,” instead positioning him as
immanently working through handed down artistic forms, as one who exhibited an acute
awareness of the importance of tradition (Sociology of Music, 209-223; Beethoveen,1523, 59, 102-5). For Adorno, an artwork is “political” not to the extent that it deals with
politics on the level of content, but rather, to the degree that it responds formally to the
demands set forth by the material, which are given over to it by way of tradition. Adorno
rejects explicitly political or “committed” forms of art that do not embody politics on the
level of form: despite their avowed political content, such works refuse to acknowledge
the entanglement of aesthetic material and history, thus regress to an un-dialectical
immediacy.137 For Adorno, within the modern context of mechanical reproduction,

For Adorno, “committed” art degrades art to mere propaganda and denies the thought-provoking critical
supplementary element of the work: “commitment often means bleating what everyone is already saying or
at least secretly wants to hear” (NL II: 93). Stressing the movement of politics from committed-political art
to autonomous art Adorno will write: “This is not a time for political works of art, but politics has migrated
to autonomous works, and nowhere more so than where these seem politically dead” (NL II: 93-4). Adorno
further describes the uniquely political potential of the autonomous work of art: “It is not the office of art to
spotlight alternatives, but to resist by its form alone the course of the world, which permanently puts a
pistol to men’s heads. In fact, as soon as committed works of art do instigate decisions at their own level,
the decisions become interchangeable” (NL II: 81; see further, Paddison, 81). For more on Adorno’s notion
of political art, see his 1962 essay “Commitment.” Huysen, in “Adorno in Reverse: From Hollywood to
Richard Wagner,” positions Adorno’s aesthetic (Modernist) notions of the autonomy of art in relation to the
explicitly political avant-garde, and the culture industry, all of which are taken as ideal typical categories.
As Huysen continually asserts, modernism and mass culture are dialectically entwined in their constant
desire to define themselves in opposition to each other (16-17). Thus, both in Adorno’s corpus, and in
137
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politics has been exiled to the autonomous (or high modernist) work of art, which
through its formal emphasis on its fragmentary and incomplete nature, monadologically
mirrors the fragmented nature of society: “the unsolved antagonisms of reality return as
problems of form” (AT, 6). Despite its seeming autonomy from society, the autonomous
work of art presents a monadological mirror to society due to the natural-historical
character of each: both entail processes of labour upon handed down natural-historical
forms, or what Adorno terms “artistic material” (New Music, 31-35; Paddison, 98).138
Given the coded character of the truth-content of the work of art, a new
importance is placed upon the practice of criticism as a means to unpack the historical
dimensions latent in “natural” aesthetic material. Describing the importance of aesthetics
as a mechanism to unfold the work of art through critical interpretation, Adorno will
write:
The truth content of artworks is the objective solution of the enigma posed by each
and everyone. By demanding its solution, the enigma points to its truth content. It
can only be achieved through philosophical reflection…. Artworks, especially
those of the highest dignity, await their interpretation. (AT, 128)

Truth content involves such an “interpretation” of the relation of aesthetic objects to their
natural-historical conditions of possibility. By decoding the “demands of the material”
within the particular “artwork,” alongside the author’s situated response to such demands,
the critic presents the work “in truth,” that is, in relation to the broader historical
unfolding of art, and the situated debates of its time (New Music, 31-34). This
hermeneutical procedure of the continual supplemental “interpretation” of the aesthetic
object provides a model for how philosophy might comport itself to the world in a more
inclusive sense, considering the natural-historical dimensions of the domain of objects
more broadly. Further, through continual critical immersion in works of art, philosophy is

cultural analysis more generally, one would do well to understand the reciprocal entanglement of both
modernist high art and the lower art of the culture industry—neither can exist without the other.
138
In a manner reminiscent of Benjamin, Adorno describes the mortuary moment of “truth-content,” in
which the truth of a work becomes more evident via historical decay, as Adorno writes: “the merits of a
work, its level of form, its inner coherence, generally become recognizable only when the material becomes
outdated or when the sensorium becomes deadened to the most conspicuous features of the façade...For
quality to unfold historically, it is not quality alone that is required in itself, but also what comes afterward
and sets the older work in relief; perhaps there is even a relationship between quality and the process of
dying off” (AT, 195).
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able to train itself in a new, more sensitive and mimetic logic of the concept, one based
on the primacy of reflective understandings of judgment.139
Adorno stresses the potential for aesthetics to interrupt unreflective catharsis within
the “constitutive subject” of philosophy by distorting the Kantian relationship between
the aesthetic object and the “disinterested spectator” (or the “subject-object” model of
cognition and aesthetic judgment). As opposed to the Kantian mechanism of aesthetic
judgment in which the artistic object “drops-out,” and aesthetics becomes a mere
occasion for the judgment of the subject, for Adorno (following post-Kantian Idealism),
the (aesthetic) object contains a dynamism which provokes further reflection, allowing
for a plethora of speculative-experimental relations between the mind and world. Thus,
the true “political” upshot of art and aesthetics lies not in its endorsement of some
particular program (or some “content”), but rather, in its ability to provoke reflection on
the level of form, shattering quotidian assumptions, provoking one to question the
“distributions of the sensible” that one exists within (cf. Rancière, [134-68]). In this
manner Adorno prefers the response of aesthetic modernism as opposed to “committed”
or political art. Modernism commences with a questioning of art’s formal mechanisms
and their adequacy in the face of given reality: it provokes reflection without lapsing into
mere propaganda, or unreflectively upholding the status quo as do the works of the
“culture industry” (DE, 94-136).140
For Adorno, the “authentic” work of art does not provide a catharsis that can be
recuperated by way of determinate categories (the work cannot be finally “understood”),
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In Negative Dialectics, Adorno describes a possible reconciliation between aesthetics and philosophy by
way of the incorporation of mimetic aesthetic moments into conceptual thought. As Adorno writes, “to
represent the mimesis it supplanted, the concept has no other way than to adopt something mimetic in its
own comportment. The aesthetic moment is thus not accidental to philosophy…but it is no less incumbent
on philosophy to avoid its aestheticism, to sublimate the aesthetic into the real, by cogent insights. Cogency
and play are the two poles of philosophy. [Philosophy’s] affinity to art does not entitle it to borrow from
art…What the philosophical concept will not abandon is the longing that animates the non-conceptual side
of art, and whose fulfillment shuns the immediate side of art as mere appearance” (ND, 15).
140
By “committed art,” Adorno broadly glosses both Sartre’s notion of “littérature engagée” (in What is
Literature?) and later Lukácsian socialist realism. Adorno is unique (as a political thinker) in siding with
autonomous art—or works which stage politics on the level of form—against political art which attempts to
thematize politics as the content of art. For more on Adorno’s aesthetic critique of Sartre, see Sherman, 758.
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but rather, it provokes a “shudder” [Erschütterung] or a fracturing of such stable notions.
As Adorno writes in Aesthetic Theory:
The shock aroused by important works is not employed to trigger personal,
otherwise repressed emotions. Rather, this shock is the moment in which recipients
forget themselves and disappear into the work; it is the moment of being shaken. The
recipients lose their footing [Er verliert den Boden unter den Füßen]; the possibility
of truth, embodied in the aesthetic image, becomes tangible. This immediacy, in the
fullest sense, of relation to artworks is a function of mediation, of penetrating and
encompassing experience [Erfahrung]; it takes shape in the fraction of an instant,
and for this the whole of consciousness is required, not isolated stimuli and
responses. The experience of art as that of its truth or untruth is more than subjective
experience: It is the irruption of objectivity into subjective consciousness ...Shudder,
radically opposed to the conventional idea of experience [Erlebnis] provides no
particular satisfaction for the I; it bears no similarity to desire. Rather, it is a
memento of the liquidation of the I, which, shaken, perceives its own limitedness
and finitude. (AT, 245; GS 7. 363: 4320-1)141

The upshot of truly critical works of art lies not in their conformity to established
categories, nor in their determination by the judgment of subjects, but rather, in their
destructive ability to shatter such suppositions, provoking a sublime “shudder” which
leads the subject back to its constitutive finitude. For Adorno, great works offer the
possibility of a transformative “metaphysical experience” [geistige Erfahrung], as
opposed to the “conventional idea of experience” [Erlebnis]: that is, experiences which
gesture towards the possibility of a new model of judgment which strives to “use the
concept in order to reach beyond the concept” (Lectures ND, 95; GS 7: 33, 393; cf.
Bernstein, Fate, 195-7). For Adorno, philosophy must follow art, while not wholly
reducing itself to it (ND, 15). After Auschwitz, philosophy cannot venture to be a
conventionally systematic or discursive endeavor, but must attempt to refract historical
crises on the level of form: philosophy must “think in fragments [in Brüchen], just as
reality is fragmentary [Brüchig]” it must “find its unity in and through the breaks and not

The relationship between Adorno’s notion of the “shudder” and the Kantian sublime is highly evident.
However, for Kant, though one perceives one’s “limitedness and finitude” in the face of sublime objects,
ultimately reason (and the stability of the subject) intervenes, bringing the subject back to itself. Whereas
for Adorno, no such solace is afforded, as the subject is perpetually shattered and ungrounded. As
Bernstein writes, “Shudder is the memorial experience of nature’s transcendence, its non-identity and
sublimity” (220, cf. 220-4). For Adorno, such a “shuddering” before nature is akin to a recognition of one’s
constitutive non-identity before the world—that the world is always in excess of whatever concept one may
have of it—as Adorno will stress, “Consciousness without Shudder is reified...” (AT, 331). More will be
said regarding the sublime, and the redemption of a minimal possibility of transcendence, in the final
chapter of this project where I take up Adorno’s notion of “natural-beauty” (6.2.3.1).
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by glossing them over” (NL I:16; Noten, 19; cf. ND, 40). Philosophy should not
commence with the stable, grounded subject, but rather, with one which has been
“shuddered,” one who has had the experience [Erfahrung] of “the liquidation of the I”—
of the loss of its ground.
Thought in Kantian terms, Adorno’s gestures involve the importation of the logic
of aesthetics— “reflective judgment” from the Critique of Judgment—into that of
cognition (Critique of Pure Reason), moving against categorical “determinate judgment,”
in which the categories (or rules) are known in advance and are merely schematized with
respect to a given sensation.142 Instead, “reflective judgment,” as employed in judgments
of beauty and sublimity, proceeds without a preordained rule that it immanently attempts
to fashion by speaking in a “universal voice” (CPJ, 15-20; 99-101). As Arendt has noted,
such a Kantian “Sensus Communis” provides a new model of political judgment which
could usher in a more egalitarian “cosmopolitan” order of things, wherein the philosopher
endeavors to theorize as a “world spectator” (Lectures Kant, 67, 70, 72-5). While for
Bernstein, what is important is the existential fragility of such judgments: in their
precarity and fragmented state, they display an openness towards community, perpetually
reminding one that the subject and its categories are “not all” (Fate, 44-58; cf. Adorno,
Metaphysics, 144). Thought together with philosophy, aesthetics is able to open the
project of reason in more empathetic directions, demonstrating the existence of
alternative logics beyond conceptual discursive cognition (more about which will be said
in Ch. 6.).
Adorno postulates that through the production and reception of art one can see
something of this revised conception of philosophy, “I believe that this procedure, which
the examination of works of art suggests to us, must in a certain sense be prototypical for

As Bernstein emphasizes, Kant’s CPJ has particular import for the continental tradition: though Kant
seemingly repeats the Platonic gesture of banishing art from considerations of truth (in the CPR), in the
CPJ Kant seeks to “mend the divide” (7), demonstrating how (aesthetic) judgment can provide a
reconciliation of the old divisions of knowledge—for Kant, the knowledge of nature with the possibility of
freedom and ethics. In the continental tradition, art and aesthetic judgment provide a means of overcoming
subjective alienation, “(re) connecting the modern subject or self with an order beyond it,” while further
providing subjects with “another discourse, another metaphysics,” in which “a secular world [is]
empowered as a source of meaning beyond the self or subject (8-9).” For more on the importance of the
Kantian aesthetic in developing new models of philosophy, see Bernstein “Memorial Aesthetics” in The
Fate of Art (17-63).
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cognition in general, for the cognition of reality” (Lectures ND, 84). Art, along with the
more general rubric of “aesthetic experience,” provides essential guides for the formation
of new philosophical logics: containing the ability to “represent something like a positive
infinity” (Lectures ND, 84). However, Adorno is careful to note that philosophy should
not simply give way to or become art; what is needed is a productive exchange (or
conflict) between the aesthetic and the philosophical domains (ND, 15).
What art and philosophy both share is a reliance on traditional natural-historical
forms, which they can strive to treat in more inclusive ways. Describing this
convergence, Adorno will write, “what art and philosophy have in common is not the
form or the shaping process, but an attitude that prohibits pseudo-morphisms” (Lectures
ND, 188). This is, both domains must take care not to “over-name,” creating neologism
or unnecessarily novel concepts (Benjamin, OT, 14), without first critically working
through the natural history of handed down forms, or the “artistic material” (New Music,
31-34). At the end of his Lectures on Negative Dialectics, Adorno gestures toward a new
art of the concept which could be founded on “the relation of labour to its material,”
which would potentially allow philosophy to “transcend the concept through the concept
itself” (Lectures ND, 188, 191). Working critically within the immanent continuum of
handed down natural-historical forms, philosophy must strive to compose itself in novel
ways from within the tradition.
Such a new logic of the concept has the potential to unlock the “object” of inquiry
in startling new ways, as when arranged in constellation the mimetic and expressive
dimensions of objects (and language) are able to emerge. Describing the emergence of
mimesis by way of conceptual constellations, Adorno will write:
To represent the thing it has repressed, namely mimesis, the concept has no alternative but
to incorporate some of it into its own behaviour. In accordance with the criteria of the
concept, this procedure introduces an element of playfulness. This means that the aesthetic
aspect is not a contingent component of philosophy. (Lectures ND, 187; cf. ND, 15)143

In order to unlock the mimetic dimensions of thought, philosophy must incorporate a
“playfulness” into its practices, whereby philosophy ceases to be an exercise of

Adorno’s notion of mimesis is indebted to Benjamin’s philosophical anthropological “mimetic faculty”
which will be discussed in more depth in 3.3.3. For more on the (slight) divergence between the two
thinkers apropos mimesis, see Jay, Experience (328-9, 338, 341, 348, 356-7).
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determinate conceptual cognition and becomes more of a “play of seeming” to follow
Schiller (Adorno, Metaphysics, 114; Ross, 46-47). Philosophy must step away from the
“seriousness” of conceptual thought:
philosophy contains a playful element which the traditional view of it as a science would
like to exorcise...The un-naïve thinker knows how far he remains from the object of his
thinking...He must not deny his clownish traits, least of all since they alone can give him
hope for what is denied him. Philosophy is the most serious of things, but then again it is
not that serious. (ND, 14)

Philosophy must secede its ground to the subaltern logics contained in art and aesthetics,
attaining identity in difference by way of logics other to the concept (ND, 15). Thought
must “redeem illusion,” that is, it must allow particular moments to emerge for
themselves, as singular differences, before attempting to subsume them under some
conceptual rubric. Philosophy must also follow after the Nietzschean “genius of
construction”: the philosopher-artist, who thinks poetically and recognizes the historical
“origin” of all thought, responding playfully and constructively (“Truth and Lie,” 42).
For Adorno, philosophy (following aesthetics) cannot commence with an appeal
to some purity of origin, nor to some a-historical table of categories; instead, it must
originate with a “shudder,” with a gesture of self-fracturing that emphasizes its own
precarity and analytic of finitude. Philosophy must begin with the “essay(er),” in an
attempt to articulate and embody both the fragile character of its object of inquiry, while
recognizing the inherent instability of its form. Philosophy initiates with a sovereign act
of construction atop what Schelling termed the “Ungrund” subtending every
representation (FE, 66-70). It is such a metaphysic, along with the tenuous philosophical
constructions erected atop it, that should be seen as informing Adorno’s 1960-6 negative
dialectic.
Through the critical constellation of philosophy with other disciplines, Adorno
contests the autarky of Spirit, while continuing the Idealist program of opening reason to
a broader array of experiences. By thinking philosophy in terms of “conflict” as opposed
to stasis, Adorno provides a negative encyclopedia for the organization of knowledge, or
a system of knowledge which prioritizes the accident or “non-identity” over unity and
“identity.” Adorno’s fracturing of philosophy by way of the aesthetic allows philosophy
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to open itself to its “natural historical” basis, elaborating a more open form of rationality,
along with novel formal imperatives of the practice of philosophy.
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Part 2: Benjamin
“To cultivate fields where, until now, only madness has reigned. Forge ahead with the wetted axe of reason,
looking neither right nor left so as not to succumb to the horror that beckons from deep in the primeval
forest. Every ground must at some point be made arable by reason, must have been cleared of the
undergrowth of delusion and myth.” Benjamin, The Arcades Project, [N1-4], 456-7.

Part two of this dissertation focuses on the early writings of Walter Benjamin
(~1916-1928) in order to outline his “coming philosophy,” or his expanded philosophy of
experience [Erfahrung]. Such an understanding of philosophy opens reason to a
polyphony of new domains (or experiences), while nonetheless remaining systematic, a
possibility allowed by Benjamin’s novel conception of language. This desire to renew
philosophy by way of experience led Benjamin first to the transcendental program of
Kant and later to German Romantic-Idealists such as the Frühromantiker, Goethe, and
finally, to the allegories of the Baroque and Modernity. His early work on Kant sought to
immanently refashion the transcendental by way of language and experience, while his
“Romantic-Idealist”144 work sought to intervene upon Kant’s negative understanding of
critique, while undertaking a further troubling of philosophy by way of the metaphysical
“tangle” that is nature. In this way, Benjamin’s early working through of the Kantian
program is eminently post-Idealist, given his commitment to meta-critically refashioning
the lexicons of both Kant and Romantic-Idealism in the development of his own coming
philosophy. Further, as will be argued throughout both chapters, Benjamin’s philosophy
as a whole seeks to move beyond conventional notions of the philosophical subject,
examining dynamic interrelations between subject and object, and, particularly in his
darker Romantic-Idealist works, eviscerating the subject entirely. Even Benjamin’s early
meta-critique of the Kantian program is radically experimental, invading the Kantian
transcendental by way of experience in a manner akin to Deleuze. In this manner,
Benjamin’s work should be seen as inhabiting the Idealist-Romantic space of concerns
and “micrologically” (OT, 3) rehearsing the movement beyond Kant, by way of an

Following Rajan, I see Benjamin’s work as continuing in the Idealist-Romantic encyclopedic tradition,
in which the encyclopedia is fractured by way of its particular moments, allowing thought to reflect upon
itself, while considering the question of system experimentally (“Encyclopedia,” 341). Further, it should be
emphasized, again following Rajan, that Romanticism and Idealism be seen in a permeable relationship, in
which Romanticism forms the broader fold within which Idealist philosophy takes place (“Encyclopedia,”
333). In such a manner, Benjamin’s work can be seen as developing a darker romantic metaphysics in line
with thinkers such as Nietzsche, Lukács and Schelling.
144
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experimental reworking of Kantian terminology, performed by the post-Kantian IdealistRomantics, notably Hamann, the Schlegels, Novalis, Goethe, Schelling and Hegel.
Reading Benjamin in constellation with these thinkers allows the metaphysical tenets of
his work to emerge, along with the outlines of his transcendental philosophy of
experience.
Textually, these two chapters primarily take up the early writings of Benjamin (to
approximately 1928): beginning with his 1916 “On Language as Such and the Language
of Man” and his 1918 “Program for a Coming Philosophy,” through to his 1925/8 Origin
of the German Trauerspiel. This mosaic of texts will be read as Benjamin’s attempt to
formulate an expanded philosophy of “experience” (Ch. 3), along with the development
of his metaphysical “mortuary romantic” understanding of philosophy as a practice of
criticism (Ch. 4). Though I draw from Benjamin’s wider corpus, it is these early texts
which crystalize the prosaic kernel of Benjamin’s “coming philosophy” most
distinctly.145 Originally, Benjamin intended to elaborate his philosophy for the future by
extending and opening the (neo) Kantian transcendental to a broader array of
“experiences,” such as, history, art, and language (SW 1: 100-10). This expansion was
made possible by Benjamin’s novel conception of language, which allowed language to
be seen as a transcendental-systematic condition for a diversity of experiences. However,
while conducting provisional research for his dissertation—which would attempt to
articulate a notion of “historical experience” by way of Kant—Benjamin became
dissatisfied with the Kantian “subjective Idealist” program, and thus entered the
Frühromantik “absolute Idealist” sphere of concerns with his 1919-20 dissertation “On
the Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism,” along with his related study on

Perhaps due to his aversion to “neologisms” (OT, 14), methodological statements are sparse throughout
Benjamin’s oeuvre. The majority of Benjamin’s texts do not arise ex nihilo, but rather, subsist as
commentary upon another text or author: such as N. Leskov providing the conditions for Benjamin’s
reflections of “storytelling,” Baudelaire for an interrogation of Modernity and translation, and Eduard
Fuchs for Benjamin’s reflections on historicism. Despite this, Benjamin does have several
“methodological” texts, which, if read in constellation, can illustrate a unified philosophy. These are “On
Language as Such and the Language of Man” (1916), “On the Program for the Coming Philosophy”
(1918), “The Task of the Translator” (1921/3), “Epistemo-Crtical Prologue” in The Origin of the German
Trauerspiel (1925/8), “Convolute N” of the Arcades Project, and “Theses on the Concept of History”
(1940). These texts can be read as “meta-critical” commentaries and elucidations of Benjamin’s own
historical-critical philosophy.
145
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Goethe (“Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” 1919-22/1924-5), and his Habilitation on the
Baroque Trauerspiel. Seen in constellation, Benjamin’s early writings recapitulate the
meta-critical extension of the Kantian program, via Kant’s own aporias and concepts,
undertaken by many in the Idealist-Romantic generation.
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3

Benjamin’s Systematic Intentions: Towards a Transcendental
Philosophy of Experience

3.1

A Transcendental Philosophy of Experience

“Of all philosophers, Kant is the one who discovers the prodigious domain of the transcendental. He is the
analogue of a great explorer—not of another world, but of the upper and lower reaches of this one.”
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 136, cf. 176.

This chapter will map the promissory notion of “system” in Benjamin’s early
writings (1916-21), considering both its experiential and transcendental poles. It will be
argued that Benjamin’s early work develops a transcendental philosophy of experience
structured by a unique understanding of language and its mimetic dimensions. Such an
early taxonomy for philosophy is retranslated into a more expansive “mortuary” model of
philosophy as criticism, as Benjamin developed intellectually and sought to metacritically move beyond the confines of the Kantian program. The contours of such a
philosophy, as it is articulated in Benjamin’s dissertation on the Frühromantik concept of
art criticism, his essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities, along with the study of Baroque
Trauerspiel, will be articulated in the next chapter (Ch. 4).
Following a brief critical biographical panorama, this chapter commences by
glossing Benjamin’s essayistic “program” for a new understanding of philosophy,
reading his 1918 text, “On the Program for a Coming Philosophy.” Within the text,
Benjamin presents the task for a philosophy of the future: the articulation of an expanded
conception of experience [Erfahrung] in a systematic manner, a task Benjamin sought to
undertake via an extension of the Kantian program into the domain of language (GS II:
158). In order to articulate Benjamin’s “coming philosophy” this chapter presents the
antinomy between “experience” and “system” (understood as language or the
transcendental) as it appears in Benjamin. Reference will be made primarily to
Benjamin’s early writings (to 1921) to describe his “coming philosophy” and philosophy
of language; however, to comprehend his philosophy of experience one must draw from
his writings on Modernity from the 1930s.
To convey Benjamin’s polyvalent understanding of “experience,” I will draw
from several of his avant-garde texts, which can be read as latently articulating his
natural-historical model of perception. In such a model, authentic “experience”
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[Erfahrung]146 comes to be understood as a historically attuned awareness of the
“media”—or systems of mediation such as technology and language—that one exists
within. Following Caygill, experience can be understood as the motor of Benjamin’s
thought, a nebulous flow that always already exceeds the bounds of the concept, acting as
a transient “real” against which philosophy must continually (re)evaluate and (re)orient
itself (xii-xiii).147 However, despite this primacy conferred to experience, Benjamin’s
thought should be distinguished from both phenomenology and vitalist philosophies of
life (or Lebensphilsophie), primarily due to the central role Benjamin accords to
language.148 For this reason, I will examine Benjamin’s early writings on language—
particularly his “On Language as Such and the Language of Man” (1916) along with the
“Task of the Translator” (1923)— which present a mimetic understanding of language
able to transcribe experience into a malleable, though nonetheless transcendental,
structure.
This invasion of philosophy by experience can be glossed in terms of Schelling’s
“asystasy.” Schelling, in his “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science” (1821), takes up
the question of system in terms of “asystasy” (210-1): the “inner conflict” driving

Erfahrung, in German connotes a more durational form of experience, in which one is said to have “had
an experience,” that is, to locate a particular event within a larger narrative, context, or story. This is
opposed to the more immediate Erlebnis: instant experiences of life that one has on a daily basis.
147
For Caygill, Benjamin is a thinker who attempts to create a transcendental yet speculative model of
philosophy, one which commences with and extents the Kantian understanding of experience. As Caygill
writes: “Benjamin…attempts to extend the concept of experience bequeathed by Kant by transforming it
into an anti-Hegelian but nevertheless speculative philosophy of history inspired by a Nietzschean active
nihilism” (xii). Such a deconstructed Kantianism, infused with a Nietschean historical sentiment, allows for
the possibility of a “discontinuous experience of the absolute” (xii), in which philosophy is able to
encounter domains beyond the usual purview of the concept without lapsing into an uncritical irrationalism.
Caygill is correct to stress the primacy of experience in Benjamin’s thought, though I depart with him with
his gloss of Benjamin as “anti-Hegelian”; instead, I position Benjamin as operating within the IdealistRomantic field of concerns. Further, as will be argued in this chapter, Caygill goes too far in his
subsumption of Benjamin’s thinking on language into a mere moment within a broader transcendental
philosophy of experience; instead, as will be argued in the final section, it is precisely Benjamin’s novel
understanding of language which acts as the transcendental condition for his expanded philosophy of
experience.
148
Benjamin differentiates his later historiographical “dialectic images” from a phenomenology experience
by way of the critical importance of language (Arcades, [N3,1] 462-3). Despite Benjamin’s ongoing
polemic against Heidegger (BC, 82, 168, 172, 359-60, 365), the two thinkers arrive at similar insights
regarding language, a connection about which more deserves to be said. Benjamin was drawn to certain
vitalist philosophies of life such as the German Youth movement (specifically their metaphysical notion of
“youth”), though from an early age he was skeptical of their wholesale abandonment of critical philosophy,
along with their mythological lapse into irrationalism and nationalism (during WWI).
146
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knowledge, a maelstrom out of which the need for system arises: “The need for harmony
arises first of all in disharmony” (210; cf. “Criticism & Dogmatism,”163-77). By
recognizing “asystasy,” “a kind of a-systematicity, or resistance to system,” as the
“condition of possibility” for the “life of systems” (Rajan, “Encyclopedia,” 348, 341;
“Excitability,” 312), Schelling allows “system” to be theorized in a dynamic and
expanded sense, in a manner which risks itself in relation to its object. Likewise,
Benjamin’s early “system,” grounded upon his philosophy of language, allows the
dynamic asystasy of experience to enter into philosophy, troubling thought, while
nonetheless moving it forward. The particular “accident,” event, or experience is allowed
to annex and influence philosophy.
Benjamin opposes the “more gemetrico” (OT, 1), or the dogmatic veneration of
methodological clarity in philosophy, operating instead in a “left-handed” or indirect
manner which posits criticism as first philosophy (SW 1: 447). However, as Missac is
careful to note, the replacement of philosophy by criticism does not commit Benjamin to
a wholesale rejection of the systematic possibility of philosophy; instead, Benjamin
deconstructs the naïve binary between “systematic” and “anti-systematic,” and should be
considered an “anti-systematic thinker, who nevertheless sometimes experienced the
need to cast anchor” (21). Criticism as first philosophy commences by denying
philosophy the possibility of creation ex nihilo: thought does not commence
“neologistically” (OT, 14-15), but rather, with a gesture of deferral, a ceding of its stable
ground and a recognition of its perpetual lateness. Such an indirect understanding of
philosophy as criticism allows thought to become open to new cross-disciplinary and
non-philosophical constellations, considering other logics, or “-abilities,” such as
experience, translation, mediation, and language (Weber, 4).
Benjamin provides a unique post-Idealist model of philosophy: one which does
not reduce all experience to a static table of categories (as Kant does), nor does it lapse
into some uncritical phenomenological immediacy or vital Lebensphilosophie. By
intervening upon the Kantian architectonic in terms of both experience and language,
Benjamin is able to articulate a transcendental philosophy of experience that allows for
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new mimetic encounters with domains such as nature, history and mythology.149 It is this
possibility of a transcendental philosophy of experience that remains efficacious beyond
Benjamin’s early work: an “-ability,” to refashion Weber’s term (4), which can be used to
structure and mediate experience, while nonetheless remaining open and malleable with
respect to events that should prompt a revision of determinate categories. Benjamin
critically moves beyond the Kantian understanding of “transcendental Idealism” —in
which experience was subjugated to knowledge and reason as merely “possible
experience”150—towards a more expansive and open form of transcendental philosophy.
To speculatively follow Deleuze, Benjamin formulates a “transcendental empiricism,” a
systematic mode of philosophical inquiry that is fundamentally open to revision by way
of events and experience.151 Such a model allows the philosophical system to remain
open to that which is ephemeral, mythical, and transient: those “micrological” domains
considered beyond the domain of conceptual philosophy.

149

Despite such invasions, it should be emphasized that Benjamin is not an irrationalist who wishes to
wholly dispense with the philosophical system. Instead, a systematic intention continues to subtend his
work. As Fenves writes, “The sense that his work is unsystematic and should be classified as
“unphilosophical” stems in no small part from his refusal to construct a table of categories, even if only in
the mode of negation” (19).
150
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason considers “experience” only with respect to its possibility, that is, with
respect to the formal conditions which make experience possible, i.e. the categories and intuitions of the
mind. Experience is wholly reduced in this schema to an empty form which is merely “given,” a
placeholder, which has no relevance in itself. Exemplary of this is Kant’s discussion of “Object=X” [A103A111] in the “A version” of the “transcendental deduction”: experience is distilled to a mere variable (“x”),
a stand in term in the mechanism of consciousness. Schopenhauer has pointed out the contradictions
surrounding the “given” nature of Kantian experience, see “Appendix: Criticism of Kantian philosophy” in
The World as Will and Representation (437-443).
151
Daniel W. Smith, in both his dissertation “Gilles Deleuze and the Philosophy of Difference: Towards a
Transcendental Empiricism” (1997), and his Essays on Deleuze (2012), presents Deleuze’s thought as a
“transcendental empiricism,” which seeks to overturn philosophy’s Platonic biases of identity and unity,
creating a genuine “philosophy of difference,” or, a system of thought in which empirical particularity (or
“difference”) can be thought without reducing it to some taxonomy, concept, or position within a system.
As Smith writes, “Difference [for Deleuze] is no longer an empirical relation but becomes a transcendental
principle that constitutes the sufficient reason of empirical diversity as such. Deleuze’s philosophy can thus
accurately be described as a transcendental philosophy—a “transcendental empiricism” as he himself puts
its” (Empiricism, 1-2). Benjamin’s philosophy proceeds in a similar fashion, though instead of
“empiricism,” Benjamin seeks to liberate “experience” as a singular entity. More remains to be said
regarding the philosophical affinities (and differences) between Benjamin and Deleuze, specifically the
possibility of supplementing Deleuze with Benjamin’s historical sense.
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3.1.1 Biographical Panorama: The Interconnected Concerns of Benjamin’s
“Munich Years” 1915-17
“[Benjamin] the friend of a lifetime whose genius united the insight of the metaphysician, the interpretative
power of the critic, and the erudition of the scholar.”
Scholem, “Dedication,” Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism.

To motivate Benjamin’s “coming philosophy,” it is useful to provide a brief
intellectual-biographical gloss on Benjamin’s academic concerns from 1915-17. In the
year 1915, the historical upheavals of the First World War notwithstanding, Benjamin
enrolled at the University of Munich, where he would remain until 1917. Both McCole
and Fenves highlight this period as a formative and transitional period with regard to
Benjamin’s intellectual concerns. The crises of the First World War, along with the
suicide of his close friend from the youth movement, Fritz Heinle, provoked a period of
much “stocktaking and reflection” (McCole, 71). The “metaphysical experience” of the
First World War solidified Benjamin’s movement away from his early associations with
the vitalist Lebensphilosophie of the German youth movement152—particularly because
of its dubious politics and associations with German nationalism—to a more articulate
and complex understanding of philosophy informed by phenomenology, NeoKantianism, the philosophy of language, and emergent mathematics (McCole, 71-115,
Fenves, 44-78, 125-151; Caygill,1-22).153 Benjamin and Scholem engaged in extensive
discussions regarding new developments in mathematics, speculating with regard to the

For more on Benjamin’s 1912-14 relationship to the German youth movement, see “Metaphysics of
Youth” in Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life. 33-74. Such a tradition, stemming out of Schlegel, Novalis and
Nietzsche, was crystalized in Benjamin’s teacher G. Wyneken, who saw “youth” as a “vanguard” sentiment
for the awakening of a new humanity (Ibid., 39). See, “The Metaphysics of Youth (SW 1: 6-17) and “The
Life of Students” (SW 1: 37-47 cf. BC, 5-46).
153
Peter Fenves, In The Messianic Reduction, situates Benjamin’s early writings within the intellectual
context of pre- and post-WW1 Germany, providing remarkable insight into Benjamin’s engagement with
phenomenology (specifically Husserl), Mathematics (A.W. Shöenflies, B. Russell, G. Scholem, G. Frege),
and Marburg Neo-Kantianism (H. Cohen, H. Rickert). Fenves depicts Benjamin’s intellectual emergence as
a constellation of “Kant, Plato, Husserl and Marburg” (1): arguing that Benjamin’s work attempts a certain
systematization of philosophy (as in (neo)Kantianism), through the undertaking of a quasiphenomenological “reduction” (as in Husserl). However, Benjamin’s reduction does not result in some
purified transcendental subject of perception; instead, it reveals fundamental antinomies in the subject’s
relationship to time and history. Describing the thesis of his work, Fenves will write: “The task around
which Benjamin’s work comes to revolve does not consist in accomplishing the reduction of the naturalmythological attitude through a heroic exertion of philosophical will but, rather, in discovering the tension
between the non-directionality of time and the uni-directionality of history. The tension itself has a
direction, which can be discerned in certain works of art and stretches of time: ‘towards the messianic’” (4).
According to Fenves Benjamin’s work does not culminate in some “heroic exertion of philosophy” (8-9),
but rather in fundamental existential, metaphysical, and mathematical antinomies.
152
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new philosophical modes of grounding provided by non-standard mathematics (BC, 81-2,
97-102; Scholem, Friendship, 46-8). It is during this Munich period that Benjamin
attempts to formulate a speculative form of Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy: one
founded not upon the transcendental unity of the categories of the mind (as in Kant), but
rather, on a transcendental understanding of language as the mediate condition of all
thinking.
Fenves has located Benjamin’s intellectual relationship with Felix Noggerath –
whom Benjamin dubbed simply “the genius” (BC, 86-7)—as foundational for Benjamin’s
position with respect to Kant and the philosophical system, solidifying Benjamin’s early
commitment to a modified vision of transcendental philosophy.154 Though Benjamin was
dedicated to an expanded conception of experience, particularly with respect to
“mythological” domains, he was unwilling to wholly abandon Kant’s transcendental
understanding of philosophy. Instead, Benjamin strove to “meta-critically” work through
the Kantian program.155 Through such critical engagements, Benjamin was able to move
past Kant’s reification of experience as “possible experience,” whilst rejecting the
outdated Newtonian conception of mathematical physics inherent in the Kantian world
view.156 Such undertakings demonstrate Benjamin’s commitment to reading Kant

Fenves—particularly in his 2017 address at the Benjamin Symposium “Force and Messianicty,” as well
as in The Messianic Reduction—has repeatedly asserted the importance of F. Noeggerath in crystalizing
Benjamin’s conception of philosophy. Noeggerath’s dissertation, “Synthesis and the Concept of System in
Philosophy: A Contribution to the Critique of Anti-Rationalism,” attempted to define a revised NeoKantian philosophy “which recast[ed] the relational categories of Kantian critique in terms of the
mathematical concept of seriality” (Fenves, 113). Such a recasting provided the means to salvage the
concept of system (or transcendental philosophy) against the challenges of a Bergsonian vitalism. McCole,
however, has asserted, “Benjamin’s intellectual debt to Noeggerath was real, but it should not be
exaggerated” (75). Much of this scholarly divergence can be explained with respect to varying
interpretations of the importance of mathematics to Benjamin’s philosophy, with Fenves seeing Benjamin
as fundamentally influenced by debates in mathematics of the time (112-118;125-130), and with McCole
according more importance to Benjamin’s “long term intellectual strategy” of undertaking an immanent
critique of Romanticism (71-115).
155
McCole asserts that “The philosophical consequences of a doctrine of mythos...fascinated Benjamin”
(74), as Benjamin engaged with comparative mythology, seeking to understand the various mechanisms
through which myth and religion were transmitted throughout history and as such dialogued with thinkers
such as Ernst Cassirer, Herman Cohen and Walter Lehman. McCole has also stressed myth as a
“placeholder term” (74) for Benjamin, connoting a constellation of entities beyond the usual conceptual
purview of philosophy.
156
Fenves has noted Benjamin’s active engagement with contemporary debates in mathematics, which
allowed him to think through questions relating to set theory, non-Euclidian geometry, and the issues
arising from Einstein’s doctrine of relativity (see, The Messianic Reduction, 112-118, 136-9). Given the
154
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“against the grain,” that is, attempting to move beyond Kant by way of the Kantian
program.
McCole has aptly highlighted five intersecting concerns that occupied Benjamin
during his “Munich years” (71-9). Presented in constellation, these concerns demonstrate
the fundamental motivations for Benjamin’s programmatic “coming philosophy.” These
are: 1) the articulation of philosophy in a “systematic manner”; 2) the acknowledgement
and incorporation of mythological and spiritual forms of experience into philosophy; 3)
the articulation of a philosophy of history; 4) the creation of a “non-instrumental theory
of language”; and 5) thinking through a non-instrumental theory of politics. It should be
underscored that Benjamin does not strive to deduce a philosophy that would articulate
these concerns definitively; rather, in opening the philosophical architectonic by way of
experience, he creates an expanded notion of the philosophical system that is able to
arrange and mediate insights from each of these domains in constellation. In his 1918
“On the Program for a Coming Philosophy” (“Program” hereafter) Benjamin lays the
methodological groundwork for such a constellation of these domains, based upon his
modification of Kantian transcendental philosophy.

3.2

On the Program for a Coming Philosophy (1918): Benjamin’s Philosophy for
the Future
“I believe in philosophy as a system. For me, the system must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it
must be a heterogenesis, which is something, it seems to me, that has never been attempted.” Deleuze,
“Preface” in Jean-Clet Martin, Variations, 7.

In a 1917 letter to Scholem, Benjamin avers: “there will never be any question of
the Kantian system’s being shaken and toppled. Rather, the question is much more one of
the system’s being set in granite and universally developed...no matter how great the
number of Kantian minutiae may have to fade away, his system’s typology must last
forever” (BC, 97).157 Such a project of “setting” and developing the Kantian

grounding of Kantian philosophy on the Newtonian world view, one can speculate as to what new modes of
philosophical grounding are allowed by non-standard models of mathematics. Benjamin labeled Einstein an
avant-garde “new constructor” (SW 2: 732-3), one who provided the mathematical (or ontological) basis for
a new modern theory of experience, one attuned with the relativistic complexities of everyday life.
157
Benjamin goes on to describe this typology in relation to Plato, the only figure “within the realm of
philosophy... [Kant’s] typology can be compared with. Only in the spirit of Kant and Plato and, I believe,
by means of the revision and further development of Kant, can philosophy become doctrine, or at least, be
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transcendental program—particularly with respect to a greater array of experience—is
undertaken explicitly and implicitly throughout Benjamin’s early work: “the ambition to
extend and transform Kant’s concept of experience is the thread which runs through
Benjamin’s otherwise disparate early writings” (Caygill, 1). Kant remains efficacious for
Benjamin due to his continuing belief in the possibility of philosophy as a systematic
practice, against the challenges of empiricist skepticism (from Hume), and advances in
mathematics and the physical sciences (from Newton). In a similar manner, for
Benjamin, the possibility of philosophy must be affirmed against the historical and
existential crises of his age: the dissolution of Idealism, along with growing advances in
technology (photography and film), and revolutions in mathematics and physics
(Einstein). It is this systematic possibility of philosophy—thought as what I will term
Benjamin’s transcendental philosophy of experience—that is essayistically figured in his
“Program.”
Despite being only ten pages, Benjamin’s “Program” crystalizes, in manifesto like
fashion, his avant-garde and aleatory reading of Kant, a thinker he meta-critically
redeems as providing the resources to think a philosophy for the future. Though he turns
to Kant in a neo-Kantian fashion, Benjamin’s interventions should be considered postKantian, in line with the experimental absolute Idealist invasions performed upon Kant
by the Frühromantiker, Schelling and Hegel. Benjamin’s text commences
programmatically in a style reminiscent of his early writings from the youth movement,
and in a manner that echoes the sentiments of his early letter to Scholem: “The central
task of the coming philosophy will be to take the deepest intimations it draws from our
times and our expectation of a great future, and turn them into knowledge by relating
them to the Kantian system” (SW 1: 100). It should be emphasized that Benjamin moves
decidedly against the Neo-Kantian, overly scientific, interpretation of the critical project:
one which sought to elucidate a scientifically verifiable epistemology via an
interpretation of the CPR (Beiser, Neo-Kantianism, 3, 6).158 For Benjamin, such positivist

incorporated into it” (BC, 97). This doublet of Plato and Kant is further considered throughout Benjamin’s
“Epistemo-Critical Prologue.”
158
Benjamin’s relationship with Neo-Kantianism is ambiguous and contradictory. His early writings and
correspondence with Scholem demonstrate a desire to work through Kant in a manner akin to Herman
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interpretations of Kant served to erect a new mythology of enlightenment conceptual
imperialism in which, “naked, primitive, self-evident experience...seemed to be the only
experience given—indeed, the only experience possible” (SW 1: 101). For Benjamin, the
rigid “epistemological mythology” of the “subject-object” model of cognition is
emblematic of the “religious and historical blindness of the enlightenment” (SW 1: 103).
Through its abject denial of other ways of relating to the world, enlightenment itself
became a mythology: one which lionized a dominating notion of the subject at the
expense of other non-conceptual ways of interacting with the world, denying the diversity
of possible “objects” a seat at the philosophical table. However, Benjamin (at this early
juncture) follows neo-Kantianism in seeing Kant as providing the “epigenetic” conditions
for a new transcendental philosophy of the future, though such a philosophy must remain
fundamentally open to the diversity of possible experiences.
For Benjamin, one must meet the Kantian program with “a truly time and eternity
conscious philosophy,” creating a new historically cognizant model of philosophy which
could incorporate a diversity of domains and experiences (SW 1: 103). Benjamin’s
attempt to revitalize Kant in a historical manner should be seen in constellation with
similar projects undertaken by his contemporaries Heidegger and Bergson.159 However,
Benjamin must be distinguished from both vitalist and phenomenological “attempted
breakouts” from the metaphysical tradition (Adorno, ND Lectures, 65-75), most
forcefully due to his unique conception of language. Such a philosophy of epistemic
finitude, which is nonetheless historically conscious, would inaugurate a “prolegomena to
a future metaphysics,” and “in the process... envision... this higher experience” (SW 1:
102). In his 1917 fragment “On Perception,” Benjamin explicates this metaphysics:

Cohen (whose 1871 Kant’s Theory of Experience Benjamin attempted to read with Scholem). See,
Scholem, Friendship, 58-60. However, Benjamin quickly became dissatisfied with the heavily scientific
positivist cast of Neo-Kantian thought, opting instead to fracture Kant by way of experience, language, and
religion.
159
More remains to be said regarding Benjamin’s precise relationship to his contemporaries. All three are
united by a desire to move beyond Kant by way of the Kantian program, and one can see Bergson’s Matter
and Memory (1896) as an attempt to think the polarities of “matter” and “memory” (or subject and object)
in terms of a “difference of degree” (not of kind). (9-16, 23-4). Likewise, Heidegger, whose Kant and the
Problem of Metaphysics appeared in 1929, sought to work through Kant so as to lay the groundwork for his
own “fundamental ontology” (Kant, 3- 5), a project taken up with more depth in Being and Time (1927).
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“Philosophy is absolute experience deduced in a systematic, symbolic framework as
language” (SW 1: 96).
Benjamin’s “higher” conception of experience does not necessitate some purified
or more scientific form of (Neo) Kantianism. Instead, Benjamin problematizes the
Kantian architectonic by confronting it with its disavowed phantasms, with those
domains downgraded by Kant as “dogmatic”: “art, jurisprudence... history,” “religion”
along with its historical transmission in the form of “doctrine” [Lehre], and most notably,
“language” (SW 1: 107-108; GS II: 165-167). 160 Such a critical confrontation with Kant
allows Benjamin to “test the limits of philosophy” (Caygill, xiii), opening up new
productive and interdisciplinary constellations, while rethinking the position of
philosophy within the organization of knowledge more generally. Fundamentally,
Benjamin seeks to problematize, while opening, the Kantian relationship between the
experiential and the transcendental moments of knowledge, allowing the former to
reciprocally influence the latter. Describing this, Benjamin writes:
The problem faced by Kantian epistemology, as by every great epistemology,
has two sides, and Kant managed to give a valid explanation for only one of
them. First of all, there was the question of the certainty of knowledge that is
lasting, and second, there was the question of the integrity of an experience
[Erfahrung] that is ephemeral [Vergänglich]. (SW 1: 100; GS II: 158)

Though Kant had securely grounded knowledge by tethering the understanding to the
domain of a priori intuitions (of space and time), in the process he reduced “experience”
to a mere afterthought: a simple function of knowledge, something which one must
accept as merely “given from without” (Schopenhauer, 438). For Benjamin, such deficits
in the Kantian program do not necessitate the elimination of the transcendental system,
nor the dispensation of epistemic certainty, but rather, the dialectical opening of the
domains of system and experience into a more porous and reciprocally interactive
relationship. Such an untethering allows for the possibility of new productive conflicts
between the faculties of knowledge, as experience is allowed to meaningfully contribute

160

Speaking to the importance of language (and religion) for his philosophy of the future, Benjamin will
write: “A concept of knowledge gained from reflection on the linguistic nature of knowledge will create a
corresponding concept of experience which will also encompass realms that Kant failed to truly
systematize. The realm of religion should be mentioned as the foremost of these” (SW 1: 108).
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to knowledge. However, Benjamin stresses that such an opening of the Kantian program
does not necessitate the disregard of knowledge in favour of experience beyond the reach
of the system: philosophy must maintain its transcendental basis. Benjamin affirms
Kant’s transcendental grounding for philosophy: “Philosophy is based upon the fact that
the structure of experience lies within the structure of knowledge and is to be developed
from it” (SW 1: 104). Though the transcendental must be moved away from the subject,
“all genuine experience rests upon the ‘pure epistemological (transcendental)
consciousness,’ if this term is still useable under the condition that it be stripped of
everything subjective” (SW 1: 104). Benjamin’s problem is not with the philosophical
system as such, nor with Kant’s coupling of experience and knowledge, but rather, with
the fact that such a doublet remains too subjective, caught within a problematically
narrow subject-object model of cognition, which gives an excessive primacy to the
categories and functions of the subject. The task of a coming philosophy must involve the
elaboration of a new transcendental philosophy of experience, one purged of “everything
subjective,” and resting on a sphere of “total neutrality between subject and object” (SW
1: 104), which, I will argue is language. That is, the task for a philosophy of the future
will necessitate the thought of experience in a dynamic and reflexive relation to its
conditions, creating plastic and historically malleable categories for philosophy—
providing an epigenesis of the transcendental.
Benjamin chastises those who would simply disregard Kant’s employment of
language: such arguments are weak and fail to understand the seriousness of Kant’s
transcendental enterprise (SW 1: 108). A “coming philosophy” must not simply criticize
Kant for his failure to understand language or for his terminological inconsistency, but
instead, it must undertake the “relating [of] knowledge to language as was attempted by
Hamann in Kant’s lifetime” (SW 1:108).161 Benjamin speculates that Kant was perhaps
too blinded by Newtonian advances in the mathematical and physical sciences such that
he failed to comprehend the extent to which “all philosophical knowledge has its unique
expression in language and not in formulas or numbers” (SW 1: 108). The Kantian critical

Stern has provided an extensive overview of Benjamin’s relationship with the linguistic-cultural
philosophy of Hamann, see “Part 2: The History of Language as Such” (141-290), in The Fall of Language:
Benjamin and Wittgenstein on Meaning.
161
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project explicitly modeled itself after the mathematical sciences, striving for the same
clarity and universality, such that experience was reduced to its mere possibility: the
formal play of faculties and categories (CPR, 107-8, 110-1). In moving transcendental
philosophy away from epistemology and consciousness and towards language, Benjamin
enacts a reversal of the Kantian program: the world of experience is not reduced to some
finite table of categories and intuitions, but rather, structure (understood as language)
takes its cue from experiences in the world. The final section of this chapter (3.4), dealing
with language, will elaborate this more fully.
Given the immense scale and complexity of the Kantian critical enterprise, for
Benjamin, the question becomes: which of its elements should be enlarged or amended,
and which should be simply discarded? That is, how can Kant’s transcendental Idealism
be refashioned such that it can express a greater continuum of experiences? As Benjamin
asserts, “The table of categories must be completely revised” (SW 1: 106), moving
philosophy away from Kant’s a-historical deductions to a historically informed
perspective which would “allow insight into the origins of knowledge” (SW 1: 107).
Benjamin contends that domains such as “art, jurisprudence, and history” must be
allowed to influence the transcendental philosophical system with “much more intensity”
than allowed by Kant (SW 1: 107). With such proclamations, Benjamin is squarely within
the German Idealist field of concerns, following thinkers such as Schelling and Hegel
who sought to expand the purview of philosophy to a broader range of “experiences,”
envisioning an enlarged notion of reason, along with a reciprocal dialogue between the
experiential and transcendental moments of knowledge.
In line with Adorno’s post-Idealist perspective, Benjamin is committed to
“working through” the Kantian program, refashioning its concepts instead of wholly
dispensing with them. Benjamin is emphatic that the discrete domains of the critical
project must be maintained: “The trichotomy of the Kantian system is one of the great
features of that typology that must be preserved” (SW 1: 106). That is, Benjamin (at this
early stage) remains committed to the division of philosophy into speculative, ethical (or
practical), and aesthetic-judgmental, domains, corresponding to the three Kantian
critiques; though he seeks to open and problematize the rigidity of such divisions
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(Caygill, 24-5).162 Further, Benjamin deconstructs Kant’s regulative employment of
religion as a capstone to both pure reason and ethics (practical reason), specifically with
respect to Kant’s regulative postulate of the “Idea of God” (CPR, 677, 682-4). For
Benjamin, religion must be unbound from such a position of subservience, becoming a
site of violent and critical “interruption” with respect to philosophy (Missac, 29).
Throughout his oeuvre, one can see Benjamin employing religion and mythology in a
“critical” manner, harnessing motifs from such domains to short-circuit philosophy’s
constitutive stability: perhaps most notably, his employment of Judaic messianism in the
historiographical domain (SW 4: 389-411). Schelling undertakes a similar confrontation
between philosophy, religion, and nature in texts from his middle period, in which
philosophy is constantly exposed to its naturalistic “living ground,” along with the “selflacerating madness” of God’s duality, forcing it to reckon with logics other than itself,
and short circuiting its absolute ambitions (FE, 26; AW, 103).
Towards the end of the essay, Benjamin begins to elaborate his own novel
conception of the philosophical system ordered around the principle of “non-synthesis”:
“besides the concept of synthesis, another concept, that of a certain non-synthesis of two
concepts in another, will become very important systematically, since another relation
between thesis and anti-thesis is possible besides synthesis” (SW 1: 106).163 Such claims
are later elaborated in Benjamin’s “Epistemo-Critical Prologue,” where Benjamin
describes “the Idea” as a “non-synthesis” between “concept and phenomena,” resulting in
a tenuous negative dialectical unity between “unique and extreme” (OT, 35). Though
Benjamin does not fully flesh out such a framework in his 1918 program, one can see
how the possibility of a system founded upon “non-synthesis” is unfolded throughout his
oeuvre (Weber, 50, 119, 165). Such a negative dialectical understanding of philosophy
corresponds to Benjamin’s “antinomical” (McCole, 10) relationship to the philosophical
tradition: one which affirms mosaics of discord and tension, over and against synthesis

On this point, Benjamin anticipates Deleuze’s later call to de-territorialize and experiment with differing
relations between the Kantian faculties of knowledge (Deleuze, Kant, 68).
163
Such an emergent negative dialectic has evident Schellingian valences, specifically the 1815 Ages of the
World, in which the “third term” is unable to be thought from a position of syntheses (64, 75-91; Rajan,
“Psychoanalysis,” 9). One can locate a similar negative dialectical motif of tension or non-synthesis
throughout Benjamin, Adorno, Schelling and Hegel.
162

113

and unity.164
Such a refractory conception of systematicity allows Benjamin to develop his
linguistic-transcendental account of knowledge, which would correspond to the
kaleidoscopic variety of possible experiences. In the cryptic addendum of the work,
Benjamin muses extensively on the relationship between “epistemology, metaphysics and
religion” (SW 1: 108),165 reflections which invade the Kantian critical project by way of
those domains deemed “dogmatic,” or unworthy of critical reflection. As McCole points
out, “myth,” for Benjamin, remains something of an empty signifier, a placeholder term,
encompassing in constellation those domains beyond the scope the philosophical concept
(74). Adorno groups a similar assemblage of terms under “non-identity”: “nonconceptuality, individuality, and particularity...things which...used to be dismissed as
transitory” (ND, 8, 11-12, 162-3, 326-30). To philosophically interrogate such domains,
Benjamin turns to the discourse of religion, specifically, the Judaic notion of “the
teachings [or doctrine]” [Lehre]: the “Philosophical concept of experience must answer
the religious concept of teachings” (SW 1: 110; GS II: 164-5).166 Myth, by becoming
historical through its transmission, enters into language, and so becomes
“communicable.” Likewise, when philosophy is taught or transmitted from teacher to
student—by way of a “weak messianic” pact between generations (SW 4: 390)—it forms
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Throughout his oeuvre, Benjamin presents his own thought in terms of antinomies which he takes to
their respective extremes without resolution (such as those between “theology/materialism”; “mythical
violence/divine violence”; “commentary/criticism”; “allegory/symbol”). Scholem has aptly described such
a proto-deconstructive approach as Benjamin’s “two-sidedness” (Zweigleisigkeit), or “Janus faced”
character (Story, 197-8), in which oppositions are employed strategically—in order to “shock” and provoke
reflection in the reader (OT, 4) —and no synthesis or final resolution is granted.
165
In this early essay, Benjamin refashions the notion of “metaphysics,” seemingly collapsing a hard
distinction between metaphysics and experience, speculating as to the possibility of “metaphysical
experience” in a manner akin to Adorno: “The meaning of the term ‘metaphysical,’ as introduced in the
foregoing, consists precisely in declaring this border nonexistent, and the reformulation of ‘experience’ as
‘metaphysics’ means that so-called experience is virtually included in the metaphysical or dogmatic part of
philosophy, into which the highest epistemological—that is, the critical—is transformed” (SW 1: 109). He
goes further: “To say that knowledge is metaphysical means in the strict sense: it is related via the original
concept of knowledge to the concrete totality of experience—that is, existence” (SW 1:110).
166
Benjamin highlights the critical-destructive power of Lehre (and education), in a letter to Scholem:
“Theory [Lehre] is like a surging sea, but for the wave (if we take it as an image of the human being)
everything depends on giving oneself over to its motion in such a way that it crests and overturns, foaming.
The tremendous freedom of this overturning is education... [it is] tradition becoming visible and free.” BC,
94. For the rendering of Lehre as “Theory” see McCole, 77. Such theological motifs highlight what E.
Jacobson has termed “the messianic idea in Benjamin’s early writings (see, 19-51).
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a profane affinity with religious notions: “Only in teaching does philosophy encounter
something absolute” (SW 1: 109). Benjamin’s “Life of Students” (1914-5) expounds on
this relationship between education, historical-critique, and the absolute, demonstrating
Benjamin’s early obsession with a Nietzschean conception of youth as a means to reinvigorate the practice of knowledge. In language anticipating his later writings on the
philosophy of history (1937-40), Benjamin depicts students (who provide “an image of
the highest metaphysical state of history”), as receiving “the historical task...to disclose
[the] immanent state of perception and make it absolute, to make it visible and dominant
in the present” (SW 1: 37).167 Via their “weak messianism,” student-critics become
critical inheritors of the past, articulating past experiences (by way of language), thus
allowing philosophy to be seen as “absolute experience deduced in a systematic,
symbolic framework as language” (SW 1: 96). Accordingly, Benjamin’s program for a
philosophy of the future can be surmised as the articulation of an expanded philosophy of
experience, which remains transcendentally grounded in language. In what follows, these
two domains—experience (3.3) and language (3.4)— as they present themselves in
Benjamin’s work will be critically examined.

3.3

Benjamin’s Philosophy of Experience [Erfahrung]
“For what is the value of all our culture if it is divorced from experience? Indeed (let’s admit it), our
poverty of experience is not merely poverty on a personal level, but poverty of experience in general.
Hence a new kind of Barbarism.” Benjamin, “Experience and Poverty,” SW 2: 732.

In what follows, the operative conception of “experience” in Benjamin’s oeuvre
will be charted. As has already been argued, Benjamin’s thinking attempts to open and
problematize the static enlightenment understanding of experience (personified in Kant),
allowing philosophy to productively encounter a plethora of new domains and territories.
168

Such a polyvalent understanding of experience allows Benjamin to experiment with

For Benjamin, “students” must come to realize the historical aspect of their experience, recognizing that
they stand in the ‘middle of history’ and have the ability to rewrite (or re-archive) the past from their
perspective. The “students” are the “highest metaphysically” in that they are able to construct history from
their perspective in the present—they are able to act with respect to the past (SW 1: 37). Such models will
later be taken up and elaborated in Benjamin’s 1940 “Theses on the Concept of History” (SW 4: 390-4).
168
Describing Benjamin’s contamination of philosophy by way of experience, Caygill writes: “The concept
of experience necessarily exceeds philosophy, and puts into question the relationship between philosophical
reflection and its objects. To a large extent Benjamin’s thought may be understood as an attempt to extend
167
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constructive relations between subject and object, or the experiential and transcendental
domains. Stated otherwise, against Kant, who reduced experience to its “possibility” (or
general form), Benjamin sought to develop formal structures for thought that are able to
dynamically respond to events in the world, revising themselves based on encounters
with what Adorno will later term “metaphysical experiences” (Metaphysics, 137-145). To
place such a primacy on experience is, following Deleuze, to “overturn Platonism”: to
create a mode of thought that is receptive and relevant to “real” experience, not simply its
formal conditions of possibility (Logic of Sense, 253-266).169 In such a manner, Benjamin
forces philosophy into productive encounters with a diversity of “experiences”: literature,
mythology, religion, history, drugs, urban experience, technology, and modern life all
invade and trouble philosophy. Benjamin’s many writings on Modernity typify this
primacy of experience: as a constellation of texts (from ~1931-40), they seek to chart the
effects, or the experience, of modernization upon the human sensorium. “Modernity” can
be broadly defined as the experience of modernization, wherein traditional forms of life
are both liquefied and reified, provoking a feeling of groundlessness which forces human
beings to attempt to “become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to get a grip
on the modern world and make themselves at home in it” (Berman, 5). Given such a
definition, one can see that in the twenty-first century one does not exist within some
“post-modern” paradigm, wherein the trajectories of Modernity have been somehow
overcome, but rather, we, as subjects and objects of modernization, are still attempting to

the limits of experience treated within philosophy to the point where the identity of philosophy itself is
jeopardized. In place of a philosophical mastery of experience, whether that of art, of religion, of language
or of the city, Benjamin allows experience to test the limits of philosophy. The work of philosophical
criticism according to the ‘method called nihilism’ allows experience to invade, evade and even ruin its
philosophical host” (xiii).
169
Smith reads Deleuze’s philosophy as a similar overturning of the Kantian critical project, which is then
completed in empirical terms, transforming Kant’s transcendental Idealism into a transcendental
empiricism. Such a philosophy would account for “the real conditions of genesis”—as opposed to the mere
formal conditions provided by Kant—a “properly immanent account of the genesis of knowledge, morality,
and even reason itself” (Smith, Transcendental, 5-6). The implications of such an overturning are wide
ranging, though in the ethical sphere, Deleuze inaugurates a new (stoic) “ethics of the event,” a mode of
thinking which embraces “the accident,” or the contingencies of experience (Deleuze, Logic, 148).
Describing his ethics of the event, Deleuze will write: “Either ethics makes no sense at all, or is what it
means and has something else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us...to will and release the
event, to become the offspring of one’s own events, and thereby to be reborn” (Logic, 149). See further,
“Twenty-First Series of the Event” (Logic, 148-153, and 183-5, 130).
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come to terms with the experience of Modernity, and have perhaps “never been modern”
(Latour, 10-12).
Benjamin’s thought should be seen as an attempt to force an encounter of
philosophy with Modernity, with Benjamin being a philosophical “modernist” in a
similar manner to Adorno (Bernstein, “Modernism,” 56-7). As Baudelaire and Rimbaud
laboured to create new forms of art worthy of the tensions of modern life, so too did
Benjamin strive to theorize new avant-garde models for philosophy in sync with modern
times. Benjamin, via Baudelaire, describes Modernity as this feeling of vertigo at the
liquidation of stability, rupturing both tradition and experience, a time in which “all that
is solid melts into air.”170 As will be argued, the Modern crisis of “experience”
[Erfahrung] clears the way for new constructive notions of the human subject (3.3.1),
informed by what Benjamin terms, in Nietzschean fashion, the “new barbarism” of the
avant-garde (3.3.2). Following this, Benjamin’s “mimetic subject”—or the receptive
materialist subject of experience subtending his philosophy—will be analyzed in relation
to the theories of media and mediation developed by Marshall McLuhan (3.3.3).

3.3.1 Experience in Modernity (Or Experience in Crisis)
“La Nature est un temple où de vivants piliers
Laissent parfois sortir de confuses paroles;
L’homme y passe à travers des forêts de symboles
Qui l’observent avec des regards familiers.”
Baudelaire, “Correspondences,” Les Fleurs du Mal, 37.

At the conclusion of his 1939 “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” Benjamin signs off
his discussion with a reading of Baudelaire’s “Loss of A Halo,” describing the
melancholic image of Baudelaire, the “epic poet” of Modernity, losing his poetic “Halo”
as he is jostled backward by the rabbling crowd of modern life. As Benjamin’s “angel of
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Echoing such sentiments, though with sparse reference to Benjamin, Marshall Berman (in his All That is
Solid Melts into Air [1982]) describes modern life as a “life of paradox and contradiction” (13), in which
“becoming Modern” entails both a celebration and mourning of the liquidation of tradition. Berman’s sets
out to describe “the meanings of Modernity,” with all of its “ambiguities and ironies” (13), through
readings of various thinkers (notably Goethe, Marx and Baudelaire). Despite their seeming divergences,
these thinkers are united by a distinctly “modern” intellectual sentiment. As Berman writes: “They are
moved at once by a will to change—to transform both themselves and the world—and by a terror of
disorientation and disintegration, of life falling apart. They all know the thrill and the dread of a world in
which ‘all that is solid melts into air’” (13).
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history” is blown backward by the “storm called progress,” Baudelaire, the poet of
Modern life, had no place in the epoch he described (SW 4: 392). Recounting such a
tragic scene, Benjamin writes:
Baudelaire singled out his having been jostled by the crowd as the decisive,
unmistakable experience. The semblance [Schein] of a crowd with a soul and
movement all its own, the luster that had dazzled the flâneur, had faded for him. To
heighten the impression of the crowd’s baseness, he envisioned the day on which
even the fallen women, the outcasts, would readily espouse a well ordered life,
condemn libertinism, and reject everything except money. Betrayed by these last
allies of his, Baudelaire battled the crowd—with the impotent rage of someone
fighting the rain or the wind. This is the nature of the immediate experience
[Erlebnis] to which Baudelaire had given the weight of long experience [Erfahrung].
He named the price for which the sensation of modernity could be had: the
disintegration of the aura in immediate shock-experience. (SW 4: 343; GS I: 653)

Baudelaire attempted to experience [Erfahren], in a durational sense, the destruction of
experience that formed the essence of modern life. Within Modernity, such durational
and historically situated experiences of tradition—which can be termed “Erfahrungen”—
were surpassed by the reproducible and momentary “shock” experiences of modern
life.171 Baudelaire’s 1865 poem, “Perte d’auréole” [Loss of Halo] depicts a poet who has
lost his auratic “halo,” and with it his Platonic remove from everyday life, entering into
dialogue with a man on the boulevard. The modern poet embraces his newfound
immanent relationship to the world: “Now I can go about incognito, do bad things and
indulge in vulgar behavior like ordinary mortals” (Baudelaire, Spleen, 94). Benjamin
allegorizes such a scene to describe both his and Baudelaire’s affirmative and destructive
relationship to Modernity: one must embrace the experiences of shock that is modern life,
according the immediate and leveling experiences of the everyday [Erlebnis] the weight
of a meaningful Erfahrung, experiencing the destruction of experience. In his
considerations of surrealism, Benjamin terms such a practice “profane illumination” (SW
2: 109): a dialectical optic which sees transcendence in the micrological particularities of
modern life.

Elsewhere in the essay, Benjamin describes the ubiquity of such a “shock-experience” in modern life:
“What determines the rhythm of production on a conveyor belt is the same thing that underlies the rhythm
of reception in the film. … The shock experience [Chockerlebnis] which the passer-by has in the crowd
corresponds to the isolated ‘experiences’ of the worker at his machine” (SW 4: 328-9; GS I: 632). Kittler
locates a similar shock experience at the origin of cinema, which he describes as an afterimage of automatic
weaponry and the shock experiences of WW1 (see Gramophone, 124-30, 115-19).
171
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Modernity provoked a plethora of questions regarding the changing role of
experience, the function of technology in shaping and organizing perception, along with
with an inquiry into the continuing efficacy of traditional forms of life. As spectators to
the upheavals and crises of the Weimar Republic (1919-33), many in Benjamin’s
generation responded to such atrophies of experience by embracing forms of “reactionary
modernism”: dangerous political and aesthetic programs that attempted a nostalgic return
to a pastoral utopia unshaken by the pressures of modern life.172 Benjamin is unique in
his critical embeddedness within many trajectories of modernization: he did not
straightforwardly embrace Modernity, nor did he nostalgically mourn the loss of tradition
(McCole, 8). His relationship to both tradition and Modern life remains paradoxical,
antinomical, “non-synchronous” (Bloch, Heritage, 22-30), and oftentimes contradictory.
Against Heidegger and other “reactionary modernists” of Weimar Germany (Carl
Schmitt, Ernst Junger, Oswad Spengler), Benjamin rejected any nostalgic discourse
which lamented the changes modern life out of a desire to return to some mythological
provincial community. For Benjamin, experience (in the sense of Erfahrung) should not
be fetishized as some primordial or authentic structure, but rather, should be seen as
already temporal, fleeting, transient, and historical— “une passante” (Baudelaire, Fleurs,
127)— as that which cannot be reified into some fundamental structure or capacity. For
Benjamin, to question the possibility of experience in modern life is not merely to attempt
to expand the domain of a priori intuitions considered within the philosophical purview
beyond Kant’s consideration of space and time, or to imagine new modern categories.
Instead, one must consider how experiences, or events, should prompt a revision of
constitutive philosophical categories. Benjamin’s considerations of experience in modern
life are not animated by some nostalgia for destroyed forms of life. For Benjamin,
criticism must interrogate how Modernity at once destroys traditional forms of
experience, while molding news capacities for experience. One must scrutinize what new

The term “reactionary modernism” stems from J. Herf’s text of the same name, and describes a certain
intellectual field pervading Weimar Germany, typified by the work of Heidegger, Junger, and Schmitt (148). Such thinkers sought to combine technological modernity with romanticized pastoral values. Such an
intellectual field is criticized extensively by Adorno in his 1964 Jargon of Authenticity (xix-xxii, 3-9, 3134, 48-50, 59, 65, 68, 73, 78, 98-99, 106, 138-40, 157-9, 164-5).
172
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aptitudes are opened for philosophy by modern experiences. It is such a constellation of
concerns that Benjamin responds to with his engagement with avant-garde practices
throughout the 1930s.
3.3.2 Experience and the Avant-Garde: Towards a “New Barbarism”
“It might be stated as a general formula that the technology of reproduction detaches the reproduced object
from the sphere of tradition. By replicating the work many times over, it substitutes a mass existence for a
unique existence.” Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility,” SW 3:
254.

A peculiar difficulty in approaching Benjamin’s discussions of experience is the
ambiguous normative value he accords to the waning of experience (in the sense of
durational Erfahrung). In one sense, Benjamin’s longing for “authentic” or “durational”
experience” can be seen in analogue with Heidegger’s search for some authentic “Being”
amidst the leveling powers of modern life –the forces of the public, or “the they” (Being
& Time, 111, 122-6). While in another sense, Benjamin seems to celebrate the crises and
alterations of modern life, seeing such crises as new occasions for theory. With regard to
the first sense, Benjamin constantly speaks of the “poverty” or “inflation” of experience
within the context of modern life (SW 2:7 31). Analogously, Heidegger speaks of a
“forgetting” or covering over of the “sense of Being” amidst the prattle of Modernity
(Being, xxix, 1-3). In texts such as “The Storyteller” (1936), along with his writings on
Baudelaire (1937-40), Benjamin speaks disparagingly of the leveling effects of
Modernity: he describes its destruction of the “capacity to tell a story,” along with other
durational forms of experience, forms of life which are replaced by incessant drivel of
“information”(SW 3:148).173 Benjamin’s choices of textual objects reveals a preference
for the “outdated,” or what he asserts apropos of surrealism, “a revolutionary energy that
exists in that which is outmoded” (SW 2: 210).174 In such a manner, one can read

Differentiating “storytelling,” which conveys a durational form of experience [Erfahrung], from the
“information” provided by the modern culture industry [Erlebnis], Benjamin writes: “The value of
information does not survive the moment in which it was new. It lives only at the moment; it has to
surrender to it completely and explain itself to it without losing any time. A story is different. It does not
expend itself. It preserves and concentrates its energy and is capable of releasing it after a long time” (SW
3: 148). Adorno translates Benjamin’s notion unreflective “information” to describe the unreflective art of
the “culture industry” (DE, 94-136).
174
Such a desire to recover the “utopian impulses” of previous ages has evident Blochian affinities, see
Bloch, The Principle of Hope (3-18).
173
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Benjamin as one who attempts to critically rescue downcast literary, cultural, and
intellectual movements, such as the German Trauerspiel, surrealism, or the historicism of
Eduard Fuchs, as Benjamin sought to employ the critical power of tradition as bastion
against the leveling forces of modern life.
However, in light of the “destructive character” of Benjamin’s model of criticism,
one can also read Benjamin as celebrating Modernity’s fracturing of experience and
tradition: Modernity “forces [us] to start from scratch; to make a new start; to make a
little go a long way; to begin with a little and build up further, looking neither left or
right. Among the great creative spirits, there have always been the inexorable ones who
begin by clearing a tabula rasa. They need a drawing table; they were constructors” (SW
2: 733). Modernity, with its energetic and crushing liquidations, has created space,
allowing for the construction of new experiences: new relationships between nature,
history, technology, and community. To create such forms of life, Benjamin calls for a
“new barbarism,” a Nietzschean “second innocence,” which would allow for the creation
of novel values able to live up to the new capacities afforded by Modern life (SW 2: 733;
cf. Nietzsche, Will, 478-82). Under the influence of a Brechtian form of anti-auratic
constructivism, Benjamin celebrates the destruction of the “cult-value” of tradition: one
must be anti-nostalgic, embracing the tensions of Modern life. Benjamin is one who
follows Rimbaud’s proclamation: “il faut être absolument moderne” (88-89). In this
manner, for Benjamin, the dissolution or “poverty” of experience has an affirmative and
creative valence: “Poverty of Experience. This should not be understood to mean that
people are yearning for new experience. No, they long to free themselves from
experience; they long for a world in which they can make such pure and decided use of
their poverty” (SW 2: 734). Benjamin argues that avant-garde aesthetic production (and
criticism) should play a leading role in the creation of such new-utopian visions, as he
praises a vast array of Modern thinkers and constructors: P. Klee, A. Einstein, B. Brecht,
P. Scheerbart, even R. Descartes (SW 2: 732-3). These thinkers laboured to forge a new
culture through which to break free of the weight of the past: “In its buildings, pictures,
and stories, mankind is preparing to outlive culture, if need be” (SW 2: 735). Avant-garde
culture must play a pivotal role in experimenting with new configurations between the
nature, history, and technology, while forging new extension of human cognitive
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faculties. Like Nietzsche’s philosopher-artist, for Benjamin, theory must strive to
explicate “new values” attuned to the forces of modern life (Will, 509-19).
This tension between tradition and the avant-garde, between the mourning or the
affirmation of the destruction of experience, has been termed “antinomic” by McCole
(10), and is not resolved definitively within Benjamin’s oeuvre.175 However, as M.
Berman stresses throughout his own analyses of Modernity, it is precisely such a
dialectical ambivalence towards the destruction of tradition that defines the
quintessentially “modern” attitude. With his modern incongruity, Benjamin enters into
constellation with “Goethe, Marx, and Baudelaire,” figures whom Berman has analyzed
as characteristically “modern” (15-36). For Berman, these thinkers chart the crises
wrought by modernization upon traditional forms of life, but in so doing, they also seek
to provide models or methods by which humanity can become “truly modern” in an
expanded and more inclusive sense: “to get a grip on the modern world and make
themselves at home in it” (5).
Finally, with such an ambiguity, Benjamin enters into constellation with Hegel,
perhaps the first philosopher of modern life, who with his concept of “Aufhebung”
[sublation], elevates the contradictory affect of Modernity to the level of the concept (EL,
128-31). As Schulte-Sasse suggests, Hegel’s PS, can be seen as the first example of a
“cultural studies,” inventing a framework for cultural reflection that will later be
employed by thinkers such as Simmel (7). In this manner, Hegel can be seen as a theorist
who develops new (self-critical) epistemic-assimilative practices to chart the plethora of

175

McCole sees Benjamin as a thinker of crisis, one who attempted to theorize experience in Modernity:
“an epochal upheaval in the organization of the human sensorium, [in] the very structure of perception and
experience” (1). As such, Benjamin antinomically “celebrates and mourns, by turns, the liquidation of
tradition” (McCole, 8). Describing Benjamin’s experimental and antinomic relationship to tradition,
McCole writes: “His seeming ambivalence was not mere oscillation but, rather, an ongoing experiment: in
allowing perspectives usually juxtaposed as ‘radical’ and ‘conservative,’ ‘enlightened’ and ‘traditionalist,’
converge in his work, he challenged the accepted paradigms of cultural criticism. His work constructs and
explores the antinomies of a tradition understood as being in decay, antinomies whose force had emerged in
the concrete historical situation of interwar Europe” (10). Such a doubled engagement, “crystalized
[Benjamin’s] awareness of the antinomies of tradition,” a perspective which allowed him “to listen
attentively to tradition without letting it bind him” (McCole, 18, 21). Because of Benjamin’s contradictory
relation to the tradition, McCole argues that approaching Benjamin requires “a special kind of historical
reading” (28), which is attuned to the “productive ambivalence about the decay of tradition [and] the
dialectic of liquidationist and culturally conservative moments in his work” (28).
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new modern forms of life (Schulte-Sasse, 80, 85-9). Following Benjamin and Hegel,
Modern thought demands an embrace of tension and contradiction, a learning to be (not)
at home with paradox.
3.3.3 Benjamin’s Philosophy of Technology: Understanding Mediation and the
Extensions of (so-called) Man
“That our human senses, of which all media are extensions, are also fixed charges on our personal energies,
and that they also configure the awareness and experience of each one of us.” McLuhan, Understanding
Media, 35.

In the various formulations of his essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of its
Technological Reproducibility” (1936/9), Benjamin develops his theses regarding the
“formulation of revolutionary demands in the politics of art” (SW 4: 252), alongside a
latent historical theory of perception, which charts the natural-historical organization of
the human sensorium. In this manner, the majority of Benjamin’s theses regarding the
decay of “the Aura” can also be read as describing the destruction of the individual at the
hands of technological reproduction: charting the “substitu[tion] of a mass existence for a
unique existence” (SW 4: 254), along with the vast alterations undergone by human
perception at the hands of new media. Modern media have altered perception and
existence irreversibly—while revealing new domains such as the “optical unconscious”
(SW 2: 511-12)176 –and art and aesthetics should play a key role in articulating and
politicizing these new territories. Benjamin should be seen in a German lineage of
thinkers of media(tion), including Hegel, Marx, Simmel, and F. Kittler, who take up the
imperative to “understand media” by charting the natural-historical media networks “socalled-man” is enmeshed within (McLuhan, 23-35; Kittler, Gramophone, 1-19).177
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Describing this new domain in relation to the photographs of K. Bloßfeldt and E. Muybridge, Benjamin
writes, “It is through photography that we first discover the existence of this optical unconscious, just as we
discover the instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis” (SW 2: 510-12). According to Yacavone,
“Through the camera eye, hitherto unseen dimensions of objects became visible for the first time,” leading
to an analogy with psychoanalysis, “both tools that systematically uncover previously hidden dimensions of
human life” (39, see, 29, 38-40, 131). For more on the theoretical efficacy of Benjamin’s notion, see Smith
& Sliwinski, (Ed.), Photography and the Optical Unconscious.
177
Kittler describes the anti-humanistic essence of his media theory in a manner reminiscent of Foucault’s
proclamations at the end of The Order of Things (387): “Media render Man, ‘that sublime culprit in the
most serenely spiritual sense’ of his philosophy, superfluous” (Gramophone,78).
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Latent in Benjamin’s “Work of Art” essay is an operative “natural-historical”
theory of perception, one which is materially shaped in a manner akin to art historical
forms. As Benjamin writes: “Just as the entire mode of existence of human collectives
changes over long historical periods, so too does their mode of perception. The way in
which human perception is organized—the medium in which it occurs—is conditioned
not only by nature but by history” (SW 4: 255). For Benjamin, one’s perception and
experience of the world are always already formally organized according to certain
technologies or media, which facilitate one’s relationship with the (natural) world: “our
writing tools are also writing our thoughts” (Kittler, Gramophone, 200). Here Benjamin
forms an affinity with other thinkers of media, namely McLuhan, for whom technology
acts as an “extension of man,” becoming a vanishing prosthesis to the human
sensorium.178 To illustrate such a technological supplementation, McLuhan reinterprets
the myth of Narcissus to describe the numbing, or “narcotic,” effect of technological
prostheses: they at once extend, while simultaneously reducing, one’s capacity for
experience (51-66). For McLuhan, the media we employ place us in a position of
subservience: we are conditioned by the various technologies and media we exist within,
as the “medium” invariably shapes both the “message” and messenger (23). As McLuhan
writes:
To behold, use or perceive any extension of ourselves in technological form is
necessarily to embrace it. To listen to radio or to read the printed page is to accept
these extensions of ourselves into our personal system and to undergo the “closure”
or displacement of perception that follows automatically. It is this continuous
embrace of our own technology in daily use that puts us in the Narcissus role of
subliminal awareness and numbness in relation to these images of ourselves. By
continuously embracing technologies, we relate ourselves to them as
servomechanisms. That is why we must, to use them at all, serve these objects, these
extensions of ourselves, as gods or minor religions. An Indian is the
servomechanism of his canoe, as the cowboy of his horse or the executive of his
clock. (55, [Sic])179

Caygill has highlighted the “technological” character of experience in Benjamin’s oeuvre, along with
the new political imperatives issued by advances in technology, as he writes: “For Benjamin, all experience
is technological. With this tremendous development of technology, a completely new poverty has
descended on mankind. Experience always relates to a certain techné [including language]. The work of art
essay demonstrates the two perspectives from which to view technology; either to be reactive—and cling to
the aura (which is associated with Fascism), or to be progressive, and attempt to be modern (this is the
communist option)” (94).
179
Elsewhere in the text, McLuhan provides a reading of Baudelaire in a similar manner to these
considerations, an interpretation which aligns with Benjamin’s positioning of Baudelaire as a thinker of
178
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As “servomechanisms” of various media one must strive to “understand media,” coming
to terms with the technological-historical organization of the human sensorium, along
with the various systems of mediation within which one is perpetually embedded.
Experience cannot be considered “natural,” as some pure “given” sense datum of
perception, nor can it be seen to simply conform to some innate table of categories; but
rather, for Benjamin, experience must be understood in a natural-historical manner: as
shaped by history, nature, media and technology. Benjamin’s writings on media and
modern life provide the groundwork for a speculative philosophy of technology, through
which one can theorize regarding the role of history and technology in shaping
experience and perception, while provoking a reflection into the various media one
always already exists within. Much more remains to be said regarding Benjamin as a
theorist of media and technology, particularly in constellation with other media
intellectuals such as McLuhan and Kittler. As will be demonstrated in the next section,
such a philosophy is grounded upon a mimetic understanding of the subject which
continually seeks to extend and express itself through various media or “languages.”

3.4

Benjamin’s Philosophy of Language: From Nature to Language (and Back
Again)

“The question regarding the essence of knowledge, law and art is linked to the question of the origins of all
human expression of the intellect out of the substance of language.” Benjamin, BC, 437.

Towards the end of his “Program,” Benjamin describes a central task for his
philosophy of the future as the development and reorientation of the Kantian
transcendental program around an analysis of language (SW 1: 108; Stern, 34). Such an
expanded philosophy of language, which comes to be understood as the transcendental
condition of thought, allows Benjamin to systematically ground his expanded philosophy
of experience. Benjamin’s theory of language involves what Adorno has elsewhere
termed an “axial shift” of Kant’s “Copernican revolution” (ND, xx): a meta-critical

urban experience. As McLuhan writes: “Baudelaire originally intended to call his Fleurs du Mal, Les
Limbes, having in mind the city as corporate extensions of our physical organs. Our letting-go of ourselves,
self-alienations, as it were, in order to amplify or increase the power of various functions. Baudelaire
considered flowers to be growths of evil. The city as amplification of human lusts and sensual striving had
for him an entire organic and psychic unity” (117).
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movement away from the primacy Kant accords to “the subject” or “the transcendental
unity of apperception,” towards “the object,” while not dispensing wholly with the
subject’s transcendental contributions to cognition. Benjamin moves the center of
philosophical affect from the epistemic subject, outwards into the world, developing a
fundamentally “expressive” understanding of reality in which human language is
decentered into a particular manifestation of “language overall” [überhaupt] (GS VII:
785). In this way Benjamin is a mimetic thinker, one who seeks to encompass nondiscursive “languages”—or media—within the purview of philosophy. One can see that
Benjamin’s meta-critical interventions upon the Kantian transcendental are in line with
those undertaken by many in the post-Kantian generation, notably, Hegel and Schelling,
who seek to expand the purview of philosophy to a broader range of experiences, while
remaining committed to a systematic notion of philosophy. Benjamin’s theory of
language should be seen in line with Hegel’s encyclopedia, or Schelling’s organic form
of thought: models of intellectual grounding capable of mediating a broader range of
phenomena than permitted by Kant. In what follows, Benjamin’s linguistic interventions
upon the Kantian transcendental program will be elaborated (3.4.1), following which his
theory of language (3.4.2), along with its mimetic relationship to the world (3.4.3), will
be explored.
3.4.1 Kant and Language (Benjamin’s Meta-critique)
“A concept of knowledge gained from a reflection on the linguistic nature of language of knowledge will
create a corresponding concept of experience which will also encompass realms that Kant failed to truly
systematize.” Benjamin, “Program,” SW 1: 108.

In his “Program,” Benjamin outlines three main critiques of the (Neo)-Kantian
project: 1) the Newtonian scientific model of cognition that Kant develops destroys
experience; 2) the epistemological subject-object division is reductive and inadequate; 3)
Kant conflates “knowledge of experience,” or its transcendental conditions, with
experience itself (Stern, 33; SW 1: 100-8). Benjamin objects to a positivist “empiricist
bias” operative within the Neo-Kantian program (and latent in Kant), one which sought to
erect a scientific-mathematical model of philosophical certainty in a manner analogous to
Newtonian mechanics. Further, Benjamin saw the upshot of the Kantian program as the
reestablishment of an empiricist “subject-object” model of cognition, whereby
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transcendental consciousness replaces the empirical ego as a recipient of external
sensations (Stern, 35-37). As in empiricism, “knowledge”—understood as a refined, or
“worked up,” form of experience—is given primacy over transient “ephemeral
experience” (SW 1: 108). Despite this, Benjamin praises Kant’s tacit resistance to
empiricism by way of his “thing-in-itself,” in a manner akin to Adorno’s “block” (Kant,
170-80). Though Benjamin insists that the Kantian subject must be decentered further:
Kant’s “tentative turn away from a conception of knowledge as a relation between
subject and object must be radicalized” (Stern, 37). Benjamin undertakes such a task by
moving the locus of knowledge from consciousness to language: that “sphere of total
neutrality between subject and object” (SW 1: 108). Language is understood as “neutral”
with respect to both subject and object: it does not reside in some mystical communion
with the essence of things (the object), nor is it “the expression of some fundamental
subjective structure or grammar” (SW 1: 104). Instead, human language (“die Sprache
des Menschen”) is a particular manifestation, or translation, of “language as such”
(“Sprache überhaupt”): of the polyphony of expressions (or media) permeating the
world.180
Benjamin reorients the epistemic subject’s position with respect to the world:
understanding language as “first philosophy,” or recognizing the primacy of “mediation,”
identifies the fundamentally interstitial nature of all human constructions in relation to the
world. Put more radically, the world itself elicits forms of signification: “Meaning...is not
projected onto the world by human language, but is a precondition for it” (Stern, 39).
This is not to say that Benjamin lapses into some uncritical pantheism, or mystical night
of the intuition, but rather, the uniqueness of Benjamin’s project lies in his maintenance

As is evident by the opening of “On Language as Such,” Benjamin considers language in an expanded
sense, beyond the mere employment of words and discourse; instead language is understood in terms of
“expression,” which permeates both the world and human language. As Benjamin writes, “It is possible to
talk about a language of music and of sculpture, about a language of justice...The existence of language...is
coextensive not only with human mental expression...but with absolutely everything” (SW 1: 62).
Describing Benjamin’s expressive linguistic universalism, Stern will write: “Benjamin is using the word
‘language’ to apply to practices and experiences that communicate meanings, whether or not these
meanings are subsequently communicated or fully communicable in words” (32), and further, “Language is
an all-encompassing medium of expression—it is meaning as such, or what is sometimes called being.”
(13). Such an expressive understanding of language was formalized in the writings of Hamann and Herder,
thinkers who, generally stated, sought to undertake a meta-critique of the Kantian program in a manner that
anticipated the absolute Idealism of Hegel and Schelling (Stern, 18, 29-55).
180
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of language as a transcendental structure of thought. If Kant inquired after the
transcendental conditions of an assumed scientific model of cognition, Benjamin moves
beyond such an atomistic subject-object epistemology to a model which understands
language as perpetually mediating one’s relationship with reality, and as such, language
must serve as the transcendental condition for any interaction with the world. Fenves sees
Benjamin’s employment of language as in line with Kant’s “Transcendental Aesthetic,”
which presents space and time as a priori subjective intuitions structuring perception of
reality (137-8). Language remains transcendental given that it is the medium or form of
expression, through which all experience is given the to the (“so-called”) human (Kittler,
Gramophone, xxxix). Given the central role Benjamin accords to translation, it must
further be granted that any expression—human or otherwise (SW 1: 73)—can be
translated (or mediated) into human language, such that language can express,
“absolutely everything” (SW 1: 62). In such a manner, Benjamin’s understanding of
language allows for an expansive, though nonetheless transcendental, philosophy of
experience.
3.4.2 “On Language as Such and the Language of Man”: Benjamin’s Linguistic
Philosophy
“A main source of failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview [Übersehen] of the use of our
words. –Our grammar is deficient in survey-ability [Übersichtlichkeit].” Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, 54.

Benjamin outlines the main contours of his philosophy of language in “On
Language as Such and on the Language of Man” (Über Sprache überhaupt und über die
Sprache des Menschen,” 1916), a text originally composed as a letter to Scholem
intending to parse the relationship between mathematics and language.181 The finished
text seldom mentions mathematics, and when it does only obliquely (Fenves, 143-51),
and instead should be read as a quasi-mystical thought experiment into the origins of
language, one following the post-Kantian “meta-critiques” of thinkers such as Hamann
and Herder (Stern, 99, 141-3). Benjamin describes the “essay’s” aim to Scholem: “I try to
address the problem of the essence of language in this work, particularly in an immanent

“Sprache überhaupt” (GS VII: 785): can be rendered as “language as such, in general, or overall, or as
“pure language” in the parlance of “The Task of the Translator” (see Stern, 32).
181
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connection to Judaism, as far as I understand it, and the first chapter of Genesis” (BC,
81). Given the origin of the text in a letter to Scholem, a thinker with whom Benjamin
often discussed Judaic religious matters, Benjamin couches much of the argument in
explicitly theological terms via his reading of Genesis, with an emphasis on an Adamic
theory of names.182 Further, the central importance of translation or the mediation
between media must be underscored: Benjamin develops an understanding of language
which expresses the mediations between different levels of signification—between
“divine language,” Adamic “naming language,” and “the language of man,” and (latently)
the “ur-signification” of nature— such that a theory of translation emerges “at the deepest
level of linguistic theory” (SW 1: 69). In this way, it is necessary to read Benjamin’s “The
Task of the Translator” (“Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers,”1923) in conjunction with “On
Language,” seeing them as working out of a shared linguistic philosophy. Motifs from
both texts are later re-cited in his “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” which sought to crystalize
his early views (OT, 13-15, 26, 244, 256). The remainder of this section will undertake a
critical exegesis of Benjamin’s philosophy of language, with particular reference to the
modified understanding of structure or form which grounds Benjamin’s expanded
philosophy of experience.183
Benjamin’s “On Language as Such” questions the correspondences between
“language as such” [Sprache überhaupt] and “the language of man” [die Sprache des
Menschen]. The work stages a lapsarian narrative of “the fall” from the immanence of
divine language in “Eden,” into the “prattle” of everyday designative usage, degenerating

Jacobson has emphasized the theological dimensions of Benjamin’s text, situating him in relation to
Jewish thought, specifically a notion of “Bereshit Rabbah,” which sees language and the Torah existing
prior to creation as “God’s notepad” (85), out of which creation flowed. As Benjamin asserts in the essay,
“Language is therefore the creative and finished creation” (SW 1: 68). For more on the relationship between
theology and Benjamin’s theory of language see, Ch. 3. “On the Origins of Language” in Jacobson,
Metaphysics of the Profane (85-122). Opposed to Jacobson’s perspective, Stern sees Benjamin’s
employment of theology as a heuristic thought experiment by which to express his argument (25).
Benjamin describes his theological-Adamic understanding of names as follows: “The proper name is the
communion of man with the creative word of God” (SW 1: 69).
183
Stern positions Benjamin’s theory of language as grounding much of his other work: “As remains
underappreciated, Benjamin’s theory of language stands at the foundation of his later analysis of bourgeois
material culture. In particular, his famous writings on Goethe, Baudelaire, Kafka, and Leskov; his
criticisms of journalistic language in his essay on Karl Kraus and in the Arcades Project; his
characterizations of the media photography and film, all depend conceptually on his early characterizations
of language and the role of criticism” (23).
182
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further into the “bourgeois conception of language” that sees words in an arbitrary
relationship to things (SW 1: 71, 65). Following the Genesis narrative: in the beginning,
God (as divine “logos”) spoke and created the world, after which, Adam (“the first
philosopher”) was tasked with the weak messianic duty of naming creation (SW 1: 70).
Following the expulsion from Eden and the failed attempt at Babel, God “ma[de]
language mediate” (SW 1:72).
Benjamin describes his univocal understanding of language: “Every expression of
human mental life [Geisteslebens] can be understood as a kind of language”; there exists
a “language of music, sculpture, justice,” all of which tend “toward the communication of
objects of the mind” (SW 1: 62; GS II: 140).184 Discursive conceptual language, which is
typically interrogated by philosophy of language, is usurped from its primary position,
being considered but one particular “language” or instantiation of “language as such.”
Benjamin further describes the expressions of the natural world as a form of “language”:
“there is no event or thing in either animate or inanimate nature that does not in some
way partake of language, for it is the nature of each one to communicate its mental
contents” (SW 1: 62). In this regard, Benjamin continues the Hamannian project of
demonstrating “the presence of language everywhere,” formulating his own model of
“linguistic universalism” (SW 1:108; Stern, 37).185 Such an “expressive” understanding of
reality, in which the human subject is usurped from its privileged position, has much in
common with the absolute Idealism of thinkers such as Hegel and Schelling, who
consider subjective human reason as a particular moment within a broader rational
continuum.
Benjamin further postulates that latent in the human denotative naming capacity
lies a spark of originary divine logos, which continues to glimmer amidst the fallen

Livingstone translates, “Geisteslebens” as “mental life,” which is apt, though inadequate given the
difficulty of translating “Geist,” which connotes at once, mind, spirit, ghost, and intellect. For more on the
complicated histories of this term—along with the impossibility of avoiding its Idealist lineages—see
Derrida, Of Spirit, 1-7. This term will be discussed in more depth (with specific relation to Hegel) in the
final chapter of this project.
185
Differentiating Benjamin’s approach from that of the conventional philosophy of language, Stern writes:
“Benjamin will answer the question of how words refer to objects not by trying to explain how the gap
between word and object is bridged, but by explaining how the gap is created by human language in the
first place” (31).
184
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context of earthly signification. After its “fall” from Eden, humanity has lost its
proximate mimetic relationship with God, nature, and language, and is perpetually
ensnared by a mediated relationship to the world. In a typical Benjaminian reversal, the
fall becomes unexpectedly fortunate: “The fall is the birth hour of the human word, in
which the name no longer lives uninjured, [in] which [language] steps out of naminglanguage, out of its own knowing, immanent magic, in order to become explicitly from
the outside as it were, magic. The word must communicate something (other than itself)”
(SW 1: 71).186 There will be no return to the purity of divine logos, nor to the immediate
signification of Adam; one is rather condemned to existence within the various media
that constitute “the language of man.” However, in a Judaic theological about-face,
Benjamin shows how through seemingly minor practices of translation or criticism, one
can recover something of the original divine signifying intention, re-enchanting the
“prattle” of empty signification.
For Benjamin, human language is fundamentally decentered, becoming one
among many communicative mediums. Though all entities in nature “express”
themselves by communicating their “linguistic being,” Benjamin emphasizes that “It
is...the linguistic being of man to name things” (SW 1: 64). It is the task of the human to
actualize the world through language, as Adam “called each thing by its right name,”
which is “that through which, and in which, language itself communicates itself
absolutely” (SW 1: 65). Humans possess the “weak-messianic” power of language, which
directly descends from the divine spark of creation, and are thus able to participate in the
broader continuum of “expressions.”
In such a manner, Benjamin defines language as the “expression” of the
“spiritual” elements of the mind, though this should not be taken to mean that “words”
encompass some independent “thing” as in what Benjamin terms the “Bourgeois

Describing Benjamin’s allegory of “the fall,” Stern writes: “The fall represents the beginning of an
external perspective on language, which is the requirement for an external perspective on the world. This is
humanity coming into its own, stepping outside of the immanent language that connected it to things and
animals and making it capable of judgment” (74). After the linguistic fall from such an immediate prose of
the world, the “judging” power of the word arises, as humans are condemned to a designative, external, or
“bourgeois,” conception of language. Read allegorically, Benjamin’s “fall” has always already occurred
given that we, as thinkers of language, commence within a designative understanding of language from
which one must extricate oneself in order to gain insight into the expressive understanding of language.
186
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conception of language” (SW 1: 65).187 Instead, for Benjamin, the “spiritual content,”
which is expressed by language, is already elicited by the object and the world in general.
Benjamin’s starting point differs radically from conventional (“bourgeois”) philosophies
of language, which begin with a distinction between “word” and “thing,” following
which they attempt to solve problematics of “designation,” or determine how the sign
arbitrarily relates to the object it signifies. Benjamin further contrasts his own theory with
mystical understandings of language, in which language grasps the thing-in-itself, or “the
mental essence of a thing” (SW 1: 63). Against Saussure—thus also contravening much
of the resulting tradition of French theory which utilized his work—Benjamin will assert,
“language never gives mere signs” (SW 1: 69): language is not arbitrary, but rather, has
an immanent and mimetic relationship with the object it signifies.188
For Benjamin, one must move beyond both the “bourgeois” designative
understanding of language, and mystical views of language as the communion of word
and thing. Philosophy must awaken to the presence of “expression” and language
everywhere: one exists perpetually within a context of mediation, within various media or
“discourse networks” (Kittler, Discourse, 369-72). Benjamin eradicates any hard
distinction between “word” and “thing,” along with that between “mental” and “linguistic
being,” in favour of a more general understanding of language as “expression.”
Describing this, Benjamin writes:

187

The Bourgeois, or designative, understanding of language, sees words in an arbitrary or fiat relationship
to its object. Benjamin likewise moves against the “mystical understanding of language,” in which the word
fully expresses the “essence of a thing”: “The view that the mental essence of a thing consists precisely in
its language—this view, taken as a hypothesis, is the great abyss into which all linguistic theory threatens to
fall, and to survive precisely suspended over this abyss is its task” (SW 1: 63). It should be noted that
Benjamin does not wholly reject the mystical understanding of language, given that he maintains language
is an expression of divine creativity, which also subsists in objects. To follow Benjamin on language, one
must remain “suspended above the abyss,” understanding the mystical origin of language without fully
lapsing into irrationalism.
188
Weber pushes Benjamin in the direction of deconstruction, with particular emphasis on Derrida’s notion
of “iterability” (from “Signature Event Context,” 1971/1988), in which language—instead of directly
corresponding to the world—marks a repetition, or “re-iteration” of the context of meaning, inscribing a
fundamental difference (or différance) between word and thing (Derrida, 315). As such, Weber’s sees
Benjamin’s texts as the radicalization of this difference, or “extreme,” between word and thing, with
meaning coming to be based upon a certain “coming to pass,” a natural historical transience constitutive of
philosophy (5-10). Though there are evident affinities between Benjamin and deconstruction (as is
illustrated by de Man’s work) my own reading of Benjamin as a theorist of translation and mimesis pushes
against such a deconstructive recuperation of Benjamin. For de Man’s reading of Benjamin as a theorist of
translation, see “Conclusions” (73-105).
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It is fundamental that this mental being communicates itself in language and not
through language. Languages, therefore have no speaker, if this means someone
who communicates through these languages…Mental being is identical with
linguistic being only insofar as it is capable of communication. What is
communicable in a mental entity is its linguistic entity. (SW 1: 63)

Benjamin elaborates this expressive form elsewhere in the essay, contending “there is no
such thing as a content of language” (SW 1: 66): the medium of language itself is the
message. One exists “in language” and media, which are not simply neutral tools
“through” which meaning is transmitted. Given that, “all language communicates itself
in itself; it is in the purest sense the ‘medium’ of the communication,” Benjamin reorients
linguistic theory towards an analysis of mediation (SW 1: 66, 69). Linguistic philosophy
studies the role played by the media in conditioning and shaping expression: “mediation,
which is the immediacy of all mental communication, is the fundamental problem of
linguistic theory” (SW 1: 64).189 For Benjamin, philosophy of language becomes the
analysis of the various languages, or media, humans find themselves embedded within,
along with the possibility of translating between such domains.

3.4.3 Translation & Mimesis
“Fragments of a vessel that are glued together must match one another in the smallest details, although they
need not be like one another.” Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator,” SW 1: 260.

Benjamin’s “expressive” understanding of reality, whereby human language is
considered another language among many, places a new importance on translation as a
technique of mediation between different levels of signification. As Benjamin writes, “It
is necessary to found the concept of translation at the deepest level of linguistic theory,
for it is much too far-reaching and powerful to be treated in any way as an afterthought”
(SW 1: 69). In “On Language,” Benjamin describes various spheres of signification, or
“languages,” as “media of varying densities” (SW 1: 71). Human language, via particular

189

In this way, the distinction between form and content, or language and mental essence, is collapsed by
Benjamin, as the two polarities come to be seen as separated from each other by a “nothingness.” As
Benjamin writes: “Language is thus the mental being of things. Mental being is therefore postulated at the
outset as communicable, or, rather, is situated within the communicable, and the thesis that the linguistic
being of things is identical with the mental, insofar as the latter is communicable, becomes in its ‘insofar’ a
tautology. There is no such thing as a content of language; as communication, language communicates a
mental activity—something communicable per say” (SW 1: 66).
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“naming” practices, attempts to translate the “mute” language of nature into “the sonic”
language of the human: “The language of things can pass into the language of knowledge
and name only through translation —so many translations, so many languages—once
man has fallen from the paradisiacal state that knew only one language” (SW 1: 70-71).
After the linguistic fall from the immediacy of divine logos, there can be no return to the
world before Babel: one is predestined to translate between the vast array of media that
make up the continuum of “language.” For Benjamin, through such immanent practices
of mediation one is able to glimpse a refracted image of “language as such.”
Latent in Benjamin’s descriptions of language as translation is a mimetic
understanding of language as the “archive of non-sensuous similarities”; that is, language
manifests “the highest level of mimetic behavior,” participating in the “mimetic faculty”
of the human (SW 2: 722; 697).190 Describing the existence of this mimetic faculty, along
with a primordial imitative comportment to the world, Benjamin writes: “Nature
produces similarities—one need only think of mimicry. The very greatest capacity for the
generation of similarities, however, belongs to human beings. Indeed, there may be no
single one of their higher functions that is not codetermined by the mimetic faculty” (SW
2: 694). Such an originary mimetic relationship to the world subtends human “naming
power,” providing Benjamin with a primordial comportment to the expressive character
of the world. Linguistic acts of “naming” translate the pre-linguistic expressions of the
world into language. In the “Mimetic Faculty,” Benjamin takes up Rudolf Leonard’s
claim, “Every word—and the whole of language... is onomatopoetic” (SW 2: 721),
speculatively locating the origin of language in prehistoric mimetic comportments and
gestures.191
Language must be understood as a form of translation: both of the original
expression of the “object” into the “word,” and in between differing media. One can see

A. Rabinbach has noted that Benjamin’s reflections on language are continued seventeen years after “On
Language” in two similar texts dealing with the human “mimetic faculty”: “On the Mimetic Faculty” and
“Doctrine of the Similar” (both 1933) (60).
191
Elaborating the mimetic origin of language—in which language descends from earlier onomatopoetic
“languages”—Benjamin writes, “from time immemorial, the mimetic faculty has been conceded some
influence on language.” And further, “imitative behavior in Language formation was acknowledged under
the name of onomatopoeia” (SW 2: 721).
190
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the progressive translation of “language”—from that of nature to that of the human—as
part of a broader unfolding that makes up the continuum of “language as such.” As
Benjamin writes, “There is a language of sculpture, of painting, of poetry…we are
concerned here with nameless non-acoustic languages, languages issuing from matter...
we should recall the material community of things in their communication” (SW 1: 73).
As I have emphasized, such a mimetic understanding of language is particularly
efficacious in the constellation of media theory, allowing the “languages” of media and
technology to be charted and understood. Stern underscores the radical nature of
Benjamin’s mimetic-linguistic reversal: “Language begins as an immanent, mimetic
attempt to give voice to the meaning communicated by nature and not as a way of
referring to objects” (57). That is, language is not arbitrary, and should be seen in an
immanent constellation with domains such as dance, incantation, and astrology, spheres
which foreground an originary mimetic species being, along with an animistic-pantheistic
understanding of reality. More radically, within such a schema conceptual language
represents a further abstraction from more immediate forms of mimetic interaction with
the world.192
Such media philosophical lines of thinking are continued in Benjamin’s
reflections on translation, specifically his 1923 preface to his translations of Baudelaire’s
Tableaux Parisiens, “The Task of the Translator.” Here Benjamin argues that in
translation, thought as a historically informed practice, one glimpses something of “pure
language,” or “language overall” (SW 1: 261-2). That is, all translation passes through,
and contributes to, the larger mosaic that is “language as such.” While the poet or author
intends towards communication within a given epoch, and sees language as a means to

Benjamin describes his own form of “mimetic criticism” as an attempt “to read what was never
written...reading prior to languages, from entrails, the stars, or dances” (SW 2: 722). Through such a
“profane and magical” sense of reading, one is able to glimpse the mimetic basis of language as it “flashes
up” and “flits by” (SW 2: 695- 696). The motif of “the flash,” or “shock of illumination,” occurs throughout
Benjamin’s oeuvre, notably in his writings on photography, along with the flash of historical illumination
throughout the Arcades Project, and his 1940, “Theses on the Concept of History.” Describing the
“flashing up” through which one perceives mimetic constellations, Benjamin will write: “The perception of
similarity is in every case bound to a flashing up. It flits past, can possibly be won again, but cannot really
be held fast as can other perceptions. It offers itself to the eye as fleetingly and transitorily as a
constellation of stars. The perception of similarities thus seems to be bound to a moment in time” (SW 2:
695).
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communication, the translator aims at “something other than the reproduction of
meaning” (SW 1: 259). The translator reflects on questions of mediation, or the
translation of language across history, and therein previews something of “pure
language”: “to regain pure language fully formed from the linguistic flux, is the
tremendous and only capacity of translation” (SW 1: 261). This “pure language” is not
some static perfect language independent of history, but rather, language crafted through
historical reflection and linguistic criticism, the “ripening the seed of pure language in a
translation” (SW 1: 259). The translator (and perhaps the critic) is one who historically recreates “language as such” after the fall. Alluding to this historical production of “pure
language,” Benjamin writes:
And that which seeks to represent, indeed to produce, itself in the evolving of
languages is that very nucleus of the pure language; yet though this nucleus remains
present in life as that which is symbolized itself, albeit hidden and fragmentary, it
persists in linguistic creations only in its symbolizing capacity. (SW 1: 261)

Though fragmentary in themselves, individual acts of translation and criticism participate
in the broader constellation that is “pure language.” Such sentiments are echoed in
Benjamin’s 1921/39 “Theologico-Political Fragment,” which describes the image of the
messiah as mirrored in the eternal transience of nature. Human intention, by striving after
the “eternal passing” or the transience that is “nature,” gains a fragmentary image of
“happiness,” seeing an imagine of “the divine” refracted in the eternal passing of the
“profane” (SW 3: 305-6). Such a negative theology can likewise be seen as subtending
the relationship between “language as such” and the “language of man”: the perpetual
translation (or “translatability”) of the “language of man,” shoots beyond itself, refracting
an image of “language as such” in the perpetual progression of works and translations. In
concluding his 1916 “On Language,” Benjamin re-articulates the various levels of
signification described throughout the essay—from the creative word of God, through to
the “unspoken language of nature”—all of which make up the mosaic that is “Language
as such”:
Man communicates himself to God through name, which he gives to nature and (in
proper names) to his own kind; and to nature he gives names according to the
communication he receives from her, for the whole of nature is imbued with a
nameless, unspoken language, the residue of the creative word of God, which is
preserved in man as the cognizing name and above man as the judgment suspended
over him. The language of nature is comparable to a secret password that each
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sentry passes to the next in his own language, but the meaning of the password is
the sentry’s language itself. All higher language is a translation of lower ones, until
in ultimate clarity the word of God unfolds, which is the unity of this movement
made up of language. (SW 1: 74)193

The mute language of nature, in its transient resistance to signification, projects a
kaleidoscopic image of the unfolding of divine language. Such a negative theological
reversal again echoes Benjamin’s “Fragment,” which sees transience as dialectically
mirroring its opposite, transcendence (SW 3: 306). Put allegorically: after the linguistic
“fall” into a disenchanted relationship with the natural world, one cannot go back to
Eden, nor hope to “re-awaken the charnel house of rotted interiors” through some
messianic gesture (Lukács, Novel, 64). Instead, for Benjamin, one must embrace such
ephemerality, becoming attentive to the mute and sensuous language of nature. With
his expressive understanding of language and reality, Benjamin puts “meaning back into
the world” (Stern, 3), though not in an affirmative sense, as nature stands as testament
to an ur- history of transience: a monument to the primacy of ephemerality over and
against the system or table of categories. To follow Schelling, Benjamin reconnects the
philosophy of language with its “living ground” (FE, 26), theorizing language and
nature in an immanent expressive continuum. Benjamin’s thought can be described as
an originary listening to the world, an understanding of the tenuous, evanescent, and
natural-historical character of all human constructions. It is such a negative theological
metaphysics which subtends Benjamin’s reflections on language, and, as I will argue in
the following chapter (4.3.3), his understanding of allegory.
Scholarship has rightly analyzed the linguistic arguments made by Benjamin in
“On Language.” However, such analyses have come at the expense of a thorough
consideration of the metaphysical underpinnings of Benjamin’s thinking (on language).
Benjamin develops a “natural-historical” metaphysics of impermanence, what Hansen
has termed an “ur-history of change” (3): the recognition of the primacy of
transformation with respect to both nature and history (Adorno, NH, 252-3). Describing

Describing the reversal in which “pure meaning (or language)” is glimpsed through the act of
translation, Stern writes: “Pure meaning is an ideal that we never reach. Still, in the act of translations—
movement through the medium of language as such—we are provided a partial glimpse of the totality from
which individual words are fallen” (66).
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nature’s transient lamentation Benjamin writes, “It is a metaphysical truth that all nature
would begin to lament if it where endowed with language” (SW 1: 72), and further,
“Because she is mute, nature mourns” (SW 1: 73). In a primary sense one can see
Benjamin positing an expressive, or “communicable,” element to the world, an original
animism which the language of Adam first represented in “naming.”194 In a related
second sense, Benjamin figures the primacy of an ephemeral image of nature: a world
that is perpetually in flux, hence does not respect the stability of origins or signification.
In such a way, nature “mourns” the inadequacy of language to express its originary
transience, upholding the supremacy of change against any system of signification.
Further, the “language of man” contains within itself a translated fragment of fallen
nature, a further level of mediation in the broader kaleidoscope that is “language.”

3.5

Synthesis: Language and the Limits of Experience
“The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which
alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.62.

Benjamin’s understanding of language provides an expanded, though nonetheless
transcendental, grounding for his expanded philosophy of experience. As opposed to the
rigid (Neo) Kantian limitation of experience by way of knowledge (to its “possibility”),
Benjamin favors a more porous model of reason, which experimentally unbinds the
empirical and transcendental domains, bestowing upon experience the ability to shape the
philosophical system. Benjamin is highly critical of thinkers who attempt to limit the
scope of philosophy to human language (as in the prefatory remark by Wittgenstein), or
to a transcendental table or grammar (as Kant). Against such positions, Benjamin will
assert that language—when considered as the progressive unfolding or translation of

Statements such as “language communicates the linguistic being of things” (SW 1: 63) evoke the
peculiar pantheism animating much of Benjamin’s early work (in the sense of Schelling and Spinoza).
Benjamin accords an original agency to the world, which expresses itself for language. Describing the
need to “translate” the significations of nature into language, Benjamin writes: “The translation of the
language of things into that of man is not only a translation of the mute into the sonic; it is also the
translation of nameless into name” (SW 1: 70). Likewise, Benjamin speaks of the “life” of the work in
relation to translation, criticism, and other modes of supplementary reception: “Commentary and
translation stand in the same relation to the text as style and mimesis to nature: the same phenomenon
considered from different aspects” (SW 1: 449).
194
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different languages—is “potentially infinite,” containing the capacity to express
“absolutely everything” (SW 1: 62).
“System” should not attempt to reify experience, or express it in some definitive
manner, but rather, should become a technique of mediation that arranges elements into a
diversity of thought images and constellations. Structure should be seen in a medial
relationship of translation to both experience and the world, not as some static domain of
final meaning. Benjamin installs a structural openness between the transcendental and
empirical domains, as experience is allowed to continually invade structure, forcing it to
re-constellate its coordinates. As such, philosophy should no longer be understood as the
a-historical deduction of fundamental truths or categories, but rather, as a fundamentally
historical practice which constantly reconsiders itself according to new experiences.
Practices such as translation and aesthetics, along with the immanent practice of critique,
gain a new importance as techniques which are able to mediate and group disparate
phenomena into new constellations. 195 In presenting the antinomy between “experience”
and system (or language), this chapter has laid the groundwork for a fuller presentation of
Benjamin’s mortuary Romantic model of philosophy as criticism, along with a fuller
appreciation of the metaphysical underpinnings of such a view.

Describing the primacy of aesthetics in Benjamin’s relation to language, Stern will write: “Benjamin’s
idea that human language is the product of the translation of the language of experience entails the primacy
of poetic language and mimesis—an idea that has a long history in the expressivist and Romantic
traditions” (19). Stern also positions Benjamin against thinkers such as Habermas, who employ a
designative- Kantian understanding of language (and “communication”) as a universal human rational
capacity. For, Benjamin, if language is only considered in terms of discourse—failing to understand the
polyphony of expressions permeating the world—it cannot be considered “rational” in any meaningful
sense. As Stern writes, “As long as our language itself is reified, euphemized, and bereft, its rational
deployment in consenting discursive communities will remain uncritical” (Stern, 23). Finally, Stern
emphasizes the differing relationships to the world that Benjamin’s linguistic philosophy allows: “it can
take up meaning, move it from place to place, and thereby allow the world to shine light on itself, to create
connections. Language appears here not as a tool that maps, represents, or pictures the world, but one that
gives more articulate, well-defined form to its extant meaning. Language brings the world to expression”
(Stern, 62).
195
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4

Benjamin’s Mortuary Philosophy: Towards a Natural History of
Transience

“That most paradoxical, most fleeting hope finally emerges from the semblance of reconciliation, just as, at
twilight, as the sun is extinguished, rises the evening star which outlasts the night.” Benjamin, “Goethe’s
Elective Affinities,” SW 1: 355.

4.1

Critique (Against Epistemology)

“Philosophy defined by Kant as ‘the science of the limitations of reasons!!’” Nietzsche, The Will to Power,
247.

In the previous chapter Benjamin’s antinomy between “system,” understood in
relation to language, and “experience” was presented. In this chapter, I will explore how
this dichotomy is problematized and expanded into a more capacious “metaphysicalcritical” understanding of philosophy beyond the confines of mere epistemology.
Benjamin came to post-Kantian Idealism out of his desire to expand the Kantian program
by way of a broader array of experiences, though he eventually jettisoned such a
(neo)Kantian framework in favor of a broader Idealist-Romantic metaphysics. Such a
philosophy culminates in Benjamin’s metaphysical doctrine of “natural history,” which
postulates the primacy of transience against a-historical conceptions of philosophy. I will
demonstrate how such a mortuary notion of philosophy is immanently developed
throughout Benjamin’s 1919-20 dissertation, “The Concept of Criticism in German
Romanticism” [Der Begriff der Kuntskritik in der deutschen Romantik], his 1919-22
analysis of Goethe’s Elective Affinities [Wahlverwandtschaften, published 1924-5],
culminating in his 1925/8, Origin of the German Trauerspiel [Ursprung des deutschens
Trauerspiels]. Within these texts Benjamin enters the post-Kantian “force-field” of
concerns (encompassing both “Idealism” and “Romanticism”), in or order to pursue his
expanded conception of philosophy. In addition to seeing these texts as working out a
novel understanding of “philosophy as criticism”—by way of Goethe and the
Frühromantiker— I read this constellation of texts as ciphers to Benjamin’s emergent
metaphysical views. As the thinkers of the post-Kantian paradigm (re)turned to
metaphysics in order to escape the aporias that arose from Kant’s “subjective Idealism,”
Benjamin likewise immersed himself in post-Kantian metaphysics to formulate his own
expanded understanding of philosophy beyond the limited purview of Neo-Kantianism.
Within the mosaic of post-Kantian thought, Benjamin problematizes his original
antinomy between “experience” and “language” within a broader metaphysical-critical
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framework provided by the Romantic-Idealist sphere of concerns, according a greater
importance to the aesthetic domain (and the practice of “criticism”), along with the
metaphysical doctrine of “natural history.” Benjamin’s notion of “allegory” (in the
Trauerspiel) will be read as central to his own mortuary vision of Romanticism: a notion
which affirms a metaphysics of transience, while providing a historically informed model
of signification in line with such a metaphysic.
This first section examines how Benjamin’s philosophy of criticism emerges from
within the epistemological tensions of the (neo)-Kantian program, specifically by way of
his movement towards Romantic-Idealist “meta-critique” (Beiser, Reason, 4-8), or the
immanent criticism of philosophy according to its own logic(s) or suppositions (4.1). My
second section examines the metaphysical underpinnings of Benjamin’s philosophy of
criticism, analyzing the “contagion” of philosophy by organic nature, placing Benjamin
in dialogue with Schelling and Goethe (4.2). My final section examines Benjamin’s
Trauerspiel book via a reading of the notions of “natural history” and “allegory” therein
(4.3). These ideas will be presented as fundamental to Benjamin’s “metaphysical-critical”
philosophy of transience, or his mortuary vision of Romanticism.
4.1.1 Romantic Meta-Critique: From Kant to the “Force-Field” of Romanticism
“Everywhere we seek the absolute, and we find only things.” Novalis,
Miscellaneous Remarks, 383.

Throughout 1917-18 while authoring his youthful programmatic statements for a
“coming philosophy,” Benjamin was also in search of a topic on which to write a
dissertation (at the University of Bern). Such a research program necessitated a forced
rapprochement between his personal intellectual interests and the academic discourse of
the university, a struggle which persisted throughout much of his life, and which was
never finally resolved. Benjamin’s peripatetic relation to the university has affinities with
that of Schelling, and to some extent Hegel (prior to his 1818 Berlin appointment),
though Benjamin never habilitated, nor did he gain a university position. In line with his
Kantian inclined “Program” (1918), Benjamin intended to think through Kant’s
conception of history—by way of the Kantian notion of the “eternal task” (BC, 119)—
which he would position in relation to his own understanding of “historical experience,”
providing a potential starting point for a historically viable epistemology. However, after
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actually reading Kant’s essays “On Perpetual Peace” and the “Idea for a Universal
History” in preparation for his dissertation, Benjamin abandoned the explicitly Kantian
focus of the project. In rejecting Kant, Benjamin turned to a darkened vision of
enlightenment, one which eventually culminated in his own melancholy natural historical
vision. To Scholem, he expressed his “disappointment” (BC, 105-6) with Kant’s passive
notions of spectatorship, along with the “ethical interest” of his philosophy of history,
going so far as to deride Kant as a “despot of Logos,” declaring Kant to be his “greatest
adversary” (BC, 125, 103-4, 105-6). Crystalizing his frustrations with Kant’s lack of
historical sense in a letter to Scholem, Benjamin remarks, “It is virtually impossible to
gain access to the philosophy of history using Kant’s historical writings as a point of
departure” (BC, 116). Despite his earlier attempts to expand Kantian epistemology, its
lack of historical sensibility led Benjamin to look beyond the Kantian purview for
solutions, marking his entrance into the Romantic-Idealist, post-Kantian fold.
In criticizing Kant, Benjamin gravitated towards the “force- field” (Adorno, Kant,
4) of post-Kantian thought encompassing both Idealism and Romanticism; however—
particularly in his analysis of the Early Romantics—Benjamin maintained a modified
Kantian formal model of analysis (Caygill, 34), though one creatively fractured by way
of a Romantic hermeneutic. Benjamin engaged with the Frühromantik Athenaeum
journal (1798-1800), along with the writings of Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis—in
particular the former’s 1804-6 “Windischmann Lectures”—in order to elaborate the “true
nature of Romanticism of which the secondary literature is completely ignorant...i.e.
messianism” (BC, 139). According to Benjamin, this “true nature” is its historical-critical
sentiment, along with the “systematic fundamental idea” (BC, 137) of Frühromantik
“mystical cognition” (BC, 136), both of which would provide a more robust framework
for Benjamin’s own encompassing philosophy of experience. Benjamin’s 1919
dissertation, “On the Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism,” should be seen as
striving to more rigorously cast his early “program” for philosophy—which sought to
enlarge the purview of philosophy into language and experience—into a more substantive
philosophy of criticism, one able to mediate experiences from domains such as aesthetics
and history, while moving thought beyond the limits of the epistemic subject. In this
section, Benjamin’s dissertation will be read in constellation with his 1919-22 essay on
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Goethe’s Elective Affinities, a text which marks an application and immanent critique of
the notions elaborated in the “Concept of Criticism” (Caygill, 46; McCole, 117; Ferris,
“Truth,” 455-6).
Benjamin’s gravitation towards Romanticism did not stem from some irrational
rejection of reason, nor from the avowal of some vitalist cult of genius. Instead, Benjamin
sought to redeem a “radical mystical formalism” from the writings of the Early
Romantics, along with a model of “immanent critique,” which he would re-fashion and
employ throughout his own oeuvre (SW 1: 123; McCole, 82).196 That is, Benjamin reads
Romanticism philosophically: as a movement which continued to work through the
implications of Kant’s critical turn. As such, Benjamin’s dissertation should be termed a
“Romantic meta-critique”—to refashion Beiser’s term (Reason, 4-9)— whereby
“critique” as understood by Kant and the Frühromantiker is brought to bear upon itself in
an immanent, supplementary, and self-reflective analysis of its own suppositions.197
At the outset of his dissertation, Benjamin distinguishes his own formaltranscendental attempt to grasp the “problem-historical context” of the Early Romantics

McCole describes the fundamental nature of Benjamin’s encounter with the Frühromantiker:
“Benjamin’s recovery and critique of early romanticism set the coordinates for all his subsequent work. In a
sense, his identification was so complete that he can be said to have refought the early romantics battles,
working immanently” (82). In this way McCole sees Benjamin as engaging with the antinomies of
Romanticism throughout his oeuvre, specifically in his discussions of Modernity and the avant-garde (in
relation to Surrealism and Proust). However, McCole has a somewhat limited conception of
Romanticism—as a mere collection of thinkers known as the Frühromantiker—and not as a broader
intellectual milieu encompassing the philosophical positions of Idealism. In this manner, one can employ
McCole’s remarks, provided Romanticism be understood in a broader, more philosophical manner (Rajan,
“Introduction,” 14). Hansen has further stressed the extent to Benjamin’s romantic framework remains
“transcendental” (2).
197
Beiser defines “meta-critique” as the unifying sentiment of “post-Kantian” philosophy (roughly between
1781-93, or the decade following the publication of Kant’s CPR) an ethos which sets the stage for the
emergence of both German Idealism and Romanticism (Reason, 1-15). Beiser employs the term to describe
the “fate of reason” in the post-Kantian paradigm, in which post-Kantian thinkers understood “the duty of
reason to criticize all our beliefs, then, ipso facto it must criticize [Reason] itself.... Unless criticism is to
betray itself, it must become...meta-criticism, the critical examination of criticism itself.” (Reason, 6, see 715). Generally, “critique” is associated with Kant’s immanent formal critique of reason according to its
own terms, along with his separation of the transcendental and the empirical domains, which reduces
experience to its “possibility.” However, as I will argue in this section, the idea of critique (or philosophy
as criticism) remains important for Benjamin, the Frühromantiker, and the German Idealists, thinkers who
seek to speculatively invade Kantian notions of critique, opening it to a broader range of experiences and
possible objects. Supplementing Beiser, I define Benjamin’s philosophy as a “Romantic meta-critique,” in
which criticism is understood as immanent and creatively supplementary with respect to the object of
critique.
196
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from a mere exegesis or history of the literary movement (SW 1: 116; fn185). The latter
undertakings should be considered mere commentary, or an analysis of the “material
content,” providing a provisional surface reading of the Frühromantiker as an unbridled
mystical “cult of genius,” which degenerated into religiosity, only to be superseded by
the absolute Idealism of Schelling and Hegel. Against such caricatured views, Benjamin
commences with the critical assertion: “the Romantic determination of the concept of
criticism...stands completely on epistemological presuppositions” (SW 1: 116); that is,
there exists a formal-epistemological philosophy in the fragments of the Frühromantiker,
along with a methodological concept of criticism which Benjamin will refashion towards
his own concerns.198 As Caygill, Gasché, and McCole have noted, Benjamin
performatively develops his own model of immanent critique through analyses of the
Early Romantics and Goethe (34-35; “Sober,” 51-3; 85-86): a model of philosophy which
does not impose pre-formed categories upon its object, but rather, is immanently and
reciprocally shaped by the object of critique. However, scholarship generally sees
Benjamin as “parting ways” with Romanticism (Gasché, “Sober,” 53), which is
understood in a limited fashion, as more or less the Frühromantik period (1796-1806),
excluding a broader notion of Romanticism which would include the later RomanticIdealism of Schelling, Hegel, and Hölderlin.199 What is staged in Benjamin’s dissertation
is the genesis of “critique” from its negative and regulative function in Kant, to a more
positive and expansive position in the Frühromantiker and later Idealists. However,
Benjamin’s cast of Romantic-Idealism is much darker, or mortuary, centering on a
metaphysics of transience, and inhabiting a melancholic aesthetic akin to Schelling’s
“middle period,” which speaks of a similar “veil of dejection that is spread over all
nature” (FE, 63).

198

Benjamin further specifies the philosophical-epistemological aim of his research as an attempt to sketch
the “methodological grid for the thought of the Frühromantiker” (SW 1: 135). Despite the fragmentary and
discontinuous appearance of their writings, there exists a “spirit of the system” latent in the Frühromantiker
if grouped in constellation (SW 1: 136; Hansen & Benjamin, 3).
199
Hansen & Benjamin position Hölderlin, along with Goethe, as the “extremes” which define Benjamin’s
version of Romanticism (5-6). See further, Caygill (35, 49), Weber (11-19), Fenves (18-43), and Ferris
(Companion, 33-36).
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Benjamin felt an affinity with the Early Romantics for what he saw as a protomodern experimental culture of “the absolute,” one which sought to establish a new
encyclopedic “poetic culture” able to unify the diverse strivings of epistemology,
metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and politics (McCole, 86-7). McCole further underscores
the affinity of the Frühromantik program with a Nietzschean notion of Modernity: a
generation of thinkers which attempted to create new values, grounding novel models of
normativity in the force of their own assertions (85). This “modern” character of the
Early Romantics is echoed throughout Benjamin’s correspondence (BC, 136). Benjamin
was further drawn to the Frühromantiker because of their anti or para-university
commitments: their refusal to limit inquiry into “the absolute” to any one discipline or
institution (Lacoue-Labarthe, “Introduction,” 9-11). Instead, the Frühromantiker
undertook philosophy by way of their collaborative and interdisciplinary journal (The
Athenaeum), a practice paralleled in Benjamin’s own repeated attempts to found a journal
(Angelus Novus) that would be worthy of his interdisciplinary philosophy for the future
(BC, 186-200; Hansen & Benjamin, “Introduction,” 1-4). Throughout his
correspondence, Benjamin repeatedly laments that the “romantic core of romanticism”
could not be properly grasped due to the “entirely hopeless situation of the contemporary
university” (BC, 139-40, 135-6, 111). Such a conflictual relationship with the university
and its discourse animates all of Benjamin’s writing in this period (1921-8), culminating
in the rejection- withdrawal of his Habilitation, and his definitive “break” with the
university in 1928 (BC, 293-5).
Despite the anti-Kantian motivation of Benjamin’s dissertation, “The Concept of
Criticism” should not be seen as a wholesale break with Benjamin’s Kantian schema (as
presented in Ch. 3), but rather, an immanent critique of reason according to its own
terminology, or a “meta-critique” through which philosophy comes to encounter itself
reflexively. It is within such a reflexive space that Benjamin will forward his own
positive philosophy of criticism in which “the term critical meant objectively productive,
[something] creative out of thoughtful deliberation” (SW 1: 142). Caygill stresses the
continuity of Benjamin’s analyses of Romanticism with his early program for a “coming
philosophy,” theorizing both as a shared attempt to develop an expansive “speculative
philosophy of experience,” in which Benjamin’s dissertation probes “the challenge[s]
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posed to Kantian transcendental critique by the Romantic extension of the concept of
experience” (34, 40). Thus, though “experience” is not explicitly thematized in
Benjamin’s dissertation, it nonetheless remains an important moment throughout
Benjamin’s philosophy of criticism, surfacing in the critic’s speculative experience of the
work of art, and as will be argued in the next section, through the metaphysical
experience of nature. With such Romantic interventions upon the Kantian program,
Benjamin moves towards Schelling and Hegel’s “absolute Idealism,” which strove to
overcome the antinomies of Kantian-Fichtean “subjective Idealism,” by situating them
within a broader metaphysical fold, seeing rationality in a broader, unconditioned sense
(Beiser, Idealism, 350, 368, 370-1).
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe see Benjamin as “revolutionizing” the study of the
Frühromantiker via his positioning of Romanticism within the aporias opened by Kantian
thought, demonstrating the development of a reflexive critical discourse —in a manner
akin to philosophical Idealism—within such a space (46, 106, cf. 32-33). Such
revolutions notwithstanding, Gasché’s view is that although Benjamin provides a “correct
and fruitful view of the early romantic philosophical conceptions,” his argument is also
“thoroughly flawed, not only for philological, but [also] for discursive-argumentative
reasons as well” (“Sober,” 51). For W. Menninghaus, such errors are due to Benjamin’s
attempts to force the Frühromantiker to parrot his own intellectual concerns, specifically
his early philosophy of language (27-28). While there is little doubt that Benjamin’s
idiosyncratic readings of Goethe and the Early Romantics coerce these thinkers into the
orbit of his own philosophical program, such a shocking constellation of past and present
concerns— a “mak[ing] the continuum of history explode” (SW 4: 395)— is precisely
what Benjamin intends to provoke throughout his oeuvre. Put otherwise, it is far too easy
to chastise Benjamin for his unorthodox readings of past thinkers (as Gasché and
Menninghaus do); instead, one should understand these thinkers in constellation with
Benjamin’s own views, examining the extent to which he employs historical thinkers as
an experimental foil out of which to forward his own viewpoints.
Gasché (in “The Sober Absolute”) wants to lead Benjamin away from the early
romantics towards a “sober” model of criticism and the absolute, whereas I contend that
Benjamin remains deeply involved with a darkened vision of Romanticism, one centered
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on motifs of transience and allegory. With respect to the Frühromantiker, Gasché
considers how Benjamin’s analyses can be so intellectually illuminating, while being
“terminologically and conceptually wrong” (“Sober,” 51). For Gasché, this is due to
Benjamin’s spiritual grasp of the essential Frühromantik understanding of criticism as a
“poeticizing,” “romanticizing,” or “potentiating” gesture with respect to the object of
critique. Pushed further, Benjamin immanently (and speculatively) refashions the Early
Romantic concept of criticism, utilizing it in the elaboration of his own concerns, and
oftentimes enacting destructive violence upon the original texts. For Benjamin, criticism
is not simply the negative evaluation of a work, but rather, a positive unfolding of the text
by way of contemporary constellations, along with the work’s “natural historical...preand post-history” (OT, 24-26). Benjamin “romanticizes” the Frühromantiker, positioning
them within the broader unfolding that is the development of his own expanded concept
of critique. Benjamin remains within the Romantic fold of concerns, darkening the Early
Romantics in the creation of his own mortuary romantic philosophy. Benjamin employs a
Romantic hermeneutic with respect to the Frühromantiker, which can be thought in terms
of Schleiermacher’s “subjective-divinatory reading,” whereby the critic is continually
engaged in processes of hermeneutical supplementation, continually potentiating, or
absolutizing the text.200 The following section will explore the anti-humanist elements of
Benjamin’s understanding of criticism. As for Benjamin, both the author and critic are
subsumed by the natural history of the work of art, of which they are merely moments, or
differing potencies in the continuum of the work.
4.1.2 Benjamin’s Death of the Author: The Aesthetic Object (Against the Subject)
“No poem is intended for the reader, no picture for the beholder, no symphony for the audience.”
Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator,” SW 1: 253.

According to Rajan, Schleiermacher’s “proto-Hegelian concept of the [subjective divinatory reading] is
concerned with the text as part of an ongoing process that requires an imaginative leap on the part of the
reader to discern its direction...subjective-divinatory reading goes beyond the merely technical to consider
what has not yet found expression in the text, namely the process initiated but not completed in its writing”
(Supplement, 43). There are evident affinities between such a romantic hermeneutic and Benjamin’s
description of the “natural history” of works, wherein the work develops and is supplemented via its “preand post-history” (OT, 26-27).
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Benjamin’s “Program” sought to overcome the (neo) Kantian subject-object
distinction through the imposition of a sphere of “total neutrality between subject and
object,” and as I argued in the previous chapter, such a sphere was “language” (SW 1:
104). In Benjamin’s later philosophy of criticism, domains such as the aesthetic and the
corresponding practice of criticism come to occupy a similar position in allowing
philosophy to speculatively encounter a diversity of domains and experiences, while
moving thought beyond the epistemological atomism of subject-object dualism.201
Benjamin sees the Early Romantics as moving past the Kantian-Fichtean subject
centered epistemological conception of philosophy, towards a romantic philosophy of
“infinite reflection,” or “I-less... reflection” (Menninghaus, 50), in which reason is
encountered “objectively” as well as “subjectively.” Benjamin’s “subject-less” model of
reflection, along with his corresponding critical employment of the aesthetic domain,
should be seen in constellation with other absolute Idealist interventions upon the Kantian
program.202 In this section I will argue that Benjamin’s model of criticism violently
moves against the author, and subjective Idealist philosophy more generally, seeing
reason as manifesting in a broader absolute sense.
In his Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), Kant describes the limited
position of aesthetics within his critical project, repeating the common disregard of art in
vogue since the primal scene of the philosophy of art: Plato’s excision of the poets from
his ideal republic, or the casting out of art and aesthetics from meaningful philosophical
discussion (Bernstein, Fate, 1-4). Kant reduces art—in spite of its beautiful and sublime
moments—to a mere play, or “harmony,” of the faculties, whereby reason intervenes in
the case of the sublime, and in the case of the beautiful the imagination and
understanding enter into accord under the auspices of “common sense” (CPJ, 145-147,
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Describing the potential for a mutually supplementary dialogue between aesthetics and philosophy,
Benjamin writes: “critique seeks to discover siblings of the work of art. And all genuine works have their
siblings in the realm of philosophy.” (SW 1: 333). Such a meta-critical capacity for aesthetics is fleshed out
further in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (AT, 262).
202
Beiser notes that in the transition from a subjective to an absolute understanding of Idealism, the
aesthetic domain comes to play a pivotal role in expanding the limited purview of subjective Aufklärung
(Idealism, 372-4). Within absolute Idealism, art plays a mediatory and unifying role, such that it can be
considered a cipher to a broad constellation of domains: metaphysics, ethics and politics (Beiser, Idealism,
39-42). For Benjamin, the aesthetic is likewise employed to meta-critically open philosophy in a polyphony
of directions, while moving against the subjective Idealist philosophical subject.
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122-4). For Kant, the aesthetic object essentially “drops out,” having little meaningful
autonomy independent of its relation to the judgments of a spectating subject.
Despite such a repression of art, the secondary aim of Kant’s CPJ—the
construction of a model of “teleological judgment” (Zamitto, Judgment, 5-7)–opens the
door to the post-Kantian aesthetic invasions of philosophy performed by Schiller,
Hölderlin, the Schlegels, Novalis, Schelling, and Hegel. These thinkers play upon the
“organic” affinity between art and nature discussed, though prohibited, by Kant (CPJ,
221-30, 242-46). Art, following nature, becomes a means through which to unify diverse
domains within an organic continuum, and above all attains an autonomous, revelatory,
and speculative function within the philosophical system. The danger posed by the
autonomous-accidental position of art will be explored in the final chapter of this project
dealing with Hegel.
For the Frühromantiker, criticism was not a mere evaluative judgment of the
work of art, as it was for Kant, but instead, a positive, experimental, and supplementary
gesture, through which the individual work of art is “romanticized” or “poeticized”:
located within the broader sequence of “forms of art” in a progression towards the poetic
absolute (SW 1:154-5, 156). Criticism unfolds the immanent potential latent within every
work by seeing it in relation to the broader historical working out of “art”: “Criticism...
discerns the traces of the infinite left in a particular reflection or work of art” (Caygill,
43).203 Criticism does not decode the work by way of authorial intention, or some other
nexus of meaning, but rather, the specific work is located historically, as participating in
the universal progression of art. In a similar manner, Benjamin sees particular acts of
translation as discerning the traces of “language as such” from within particular
expressions (SW 1: 261). For Benjamin and the Frühromantiker, the aesthetic becomes a
similar space of “meta-critique” that allows them to work through and move beyond
Kantian subjective Idealism.

Caygill sees Benjamin as sketching a middle ground, or Kantian “critical path,” between “the normative
rules of neo-classicism and the unruly subjective genius of the Sturm und Drang analogous to that of
Kantian critique between dogmatism and skepticism” (41). Gasché sees the Frühromantiker (and
Benjamin) as breaking with a “dogmatic rationalism of aesthetics”: mediating between the idolization of
subjective genius in the Sturm and Drang and the lack of agency accorded to the aesthetic object in Kant
(“Sober,”53).
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Benjamin highlights Novalis’ remark, “the true reader must be the extended
author”: the critic, via interpretation, participates in “completing the work,” entering it
into the broader aesthetic absolute (SW 1: 152-3). Caygill (45-60) continually highlights
this “speculative” and supplementary dimension of Benjamin’s concept of criticism: in
viewing the work of art as essentially incomplete in relation to the absolute progression
of forms—as a “torso” in the Hölderlinian sense (SW 1: 340-1)—critique supplements the
work by way of “pre and post-history” (OT, 24-26).204 In this way, “absolutizing” the
work contains a destructive moment in which the critic violently wrests the work from its
contemporary context, (re)positioning it within speculative constellations. Accentuating
this violence of critique, Caygill writes: “critique disturbs the identity of the work by
opening it to future possibilities” (45, cf. 60).
As will be elaborated in the next section, Benjamin positions the Early Romantics
as breaking with the “subjective Idealism” of Fichte (and Kant), with his argument that,
for the Frühromantiker, “the midpoint of reflection is art, not the ‘I’” (SW 1: 134). The
self-conscious “thinking of thinking of thinking” (SW 1: 129) –or the reflection of
consciousness upon itself through “positing” first inaugurated by Fichte—does not occur
through the spontaneous freedom of the subject (“the I”), but rather, through the medium
of art and aesthetic criticism. As Benjamin continues, “The Frühromantik intuition of art
rests on this: that in the thinking of thinking no consciousness of the “I” is understood.
Reflection without the ‘I’ is a reflection in the absolute of art” (SW 1: 134, cf. 135).
Following the principles of “absolute Idealism,” the objectivity of the work becomes
“axiomatic” for Benjamin (Caygill, 41): the transcendental subject is dethroned from its
privileged epistemic position, becoming one center of reflection among many.
Illustrative of Benjamin’s “subject-less” philosophy of reflection are his comments
on the “death of the author”—or the use and misuse of the author function—in his essay

Schleiermacher, who consolidated many insights from the Frühromantiker in his own “romantic
hermeneutic,” describes the hermeneutic process as a similar process of supplementation. Elaborating his
“divinatory” model of reading (in relation to mere “historical” reading), Rajan writes: “The historical
method examines the text as a finished product, whereas the divinatory method grasps it as a moment in a
process and considers how a discourse that is produced by a certain line of thought in turn reacts upon those
thoughts, so as to require a reader who will understand ‘better than its creator’ the potential within it...”
(Supplement, 41, see further, 38, 43, 81-98, 69-72).
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on Goethe’s Elective Affinities. In part two of the essay, Benjamin polemicizes against his
contemporaries in the Stefan George circle, in particular Gundolf, who mythologized
Goethe’s life as a means to explain his works (SW 1: 322-323; 313, 318-9).205 Benjamin
condemns, the “Thoughtless dogma of the Goethe cult,” which committed the “proton
pseudos” [First Falsehood] of criticism: seeking to gain an understanding of the work of
art by understanding the subjective conditions of its production (SW 1: 324). Against
such vulgar “Erlebnis philosophy,” Benjamin emphatically asserts, “Works, like deeds,
are non-derivable” (SW 1: 321). For Benjamin, the production of the work takes place in
a Blanchotian “space of literature”: in which (in Blanchot’s terms) one surrenders
subjective agency to the “demand of the work,” which has a dynamism and drive of its
own (49-59, 211-4). Benjamin describes artistic creation in similarly anti-subjectivist
terms: “For the great work does not take shape in ordinary existence” (SW 1: 321).
Further, Benjamin accords a “natural history” to the works themselves: “the artist is less
the primal ground or creator than the origin or form giver, and certainly his work is not at
any price his creature but rather, his form. To be sure, the form, too, and not only the
creature has life” (SW 1: 323-4). These remarks show the extent to which Benjamin
accords agency to “the object” (or work) over and against the subject, as his philosophy
dispenses with the epistemic subject as a site of constitutive stability. Benjamin affirms
his own Early Romantic leanings: criticism is not an attempt to decode or evaluate the
work in any sense—by way of its author, history, material-social context–but rather,
critique is a gesture of supplementation that completes and unfolds the work further.
Schlegel considered his “Übermeister” criticism of Goethes’ Wilhelm Meister’s
Lehrjahren the culmination or completion of the work, not a decoding, or “laying out” of
the work by means of some variable. Likewise, for Benjamin, criticism is not a secondary

Despite this, Benjamin does allow for the selective application of “life-content” in the analysis of works,
though such biographical considerations have no place within the hallowed practices of commentary and
critique (SW 1: 321-3; 325; 321). In fact, Benjamin’s own marital disintegration was mirrored in Goethe’s
novel, with the role of Otillie being played by Jula Cohen, to whom Benjamin’s essay is dedicated. See
Eiland & Jennings, A Critical Life, 141-48. Though Benjamin himself advocated a selective employment of
the authorial function vis-à-vis the text, he repeatedly chastised those, such as Max Brod with respect to
Kafka (SW 2: 794-820; SW: 3: 317-321), or Gundolf with respect to Goethe (SW 1: 97-99; 297-360), who
uncritically revered such authors by way of an auratic concept of genius.
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activity, but is on par with creation itself (contra M. Arnold).206 As is for Adorno, for
Benjamin, all great works are “late-works” in which the medium of art transcends the
subject and their agency. Such interventions in aesthetics and the related practice of
criticism demonstrate Benjamin’s larger movement away from subjective Idealism—or
the model of philosophy as epistemology practiced by Kant and Fichte —and into the
“force-field” of Romantic-Idealist meta-critique.

4.1.3 Kant, Fichte, Romanticism, and Goethe: The Genesis of Critique
“Kant introduced the concept of the negative into philosophy. Wouldn’t it be worthwhile trying now to
introduce the concept of the positive into philosophy as well?” Athenaeum Fragments, #3.

Benjamin’s dissertation, along with his corresponding essay on Goethe, contain
sustained reflections on the question of “critique” (along with the practice of criticism):
on its limits, aims, and purpose within the philosophical tradition (SW 1: 142-3; 117).
However, Benjamin does not simply posit some static critical method which he then
applies to texts and objects, but rather, performatively works out such a model through
textual encounters, engaging in an immanent “meta-critique”—or “critique of critique”—
through which reason is able to reflect upon itself (Caygill , 50).207 What is charted in
this constellation of Benjamin’s texts is the movement of critique from its merely
negative or evaluative-regulative sense (in Kant), towards a more positive, creative, and

Arnold (in “The Function of Criticism”), distinguishes between epochs of “creativity” (or “epochs of
expansion,” 4-9) and eras of “criticism” (or “epochs of concentration, ”14), the latter of which are
supposedly of a lower rank than the former (4, 5-6). Though criticism still plays an important sober
(“disinterested,” 18) social function in educating the public with regard to creative acts (of poetry), it does
not live up to the high standards of the creative work (40-1). Benjamin deconstructs such a distinction by
seeing criticism as equally important and supplementary with respect to the original work. Benjamin
likewise overcomes such a distinction between epochs of “decay” and “renaissance [or ‘decadence’]” (OT,
18; cf. Arcades, 458).
207
Describing the immanent genesis of Benjamin’s concept of critique, Caygill writes: “Benjamin’s
critique of German Romanticism exemplifies his finite, transformative concept of critique. It does not begin
with a philosophically secured concept of truth and value which is then applied to an object in critical
judgment, but rather philosophy itself is risked in the critical encounter.” (50). Caygill further describes
Benjamin’s movement beyond the narrow confines of Kantian epistemology in a manner akin to Hegel:
“The object of critique reflects the limitations of the given doctrine of criticism back upon the critic who
then approaches the object anew. In this way Benjamin repeats the Hegelian critique of the finite character
of Kantian critique—its narrow notion of experience that banished the absolute from thought—but without
the collateral of a progressive philosophy of history. The absolute is folded into experience in complex and
often inconspicuous ways, which it becomes the task of critique not at the outset to judge, but first to
delineate and map” (50).
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expansive understanding of critique in the Frühromantiker, Goethe, and German
Idealism. Benjamin’s own intellectual “Bildung” rehearses the Romantic-Idealist
intervention upon the subjective Idealism of Kant and Fichte. Against the Kantian
reduction of philosophy to a mere subjective Idealism, Benjamin opens epistemological
problematics by way of the metaphysical domain in order to think philosophy in an
expanded absolute sense.
In the CPR, Kant defines critique in a “negative” manner: as the reflexive
examination of the limits and scope of reason according to its own standards (CPR, 114).
Describing this (limited) Kantian conception of critique, McCole writes, “criticism [for
Kant] meant objective reflection on the universal characteristic of the cognizing subject,
not license to pass arbitrary judgments from an unexamined standpoint” (85, cf. 86-7).
For Benjamin, though Kant’s work offered a “Map through the bare woods of reality”
(SW 1: 298), by providing thought with a transcendental framework through which to
view the world, such a limited epistemological framework led Kant to reduce the
polyphony of experience to the schematization of the twelve categories (SW 1: 100-10).
In the context of his dissertation, Benjamin articulates similar qualms with the
Kantian program, though they are couched by way of Fichte: a thinker who saw himself
perfecting the subjective Idealist program inaugurated by Kant, “in spirit” and not in
“letter” (Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre, 2-6; Beiser, Idealism, 260). Fichte’s thought
commences with a radical interrogation of the “categorical antinomy” first presented by
Kant in his “third antinomy” (CPR, 484-489). Here Kant questions how freedom (or
“spontaneity”), which grounds the whole sphere of practical ethical reason, can exist
alongside the deterministic realm of causal laws that is nature. Fichte probes the proper
relationship between the epistemic-ethical subject and the determinism of nature. In a
Rousseauesque spirit which was echoed by the events of the French Revolution, Fichte
contends that philosophy must side with the freedom of “the act” over and against the
determinism of “the fact” (Wissenschaftslehre, 51). One who commences philosophy is
immediately confronted with the intractable dilemma between “dogmatism” (or
pantheistic naturalism: “necessity”), and “Idealism” (or the freedom of the intellect), a
dilemma which Fichte stages in ethical terms: “the kind of philosophy one chooses thus
depends on the kind of person one is” (Wissenschaftslehre, 20, cf. 25, 43). To preserve
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freedom—and practical reason—philosophy must begin with the “intellectual intuition”
of the absolute subject, which “posits” itself reflectively in the continual movement of
consciousness (Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre, 46, 40-1). Such a dialectic of consciousness,
between the “I” and “not-I,” progresses ad infinitum, with Fichte granting the “selfpositing ego” absolute status in a regulative (contra constitutive) sense (Fichte,
Wissenschaftslehre, 40-1, 101; Beiser, Idealism, 217-8).
Benjamin argues that such Fichtean “self-reflection” is the most frequent “type”
of thought for the Frühromantiker, and as such, Fichte’s writings serve as “indispensable
sources” for the “comprehension” of the Frühromantik conception of criticism (SW 1:
121). Such a model of criticism strives, through self-reflection, to reflect on the
movement of thought itself: “to understand understanding” [Das Verstehen zu verstehen]
(GS I: 18).208 The Frühromantiker were particularly drawn to Fichte’s notion of
“intellectual intuition,” in which the subject projects an immediate non-discursive
knowledge of itself as “absolute subject” (Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre, 46). According to
Fichte, there exists a reciprocal relationship between “reflective thinking and immediate
cognition” (SW 1: 121), through which the subject comes to understand its “absolute”
status: recognizing the fundamental role played by consciousness in the constitution of all
experience.
However, Benjamin notes that an understanding of the Frühromantik proximity to
Fichte is efficacious only in order to see the “philosophical and epistemological motives
by which they part with him” (SW 1: 122, 119). That is, the Frühromantiker stand on the
threshold between the “subjective Idealism” of Kant and Fichte and the “objective” or
“absolute” Idealism thematized by Schelling and Hegel. The Early Romantics commence
with the Fichtean movement of consciousness—in which “the I” comes to comprehend
itself through the unconscious act of self-positing and subsequent reflection—which they
then speculatively unbind, creating an “infinitude of reflection.” Though such a

Benjamin describes the Romantic meta-critical “radical mystical formalism” (SW 1: 123), as follows: “It
is a question not of the cognition of an object through intuition, but of the self-cognition of a method, of
something formal—and the absolute subject represents nothing other than this” (SW 1: 122). Elaborating
this centrality of self-consciousness to Frühromantik epistemology, Benjamin writes: “Thinking that
reflects on itself in self-consciousness is the basic fact from which Schlegel’s and, in large part, Novalis’
epistemological considerations take their start” (SW 1: 120).
208
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movement of positing and reflection could progress to infinity, ultimately Fichte brought
reflection back to the finite subject so as to preserve the possibility of ethics (SW 1: 125);
whereas the Frühromantiker refused such closure, seeking to open thought to an
“infinitude of reflection” (SW 1: 119). With their radicalization of the Fichtean position,
the Early Romantics move thought beyond the constitutive epistemic subject, considering
reason in an absolute manner.
Instead of locating reflection in the subject (or Fichtean “I”), the Frühromantiker
understood reality as a vital force, an “infinitude of reflection,” in which “everything in it
is to hang together in an infinite many ways” (SW 1: 126, 119). As Benjamin continues,
“For Fichte, consciousness is the ‘I’ for the Romantics, it is the self” (SW 1: 128). This
“self” should be understood as a site in which “‘reflection expands without limit or
check... and [reflective thinking] turns into formless thinking which directs itself upon the
Absolute” (SW 1: 129 ).209 Though the Romantics began with the subject, they expanded
and potentiated it towards the absolute: “The romantics start from mere thinkingoneself... this is proper to everything, for everything is a self” (SW 1: 128). According to
Benjamin, Novalis positions Romantic thought as a “Fichteanism without check,” in
which all of reality is seen as an infinite continuum of self-reflective “I-ness” (SW 1:
132). Following the Fichtean formal model of reflection—the “thinking of thinking”—in
which thought takes itself as an object, the Romantics introduce a “third level of
reflection” of thought thinking its own movement: “the thinking of thinking of thinking,”
which dissolved the Fichtean model into the broader fold of the absolute, such that
thinking the world and one’s intuition of oneself become reciprocal concepts (SW 1: 129,
132). To “Romanticize,” for Benjamin (in a manner akin to Novalis), entails the
“qualitative potentiation” of thought, a movement beyond the subject, recognizing the
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Further, describing the Frühromantik movement beyond the subjective Idealism of Fichte— specifically
his dialectic of positing and reflection— Benjamin writes, “As Fichte located the whole of the real in acts
of positing though only by virtue of a telos that he introduced into these—so Schlegel saw, immediately
and without holding this in need of a proof, the whole of the real unfolding in its full content, with
increasing distinctness up to the highest clarity of the absolute, in the stages of reflection” (SW 1: 130).
That is, the Frühromantiker move beyond Fichte’s conditioning of reflection by way of the philosophical
subject, undertaking reflection without limit or check.
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diversity of moments, or “selves,” present in the larger continuum of the absolute (SW
1:133).
Benjamin and the Frühromantiker deconstruct and refashion critique “against
epistemology,” to employ Adorno’s phrase (Against, 1-8). That is, Benjamin’s
philosophy as criticism commences by rejecting the subjective Idealist diminution of
philosophy to epistemology, instead undertaking a broader “meta-critique” which charts
the “thinking of thinking of thinking,” or the immanent reflection of reason upon itself so
as to determine its limits and proper employment. Gasché (in “The Sober Absolute”)
argues that although Benjamin shares many Early Romantic convictions regarding the
practice of criticism, he is also extremely critical of the transcendent and mysticalreligious sentiments into which the movement lapsed (62-4).210 According to Gasché,
Benjamin attempts a critical rapprochement with the movement, forwarding his own
“sober” understanding of the absolute, one which is associated with “nature, fate, myth,
[and] more generally the profane” (“Sober,” 57). However, as will be argued in the next
section, Gasché’s sober “prosaic” gloss fails to grasp the transient metaphysics grounding
Benjamin’s mortuary model of Romantic criticism. This constellation of themes—
“nature, fate, myth...the profane” —should instead be collected under the general heading
of “transience” [Vergänglichkeit], anticipating the discussions of “allegory” and “natural
history” in Benjamin’s Trauerspiel. Benjamin asserts the primacy of destruction and
change against the religiosity of the Romantic symbol, moving Frühromantik criticism
towards his mortuary vision of Romanticism.

Benjamin criticizes the Frühromantiker for conflating “the abstract and the universal” (SW 1: 166–7;
Gasché, “Sober,” 62): postulating a mystical thesis regarding the absolute as a work of art, and further
believing that such an absolute could be grasped through mere intuition (without the labour of the concept).
Put otherwise, the Frühromantiker too hastily collapsed the Kantian distinction between “concept and
intuition” (Hansen & Benjamin, 3). For Benjamin, despite their Kantian proclivities, the Frühromantiker
remained marred by irrational mythology, and their later religious conversions only served to confirm this.
Benjamin further sought to amend such a mystical theory by way of Goethe in the work’s unpublished
afterward (SW 1: 178- 185). As Gasché writes, the Frühromantiker “infringed upon the rule that [forbade]
mixing genres of thought”; thus, for Benjamin, “Romantic art criticism is anything but critical; it fails to
distinguish and set apart as trenchantly and vigorously as the concept of criticism calls for” (“Sober,” 62,
64). For Gasché, the Frühromantik affirmative understanding of the absolute “entails a loss of the force of
transcendence and the relativization of difference (“Sober,” 63); that is, despite the romantic attempt for
formalize criticism as a practice, they ended up succumbing to the same mythological dogma they set out to
resist.
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Benjamin’s understanding of the absolute should be considered “profane,” in the
sense that criticism strives after “profane illumination” (SW 2: 209), that is, the
speculative illumination of critical capacities latent within the work, which if constellated
correctly allow the object of critique to shine forth anew.211 Caygill glosses Benjamin as
a thinker of the “folded” or “discontinuous absolute,” one who searched for the traces of
transcendence folded within the secular and profane realm (50). Benjamin’s ruined
Arcades Project, with its descriptions of Paris, fashion, toys, “interiority,” and advertising
can be seen as “romantic encyclopedia” (to follow Novalis): an attempt to “absolutize”
the historical experience of the 19th century by way of allegorical immersion in particular
objects.212
Benjamin’s critical supplementation of the Early Romantic concept of criticism is
expressed by his distinction between “truth and material content” in his essay on
Goethe’s Wahlverwandtschaften (1921). 213 “Material content” as the factual content of
the work is aimed at by provisional “commentary,” whereas “truth-content” is arrived at
by way of an analysis of form which is “romanticized” by way of critique in relation to a

For Benjamin, “The absolute becomes de-sacralized, de-divinized by refection...soberly rational and
down to earth” (Gasché, “Sober,” 65). Benjamin’s understanding of criticism aims at the “prosaic core” of
every work: the transparent, colourless, quality of the work as illuminated through the sober light of
critique (McCole, 105, 151; Gasché, “Sober,” 65). For Gasché, the great moments of the Frühromantiker
lie in their “total relinquishing of transcendence” (“Sober,” 67), in their glorification of the immanent sober
truth of every work, over and against theological transcendence. I wish to push against such a “sober”
understanding of Benjamin’s model of criticism, seeing him as an allegorical—though nonetheless
speculative—Romantic thinker.
212
Benjamin’s Arcades can be seen as a (ruined-unfinished) Romantic encyclopedia, one which sought to
organize speculative and interdisciplinary insights via a potentiation of the various objects or spheres from
nineteenth- century Paris, all in an attempt to provoke a “historical experience” in its readers (see the two
“Exposes” of the project [1935/39], Arcades, 4-24). For a description of Novalis’ project see Wood,
“Introduction” (ix-xxx) in Novalis: Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia. Novalis attempted to romanticize
particular moments in relation to the absolute, whereas Benjamin attempted to arrange various fragments so
as to provoke the historical experience of the nineteenth century.
213
In his essay “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” Benjamin proposes a distinction between “commentary” and
“criticism,” the former aiming at the material content of the work (“the way of meaning”), while the latter
aims at the “truth content”: the relation of these material elements to history and tradition. Describing this,
Benjamin writes: “Whereas for the former [commentary], wood and ash remain the sole objects of his
analysis, for the latter only the flame itself preserves an enigma: that of what is alive. Thus, the critic
inquires into the truth, whose living flame continues to burn over the heavy logs of what is past and the
light ashes of what has been experienced” (SW 1: 298). Describing the “risk” of criticism, given its
proximity to the original text (and its dependence on it), Missac writes: “Commentary, aspiring to a status
close to, and perhaps rivaling, that of the original, depends on the original for its confirmation, or rather, as
I have said, collaborates with it in an enterprise that is presumed to be mutually profitable but that is
dangerous as well, since it jeopardizes the autonomy of both partners” (17).
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poetic absolute (SW 1: 314).214 Benjamin stresses that criticism is not some gesture of
unmasking or decoding “the veil” of the text: “the task of art criticism is not to lift the
veil but rather, through the most precise knowledge of it as a veil, to raise itself for the
first time to the true view of the beautiful” (SW 1: 351). Benjamin formulates “Beauty” as
“the object in its veil” (SW 1: 351), seeing it as bound up intimately with a transient
notion of “semblance (Schein)” (SW 1: 350). These discussions anticipate Benjamin’s
later analysis of Plato’s Symposium, whereby he allegorizes the fleeting nature of critical
truth by way of the transient ephemerality of beauty (OT, 5-8). Within the context of his
Goethe essay, Benjamin allegorizes Ottilie’s beauty as a figure of the fleeting
unapproachability of the text’s “truth-content.” Pushed further, in the mythical-naturalist
environment of Goethe’s novel, Ottilie’s innocent beauty leads to the fateful downfall of
all involved: nature and mythology triumph at the expense of morality and the stability of
truth.
This dark, semblance-like element of beauty highlights the destructive character
of criticism for Benjamin, along with the intimate connection between natural history and
truth content. Describing Benjamin’s destructive optic, Kracauer writes: “the truth
content of a work reveals itself only in its collapse ... the work’s claim to totality, its
systematic structure, as well as its superficial intentions share the fate of everything
transient; but as they pass away with time the work brings characteristics and
configurations to the fore that are actually images of truth” (Kracauer, xv; cf. Adorno,
AT, 195). Criticism, for Benjamin, is fundamentally destructive with respect to the object
of criticism. Benjamin continually affirms the mortuary “destructive character” of
criticism, which enacts a “flaming up” of “the veil” that is the exterior of the work (OT,
7; SW 1: 298), and can only be enacted by recognizing the proviso that “only he who can
destroy can criticize” (SW1: 460). As Benjamin writes in his avant-garde program, “The

Further, describing the respective tasks of commentary and critique, Benjamin writes: “Critique seeks
the truth content of the work of art; commentary its material content. The relation between the two is
determined by the basic law of literature according to which the more significant the work, the more
inconspicuously and intimately its truth content is bound up with its material content” (SW 1: 297). And
further, “For critique ultimately shows in the work of art the virtual possibility of formulating the work’s
truth content as the highest possible problem.” (SW 1: 334). Adorno further fleshes out the implications of
such a distinction. See “Enigmaticalness, Truth-Content, Metaphysics” (AT, 118-136).
214
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Destructive Character” (1931), “the destructive character knows only one watchword:
make room. And only one activity: clearing away...For destroying rejuvenates, because it
clears away the traces of our own age” (SW 2: 541).215 By engaging with such epistemocritical antinomies, Benjamin was led into the domain of Idealist-Romantic metaphysics.

4.2

Metaphysics (Or Benjamin’s Naturphilosophie)

“Philosophy...is nothing other than a natural history of our mind...we consider the system of our ideas, not
in its being, but its becoming...the system of nature is at the same time the system of our mind.” Schelling,
Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 30.

The Early Romantics (and Goethe) should not be seen as comprising a simple
literary movement— some offshoot of the anti-enlightenment Sturm und Drang—but
rather, should be understood as thinkers involved in the creation of a new “modern”
understanding of philosophy and its relation to society, politics, art, and nature (Beiser,
Romantic, ix-x, 1-5; Nancy & Lacoue-Labarthe, xv, 5). Beiser notes that many of the
“absolute Idealist” motifs attributed to Hegel—such as “identity in difference, subjectobject identity, Naturphilosophie”—should more accurately be seen as arising from the
broader “Romantic” milieu he inhabited (Romantic, 33; Hegel, 5-6, 13; Idealism, 508510). In this manner, “Romanticism” should be understood as the broader “intellectual
and artistic milieu” in which the meta-critical debates of post-Kantian Idealism were
staged, eviscerating any hard distinction between “Idealism” and “Romanticism” (Rajan,
“Introduction,” 14; “Encyclopedia, 353). The Idealist-Romantic “force-field” (Adorno,
Kant, 4), facilitated vibrant debates regarding the proper purview of philosophy,
questioning its relationship to proximal domains such as poetry, the natural sciences, art,
and aesthetics, while posing more fundamental questions relating to the status of
metaphysics following Kant’s critical interventions and his prolegomena for future
systems. Benjamin should be seen as a thinker who inhabits this meta-critical space

Describing the “destructive character” as a Nietzschean form of historical consciousness, or actively
nihilistic relationship to tradition, Benjamin writes: “The destructive character stands in the front line of
traditionalists. Some people pass things down to posterity, by making them untouchable and thus conserving
them; others pass on situations, by making them practicable and thus liquidating them. The latter are called
the destructive. The destructive character has the consciousness of historical man, whose deepest emotion is
an insuperable mistrust of the course of things and a readiness at all times to recognize that everything can
go wrong. Therefore, the destructive character is reliability itself” (SW 2: 542).
215
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opened by the Romantic encounter with philosophy; as such, one can approach his texts
hieroglyphically as the presentation of his own metaphysical-philosophical program.
In the previous section, Benjamin’s affinity with the Frühromantik “subject-less”
model of reflection was described: such a framework allowed both Benjamin and the
early Romantics to move beyond the limits of Kantian epistemology and the subjective
Idealist starting point for philosophy. This section will further explore Benjamin’s
emergent metaphysical commitments, specifically his proto-Schellingian
Naturphilosophie, by situating Benjamin within debates regarding the status of
metaphysics in the post-Kantian paradigm. The emergent life sciences in the RomanticIdealist period ushered in new “organic” understandings of nature, along with naturalistic
models of philosophical grounding, both of which sought to return philosophy to (neo)
Platonic metaphysical conceptions of science (4.2.1). These debates regarding the status
of metaphysics after Kant actively engaged the Frühromantiker, Goethe, Fichte,
Hölderlin, Hegel and Schelling, and in criticizing such thinkers, Benjamin enters the
“force-field” of their concerns. This section also marks the appearance of Schelling, a
thinker with whom Benjamin has a warranted speculative affinity, given that both
thinkers grant a constitutive metaphysical role to “nature” in their movement beyond
subjective Idealism (4.2.2).

4.2.1 Beyond Kant and Subjective Idealism: The Genesis of Naturphilosophie
“I can think of no more pitiful workday occupation than such an application of abstract principles to an
already existing empirical science. My object, rather, is first to allow natural science itself to arise
philosophically, and my philosophy is itself nothing else than natural science.” Schelling, Ideas for a
Philosophy of Nature, 5.

Kant’s “Copernican revolution” attempted to abolish ungrounded metaphysical
conjecture, allowing speculative questions pertaining to “pure reason”—the postulates of
“the Ideas” of God, Freedom, and Immortality (CPR, 407)— “problematic” or
“regulative” status: they are permitted as necessary fictions in order to ground the causal
regress of Kantian consciousness (CPR, 409). For Kant, metaphysics, as the creation of
“synthetic a priori judgments,” can be pursued only negatively provided it remain within
the intuitions and concepts of experience, and it is ordered towards the goal of grounding
the causal nexus of the understanding, thus securing the possibility of morality. Despite
Kant’s bureaucratic prohibitions and his rigid academic “division of labour” (Conflict,
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23), Iain Hamilton Grant underscores the importance of the Kantian “territory” for
subsequent thinkers: “‘Kant’ remains the name of an upheaval in modern philosophy, a
seismic shift so intense as to shift the terrain on which philosophy is conducted” (59).
Notwithstanding the ambiguous discussions of “organicism” and “natural teleology” in
sections 64-6 and 75-9 of the CPJ (242-49, 268-284), in the critical program Kant
essentially abandoned the study of nature to the Netwonian mechanistic-causal paradigm.
For Kant, nature could not be known in any metaphysical or ontological sense, and
speculation should be restricted to the discrete categories of the subject. Fichte went
further than Kant, wholly excising nature as a meaningful site from philosophy. For
Fichte, Kant’s true aim lay in the redemption of the domain of ethics via practical reason,
and as such, nature becomes a mere background upon which human freedom is
actualized. The major challenge to this subjective Idealist banishment of nature came in
the form of the emergent Naturphilosophie, a fundamental moment in the movement
towards “objective” absolute Idealism (Beiser, Hegel, 104-109; Idealism, 483-490).216
New movements in both the physical and life sciences (such as biology,
chemistry, galvanism) presented challenges to the Kantian-Netwonian paradigm,
questioning the extent to which nature could be conceptualized under the determinist
causal assumptions of the Newtonian world view, while provoking speculation as to the
need for more “naturalistic” theoretical assumptions. As Krell stresses, for Kant, the
question of “nature” remained a “tangle” against which he erected his architectonic as a
“desperately contrived bulwark against the dire forces of nature,” so as to preserve the
intelligible realm of “freedom” or practical reason (Contagion, 11).217 However,
particularly in the CPJ, where Kant had the more systematic ambition of unifying the
domains of “nature” and “freedom” through the subjective “faculty” of judgment,
questions of organicism and natural-teleology contaminate the architectonic unity of the

216

More will be said regarding this absolute Idealism in part 3 of this project dealing with Hegel and
Schelling.
217
Krell argues that post-Kantian thought can be seen as an opening of the Kantian architectonic to the
forces of “contingency, ambiguity, and nature,” all of which are denied by Kant’s capitulation to
architectonic unity in order to save morality: “[Kant] reverts willy-nilly to human reason, the regulative
idea, the noumenon, and the moral law, or to intention, final purpose, and the super-sensuous substrate, in
order to combat contingency” (Contagion, 11).
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critical program (CPJ, 3-14, 41-46). This ambiguity of nature—which Krell has termed a
“contagion” (Contagion, 2-3)—decenters the foundational Cartesian-Kantian epistemic
subject, opening it to a variety of natural-historical forces such that reason becomes
porous and other to itself. Schelling’s work, in addition to being the apex of
Naturphilosophie, undercuts the stability of Kantian thought by way of its own
disregarded phantasms, the most notable of which is organic nature. With such
encounters, Schelling allows for naturalist, though non-reductive models of philosophical
grounding to be explored.
The “fate of reason” after Kant’s critical project does not become a dogmatically
adhered to “highway” in which metaphysics and skepticism are abolished, but rather, the
deeply contested and ambiguous terrain of Idealism-Romanticism, which tested and
experimented with the terminology laid down by Kant (Beiser, Reason, 1-7; CPR, 704).
German Idealism should be seen as inhabiting this Kantian “territory” (Grant, 59),
working within the “force-field” (Adorno, Kant, 4) of its problematics: tarrying with
questions relating to the transcendental and other models of philosophical grounding,
along with the status of metaphysics after the Kantian critique. Likewise, Benjamin and
Adorno continue such a meta-critical working through of the Kantian program, though
from the perspective of their twentieth-century.

4.2.2 Schelling (Speculatively)
“Reality is inherently fragile...Therein resides Schelling’s fundamental motif: what we experience as
‘reality’ is constituted and maintains itself through a proper balance between two antagonistic forces, with
the ever-present danger that one of the two sides will ‘be cracked,’ run out of control and thus destroy the
‘impressions of reality.’ Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder, 24.

Benjamin’s understanding of nature as containing “infinite centers of reflection”
(SW 1: 119) has an evident affinity with Schelling’s Naturphilosophie (to 1801), which
sees the subject as a difference in degree, not of kind, from the productivity of nature, as
expressing the maximum “potency” of its self-reflection (FO, 33-34, 54). 218 In his early
writings on the philosophy of nature, Schelling attempted to systematize many elements

“Naturphilosophie” can be defined as an attempt to ground the absolute-Idealist “subject-object
identity...not in the self-consciousness of the ego [as Fichte and Kant], but in the single universal substance
[such as nature or organism]” (Beiser, Idealism, 506). Naturphilosophie endeavoured to “explain life and
the mind on a naturalistic yet non-mechanistic foundation” (Beiser, Idealism, 508).
218
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of his Romantic milieu, and according to Beiser, should be considered the “apex” of
absolute Idealism (Beiser, Idealism, 465-468). With his break from his earlier Fichtean
proclivities (around 1799-1802 [Beiser, Idealism 491-505]), Schelling definitively rejects
the “subjective Idealism”—or the foundational primacy of epistemology—that marked
the Kantian-Fichtean paradigm. Schelling usurps the constitutive epistemic subject from
its position of primacy, making the human one circle of reflection among many, the
highest reflective manifestation of the productivity that is nature.219 In a similar manner,
Benjamin’s “coming philosophy” sought to move away from the static mythology of
subjective enlightenment, considering modes of philosophical grounding beyond both
subject and object. Due to such affinities, Benjamin and Schelling can be placed in
speculative constellation with each other, regardless of the explicit presence or absence of
Schelling in Benjamin’s texts, or philological evidence that Benjamin “read” Schelling.
Both thinkers inhabit the same post-Kantian “force-field,” engaging in similar debates
regarding the continuing efficacy of the Kantian framework, along with meta-critical
debates which sought to theorize philosophy in an expanded manner.
Apropos of Schelling in relation to Benjamin’s dissertation, Menninghaus has
noted the “polemical absence” of Schelling “throughout, up to, and including the
bibliography” (37). Menninghaus speculates that despite such a textual absence,
Benjamin considers Schelling under erasure: given that much of the Romantic literature
Benjamin consulted for the project interpreted Schelling alongside Schlegel and Novalis,
along with the more general Schellingian tone of Benjamin’s anti-Fichteanism.220

219

It is a mistake to see Naturphilosophie as totally opposed to transcendental philosophy, or as abandoning
the subject totally in favour of some vitalist-irrationalism or materialism. Naturphilosophie still poses the
transcendental question as to how experience is possible, though it attempts to explain both nature, and
one’s experience of it, according to a single principle (Beiser, Idealism, 510-11). For Schelling, this entails
recognizing the transcendental subject as the “highest-potency” of nature, blurring the subjective-Idealist
distinction between the form and content of knowledge, and transgressing Kant’s proviso that one thinks
organicism in a merely “regulative” sense (See also, Grant, 65-8).
220
Menninghaus speculates that Benjamin was, “forgoing any explicit discussion of Schelling so as not to
compromise his exposition” (38). Despite this, Menninghaus notes that evident thematic affinities exist on
questions of “intellectual intuition,” and their general movement beyond “subjective Idealism.” Despite
such an affinity, Menninghaus questions the centrality Benjamin accords to the Fichtean influence upon the
Frühromantiker, along with his “simplistic” gloss of the problem of intuition and reflection: “Benjamin’s
‘deduction’ of the immediacy of reflection is too simplistic by far, and the level it works on—which is
unrepresentative of the extent of the problem’s consideration within Romantic philosophy—is more apt to
draw out contradictory conclusions” (23). However, for Menninghaus, despite his conceptual errors and
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Following Menninghaus’ analysis, I deem Schelling to be “worthy of consideration as
absence” (37) in relation to Benjamin, though in an unbounded and speculative sense,
given that both thinkers sought to move beyond the subjective Idealism of the Kantian
Fichtean paradigm. Thinking Benjamin in constellation with Schelling will allow the full
Idealist contours of Benjamin’s mortuary vision of Romanticism to emerge, a model in
which nature is considered as a transient “Ungrund” against which all thought must test
itself.
According to Schelling, the path beyond the Fichtean constitutive subject
necessitated viewing the subject as the “ideal” summit of natural forces (Schelling, FO,
xxvii, 33). Thus, “nature” should not be seen as “a separate inaccessible thing in
itself...because it is also at work in the subject, as that which moves the subject beyond
itself” (Bowie, 36). In Naturphilosophie the subject is deterritorialized as a privileged
philosophical locus, becoming one “center of reflection” amongst many: a “whirlpool” in
the broader stream that is the “productivity of nature” (SW 1: 119; FO, 18). For Grant,
Schelling can be seen as a thinker who elaborates a “materiality of ideation” (45): a
naturalistic understanding of philosophy not as some pure Idealist logical deduction, but
rather, as a “natural history of mind” (Schelling, Ideas, 30). Likewise, Benjamin troubles
the stability of thought with his search for a domain of “neutrality between subject and
object” (SW 1: 104), though for Benjamin such a domain becomes language thought in an
expressivist and mimetic manner. Alluding to such a mystical affinity between nature and
language, Benjamin will write: “Only nature cannot be unveiled, for it preserves a
mystery so long as God lets it exist. Truth is discovered in the essence of language”
(SW1: 353). As I have argued, language allegorically figures the ur-transience that is
nature by way of the historical progression or translation of “languages” into each other.

textual violence, Benjamin’s derivation of the essence of romanticism remained “largely valid” with some
minor incursions of “marginal violence” (51). For Menninghaus, such textual violence is better understood
if one sees Benjamin as employing the Frühromantiker as an occasion to work out his own philosophy of
language (28). More remains to be said regarding the relationship between Benjamin and Bloch, who has
been described by Habermas as a “Schellingian Marxist.” Given Benjamin’s intellectual dialogue with
Bloch around questions of utopia, one can see Benjamin as engaging with several Schellingian-Idealist
motifs, in relation to which he elaborates his own views (see SW 3: 305-6; BC, 146-8, 159-60, 246-7).
Benjamin also cites a photograph of Schelling in his “Little History of Photography” (SW 2:513).
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As has also been argued, within Benjamin’s work one can see the development of
a “tragic” or negative notion of the absolute, one associated with “nature, fate, myth,
[and] more generally the profane” (Gasché, “Sober,” 57). Such a mortuary metaphysic
emerges by way of a dialogue with the mythical and “telluric” moments Benjamin locates
within Goethe’s thought, and culminates in the melancholic transient conception of
nature figured in the Trauerspiel. With such a mortuary vision, Benjamin forms an
affinity with Schelling’s middle Freedom essay (1809), which describes “the veil of
dejection that is spread over all nature, the deep indestructible melancholy of all life”
(FE, 63). Echoing such sentiments, Žižek (in The Indivisible Remainder) positions
Schelling’s middle thought as perpetually “antagonistic”: depicting an ur-history of
transience, or “abyss of freedom,” pervaded by motifs of fragility, interruption, and nonidentity (Indivisible, 24, 28). Schelling’s work will be considered in more depth in
Chapter 5 of this project, though Schelling’s absolute Idealism provides a speculative site
through which to think Benjamin’s metaphysical commitments, and as such, much more
remains to be said regarding this connection.

4.2.3 Goethe: Nature and Mythology
“This study rests upon an ambiguity—sometimes naïve, sometimes doubtless more mediated—in the
concept of nature.” Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities” SW 1: 314.

Benjamin’s 1921-2 essay on Goethe’s 1809 Elective Affinities
[Wahlverwandtschaften] provides a speculative reading of Goethe’s late text, while also
serving as an occasion for the provisional fashioning of Benjamin’s immanent model of
criticism, which he continues to elaborate in dialogue with various textual objects
(Caygill, 46-7). One can further read the essay as allegorizing many of Benjamin’s latent
metaphysical suppositions, specifically the “ur-history” of a transitory mythological
image of natural history that will emerge more forcefully in his Trauerspiel study.221

Buck-Morss argues that Goethe’s notion of “ur-phänomen” plays a fundamental role in Benjamin’s own
formulation of “ur-history” (Dialectics, 71-2, 211, 217-9). For Goethe, ur-phenomenal archetypes represent
material instantiations of Platonic ideas which (re)emerge through the experimental-empirical study of
nature (see, Goethe, Plants, xvii xvii, 105n 23). Via Simmel, Buck-Morss speculates that such a notion
allowed Benjamin to synthesize the ideal and material domains (Dialectics, 72). In his Goethe essay,
Benjamin accords an important role to art and aesthetics in discovering such ur-phenomenal archetypes:
“only in the domain of art do the ur-phenomena—as ideals—present themselves adequately to perception,
221
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Benjamin reads Goethe’s novel as a metaphysical space in which “nature itself, in the
hands of human actors, grows superhumanly active” (SW 1: 303). The characters in the
novel, along with their respective marital relations decay under the sway of “elective
affinities”: that “particular harmony of the deeper natural strata” (SW 1: 304), forces
which are awakened upon the arrival of the mythically innocent Ottilie.222 Benjamin
highlights the “tellurian element” of Goethe’s work (SW 1: 303), echoing his own
writings on Bachofen (SW 1: 349), Kafka (SW 2: 794), and The Arcades, which describe
a modern world still in the grip of subterranean mythological forces, a realm of “fate”
governing human relations (SW 1: 308-9).223 In the novel, just as Eduard and Charlotte
are set to consummate their marriage—entering into the Kantian “Kingdom of ends” that
is ethical marriage –fate is visited upon them: “at the height of their cultivation, however,
they are subject to the forces that cultivation claims to have mastered, even if it may
forever prove impotent to cub them” (SW 1: 304). Benjamin sees Eduard and Charlotte as
“torn out of the path of marriage in order to find their essence under other laws” (SW 1:
348).
Benjamin’s juxtaposition of the Kantian ethical notion of marriage against that of
Goethe reveals his broader critique of the primacy of practical reason: Goethe’s text is
not a moral fable affirming the sanctity of marriage, but rather a grim tale of “natural
fate.” As Benjamin asserts, “It is a question here not of ethical guilt...but rather [guilt] of
the natural kind, which befalls human beings not by decision, but by negligence and
celebration” (SW 1: 308). In this way, Benjamin reads “the mythic” as the real “truth-

whereas in science they are replaced by the idea, which is capable of illuminating the object of perception
but never of transforming it in intuition. The ur-phenomena do not exist before art; they subsist within it”
(SW 1: 315). Analytically speaking, Goethe’s novel tells the story of the degeneration of Eduard and
Charlotte’s relationship, as each is drawn—chemically via elective affinities—to Ottilie and the Captain
respectively. The conflicts of the novel eventually lead to a tragic end with the death of the youthful Ottilie.
222
Situating Goethe’s text within the broader context of the “contagion” of philosophy, by which the
degenerative moments of nature are reckoned with philosophically, Krell writes, “Goethe’s later
Wahlverwandtschaften, composed in 1808-9, was to show that the chemistry of love could be deadly, that
even a landscaped nature was never truly domesticated, never truly deprived of its daimonic force, and that
human nature in particular resisted trimming and taming” (Contagion, 5). Resounding upon such
sentiments, Benjamin describes Goethe’s text as “a book in which nature has become alive, human, and
companionable” (SW 1: 314).
223
Benjamin positions Ottilie’s death as a mythical sacrifice to the telluric world of myth and fate: “it is the
sacrifice for the expiation of the guilty ones...atonement through the ‘death of the innocent’” (SW 1: 308-9).
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content” of Goethe’s text, beyond the mere surface “material-content” of the moralitymarriage play (SW 1: 309). Benjamin situates Goethe’s text in dialogue with his scientific
studies, specifically Goethe’s work on magnetism, his “Theory of Colours” and the
“Metamorphosis of Plants,” texts which illustrate the “ambivalence Goethe feels toward
nature” (SW 1: 315; Krell, Contagion, 3). Against the abstract Idealism of his
contemporary Schiller, Goethe upheld a mythological empiricism, a “tender empiricism
which becomes intimately identical with its object and thereby becomes actual theory”
(Maxims, 565), a model of thought which immerses itself in the ambiguity of nature and
the sensuous particularity of experience (Krell, Contagion, 5; Charles, 25-39). Benjamin
is drawn to this “daemonic character” of Goethe’s novel— “the incomprehensible
ambivalence of nature” (SW 1: 316)—that Benjamin critically excavates as the “truthcontent” of Elective Affinities.
Through Goethe’s text Benjamin allegorizes his own metaphysical suppositions,
depicting a world view in which the “word of reason” should be “reckoned to the credit
of nature” (SW 1: 315). “Myth”—or nature and its dynamic processes—must be regarded
as a necessary a priori for all philosophical reflection, anticipating the transient
metaphysics of Benjamin’s notion of “natural history.” Against Fichte, and the
transcendent religiosity of many Frühromantiker, Benjamin undercuts the spontaneity of
“freedom” by way of the fated necessity of mythology. The “free” actions of Goethe’s
characters only hasten their further destruction; however, virginal Ottilie’s alliance with
the necessity of her fate seemingly wins her a “semblance of reconciliation” (SW 1: 348).
With a “plant-like muteness,” Ottilie willingly goes to her death, refusing to speak, which
would make her death into a tragedy (SW 1: 336, 335-7). Instead, Ottilie’s wordless
alliance with fate makes Goethe’s text a belated Trauerspiel, shrouded in the “aura of
Hades” (SW 1: 339). The novel does not present a stage for the enlightenment realization
of freedom, but rather a grim parable in which the “dark transgression” of the characters
“demands its dark expiation” (SW 1: 343).
As Schelling argues in his despondent Freedom essay (1809), published in the
same year as Goethe’s novel, the Kantian antinomy between “freedom and necessity”
disappears within the broader absolute progression that is the productive genesis of nature
(4, 10-11, 50). Benjamin likewise posits a darker deterministic and natural force
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pervading all of life. In a characteristic negative theological reversal, Benjamin
allegorizes Ottilie’s death as a “semblematic” experience of reconciliation, “that most
paradoxical, most fleeting hope finally emerges from the semblance of reconciliation, just
as, at twilight, as the sun is extinguished, rises the evening star which outlasts the night”
(SW 1: 355, 354). Such a paradoxical fleeting image of hope, like a shooting star or
“firework” (Adorno, AT, 28, 81), is all that is granted as reprieve from such mythical
fates. Benjamin famously signs off his Goethe essay in Kafkaesque fashion: “only for the
sake of the hopeless ones have been given hope” (SW 1: 356). It is such a paradox— or
the antinomy between the productivity of nature and the transience of reconciliation—
that sets the stage for Benjamin’s discussion of Baroque Trauerspiel.

4.3

Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels: Mortuary Philosophy

“He was deep in work on The Origin of German Tragic Drama. When I learned from him that it had to do
with an analysis of the German Baroque tragedy from the seventeenth century, and that only a few
specialists know this literature—these tragedies were never played—I made a face. Why busy oneself with
dead literature?” Asja Lācis, Revolutionär im Beruf, 43-44 [Sic].

Benjamin’s Origin of the German Trauerspiel (Ursprung des deutschen
Trauerspiels, 1925/8) should be considered the “summa” of his early work, a moment of
“(non) synthesis,” or a reconciliation-in-difference, of the varying trajectories of his early
writings (Caygill, 51; Cristache, 31-8). Key moments of Benjamin’s philosophy of
language, along with his critical avant-garde program for an expanded philosophy of
experience (Caygill, 54), are brought together with theological, political, and historical
considerations to form the fraught constellation that is Benjamin’s (failed) Habilitation.
These tensions beneath the fragmentary “mosaic” (OT, 3) that is the finished text
overflow the restricted economy of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel, working themselves out
throughout the remainder of Benjamin’s oeuvre. In such a manner, independent of the
scholarly merit of Benjamin’s specific analysis of Baroque plays, Benjamin’s Trauerspiel
can be approached as an allegorical cipher to his metaphysical-critical commitments.
Against the grain of much of Benjamin scholarship—which focuses on the text’s
“Epistemo-Critical Prologue” at the expense of a critical consideration of the body of the
text—I will present Benjamin’s idiosyncratic understanding of Baroque allegory, along
with the entwined notion of “natural history,” as the fundamental metaphysical
suppositions of the work. Read in conjunction with the “theory of Ideas” in the work’s
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prologue, these concepts can be interpreted to reveal the metaphysics of transience
operative in Benjamin’s corpus. The contradiction between the shameless Platonic
Idealism of the work’s esoteric “Epistemo-Critical Prologue,” and the body of the text,
which describes the transience of all signification by way of allegory, has been repeatedly
emphasized in scholarship (McCole, 149-151; Hansen, 10-11, 24-5, 82-3). However,
Benjamin’s prologue should not be treated in isolation, but rather, should be seen as
arising out of the natural-historical metaphysics operative within the body of the text. In
such a manner, Benjamin’s Trauerspiel despite being “on” the Baroque, should be seen
in constellation with other Romantic texts such as those of Nietzsche (The Birth of
Tragedy, 1872), and Lukács (The Theory of the Novel, 1916), which continue to work
through Idealist metaphysics—elaborating “the ruin” of the Hegelian encyclopedia—by
way of the aesthetic dimension (Rajan, “Encyclopedia,” 341).224 These theorists employ
literary tropes or formal genres as prisms through which to consider broader historical
philosophical notions. Nietzsche fashions the “Apollonian” and “Dionysian” elements of
Greek theatre as prisms through which to consider Greek philosophical-political culture
(Birth, 103-109, 139-144, 33-52). While Lukács utilizes the historical-critical genres of
“the epic” and “the novel”: the former of which he reads as a rebus to the “transcendental
loci” of Greek immediacy, with “the novel” speaking to the emergent “modern”
alienation (Novel, 29-40, 56-69, 84-93). For Benjamin, allegory becomes a similar means
by which to illuminate the disenchanted world of the German Baroque.
The Trauerspiel presents the culmination of what I have term Benjamin’s own
mortuary vision of Romanticism, with its profane, or “absconded” understanding of the
absolute (Hansen & Benjamin, 5): one that emphasizes ruin, decay, and transience over
and against the providence of enlightenment narratives. Such a Romantic form of

As Rajan continues, “the encyclopedia, or its persistence as a deliberately broken down circle, can be
seen in the work of Walter Benjamin, Georg Lukács, Ernst Bloch, Georg Simmel and others. These postHegelian thinkers microcosmically develop only parts of Hegel’s encyclopedia, as...Lukács who develops
his theory of the novel as the loss of epic totality out of the sections on Romanticism in Hegel’s Aesthetics”
(“Encyclopedia,” 341). The Romantic nature of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel is further exemplified by its
dialogue with Nietzsche’s 1866 romantic text The Birth of Tragedy (OT, 94-99, 102-3). Both thinkers
sought to critically elaborate metaphysical positions by way of a dialogue with literary forms. Benjamin
was persistently engaged with Nietzsche’s work in this early period, as is exemplified by his
correspondence (see BC, 20, 50, 66, 107, 123, 127-8, 137).
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philosophy has much in common with the darker Romantic Idealism of Schelling, and
Benjamin’s allegorical form for philosophy should be seen as a similar response to the
“groundless ground” that is nature (FE, 68-9). The “aesthetic of ruination” pursued by
Benjamin throughout the text is upheld by many commentators as being characteristically
“modern” (Caygill, 60; Newman, 7-11; Wolin, 75-77; Weber, 131-63). However, it
should be emphasized that Benjamin sees such motifs of ruination and disenchantment as
prefigured in both Romanticism and the Baroque.225 In this way, the ur-inhabitant of the
Lukácsian “grand-hotel abyss” is not Adorno, but Benjamin, who should be seen as the
originator of the melancholic temperament pervading so much of Frankfurt School
Critical Theory. Such a temperament is not simply a subjective melancholic nihilism, but
rather, a form of intellectual intuition which reveals transience as the archē of all things.
Both Benjamin’s Trauerspiel and Adorno’s Negative Dialectics should be seen as
fragmentary romantic texts (as I have argued in 1.4). Though “finished” in the sense of
being brought to publication, these texts have a deliberately ruinous mosaic quality,
allowing them to be experimentally unbound and re-constellated in novel directions.
Further, following Adorno’s theses on “form” (1.4.1.), philosophy must incorporate
ruination into its very form so as to express metaphysical conceptions of ephemerality,
and it is Benjamin’s notion of allegory which allows for such a confrontation of
philosophy with natural history. As Benjamin writes, “allegories are to thoughts what
ruins are in the realm of things” (OT, 188).
4.3.1 The ‘Origins’ of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel
“Capitalism is entirely without precedent, in that it is a religion which offers not the reform of existence but
its complete destruction. It is the expansion of despair, until despair becomes a religious state of the world
in the hope that this will lead to salvation.” Benjamin, “Capitalism as Religion,” SW 1: 289.

A central moment of Benjamin’s “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” lies in its
speculative rethinking of the category of “origin” [Ur-sprung], which Benjamin is careful
to differentiate from “genesis” or “emergence” [Entstehen], while further distinguishing

The full modernist implications of Benjamin’s Romantic aesthetic of ruination are worked out in
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (see AT, 44-45 56, 116, 145-6, 205, 299, 310-11, 333).
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his own “historical-philosophical” method from both the Idealist and historicist
programs. As he writes:
Origin [Ur-Sprung], although a thoroughly historical category, nevertheless has
nothing in common with genesis [or emergence—Entstehung]. By “origin” is meant
not the coming-to-be of what has originated but rather what originates
[Entsprungenen] in the becoming and passing away. The origin stands as an eddy [or
maelstrom—Strudel] in the stream of becoming and vigorously draws the emerging
material into its rhythm. In the naked, manifest existence of the factual, the origin
never allows itself to be recognized; its rhythm stands open only to a dual insight. On
the one hand, it demands to be recognized as restoration, restitution, and on the other
hand—and precisely on account of this, as something incomplete and unclosed.
Determining itself in every origin-phenomenon is the formation in which, again and
again, an idea confronts the historical world, until it lies there in the totality of its
history. The origin, then does not arise from the facts attested but concerns their foreand after-history. (OT, 25; GS 1: 226)226

“Origin” is not a purely historical or material textual occurrence, nor is it purely ideal, but
rather, origin arises out of the speculative grouping of materials in constellation by way
of criticism—via gestures of “profane-illumination.” “Origins” are continually reinscribed by way of historical critical analysis and texts which come before and after
them. Benjamin describes the “natural history” [natürliche Geschichte], or the “after life”
[Nachleben], of works in terms of their “pre-and post-history” [Vor- und Nachgeschichte] (OT, 25, 27; GS 1: 226-228): that is, the work continues to evolve (or live on)
by way of texts which come after it, while it continually gives new senses to works which
came prior to it (Weber, 133-139).
Reflexively, this conception of “origin” can be applied to speculate upon the
“origins” of Benjamin’s own Trauerspiel book, critically performing one of the text’s
central methodological innovations.227 Biographically, Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book was
authored primarily on the Greek island of Capri throughout 1924, where Benjamin
traveled with some “600 quotations collected,” in order to complete the text in solitude
(BC, 236). During this productive stay, financial and personal concerns forced a return to

Schelling employs the same motif of the stream in his First Outline, to describe the “universal duality”
of nature in terms of “productivity” and “products” (18, 206). This duality of nature will be explored
further in Ch. 5. Both Benjamin and Schelling present natural-historical hybrid concepts to make
philosophical articulations.
227
Buck-Morss, in The Dialectics of Seeing, has undertaken a similar reflexive-immanent application of
Benjamin’s category of origin, though with respect to the Passagen-Werk (8-43).
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Berlin in 1925, whereupon the text was ultimately finished, only to be rejected as a
Habilitation by Frankfurt Universität in July of 1925 (BC, 252, 275). Benjamin’s
completed text is at once uncompromising in its methodological innovation, though
simultaneously shaped by personal, historical and academic concerns. As such, the
Trauerspiel can be said to have a polyphony of “origins” spanning the entirety of
Benjamin’s early academic career, along with his personal intellectual experiences, all of
which are brought together in the tensioned mosaic that is Benjamin’s Trauerspiel. In
what follows I will articulate the natural history of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel in terms of its
“pre and post history.”
“Pre-historically” (OT, 25) , the Trauerspiel’s frontispiece declares, “Conceived
in 1916, written 1925,” bringing it into dialogue with Benjamin’s early fragment “On
Language” (1916) along with other fragments which speculated on the relationship
between language and the Baroque.228 This relationship is further reinforced by the fact
that at key moments in the argument, specifically surrounding the development of his
theory of allegory, Benjamin directly cites or un-subtly rephrases his early writings on
language and translation (OT, 13-15, 26, 244, 256). Further, the OT also continues
Benjamin’s project for a philosophy of criticism inaugurated by his dissertation and
continued in his Goethe study, though given an even darker and more pessimistic cast.
Instead of “poeticizing” the work within the broader continuum of the absolute (or the
medium of forms), in the Trauerspiel, “criticism” comes to be seen as “the mortification
of works” (OT, 193).
In this way, the OT continues Benjamin’s immanent critique of the Early
Romantics, which allows for the development of his own mortuary vision of
Romanticism, to the extent that Benjamin’s text should be seen as not simply about the
Baroque, but rather, as providing an occasion for the development of Benjamin’s own
fractured vision of Romanticism. It is possible to describe Benjamin’s “Epistemo-Critical

While authoring “On Language as Such” (1916), Benjamin also penned two fragments, “Trauerspiel
and Tragedy” and “Language in Trauerspiel and Tragedy” (SW 1: 55-61). These fragments speak not only
to Benjamin’s early interest in the Trauerspiel form, but also reveal the proximity of such research to his
philosophy of language. These fragments provisionally sketch several themes that will recur in his
Habilitation, notably the mourning of nature, along with the deferring and allegorical language of the
Trauerspiel, which distinguishes it from the heroic closure of tragedy (see Caygill, 53-4).
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Prologue” as a methodological-critical statement of sorts, a “prologue to epistemology
dressed up as a theory of ideas,” notwithstanding Benjamin’s labeling it “unmitigated
chutzpah” to Scholem, (BC, 261). However, as will be argued, Benjamin’s prologue has
been overanalyzed in remove from the body of the text, in which Benjamin immanently
works out the main critical-metaphysical tenets by way of analysis of “allegory.”
Politically, nationally, and religiously, the Trauerspiel should be seen in an
ambiguous position with respect to German nationalism and nationhood. Jane Newman
positions Benjamin within the broader “citational community” that was undertaking a
German nationalist revival of the Baroque that attempted to re-archive the Baroque as the
birth of a “singular German Modernity” (9, xv-xiv, 2; 7-9, 19-20, 22, 101). Related to
such national questions is Benjamin’s relationship with the Protestant theologian, Florens
Christian Rang, with whom Benjamin entered into a lengthy correspondence regarding
key moments of the work’s argumentation, specifically, in relation to the idea of Greek
tragedy as an “agon” or “contest” (BC, 231-5), the particular “Protestant character” of the
German Baroque (BC, 215-216), along with key methodological formulations of the
theory of “the Idea” (BC, 225-6; cf., Caygill, 52, 56). Benjamin repeatedly stresses the
“enormous significance” (BC, 225) of their dialogues for the text, such that upon Rang’s
death Benjamin lamented the loss of the work’s “ideal reader” (BC, 262, 252-3).
Politically, the first section of the text, “Trauerspiel and Tragedy,” establishes the
Baroque historical-political context by drawing extensively on the work of Carl Schmitt,
whose political-theological formulations Benjamin both employs and criticizes (OT, 4852, 55-7; 72).229 Though Benjamin should be understood politically as a theologicalanarchist, both thinkers share similar mystical-theologically notions of the political.
“Post-historically” (OT, 25), Benjamin repeatedly acknowledges the affinities of
his project with historical- materialism (BC, 243, 253, 257), principally with that of
Lukács, a thinker whose insights Benjamin saw as largely “validat[ing] his own thinking”

229

G. Agamben has traced the nuances and complexities of the encounter between Benjamin and Schmitt
as it relates to Benjamin’s broader considerations of politics. See “Gigantomachy Concerning the Void” in
The State of Exception (52-64).
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(BC, 248).230 The close proximity of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel, specifically its notion of
allegory, with his later Arcades Project, particularly its discussions of the “commodity
form,” has been well documented in scholarship (Buck-Morss, Dialectics, 157-201;
Caygill, 60). Given the contiguity of these notions, one could speculate that Benjamin’s
“Marxist turn” (~1929-30) could be seen as a probing of the implications of this affinity
between allegory and Marxist analysis.
Benjamin describes the melancholic as one who “goes away empty handed,” one
who dwells under the “sign of Saturn,” contemplating transience, guilt, and failure (OT,
152-6, 255). Such a melancholy temperament most aptly illuminates the Baroque
interiors of Benjamin’s text. Despite its publication in 1928 by Rowohlt Verlag (BC, 2935), catastrophe pervades Benjamin’s Trauerspiel, a work which definitively marked his
inability to gain entrance to the discourse of the university and begin a conventional
academic career. The Trauerspiel, and the letters surrounding it, are marred by a hatred
of orthodox academic discourse, and such an anti-university sentiment is illustrated in the
uncompromisingly esoteric nature of the work’s key insights, along with the “minor”
character of the textual objects chosen (BC, 263-6; Deleuze & Guattari, Kafka,16-19).231
In many respects, Benjamin’s fall from the academy was fortunate, as it led him to move
away from the university, immersing himself instead in the media and allegories of the
everyday. Despite his assertion to Scholem apropos of his failure to pass his Habilitation,
“All in all I am glad” (BC, 276), Benjamin continued to dwell in such an ethos of
failure— “under the sign of Saturn” (Sontag, “Saturn,” 286)—until his death in 1940.

The relationship of historical materialism (or Marxism) to Benjamin’s Trauerspiel deserves further
consideration. Whilst composing the text Benjamin engaged extensively with Lukács’ History and Class
Consciousness and Soul and Form, likely at the urging of his communist lover A. Lācis. His letters
throughout the work’s composition reveal a growing sympathy to Marxist politics and theoretical questions
(BC, 243, 248 257, 279). Later, in 1931, Benjamin writes to Rychner regarding the “dialectical-materialist”
affinities with his Trauerspiel (BC, 372). Perhaps most notably, in his 1937 essay on Eduard Fuchs,
Benjamin retranslates much of his “epistemo-critical” methodology —specifically the ideas of the “preand post-history of the work”— in explicitly Marxist terms via a dialogue with Engels (see SW 3: 261-3,
267-8). Many of these historiographical formulations are further re-constellated in Benjamin’s 1940
“Theses on the Concept of History.” In this manner, the Trauerspiel has much in common with Lukács’
1916 Theory of the Novel, both texts emerge out of the atrophies of WWI, and though they analyze literary
forms, are able to be repurposed in Marxist-materialist directions.
231
“Minor literature” involves the nomadic “minor” invasion of a “major language,” the
“deteritorialization” of a discourse it by way of its margins, or minor, non-identical moments, allowing for
reflection upon the whole major discourse (Deleuze & Guattari, Kafka, 16).
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4.3.2 Natural History: The Metaphysics of Transience
“For nature is messianic by reason of its eternal and total passing away.” Benjamin, “Theological Political
Fragment,” SW 3: 306.

Benjamin’s ambivalent notion of “natural history,” or his metaphysical
understanding of transience, should be seen as the key contribution of his Trauerspiel
study. Hansen articulates two tensioned senses of the term “natural history” occurring in
Benjamin’s Trauerspiel text (10). The first, “natürliche Geschichte,” articulates the
“specific historic mode that typifies the work of art,” and is detailed in the “EpistemoCritical Prologue,” where Benjamin describes the “non-human topos” (10), or “life” of
works of art in terms of their “pre and post-history,” which according to Benjamin is “a
mark of their redemption or their gathering into the preserve of the world of ideas, not
pure but natural history” (OT, 26).232 The second sense, “Naturgeschichte/NaturGeschichte,” corresponds to the body of the text, and acts as a critical hermeneutic
through which Benjamin seeks to “unlock the historic disposition of the Baroque” out of
a disenchanted space in which history has becomes “de-historicized” (Hansen, 10) or, as
Benjamin puts it, “spatialized,” becoming “transposed into the setting” (OT, 81). In this
second sense, history is allegorized and read as a “cipher” out of seemingly petrified, or
natural objects (Adorno, NH, 262, 265). In a similar vein, Hegel describes nature as a
“petrified intelligence,” a domain in which Spirit is conditionally “presaged” (PN, 14-15,
3). Though evident affinities exist between Benjamin’s two senses, they cannot be
synthesized into a single definitive conceptual articulation, but rather, natural history
should be understood as a constellation of entities— “nature, history, signification,
transience” (Hansen, 16)—held together in “non-synthesis” (Cristache, 31-8, 198,
229).233

Hansen reads Benjamin’s Trauerspiel as the articulation of such an ethico-theological model for
“another kind of history...one no longer purely anthropocentric in nature or anchored solely in the concerns
of a human subject” (48). For Hansen, such an ethics is illustrated by Benjamin’s discussions of natural
history, specifically his pantheistic bestowal of agency upon non-human objects, along with his continual
calls for the redemption of “creaturely life.” This possibility of an ethics of “creaturely life” is articulated in
more depth—in relation to Benjamin, R.M. Rilke, W.G. Sebald (and Agamben)—in Santer’s On
Creaturely Life (1-41, 79-95).
233
In a similar manner, though apropos of Adorno’s employment of the term, Penksy has described
“Natural history” as a “theoretical promissory note,” a “methodological proposal” (232), or even an
allegorical “way of seeing” which provides insight into the transience of all things (231-6). Likewise, for
Benjamin, the second allegorical sense of the term is not a consistent or reproducible philosophical concept,
232
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Following Hansen, this doubled sense of the term will be recognized, and my
exegesis will proceed by way of the body of the text (thus via the second allegorical
notion), following which, I will demonstrate how the former sense (related to the theory
of Ideas in the “Prologue”) arises immanently out of the metaphysical presuppositions
Benjamin locates in the Baroque. In scholarship on Benjamin’s Trauerspiel, the work’s
prologue is often upheld as the capstone of Benjamin’s early thought (as in Caygill, 54,
Buck-Morss, Origin, 21-3), downplaying a substantial analysis of Benjamin’s theory of
allegory, along with the metaphysical doctrine of transience subtending it. This second
sense of the term can be further elaborated by way of its “post-historical” development at
the hands of Adorno, who first understood the critical efficacy of Benjamin’s
Trauerspiel, though it is important to first locate the “origins” of Benjamin’s discussion
of the term.
The constellation “natural–history” has a long lineage in German–IdealistRomanticism (Rajan, “Natural History,” 187-196). In his FO, Schelling strives to develop
Naturgeschichte—which, in its Kantian employment presented a mere “description” of
nature—into “eine Gechichte der Natur,” a proper “history of Nature itself...as it
gradually brings forth the whole multiplicity of its products through a deviation from a
common ideal” (53). One should note the enlightened optimism in such a task: if nature
progresses upward towards the absolute, so too should history, as humanity is positioned
as the providential destiny of larger “natural” developments (Kant’s “Universal History”
is exemplary in this regard, 41-54). Benjamin’s notion of natural history pushes back on
such enlightened optimism, allying instead with transience—with “nature, ruin and
trauma” (Rajan, “Natural History,” 187)—while nonetheless remaining within the
Idealist-Romantic fold, charting a counter-enlightenment “natural-historical” vision
(Adorno, ND, 300-7).
Benjamin employs the term Naturgeschichte to describe the “boundless despair”
of the German Baroque: one confronts an epoch under the “unshakeable domination” of
the Christian counter-reformation (OT, 65). Such a bleak political outlook, coupled with

but rather, an affective melancholy temperament, or “way of seeing” which provides on with an intellectual
intuition into his metaphysics of transience.
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the disenchanted world of Protestantism, resulted in a dark horizon of “no eschatology,”
or “restoration theology on earth” (OT, 48, 67).234 Apropos of such a grim politicalexistential horizon, in which tragedy was so recurrent that it came to be seen as “natural,”
Benjamin writes: “the constantly repeated spectacle of the rise and fall of princes, the
patient endurance of honorable virtue, stood before the eyes of the writers less as
morality than as the natural side of the historical process, essential in its constancy” (OT,
76).
Such a brutal sentimentality, mirrored in the violent subject matter of many of the
plays, greatly contributed to the scholarly neglect of the German Trauerspiel, leading it to
being dismissed as naïve or un-enlightened. The Trauerspiel poets failed to transcend
their own time; thus, the Baroque remained a so-called “dark-age,” as opposed to the
Renaissance which birthed a new global sentiment (according to theorists such as J.
Burkhart). Against such readings, Benjamin argues that within the Baroque, “history
passes into the setting”; that is, the “temporal process is caught up and analyzed in a
spatial image” (OT, 81, 82). This spatialization of historical temporality— the “setting
the stage of history” (Hansen, 49-50)—is read by Benjamin as a cipher to the historical
experience of the Baroque, an epoch during which individuals strove to make themselves
at home in a disenchanted and transient world. Benjamin read the Baroque plays as
rebuses to the “natural décor of the course of history,” in which dramatic actions “unfold
as in the days of creation when no history was happening” (OT, 82, 80).235 What is put on
display in the Baroque is the “de-historicizing of history” (Hansen, 51): an experience of
the loss of historical experience [Erfahrung].236 One should note the correspondence of
such Baroque sentiments with those of Modernity, an epoch likewise animated by a loss
of historical sense, in which historical-material forces are reified so as to appear

In his “Program,” Benjamin defines a central task for a philosophy of the future as the articulation of an
expanded understanding of historical experience. In the Trauerspiel, the critic is tasked with reading
Baroque texts so as to access through experience the historical sentiment of the Baroque: “Historical life, as
that epoch represents it to itself, is its content, its true object” (OT, 46, 48).
235
Such motifs bear an evident affinity with Schelling, particularly his middle work: The Weltalter project
(1811-15) and his 1809 Freedom Essay. These texts will be taken up more substantially in Ch. 5. of this
project.
236
Hansen positions Benjamin within early twentieth-century debates regarding historical time and the loss
of historical sense (or “historicity” following Heidegger), participated in by thinkers such as Bergson,
Simmel, Husserl and Heidegger (54-57).
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“natural.” This affinity is further underscored by Benjamin’s constellation of the Baroque
drama with early twentieth-century expressionism: “in both...the writers were concerned
with the voicing and resonance of lament (OT, 36-7).
This model of reading seemingly “natural” objects as a “cipher” to history is
picked up by Adorno in his 1932 essay “The Idea of Natural History.” In his address,
Adorno elaborates Benjamin’s conception of the term in dialogue with Lukács’ notion of
“second nature,”237 while developing his own critical hermeneutic—which he terms “the
historical image” of “changing experimental constellations” (AP, 130-1, 127)—out of the
antinomies in Benjamin’s conception of allegory. Adorno’s analysis is occasioned by a
criticism of the “new ontology” of Heidegger and Husserl, a polemic which continued
throughout Adorno’s oeuvre, as he continually chastises ontology as a failed “attempted
breakout” from the Idealist architectonic (Lectures ND, 65-75; NH, 260). Through such
critiques, Adorno forwards his own “ontological reorientation of the philosophy of
history” (NH, 260), or what can be thought as the new “historical-philosophical method”
launched by the Frankfurt School (Hansen, 14-15). Against the hypostasized ontologies
of his contemporaries, Adorno proclaims that philosophy must “dialectically overcome
the usual antithesis of history and nature” (NH, 252): understanding the historical
dimensions of nature, along with the “natural” (or pathological) character of history.
Adorno goes on to sublate this antinomy by locating a shared moment of “transience”
mediating both polarities, while affirming the new allegorical capacity awakened by such
a metaphysic (NH, 262, 263-4). Adorno sides with Benjamin’s notion of allegory against
the salvific Marxist narratives of Lukács, specifically his metaphysical desire for the
transcendence of the profane and disenchanted world— that “charnel-house” of long
rotted interiors (Novel, 64). Adorno embraces Benjamin’s allegorical exposure of the “urhistory of signification,” and his metaphysical commitment to transience, which

Lukács defines “second-nature” in the Theory of the Novel, as follows: “The second nature is not dumb,
sensuous and yet senseless like the first: it is a complex of senses—meanings—which has become rigid and
strange, and which no longer awakens interiority; it is a charnel- house of long-dead interiorities; this
second nature could only be brought to life—if this were possible—by the metaphysical act of reawakening
the souls which, in an early or idea existence, created or preserved it; it can never be animated by another
interior” (64). One can see how Adorno and Benjamin would both reject Lukács’ transcendent calls for a
“metaphysical act of reawakening,” in favour of immanent affirmations of transience.
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“corroded the assumption of a primary substance or archē, but also took leave of the
metaphysical conception of nature as originary immediacy” (Adorno, NH, 264;
Benjamin, OT, 135; Hansen, 16).238 However, despite Adorno’s ostensible commitment
to a metaphysics of transience, his own Marxist leanings hold open the “impossible
possibility” (MM, 247) of a minimal revolutionary transcendence maintained by the
aesthetic dimension, a possibility which is denied a priori by Benjamin’s baroque
metaphysics (Taubes, 70-76).239
In Kafkaesque fashion, for Benjamin in the Baroque there will be no grand
“revolutionary conviction,” for the “Baroque drama knows historical activity not
otherwise than as the base machination of schemers” (OT, 77). It is a world where heroic
action is denied in advance, unlike in the tragedies of antiquity (OT, 115-6; Lukács,
“Tragedy,” 160). It is an epoch in which the realms of fate and guilt triumph to such an
extent that they are naturalized as an aspect of the setting, which “intrudes more and more
into the dramatic action” (OT, 83; 110-11).240 Human action is failed in advance,
seemingly awakening an archaic world of guilt, in which the “murderous time of
irredeemable transience” will ultimately be given the “last word” (OT, 81, 118).
Benjamin refashions a (German critic’s) remark apropos of pre-Shakespearean drama’s
lack of definitive resolution to describe such a “ur-history” of transience: “it has no
proper ending; the stream flows on” (OT, 136). Death will not be granted as some heroic
form of closure (as in classical tragedy); instead, the “Trauerspiel knows no heroes, only
constellations” (OT, 132-3). The priority of nature along with the general anti-humanism

Hansen emphasizes the radical nature of Benjamin’s metaphysics of natural history vis-à-vis the
philosophical tradition: “In emphasizing transience at the expense of permanence, Benjamin’s concept of
natural history proved to be directed against the Platonic metaphysical tradition, as well as its cover legacy
in contemporary political thought” (Hansen, 82).
239
Taubes describes Benjamin’s bleak eschatological vision: “The drawbridge comes from the other side.
And when you get fetched or not, as Kafka describes it, is not up to you. One can take the elevators up to
the high-rises of spirituality—it won’t help...there is a prius, an a priori. Something has to happen from the
other side; then we see, when our eyes are pierced open. Otherwise we see nothing. Otherwise we ascend,
we strive until the day after tomorrow” (Political Theology, 76).
240
Describing the “natural-historical” character of fate in relation to the “guilt laden physis of Christianity”
(OT, 247), Benjamin writes: “For fate is no purely natural occurrence, any more than it is purely historical.
However, it may disguise itself in pagan, mythological guise, fate is meaningful only as a natural-historical
category in the spirit of the restoration theology of the counter-reformation. It is the elemental natural force
in historical occurrence, an occurrence that is itself not entirely nature because the state of Creation still
reflects the sum of grace.” (OT, 128; see Buck-Morss, Dialectics, 172).
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of the epoch are repeatedly emphasized: it is ruled by “blind chance” and marred by an
animistic form of guilt mirroring that which is located by Benjamin in Elective Affinities
(OT, 132-3). The character’s actions within the plays are tainted by a pathological
repetition compulsion, as the parodied actions of the sovereign come to mimic the
incessantly mythic rise and fall of both nature and history (OT, 138, 48-52). Everywhere
transience, failure, and myth have the “last word.”
It is within this metaphysics of transience—one which proclaims the priority of
change over stasis—that Benjamin’s discussion of melancholy should be understood. In
the Baroque, an epoch in which “whole cities have sunk,” melancholy becomes “the
mood of the times” (OT, 144-5). Melancholy presents an attuned awareness of the
“desolation,” and “misery of the human condition in its creaturely state” (OT, 68, 149;
67)— it recognizes the “inexorable passage of every life to death” (OT, 155). The
doctrine of melancholy should be seen as the proper affectation of the allegorist, the most
“saturnine” of temperaments (OT, 152-3, 162). For Benjamin, melancholy becomes the
affective temperament—or the Heideggerian “mood” or “attunement” (Stimmung,
Befindlichkeit [Being, 130-38])—that provides an intellectual intuition of his transient
absolute. As Benjamin writes, “Mourning is the disposition in which feeling, as though
masked, reanimates the emptied-out world, so as to have an enigmatic satisfaction at the
sight of it” (OT, 141). This melancholic disposition allows the world to “appear as [a]
cipher of an enigmatic wisdom (OT, 143). Such a despondent temperament arises from
the immersion of oneself in such a world of transience, where one finds what Schelling
termed “the indestructible melancholy pervading all life” (FE, 63). However, through
critically engaging with ephemerality, one dialectically awakens the natural-historical
potential of allegory as a historically informed model of signification. As Benjamin
writes, “Melancholy betrays the world for the sake of knowledge. But its preserving
absorption takes the dead things up into its contemplation in order to save them” (OT,
162).

4.3.3 Allegory: The Redemption of Transience
“No recollection of transcendence is possible any more, save by way of transience; eternity appears, not as
such, but diffracted through the most transient.” Adorno, ND, 359-60.
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At the core of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel is his idiosyncratic refashioning of
(Baroque) allegory, the subject of which occupies the final section of the text “Allegory
and Trauerspiel” (165-258). Describing the centrality of allegory to the project, Benjamin
writes: “The philosophical understanding of allegory, and the dialectical understanding of
its limit form in particular, is the ground from which the image of the Trauerspiel stands
out in vivid... beautiful colors” (OT, 203). Over the course of the section, Benjamin
undertakes a “historical-philosophical penetration” of the allegorical form, mapping the
“antinomies of the allegorical”: a mode of signification—contra the timeless IdealistRomantic “symbol”—in which “Any person, any object, any relation can signify any
other whatever” (OT, 176, 184; McCole, 140-6). As a model of “profane illumination”
(SW 2: 209), allegory provided Benjamin with a historically informed model of
signification attuned to the ruin of transcendence, or a model of language in accord with
his metaphysics of transience. Benjamin redeems the notion of allegory from the ruin of
the Baroque, as its historical “truth-content,” articulating it in constellation with his own
theory of language as a historically informed model of signification “after the linguistic
fall.” Allegory becomes at once a critical hermeneutic, along with a positive theory of
language—that Buck-Morss has termed a “dialectics of seeing” or a “saturnine vision” to
follow Sontag (Dialectics, 159-200; “Saturn,” 286)—recurring throughout Benjamin’s
corpus, notably in his One-Way Street (1926), Arcades Project, and discussions of
Baudelaire (1938-9). Benjamin expands allegory from a mere literary trope (in Goethe et
al.), to a mode of thought in its own right, a “mood” (Stimmung), or Weltanschauung,
pervading both the Baroque and Modernity.241
Hansen has described the “iconoclastic” potential of allegory within the domain
of aesthetics, whereby allegory’s historical index stands against a-temporal Idealist
aesthetic categories such as “genius,” or “the beautiful” (66; OT, 159). This iconoclasm

Benjamin’s Trauerspiel arises out of a (German) late Romantic tradition from Hegel to Nietzsche that is
concerned with aesthetic modes, moods, and tropes as expressing different philosophical temperaments and
ways of being in the world. Nietzsche’s “historical-philosophical penetration” of the Apollinian and
Dionysian artistic forms, along with Hegel’s description of the “Classical” and “Romantic” forms of art
should be seen as exemplary in this regard (Rajan, “Encyclopedia,” 341). Though there exist few affinities
between Benjamin and Hegel’s analyses of history, Benjamin’s historical-philosophical penetration of
literary forms is post-Hegelian. As I argue, the body of the Trauerspiel, with its elevation and analysis of
allegory, exemplifies these debts most forcefully.
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can be applied to the a-historical proclivities of philosophy more generally, as
Benjamin’s historical-critical philosophy of language provides a “ur-history of signifying
intention” underwriting philosophical claims to a-historical totality (OT, 173). This
should be seen as the negative or destructive moment of allegory, which emphasizes
natural-historical decay and transience. However, allegory also contains a negative
theological moment by which the signifying power of the human—or “creature” (Hansen,
103-7)—is upheld as a model of historical “language” after the fall, mirroring the reversal
of Benjamin’s “Theological-Political Fragment.” It is upon such an antinomy, between
redemption and transience, that Benjamin’s theory of allegory is erected. In the following
subsections (4.3.3.1-4), these “antinomies of the allegorical” will be critically examined
in more depth (OT, 184).

4.3.3.1 Allegory v. Symbol
“Whereas the symbol draws man into itself, the allegorical surges out of the ground of being to intercept
the intention on its way down and therewith derail it.” Benjamin, OT, 195.

Benjamin commences his discussion of allegory negatively, describing the
Idealist aesthetic notion of the “symbol” as a “usurper” in the history of art (OT, 165).
The symbol glorified the transcendent appearance of the absolute idea in the work of art,
along with art’s timeless unity, downplaying the contingencies of history. Benjamin saw
the tradition of Idealist aesthetics as favoring the theological-classical ideology of
symbolic unity—participated in in various ways by Schopenhauer, W.B. Yeats, Goethe,
and G.F. Creuzer– whereas allegory was downgraded as a merely “cursory mode” of
signification (OT, 169, 170-1). Against such conventions, Benjamin draws upon a
counter tradition, informed by K. Giehlow, J. Görres, and Herder (OT, 175-6), which
contends that allegory “is not a perfunctory illustrative technique but expression, as
language is expression, as indeed writing is expression” (OT, 169, 135, 200).242 The
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Hansen notes that it was Creuzer and Görres who first introduced a temporal distinction into semiotics,
distinguishing the natural “organic mountain and plant like quality” of the symbol, from the historical
dimensions of allegory (50, 68). Benjamin also accords immense significance to Giehlow, whose analyses
of Egyptian hieroglyphs as a “rebus” or “natural-theology of script” (OT, 177, 178) laid the groundwork for
his own historical-philosophical “penetration of the allegorical form” (OT, 176). Throughout the OT,
Benjamin associates allegory with the persistence of pagan, theosophical, and antiquated religious

182

Baroque allegorical emblem, with its montage of visual and linguistic signs, is read by
Benjamin as a novel understanding of the relationship between history and signification
(Buck-Morss, Dialectics, 159-200, 165, 161). Further, allegory’s expressive
understanding of media corresponds to Benjamin’s early writings on language, along
with his expressive understanding of the world, which he recasts within the broader
Romantic fold.
Benjamin does not simply invert the historical primacy of symbol in favour of
allegory; instead, he locates a temporal index differentiating the two: in allegory all
meaning is subject to time, whereas the symbol upholds and captures the transcendent
fleeting instant, the mystical nunc stans (OT, 138). Benjamin depicts “the core of the
allegorical vision” (OT, 174) in contradistinction to the instantaneous symbol as follows:
Whereas in the symbol, with the sublimation of downfall, the transfigured
countenance of nature reveals itself fleetingly in the light of salvation, in allegory
there lies before the eyes of the observer the facies hippocratica of history as
petrified primordial landscape. History, in everything untimely, sorrowful, and
miscarried that belongs to it from the beginning, is inscribed in a face—no, in
death’s head. (OT, 174)

Whereas the symbol attempts to capture the transient moment “in the light of salvation,”
allegory embraces transience, disrupting any stable relationship between elements of the
linguistic sign. Caygill describes symbol and allegory’s divergent relationship to
temporality: “the symbol tries to make the finite participate in the infinite, to freeze the
moment into an image of eternity, while allegory inscribes death into signification,
making the relationship between appearance and essence one which is provisional and
endangered” (58). Allegory is a form in which “all meanings are subject to time,”
whereby “all claims to eternity are qualified by their being made and unmade” (Caygill,
58): a conception of writing which formally figures themes of finitude and natural
history, perpetually mourning the loss of transcendence. Describing this abyss opened by
the allegorical mode of signification, Benjamin writes: “Whereas the symbol draws man
into itself, the allegorical surges out of the ground of being to intercept the intention on
its way down and therewith derail it” (OT, 195). In the “Prologue,” Benjamin notes a

symbolism within the Christian paradigm (see Buck-Morss, Dialectics, 172). For more on Benjamin’s
relationship to Herder, see Stern (12-19, 148-66).
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similar “feeling of vertigo” evoked by the nihilism of the Baroque (OT, 39), one akin to
the Adornian “shudder” or the “loss of ground” evoked by the authentic work of art (AT,
245, 220, 331).
This “abyss of allegory” provides insight into “natural history as [a] primal
history of meaning or intention,” that is, the fundamentally temporal index of all
linguistic meaning and semiotic systems (OT, 173). Allegory is the “transcendental loci”
which foregrounds the transient, or natural-historical, character of human signification
(including the symbol) and should be seen as a metaphysical a priori, or “groundless
ground” (Ungrund) atop which all philosophy is undertaken (Schelling, FE, 68-9). For
the Baroque allegorists, history “is not the teleology of the enlightenment, for which
human happiness was the supreme purpose of nature, but a wholly different teleology,
that of the Baroque” (OT, 179). Such a teleology inclines towards the “mysterious
instructions” of nature, and the “creatureliness” of the human (OT, 179; Hansen, 103-107,
119, 152-62). History and language follow nature in their embrace of impermanence, as
Benjamin writes:
Thus for the writers of this period... one can say, nature has remained the great
teacher. Yet nature appears to them not in the bud and blossom but in the over
ripeness and decay of its creations. Nature looms before them as eternal
transience: in that alone did the saturnine gaze of those generations recognize
history. (OT, 190-1)

Against the conventional Hegelian vision of history as the tribunal and gradual revelation
of reason—in which the “bud disappears in the bursting forth of the blossom” (PS, 2)—
Benjamin’s offers a vision of nature that is supra-fecund, excessive, non-teleological, and
ultimately transient. Such a historical optic, specifically in relation to such conceptions of
Hegel, is elaborated in the penultimate section of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, “World
Spirit and Natural History,” which undertakes a corrective to the Hegelian historicism
following the events of the twentieth-century (ND, 300-58; Pensky, 233; Hansen, 18).243
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With such descriptions I do not mean to straw man Hegel as a simple logo-centric totalitarian; in fact,
what Benjamin and Adorno demonstrate with their interventions is the possibility of reading the Hegelian
program “against the grain.” That involves reading Hegel as a thinker who favours the speculative accident
over and against systematic closure—reading one moment of Hegel against himself—as domains such as
nature and aesthetics gain an autonomy with respect to the encyclopedic whole. This will be explored in
more depth in the final chapter of this project.
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Benjamin’s affinity with Adorno, the “modernist mandarin,” can be pushed further
to highlight that it is within Benjamin’s Romantic meta-critique that the central epistemometaphysical leitmotif of Critical Theory is first elaborated: its aesthetic of ruination, or
metaphysical doctrine of transience—natural history. Such an “ur-experience” of
Modernity as a ruin is mirrored in the Baroque experience of history as a literal
Trauerspiel: a stage in which all affirmative hopes are met with Baroque counterrevolution and the re-installation of the absolute authority of the status quo. Within such
bleak contexts all that is permitted is the “revolutionary potential of the intriguerschemer” (OT, 226, 77). As in Kafka’s parables, the simple cunning gestures of the minor
assistants wins out against the grand actions of the sovereign, who is continually
lampooned and wrecked by his own intentions. By recognizing their work’s as “ruins”—
as unsuccessful and untimely and failed in advance—the Baroque playwrights entered
into a “weak messianic” affinity with generations that would follow, holding open the
possibility that such a “pile of wreckage” could be redeemed by post-historical critics
(SW 4: 390, 392). In this way, the “ruin” becomes a meta-figure, or “cipher” to the
historical-critical process, as Benjamin writes:
When, with the Trauerspiel, history enters the scene, it does so as script. “History”
stands written on nature’s countenance in the sign-script of transience. The
allegorical physiognomy of natural history, which is brought onstage in the
Trauerspiel, is actually present as ruin. In the ruin, history has passed perceptibly
into the setting. And so configured, history finds expression not as process of an
eternal life but as process of incessant decline. Allegory thereby positions itself
beyond beauty. Allegories are in the realm of thought what ruins are in the realm of
things. (OT, 188)

The allegorist strives to be at home in this unsuccessful and failed landscape, “the pile of
rubble” (OT, 189) that is the ephemerality of historical happening, while continually
holding open the possibility of criticism and “rescue” by generations which will follow
(OT, 194). Benjamin describes “the baroque ideal of knowledge” as a “storeroom,” or a
“stockpiling, to which the giant libraries were a monument is fulfilled in image writing,”
thus highlighting the intimate relation between language, ruin, and history subtending the
allegorical vision of the Baroque (OT, 196, 201). Benjamin shares such a melancholic
vision, one in which “meaning and death are brought to fruition in historical unfolding.
Just as they are closely intermeshed as seeds in the unredeemed state of sin in the
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creature” (OT, 174). Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book strives after such Baroque ideals of
knowledge, ruining itself in the performative articulation of allegory and natural history.
4.3.3.2 Benjamin’s Mortuary Romanticism
“[T]he history of works prepares for their critique, and thus historical distance increases their power. If, to
use a simile, one views the growing work as a burning funeral pyre, then the commentator stands before it
like a chemist, the critic like an alchemist. Whereas, for the former [the chemist], wood and ash remain the
sole objects of his analysis, for the latter only the flame itself preserves an enigma that of what is alive.
Thus, the critic inquiries into the truth, whose living flame continues to burn over the heavy logs of what is
passed and the light ashes of what has been experienced.” Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities” SW 1:
298.

Allegory should be seen as the central element of Benjamin’s own mortuary
vision of Romanticism. McCole positions Benjamin’s notion of allegory in relation to his
“long term intellectual strategy” of an “immanent critique of Romanticism,” specifically
its affirmative religious and transcendent Idealist moments, and in such a manner,
allegory should be considered a “corrective to the affirmative temptations of
Romanticism” (115, 140, cf.124-130).244 At several junctures in the OT, Benjamin
blames the Frühromantik affirmation of symbol and its transcendent motifs for the lowly
status accorded to the Trauerspiel and its doctrine of allegory (OT, 165-7, 170-5).
The Early Romantics sought to “perfect” or “absolutize” individual works in an
affirmative sense, whereas Benjamin’s own mortuary Romanticism participates in the
work’s destruction and decay, examining the “natural history” of texts as they progress
through time. As Benjamin writes, “Whereas Romanticism, in the name of infinity, form,
and idea, critically potentiates the perfected construct, the deep gaze of allegory at one
stroke transforms works and things into moving script” (OT, 186). Against the unified
totality of the symbol, “the field of allegorical intuition” affirms “fragment, ruin,” and the
“lack of freedom” of the “beautiful physis” (OT, 186). As the enlightenment saw history
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McCole sees a criticism of the affirmative tendencies in the Frühromantiker as intimately entwined with
Benjamin’s understanding of allegory, which attempts to redeem a negative notion of Romantic critique:
“There was a hidden constellation, between the true intentions of Baroque allegory, the missed chance of
the Frühromantik, and the slender hopes remaining for an uncorrupted Idealist in [Benjamin’s] own times”
(154). For McCole, such a negative vision of Romanticism provided the groundwork for Benjamin’s own
modernist avant-garde aesthetic, “Many of the figures of the allegorical aesthetic would later recur in
Benjamin’s encounters with modernist and avant-garde culture. In a sense, the Trauerspiel study employs
an implicitly modernist aesthetic” (McCole, 139). In this manner, allegory should be seen as fundamental
to Benjamin’s own mortuary vision of Romanticism. I push against McCole’s assertions that Benjamin
departs from Romanticism, positioning Benjamin instead as a mortuary Romantic philosopher.
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as the working out and perfection of freedom, Benjamin allied history with nature,
creating a natural-historical vision shot through with inevitable decay, ephemerality, and
transience. Parsing such a divergence in terms of symbol and allegory, McCole will
write, “the symbol provides a fleeting glimpse of totality, whereas the allegorical gaze
reveals history and nature as a devastated landscape subject to irresistible decay” (138).
In this manner, Benjamin moves away from the affirmative tendencies latent in
his own early conception of criticism—as typified in his dissertation, wherein the critic
“completes” the work—towards a darker mortuary or negative Romanticism in which the
critic participates in the destruction and decay of works. Describing this destructive mode
of critique, Benjamin will write:
Criticism is the mortification of works. The essence of these works is more receptive
to this than is any other production. Mortification of works: not therefore—as the
romantics have it—the awakening of consciousness in living works, but the
unsettlement of knowledge in those that have died away. (OT, 193)

The works of the Baroque playwrights “make no attempt to disguise the fact that they
contain the seeds of their own destruction” (McCole, 152; Hansen, 71). As in Beckett’s
Endgame, theatrical tropes stop functioning and breakdown; likewise, in the Trauerspiel,
the texts seem to willingly pile themselves atop the ruin of history. In his essay on
Elective Affinities, Benjamin asserts that at the work’s “origin,” “material and truth
content” are closely entwined, whereas throughout a work’s natural-historical decay, such
a linkage is severed, allowing the work to enter into new constellations of truth content
(SW 1: 297; cf. Adorno, AT, 195). In such a manner, criticism expresses an allegiance
with the work’s decay: with its natural history. Alluding to this destructive moment of
criticism, McCole will write, “The task of critique is not to preserve the work the way it
really was, but to participate with the corrosive moments of time” (152).245 It should be
emphasized that Benjamin’s employment of allegory is not a total abandonment of his
early Frühromantik proclivities, nor is Benjamin wholly dismissive of Idealism. Instead,
allegory seeks to mediate moments of Benjamin’s early philosophy of language and

Likewise, Hansen continually stresses the “iconoclastic” moment of Benjamin’s concept of criticism, in
which the critic smashes the “beautiful semblance (schoner Schein)” of the work’s façade, in order to get at
the work’s allegorical or historical core (66-7). Adorno likewise describes truth content in terms of such an
iconoclasm (see AT, 195).
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criticism within a broader mortuary Romantic fold, as will be shown in the following
section.246

4.3.3.3 Language after the Fall: Allegory and the Idea
“What is specific to writing is that with every sentence it stops and starts anew.” Benjamin, OT, 4.

This section will analyze the relationship between allegory and Benjamin’s theory
of language, along with the theory of ideas elaborated in his “Epistemo-Critical
Prologue.” Allegory provides Benjamin with a historically informed model of
signification after the linguistic “fall,” one in tune with his metaphysical doctrine of
transience. Such a model can be staged by way of Benjamin’s analysis of the Baroque
“sovereign” and his duplicitous double “the intriguer.” As the dialectical inversion of the
sovereign (associated with the symbol), the intriguer harnesses the power of allegory:
“instead of claiming the power to control signification, the character represents the
destruction of signification” (Caygill, 59). Describing the intriguer’s unique relationship
to language, Benjamin will write:
The reversal from the purely phonetic element of creaturely language to the
pregnant irony that echoes from the mouth of the intriguer is highly indicative of
this character’s relation to language. The intriguer is the master of meanings: in the
harmless outpouring of an onomatopoetic natural language, these meanings are the
blockage and origin of a mourning for which the intriguer is, with the meanings,
responsible. (OT, 226)

The uniqueness of allegory is its immersion in the profane and expressive language of
things, in the mimetic world of everyday objects, which it both defames and redeems.
Allegory inscribes transience and natural history at the heart of language, and for the
allegorist, at the heart of thinking as such. The “minority” relation of the intriguer—
mirrored in Benjamin’s 1934 discussion of Kafka’s creaturely “assistants” (SW 2: 798,
809, 815-6)—relates to its broader “minoritarian” relationship to language (Deleuze &
Guattari, Kafka, 16-19). For Benjamin, such an immanent immersion in creaturely

Buck-Morss locates allegory as a moment in Benjamin’s larger immanent meta-critique of Idealism,
participating in his movement of thought towards materialism and the avant-garde (Dialectics, 175).
Though Benjamin’s gravitation towards materialism has been well documented in the literature, it should
be emphasized that despite such interventions, Benjamin remained within the Idealist-Romantic sphere of
concerns.
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language represents a negative theological chance for “profane illumination”: a new
historically informed metaphysical-critical understanding of philosophy.
Throughout his discussion of allegory, Benjamin alludes to a return of mimetic or
onomatopoetic “ur-signification” in the language of the Baroque, rehashing motifs from
his earlier work on language and mimesis (OT, 221). Allegory presents the possibility for
a “new universal language,” after Babel, a mode of “primal sound or hearing,” which
occurs when language returns to “primal natural speech,” as sound, elemental “fire
writing,” music, and mimesis (OT, 221, 227, 230, 232, 13). Within such a profane and
allegorical “philosophy of the creature,” “everything has a mouth for the purposes of
revelation,” and philosophy enters into a new rapport with the transient language of
things (OT, 218-222). After the fall into the prattle of the “judging word” of the concept,
allegory represents a poetic opportunity to recover a semblance of “language as such”
from within the “language of man” (OT, 256, 226, 232; Hansen, 90; Weber, 9).
Benjamin emphasizes allegory’s “extreme recourse to [the] language of the
concrete”: its outlandish constructions, interruptions, “sudden reversals” in which
“thoughts evaporate into images” (OT, 213-4, 215). Baroque language is marred by crisis
and a continual “rebellion among its elements” (OT, 224). This outlandish quality
exposes itself as a deliberate construction—as always already a “ruin”—announcing the
transience of history against the timeless “symbol.” Benjamin describes Baroque
“literature as the ars inveniendi [art of invention]” (OT, 189): it is a deliberate and
unsubtle showcase of emblems, construction, staging, and ostentation. Benjamin
positions Trauerspiel in an affinity with Brecht’s “estrangement effect” avant la lettre,
whereby the work continually betrays its own constructed status through interruptions
and meta-theatrical gestures (Caygill, 60).247 Such an eccentric and tensioned

Describing the tensioned mosaic that is Baroque linguistic construction, Benjamin will write, “In the
anagrams, the onomatopoetic locutions, and many other sorts of linguistic devices, word, syllable, and
sound proudly flaunt themselves—emancipated from every traditional nexus of meaning—as a thing that
can be exploited allegorically. The language of the Baroque is constantly convulsed by rebellions among its
elements” (OT, 224). Benjamin continually emphasizes such linguistic tension as characteristic of the
Baroque: “Script and sound stand opposed to each other in high tensioned polarity” and further, “The
tension between word and script is immeasurable in the Baroque” (OT, 218). In his correspondence,
Benjamin repeatedly underscores the linguistic moment of his Trauerspiel study, as he describes the “germ
of the project” to H. Hofmannsthal as the “explanation of picture, text, and music.” (BC, 309). Buck-Morss
has further stressed the constellation of allegory with other aesthetic avant-gardes analyzed by Benjamin,
247
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understanding of language is mirrored in the “unmitigated chutzpah” that is the
Trauerspiel’s prologue, which, through its unashamed Platonic Idealism and intentionally
baffling constructions, forces the reader to pause “at stations of reflection,” confronting
“the question of presentation” and considering the linguistic nature of truth (BC, 261; OT,
4, 1-2).
The language of Baroque allegory makes no attempt to hide its “un-natural” or
fabricated quality, and in so doing emphasizes the first sense of natural history discussed
in the prologue: the “natural life” of words and texts (OT, 24-26). Into the “emptied out
physis of Christianity,” the allegorist enters, awakening the “charnel house of long dead
interiors” through the construction of Ideas (OT, 247; Lukács, Novel, 64). Adorno first
grasped the intimate relationship between the doctrine of ideas in Benjamin’s “EpistemoCritical Prologue” and his understanding of allegory, which for Adorno, represented “an
essentially different logical form than that of a scheme of thought...constituted by a
general conceptual structure” (NH, 263). That is, allegory offered the “alternative logical
structure” of “the constellation,” in which concepts are arranged in a mosaic of tension
(Adorno, NH, 263; Benjamin, OT, 10-11; Buck-Morss, Dialectics, 230). Benjamin’s
idea-constellations are immanent configurations of the “language of things,” which are
“saved” upon entrance into the “genuine unity of truth” (OT, 9). Benjamin’s allegorical
theory of the idea, along with his mortuary understanding of criticism, provides a
linguistically informed model for the practice of thought after the linguistic fall into the
prattle of signification.

4.3.3.4 Allegory as Semblance: Redemption
“[T]he more that nature and antiquity were felt to be guilt-laden, the more obligatory became their
allegorical interpretation, understood as their only conceivable salvation. For in the midst of that knowing
degradation of the object, the melancholic intention keeps faith, altogether incomparably, with its being as
a thing.” Benjamin, OT, 245.

Perhaps the most ambiguous moment in Benjamin’s Trauerspiel study is the
“reversal” [Umschwung] that occurs at the text’s conclusion (OT, 235-57; GS I: 405-6).
In such a moment, allegory itself is revealed as transient— as a form of “semblance”

most notably, the filmographic practices of montage, along with the poetic correspondences of Baudelaire
(Dialectics, 174-7, 182, 201).
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[Schein]—and melancholy reverses into its opposite, “ecstasy.” As Benjamin emphasizes,
despite its seemingly nihilistic proclivities, Baroque allegory maintained a certain
Christian eschatological vision through which objects could be “redeemed”: “indeed, the
insight into the transience of things, and the concern to save them and render them
eternal, is one of the strongest motives of the allegorical” (OT, 243). And further,
“allegory is most abidingly where transience and eternity most nearly collide” (OT, 243).
Thus, despite their insight into the groundless ground of transience, the allegorists
remained bound by a fundamentally Lutheran horizon, whereby, “Allegories fulfill[ed]
and revoke[d] the nothingness in which they present themselves” (OT, 255).
The Baroque allegorists felt ensnared by the “guilt laden physis of Christianity”
(OT, 247), and through refashioned religious allegories sought refuge from transience in
the weak illuminations provided by the persistence of the ancient Greek pantheon, and
cultic pagan religious practices (OT, 239; Buck-Morss, Dialectics, 172-4). Benjamin
notes the common Baroque alliance of the figure of Satan with all that is earthly, natural,
naked: “an empty abyss of evil” which provokes “the vertigo of its bottomless depths”
(OT, 251-2). Yet the “bottomless profundity” of nature is cut short by a Christian
eschatology of redemption, which brings about a Hölderlinian “turnabout into holy
salvation” (OT, 252; Buck-Morss, Dialectics, 231, 235).248 Baroque allegory ultimately
betrays the transient natural-historical realm it awakened. Commenting upon the
crowning allegory of “Golgotha” [Schädelstätte] Benjamin demonstrates how the
ultimate symbol of death and transience is cut through by an equally present power of
salvation. Negating its own negation, allegory itself becomes a “meta-figure,” or
allegory, of itself: “In [Golgotha], transience is not so much signified, allegorically
presented, as—itself signifying—presented as allegory. As the allegory of resurrection”
(OT, 254; GS 1: 405; Hansen, 101). Ultimately the Baroque allegorist betrays the
transience of nature in favour of a Lutheran solace: “The allegorist awakens in God’s
world,” allowing nature and objects to be “held fast in high heaven” (OT, 254, 257).

Hölderlinian motifs are evident throughout Benjamin’s Trauerspiel, and elsewhere in the conclusion,
Benjamin refers to the “sober-matter of fact” nature of the Baroque ruin (OT, 257). More remains to be said
regarding the importance of Hölderlin in Benjamin’s Romantic-Idealism.
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Benjamin critically moves against such a Christian theological model of
redemption, into a secular, or profane, model of theology, which glorifies materialhistorical models of redemption. For Benjamin, authentic allegory will ultimately “go
away empty handed,” forced to be content with its melancholy temperament of mourning,
the Goethean “mother of allegories and their content” (OT, 255, 251). Allegory can, at
best, only approximate and immerse itself in the secret hieroglyphic language of nature.
For Benjamin, allegory must maintain this “hopeless fidelity to the creaturely” against the
philosophical subject and the transcendent possibilities of redemption: “[the allegorists]
infidelity toward human beings corresponds to a fidelity toward these objects, one
completely absorbed in contemplative devotion” (OT, 161). Benjamin continues, “all the
wisdom of the melancholic hearkens to the deep; it is won from immersion in the life of
creaturely things, and nothing of the voice of revelation reaches it,” the melancholic
embraces such “promptings of mother earth drawn from the night of brooding like
treasures glimmering from their terrestrial hold” (OT, 157). It should be stressed that such
an affirmation of transience nonetheless remains within the Romantic-Idealist fold,
mirroring the self–destructive tendencies of the “late” English Romantics, and perhaps
more so, the traumatic a strife ridden middle work of Schelling which will be discussed in
the following chapter (5.3.2-5.3.3).
Hegel’s Phenomenology ends with a similar image of “Golgotha” [Schädelstätte] to
describe the (supposedly triumphant) arrival of his philosophy at “absolute knowing”
(PS, 492-3; PG, 591). This moment of absolute knowledge is often seen as the symbolic
triumph of reason over the totality of the real: the exultant completion of Spirit’s circle of
development. However, viewed allegorically, one can locate a similar reversal in Hegel’s
scene of absolute knowledge. As a ruin, or “Golgotha,” it does not culminate in some
symbolic transcendence, but rather, absolute knowing is shot through with the historical
contingencies of allegory, such that Hegel can likewise be seen as a thinker of transience.
Hegel figures absolute knowledge in a manner that affirms continual progression,
describing the culmination of Spirit’s journey in terms of a “movement...that returns into
itself, the circle that presupposes its beginning and reaches it only at the end” (PS, 488);
such that “absolute knowing” is not a final destination, but a “slow moving succession of
Spirits, a gallery of images” (PS, 492). If at the conclusion of the Phenomenology, Hegel
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seems on the edge of transience (as opposed to final absolute synthesis), in his Aesthetics,
he “ends” art’s dialectic with the confused sphere of Romantic art, as if to affirm the
perpetual movement of aesthetics, such that no synthesis or movement upward to
conceptual philosophy is seemingly possible (Rajan, “Writing,” 126, 122-3). This
possibility of reading Hegel as a ruined thinker of transience will be explored in more
depth in my final chapter (6.0) dealing with Hegel.
In the literature, it is common to mediate Benjamin’s melancholy within some
broader narrative of redemption: for Hansen, Benjamin is ultimately a theologicalexistentialist (in a manner akin to Kierkegaard), one who advocates an “ethicotheological freedom unto death” (95). For Buck-Morss, Benjamin’s pessimism lays the
groundwork for the political promise of Marxism (Dialectics, 175, 240-1). However,
Buck-Morss holds open the possibility of another form of resolution that will do justice to
both nature and history, and she reads The Arcades Project as a Kabalistic-Marxist
program in which “second nature” is “named” (Dialectics, 229, 240; cf. AP, 21-26).
Ultimately, Benjamin is a thinker who remains within the ambiguity and profundity of
natural history: within the contagion of nature rather than the stasis of the architectonic.
In this way, Benjamin’s critical-metaphysical philosophy is one which affirms transience
as an ur-principle with which all thought must reckon.
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Part 3: German Idealism
“Science sets forth this formative process in all its detail and necessity, exposing the mature configuration
of everything which has already been reduced to a moment and property of Spirit. The goal is Spirit’s
insight into what knowing is. Impatience demands the impossible, to wit, the attainment of the end without
the means. But the length of this path has to be endured, because for one thing, each moment is necessary;
and further, each moment has to be lingered over because each is itself as complete individual shape, and
one is only viewed in absolute perspective when its determinateness is regarded as a concrete whole, or the
whole is regarded as uniquely qualified by that determination.” Hegel, PS, 17.

The final part of this project takes up the work of Schelling and Hegel
respectively. The prior exegeses of Adorno and Benjamin has laid the groundwork to
consider German Idealism after Critical Theory, that is, in light of the post-Idealist
philosophical critical methods of Benjamin and Adorno. In this section I further contend
that the writings of Hegel and Schelling are always already self-fracturing, providing
ample mechanisms, or “accidents,” through which they can be read against themselves. I
present Schelling as one who attempts to theorize “with nature”; that is, one who attempts
to allows the autogenetic crises of nature to arise philosophically (Ch. 5). This attempt to
philosophize with nature has dire consequences for any possible system of philosophy,
and I read Schelling’s middle writings as space in which phantasmatic negativity
continually threatens philosophy’s providential closure. In my final chapter (6.0), I
consider Hegel’s (purportedly) absolute corpus as a “ruin,” which is able to be
speculatively invaded and refashioned in speculative directions. I elevate Hegel’s
aesthetics and philosophy of nature as prisms through which to reflect upon his
encyclopedic system, allowing Hegel to be critically read beyond himself.
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Philosophy with Nature: Schelling and the “Original Diremption in
Nature itself”

5

“It is futile to attempt to explain the diversity of nature by the peaceful eisemplasy of various forces.
Everything that becomes can only become in discontent. And just as anxiety is the fundamental sensation
of every living creature, so, too everything that lives is only conceived and born in violent struggle. Who
could believe that nature could create so many different, wonderful products...in peace and quiet?”
Schelling, AW, 90-1.

5.1

Introductory remarks: Philosophy with Nature
“There is no more nature.” Beckett,
Endgame, 11.

The work of Schelling has long been considered anathema, both in the history of
philosophy, and in commentary on German Idealism—in which Schelling is regarded as
a mere mystical precursor in the unfolding of Hegel’s project. Today, Schelling is
emerging from the “long dark shadow of Hegel” (Snow, 1). The ubiquity of issues of
nature, climate, and ecology, along with the scholarly interventions of a recent array of
speculative and deconstructive thinkers (such as Wirth, Rajan, Žižek) has led to an
(un)timely re-evaluation of Schelling’s natality as a theorist. Schelling provides the
resources to think an expanded conception of philosophy, one which does justice to—or
risks itself in relation to—the autogenetic dynamism of the natural world. In the
following chapter I will explore the main contours of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie: a
model of philosophizing with the natural world, allowing the contradictory dynamics of
“life” to arise philosophically, in contradistinction to conventional enlightenment
philosophies of nature as typified by Kant. Following this discussion of
Naturphilosophie, the consequences of nature for a broader philosophical system will
also be explored via a reading of Schelling’s “middle work” (1809-1821). Schelling’s
thinking develops a constitutive, negative dialectical, “tension between system and life”
(Snow, 3), allowing pathological negativity a dangerous degree of autonomy within the
philosophical system.
To philosophize about nature with Schelling means leaving space for the vexing
and problematic status of nature as an “original diremption”: an “Ungrund,” or
“indivisible remainder” that can never be fully incorporated into thought (FO, 205; FE,
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29).249 Schelling advocates that one practice “ecology with nature”: any possible system
of thought must be exposed to the unconscious “abyss of the past” in nature (AW, 31).250
In a similar manner, Adorno employs psychoanalysis to lead philosophy back to its
constitutive “natural history,” the transient metaphysic subtending all thought (NH, 2634). For Schelling, nature cannot be thought as a mere moment in philosophy’s final
(conceptual) triumph; instead, it must be seen as a dynamic and troubling space with
which philosophy must continually tarry. As such, Schelling allows one to theorize the
disaster of nature in a way that does not subsume its tangled “rustle” to the “stillness of
the thought” (Hegel, PN, 7). Likewise, Naturphilosophie does not fetishize nature in itself
as some deep ecological substratum independent of its actualization in the human subject.
Schelling allows thought to be more “realistic” or “naturalistic” with respect to questions
of ecology: dispensing with harmonious, vengeful, or anthropocentric notions of nature.
Instead, Schelling beckons nature to arise philosophically, experimentally opening
philosophy to the dynamics of nature and “life.”251 For Schelling, nature remains a
disruptive moment which continually contests the stability of thought.

Throughout this chapter I take “nature” to be a constellation of divergent, often contradictory, processes
defined in dialectical opposition to history (following Adorno, NH, 253, 263). This is not to say that “nature
in itself” does not exist, but rather, such natural processes are always already socially encoded by human
practices and thus expressed within the human normative space of reason. Yet, following Adorno and
Schelling, one must posit a negative dialectical relationship between nature and history, neither can be fully
resolved (in the sense of Aufhebung) in the other, instead one must recognize the inherent “non-identity,” or
perpetual conflict, between nature and history. In this way, “nature,” remains a regulative “non-identical”
notion, a “dark ground of spirit” (McGrath) or “indivisible remainder” (Žižek), which can never fully be
recuperated in thought. As such, “nature” names the perpetual other of spirit, an originary site of
diremption which continually undermines the stability of thought.
250
By this I mean to refashion the title of Timothy Morton’s Ecology Without Nature (2009), which argues
that “the idea of nature is getting in the way of properly ecological forms of culture, philosophy, politics
and art” (1, 14). Morton aptly criticizes the fetishization of natural “ambiance” and “eco-mimesis” (124),
within ecological discourse, chastising such discourses as being excessively “Romantic,” while neglecting
the complex mediations between nature and history. Morton himself argues that one should dispense
wholly with authentic “nature,” instead advocating for a “melancholic” environmental aesthetic, or “dark
ecology,” heavily informed by the work of Adorno (202, 184-6). Morton is correct in his eco-critical
analysis of the tropes of ecological writing, though his characterization of Romanticism is simplistic,
ignoring the ecological potentials within darker romantic thinkers such as Hegel and Schelling. Thus, I
contend that Morton’s wholesale rejection of “nature” is premature. I wish to refashion Morton’s term to
harness its critical-heuristic value, while seeing German Idealist conceptions of “nature,” as still containing
immense contemporary efficacy.
251
Wirth has demonstrated the immense efficacy of Schelling for discourses of extinction (or “the ruin of
nature”) and climate catastrophe. See “Extinction” in Schelling’s Practice of the Wild (3-29). Much more
remains to be said about the ecological valences of Schelling’s thinking, with specific regard to his
imperative to philosophize with nature, or to allow natural processes to arise philosophically.
249
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Schelling chastises previous systems of thought—characterized by the Idealism of
Leibniz, and the monist-materialism of Spinoza (FE, 59-62)—for their lack of a “living
ground” (FE, 26); that is, for treating nature as something external to Spirit and failing to
recognize the reciprocal entanglement of both domains. Both merely “real” or “ideal”
starting points for philosophy are unable to grasp the “original identity” of the “organic
whole” subtending both nature and Spirit (US, 9-13, 27, 36; Matthews, xiii, 9). Following
Hegel, philosophy must understand “substance and subject” as entwined moments, or
differing potencies, participating in the same absolute (PS, 10-12).252 Yet this should not
be seen as some “correlationism” in which philosophy anthropomorphically projects
itself into nature (Meillassoux, 5), but rather, a troubling dialogue in which philosophy is
led to consider its unconscious pathologies via the autogenesis of nature. Schelling does
not present an “autopoietic” system in which some stable immunitary equilibrium is
maintained, but rather, an “autogenetic” system, in which speculative offshoots and
disasters, continually upset the stability of thought. Jason Wirth has aptly glossed
Schelling’s thought as a “practice of the wild,” which stages “an asymmetrical
dialogue...like attempting to communicate with nature...[or] Job’s dialogues with the
whirlwind” in which philosophy is incessantly fractured by discoursing with its own
alterity, exposing its concepts to the “living ground” of nature (Conspiracy, 159; Wild,
xii). Schelling’s corpus challenges one to “Think and dwell on the sovereign autogenesis
of nature” (With, Wild, 23). In these two chapters on Schelling and Hegel, a model of
philosophy with nature will be forwarded, in which thought immanently collaborates and
critically reflects upon itself by way of the natural world. The crowning achievements of
Idealism—notions such as freedom, dialectic and system—are forced to reckon with the
disruptive fecundity and “sublime squandering” (Wirth, Wild, 13) of the natural world.
Schelling’s work should be seen as staging a confrontation, without definitive
resolution, between philosophy and nature, opening a productive space in which
philosophy is troubled and (re)theorized in dynamic directions. This space of metacritique—in which reason is led to immanently confront and reflect upon itself—is

For more on the “speculative identity thesis” in Schelling (and in relation to Kant and Hegel), see Ng
(67-80).
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central to the work of Benjamin and Adorno, along with the absolute Idealism of Hegel
and Schelling.253 Thought in constellation, these thinkers provide a polyphony of models
through which to theorize the actuality of philosophy anew, encompassing a vast array of
disciplines, domains, and experiences. These gestures of immanent critique (of reason by
itself) invite consideration of those moments in the Idealist tradition in which the
autogenetic dynamism— “the accident” (Hegel, PS, 18)—or the inherent genesis of
thought troubles the Idealist desire to construct overarching systems of all “the
philosophical sciences” (Hegel, EO, 51-3). In such a manner, German Idealism should be
read as performing an auto-deconstruction, or short circuiting, of thought by itself,
considering philosophy within alternate disciplinary constellations, along with in
differing relations with the natural world.
Presented in constellation with Benjamin and Adorno, the deconstructive
ramifications of Hegel and Schelling’s absolute Idealism further jut to the fore. In relation
to questions of nature, the Naturphilosophie of Schelling (and Hegel) provides a lively
space through which to revitalize the thought of nature beyond the static antinomies of
contemporary ecological thought, allowing nature to be considered a dynamic Ungrund
to new potential philosophies of Spirit. Unique to the absolute Idealism of Schelling and
Hegel is a commitment to philosophize with nature: to incorporate and tarry with its
mishaps and incongruities. Though nature is often addressed in the tradition of
philosophy, its tangled autogenesis is sacrificed in the realization of larger philosophical
aims: such as the unity of the philosophical architectonic, or ethics (for Kant), or the
“absolute” realization of the encyclopedic system (for Hegel).254
I take “Naturphilosophie” to provide a “naturalistic yet non-mechanistic
foundation” for philosophy, in which philosophy does not apply external concepts to the

As I have asserted throughout, I critically employ the term “absolute Idealism” to broadly gloss the
thinking of Hegel and Schelling. Following Beiser (Subjectivism, 355-74), absolute Idealism should be
distinguished from the critical Idealism of Kant and Fichte in its movement of reason beyond the concepts
and categories of the epistemic subject, considering reason as manifesting in nature, history, politics, art,
along with the structure of thought.
254
As will be demonstrated in the next chapter on Hegel, though he attempts to subsume nature
philosophically, Naturphilosophie remains a troubling “indivisible remainder” that he is unable to smoothly
incorporate into his finished encyclopedia. Via Adorno, I will experimentally unbind Hegel’s subsumption
of nature, employing nature as a critical lens through which to reflect on the Hegelian program.
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world, but immanently collaborates with nature, such that nature is allowed to arise
theoretically (Beiser, Idealism, 508; Grant, 2-3). Naturphilosophie is a mode of thought
which does not oppose nature to Spirit but understands both subject and object as
mutually implicated in each other. Schelling’s approach to philosophizing about nature
moves against the “fallacy of constitutive subjectivity” (Adorno, ND, xx). That is,
Naturphilosophie endeavors to think nature beyond the Kantian Copernican turn:
unconditioned by the boundaries of the subjective Idealist epistemic subject, recognizing
the “primacy of the object,” or beginning with dynamics other than those of the subject
(Adorno, ND, 183-88). However, such thought models do not fetishize some immediate
“sense-certainty,” or authentic (state of) nature independent of conceptual determination.
For Hegel and Schelling, nature comes to thought already mediated by way of the
physical and life sciences: the task is not to recover some lost immediacy with “Being,”
but rather, to open a productive and (inter) disciplinary dialogue between nature and
Spirit. Adorno and Benjamin’s notion of “natural history” allows nature and Sprit to be
dialectically reflected upon by way of each other, producing a continual troubling of one
term by way of the other. Further, natural history also demonstrates the possibility of
another kind of history, another model of thinking German Idealism that does not
culminate in some stable transition from nature to Spirit, but rather, presents an immense
speculative laboratory through which to think alternative natural historical configurations.
What is promised in the Naturphilosophie of Schelling, a promise mirrored in the
work of Adorno and Benjamin, is the potential for a more inclusive project of reason: one
in which nature is not subordinated to a narrow philosophical agenda, but rather, is
“quickened with freedom,” compelled to arise philosophically and allowed a constitutive
philosophical role (FO, 14). Such a “quickening with freedom” occurs on the level of
form, and following Matthews, Schelling’s work attempts to import an “organic and
developmental model of philosophy,” from the “system of self-organizing nature that is
our world” (xii). The experimental dynamism of Schelling’s texts—their essayistic,
ephemeral, and provisional character—mirrors the autogenetic and pathological
productivity of the natural world. Likewise, Adorno’s work attempts to incorporate
“nature’s wound” (AT, 68-75), that is, to allegorically figure the suffering ephemerality of
the natural world in the very form of philosophy (as I have argued in 1.3). Benjamin and

199

Adorno confront a conceptual philosophy of the concept with an originary history of
transience (or natural history), shattering philosophy’s absolute symbolic pretensions via
the primacy of change, decay, and ruin, alongside other non-discursive (or “nonidentical”) logics.
The relationship between the Frankfurt School and Schelling has yet to be
considered in depth. Though explicit reference to Schelling in Adorno and Benjamin’s
corpus is scant (see 1.3 & 4.2.2), several proximate figures, notably Bloch, Habermas,
and Rosenzweig engaged extensively with Schelling’s work, such that the anxiety of
Schelling’s influence is likely.255 However, as this project is not an influence study, what
is more important is the thematic affinity between Schelling, Benjamin, and Adorno
centering on a shared commitment to a natural-historical philosophy of transience.
In other words, Schelling can be seen in a feedback loop of reciprocal critical
illumination with the Frankfurt School (Benjamin and Adorno), demonstrating the
possibility of reading German Idealism—along with its notions of Spirit—beyond its
historical epoch, while further illuminating the presence of Idealist motifs within Adorno
and Benjamin’s work. This chapter provides a critical exegesis of Schelling’s work
animated by the post-historical constellation of the Frankfurt School, primarily Adorno,
though Benjamin and Habermas as well, along with supplementary reference to
Bataille.256 These theorists allow Schelling to be seen as deconstructing static
enlightenment notions of nature, while allowing a robust conception of nature to be
forwarded within a philosophical framework that is potentially amenable to critical social
theory.

Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption, employs many prominent Schellingian (and Idealist) motifs, see 3-6, 10-18,
41-53. Habermas’ first dissertation, “Dialectical Idealism in Transition to Materialism” (written under
Adorno’s supervision), examines Schelling’s Weltalter Project, both immanently, in relation to the tradition
of Idealism (specifically in relation to Hegel, 48-53, 61, 81), and speculatively in relation to Jewish
mysticism (53-5), and historical materialism (64-85). These lines of thinking are continued in Habermas’
“Ernst Bloch—A Marxist Schelling” (see 61-76), and further highlighted by Rajan (“Natural History,” 1945). More remains to be said regarding the relationship of Bloch to Schelling, following Habermas’ lead.
Given that Bloch serves as a dialectical interlocutor for much of Benjamin and Adorno’s work, further
speculative constellations can be drawn between these thinkers.
256
Particularly in these chapters on Schelling and Hegel, Bataille’s work will be employed to highlight the
negative and transgressive elements of their absolute Idealist projects. Habermas’ (Adornian) work on
Schelling (“Dialectical Idealism…”) will also be referenced throughout this chapter, and remains an under
theorized site in the tradition of Critical Theory.
255
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This speculative constellation allows several issues to be raised. In a primary
sense, Schelling’s thought prefigures several facets of what Adorno would later term the
negative dialectic: a mode of dialectical thought which favors negativity, or non-synthesis
against the unity of the philosophical system (see 1.4 & 2.2). Particularly in Schelling’s
middle work, namely the Freedom Essay (1809) and Ages of the World (1815), under the
influence of Hegel, nature and freedom become entangled in a rotary dialectic in which
each pole continually un-works the other. This middle work can be opposed to
Schelling’s earlier System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), in which nature unfolds
progressively towards freedom in Fichtean fashion (STI, 1-4, 199). This and other early
texts such as the Treatise Explicatory of the Idealism in the Science of Knowledge (1797),
typify a certain enlightenment optimism that would see the progressive unfolding of
Spirit out of nature, providentially grounding a world of freedom upon the series of selforganizing stages that is nature (STI, 202) —a paradigm that Schelling still holds on to as
a hope in the Freedom essay (FO, 53).257 Seen in constellation with Schelling and Hegel,
Adorno’s thought should be read as an Idealist philosophy of Spirit transposed into the
twentieth-century. Adorno’s negative dialectic attempts to articulate a speculative model
of experience that avoids the pitfalls of epistemological subjectivism (the Kantian “the
fallacy of constitutive subjectivity” [ND, xx]) and Hegelian conceptualism (or “identity
thinking,” [ND, 1-11]). Schelling’s thought provides a plethora of “theoretical” models
through which to think such alternative narratives of Idealism, fracturing its absolute
pretentions by way of alterity and negativity (Rajan, “Margins,” 325-334).
For Derrida (in Of Spirit, 1987), “Geist” remains marred by a problematic residue
of logo-centrism and the baggage of metaphysics, thus twentieth-century thinkers such as
Heidegger did their best to avoid beginning philosophy in such a problematic “Idealist”
manner (1-6, 29).258 However, Benjamin and Adorno (along with Lukács, Simmel, and

Describing his early providential narrative of human spirit, Schelling will write: “That the concept of
history embodies the notion of an infinite tendency to progress has been sufficiently shown...For those who
deny it could equally well maintain that man is no more possessed of a history than the animal, being
confined...to an eternal circuit of actions, like Ixion upon his wheel” (STI, 202).
258
Derrida’s Of Spirit argues that Heidegger, despite his attempt to begin philosophy anew as “fundamental
ontology,” remains marred by a discourse of “Spirit” (5-9, 14-22). Adorno levels similar critiques of
Heidegger throughout ND (61-133) and The Jargon of Authenticity (xix-xxii, 3-9), though contra Derrida,
257
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Bloch) embrace a post-historical conception of Idealism within the academic context of
neo-Kantianism, extending Idealism, and its problematics, into the twentieth-century
(Rajan, “Encyclopedia,” 341). Given the primacy of experience [Erfahrung] for both
Benjamin and Adorno (Jay, Experience, 313-19, 342-46), this notion can also be
extended to interrogate Schelling, a thinker who dispenses with an epistemically
localizable subject wholesale, in favor of thought “experiments.”259 Finally, both Adorno
and Benjamin elaborate a metaphysics of “natural history,” which understands
philosophy as allegorically proclaimed against an ur-history of transience, a model which
also serves as a critical heuristic with which to evaluate previous systems of thought.
Likewise, Schelling develops a similar mortuary understanding of philosophy as a
practice authorized atop an ephemeral “Ungrund,” which invites the energy of nature to
repeatedly interrupt thought. Schelling likewise employs the “living ground”—supplied
by his own Naturphilosophie—as a hermeneutic of suspicion with which to evaluate the
“Idealism” of his contemporaries, chastising the enlightenment for the forgetting of its
naturalistic basis.
The actuality of philosophy can nowhere more forcefully be seen than in Schelling,
for whom the abyssal ground of nature constitutes a diremptive realm against which the
highest ideals of the enlightenment must test themselves. This “living ground”
necessitates a negative dialectical understanding of philosophy, whereby the duplicity at
the heart of nature continually contests the stability of thought, such that nature can never
be finally sublated into conceptual thought. In presenting a Schellingian understanding of
“nature,” it is essential to grasp his divergence from the conventional enlightenment
thought of nature (5.2)—typified by Kant—such that the novelty of Schelling’s
interventions can emerge more forcefully (5. 3). Following a discussion of Kant, the
experimental “first outlines” of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie will be presented, in which
nature is thought “as subject”: as an autogenetic and self-organizing system of

Adorno wishes to return to an Idealist discourse of Spirit. For a further defense of philosophies of Spirit
(particularly Hegel) in the twentieth-century, see Cassirer “Geist und Leben,” (874-880).
259
In English both “experience” and “experiment” share the same Latin root: “experientia,” which
connotes the acquisition of knowledge through repeated trials— “trial, proof, or experiment” (Jay,
Experience, 10). These notions should be seen in constellation with section 1.1, in which I position Adorno
as a thinker of “the essay,” that is a thinker of speculative trial arrangements and provisional constellations.
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“productivity” (5.3.1). Though Schelling was once cast as some irrational-mystical
vitalist summarily overcome by Hegel’s conceptual sobriety (PS, 9-10), I argue that
nature remains a deconstructive site of negativity which continually troubles thought: the
diremptive natality of nature is destructive, as nature continually contests any static
individual entity, and is continually marred by its own “universal duality” (FO,88-9).
Following the presentation of nature as the “real basis” of Schelling’s thought, I examine
Schelling’s transposition of the tensions of nature into the domain of “spirit” (or
philosophy) by way of a reading of his 1809 Freedom Essay (5.3.2), along with his 1815
Ages of the World (5.3.3). Within these texts I present Schelling as a thinker of the
“negative dialectic” who gives us the resources to think the philosophical system, along
with its possible negative transgression (in “evil” and “disease”), allowing the practice of
thought to be understood in a “natural-historical” manner.
Following Adorno’s recognition of the link between epistemological conceptual
thinking and the domination of nature, one should endeavor to think philosophy in a nonoppressive, though nonetheless systematic matter, such that it is able to allow nature to
“arise philosophically” (Schelling, Ideas, 5). Adorno’s solutions to this impasse, via his
model of philosophy as “constellations,” has been discussed in 1.4.1 & 2.2 of this
dissertation. Schelling attempts a similar task of honoring nature (or “the object”)
philosophically, attempting to transfer the dynamism of nature into the very form of
philosophy (Matthews, xii-iii; Grant, 1). Further, in Schelling’s essayistic, or “draft like”
thinking, the self-troubling, or auto-deconstruction of German Idealism is highly evident:
he seemingly erected entire systems and projects, only to destroy them, starting again
from scratch, continuing to “carry out his education in public”—a thinker who constantly,
“began again from the beginning” (Hegel, History 3, 513, 515).260 Schelling’s inability to
ever complete his system definitively, thus grounding the possibility of a positive
theodicy — his perpetual remainder on the level of the “outline,” draft, or “essay”—

Further describing Schelling’s draft like and essayistic style, Hegel writes: “In the various presentations
of his views, Schelling on each occasion began again from the beginning, because...what went before him
did not satisfy him; he has ever pressed on to seek a new form, and thus he tried various forms and
terminologies in succession without ever setting forth one in succession, one complete and consistent
whole” (Hegel, History, 3, 515).
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depicts the Faustian bargain of Naturphilosophie: to do justice to nature in itself
(autogenetically), necessitates a fracturing of the stability of the philosophical
architectonic (as understood by Kant). In striving to present the dynamic and duplicitous
moments of nature within philosophy, Schelling inaugurates a troubled system of
thought, one which is constantly called into question via a dialogue with the alterity of
nature. Paradoxically, Schelling’s fecundity as a thinker, his vital plasticity, and his
problem of “beginning,” mirrors, on the level of form, the incessant (and oftentimes
destructive) “productivity” of nature. As will be argued, this productivity should be
considered autogenetic (contra autopoietic), whereby the dynamism of nature threatens
any possible recuperation within a closed immunitary system of thought. As in natural
history, transience, diremption, ruin, and allegory have the last word.
For Schelling, nature can permeate philosophy, even supply it with its “ground,”
provided this ground remain abyssal, an Ungrund with which any possible philosophy of
Spirit must reckon. Schelling’s “naturalistic” ground of philosophy does not provide any
stable reconciliation between freedom and necessity, nor does it wholly dispense with
normativity, but rather, it provokes a reciprocal troubling and articulation of philosophy
and nature by way of each other. This tensioned mosaic is made possible by Schelling’s
revised conception of “the copula,” which allows philosophy to hold together divergent
moments via their identity-in-difference.261 In his early Naturphilosophie (1797-1800),
much of Schelling’s novel understanding of the philosophical system arises from his
refashioning of the Kantian conception of “Organism,” which overflows its restrictions
within the architectonic of reason, providing Schelling with a schema by which to think a
systemic philosophy of spirit in a dynamic manner that allows for an ongoing and active
exchange between philosophy and nature, or the “ideal” and “real” moments of thought
(Matthews, 6-8, 12, 15, 17-18, 21). Though Schelling’s early Naturphilosophie allows for
speculative cross-pollinations between spirit and nature, it is in his middle philosophy

Schelling’s notion of the copula has much in common with Hegel’s notion the “speculative proposition”
(PS, 36-40). Hegel describes such a proposition in terms of a back-and-forth movement between subject
and predicate, as one term is continually “thrown back” upon the other, forcing one to “learn from
experience that we meant something other than we meant to mean; and this correction of our meaning
compels out knowing to go back to the proposition, and understand it in some other way” (PS, 39).
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that the autogenesis of nature short circuits Idealism’s absolute pretensions: “The middle
work is the after-shock of the blow dealt to Idealism by the earth and life sciences”
(Rajan, “Natural history,” 193).

5.2

The “Crooked Timber” of Enlightenment: Kant and the Fate of Nature

“Nothing straight can be constructed from such warped wood as that which man is made of. Nature only
requires of us that we should approximate to this idea.” Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” 46.

In articulating Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, it is useful to study the extent to
which his dynamic metaphysics departs from, while inhabiting, the Kantian subjective
epistemological conception of philosophy. Kant’s mature “critical” philosophy (17811789) should be seen as revolutionizing the basic methodological orientation of
philosophy. Previously, philosophy had sought to begin with some secure foundation of
certainty (Descartes’ “cogito,” or Lockean, “sense experience”), upon which a secure
edifice of thought could be geometrically deduced (Adorno, Epistemology, 6-8). With
Kant, one instead commences “transcendentally,” with the “quid juris” assumption of
basic conditions of “possible experience” (CPR, 219-221; Deleuze, Kant, 13). Kantian
philosophy begins with an assumption of the primacy of epistemology (over
metaphysics), positing the constitutive role played by the epistemological subject (or “the
transcendental unity of apperception”) in the construction of the world of experience,
along with any possible architectonic of reason.
However, Kant’s primacy of epistemology has dire consequences for the thought
of nature, as this “autopoietic” sidelining of nature in the architectonic of pure reason
represents yet another instance of the lowly destiny of nature, which within the
philosophical tradition following the pre-Socratics, was never given its due in an
“autogenetic” sense. Instead, nature’s complexity is sacrificed for the stability of the
philosophical system, or the general level of the concept. “Autopoiesis,” following
Maturana and Varela, can be defined as a system (such as the biological cell) that is able
to maintain itself via a regulation of its boundaries and composition, taking new
information back into itself, and regulating it by way of an organic concept of wholeness
(66-8, 82-4, 88; Rajan, “Immunitary,” 40-41, 46). “Autogenesis,” refers to systems which
generate chaotic and unruly moments out of themselves, or auto-immune systems which
are potentially detrimental to their own immunity protections, or to the stability of their
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organization. Schelling should be seen as one who conceives of nature “autogenetically,”
theorizing nature in a manner that perpetually disrupts any possible philosophy of Spirit
(Rajan, “Immunitary,” 40). Autogenesis is the logic of natural history as understood by
Benjamin and Adorno, a logic of change, transience, and interruption.
Kant’s subjective epistemological reorientation had immense implications for
philosophizing about nature, which is denied any meaningful “constitutive” status, or
autonomy in and for itself, as nature’s ontological metaphysical complexity is reduced to
a mere occasion for subjective autonomy and ethics. Kant’s subjective-Idealist revolution
robs philosophy of its “living ground,” and “alibies the excision of nature itself from
metaphysics” (Schelling, FE, 26; Grant, 7). Despite such erasures, Grant will assert—
with specific reference to post-Kantian Idealism-Romanticism—that all philosophy
conducted after Kant would take place within the “Kantian territory,” or with Adorno,
within the Kantian “force-field” (59, 9-12; Kant, 4). This is to say, philosophies of nature
after Kant could not commence by simply rejecting Kant’s interventions, but rather, they
must tarry with Kant’s terminology, with notions such as the organism as “natural
purpose” (Naturzweck) and the distinction between “regulative and constitutive” ideas.
For the purposes of this chapter, discussion will be limited to the main works of Kant’s
“critical project” (1781-1789), though this is not to deny the influence of Kant’s other
works—specifically the Opus Postumum (1936), and the Metaphysical Foundations for
Natural Science (1786)262—on post-Kantian Idealism, but rather, to highlight the
troublesome implications for the thinking of nature latent in Kant’s critical project for the
“unity of reason” (CPR, 387-8; Deleuze, Kant, 68).
The question of nature is latently implicated in several vexing moments of the
critical program, most notably in the discussion of “the sublime” (CPJ, 134-149),
“genius” (CPJ, 186-195), “organism” (CPJ, 244-52), and “natural teleology” (CPJ, 26184) along with Kant’s famous “third antinomy” between “nature” (understood as
mechanistic necessity) and “freedom” (understood as ethical spontaneity). Particularly in

For a detailed reconstruction of the relationship between Kant’s critical project, and his later Opus
Postumum, see Beiser, Idealism (180-214). Broadly stated, Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations is consistent
with the critical project (and its excision of nature), while the Opus, is speculatively divergent, as Kant
seemingly invites Idealist invasions of his philosophical program.
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the sublime, just as one encounters in nature “an abyss in which [one] fears to lose
[one]self,” the faculty of reason intervenes, reminding one of an inner ethical-judgmental
“power” higher than that of nature, allowing “the mind” to make “palpable to itself...its
own vocation even over nature” (CPJ, 141, 144-7). These ambiguous moments highlight
the “phantasmatic,” or “tangled” (Krell, Contagion, 11), status of nature in the critical
project, which can be read as a cipher to broader pathological moments of the Kantian
program.263
In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/3), Kant is forthright in positioning his
philosophy as a “revolution” akin to the scientific interventions of Copernicus and
Newton (CPR, 110-3). Hitherto, philosophy had been a mere capricious and dogmatic use
of the imagination, though now that a “critique” of its foundations had been completed,
philosophy (as the working out of “synthetic a priori judgments”) could take its rightful
(albeit minor) place amongst the faculties of knowledge (Conflict, 25, 43-5). In justifying
his methodological novelty, Kant continually positions philosophy as a “new science” in
dialogue with the physical sciences and mathematics, which are upheld as the guarantors
of truth towards which philosophy should aspire (Prolegomena, 2-3, 11: CPR, 108-10,
140, 129).264 Taking its cue from the (a priori) mathematical-sciences, Kant’s formal
critical method expunged the tangled realm of nature from philosophy, demonstrating
another instance of the lowly fate of nature in the tradition of thought.

Gasché elaborates Bataille’s logic of the “phantasm”: a “scientific myth” (1), or a constellation of
downcast moments left out of Hegel’s sojourn of Spirit. This concept will be further elaborated in 6.1.2 of
this dissertation. Gasché is perhaps too critical of the Hegelian program, wholly exploding it by way its
abject moments. Instead, as I will argue in Chapter 6, Hegel’s encyclopedia can be read alongside its
phantasmatic offshoots, as part of a broader “general economy” of philosophy.
264
Kant’s ongoing dialogue with mathematics throughout his critical project is complex. At key junctures
in Kant’s elaboration of the task of philosophy as a form “syllogistic reasoning,” that is, as the exercise of
“synthetic a priori judgments” about the world, Kant appeals to mathematics as an exemplary case which
demonstrates (to the skeptical empiricist) how far philosophy can go independent of experience:
“Mathematics gives us a splendid example of how far we can go with a priori cognition independent of
experience” (CPR 129, 140). Schelling (in his “The Nature of Philosophy as Science”) is critical of Kant’s
favoring of a unified mathematical understanding of philosophy (against the pathological accidents of
philosophy): “It is as though one preferred a sterometrically regular crystal” which “has no possibility of
falling ill, while [philosophy] hosts germs of every possible illness” (212). Adorno is likewise highly
critical of such a “mathematicization” of philosophy as a “model of unity” which “brings the manifold of
experience to its abstraction” (Epistemology, 9-10). Benjamin likewise criticized Kant from the perspective
of mathematics, speculating regarding new models of philosophical grounding afforded by non-standard
math (as I have argued in 3.1.1).
263
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Despite Kant’s desire for apodictic certainty, which would be attained with reason’s
self-critical elevation to the status of a science, Kant recognizes the inherent “speculative
interest of reason,” which is constantly involving itself (dialectically) in false
problematics and “illusions” beyond the tribunal of “possible experience” (CPR, 384-6).
Such an inborn proclivity of reason to speculate, metaphysically overstepping the
boundaries of possible experience, must be tamed and put to work within Kant’s sober
architectonic of philosophy. In fact, such a motif of domestication runs throughout the
Kantian project of reason: ideas (the purview of reason) must be restrained by way of the
understanding; desire must be subjugated in the service of ethics; and individual “tastes”
must be buttressed by a communitarian vision of humanity. As such, Kant conducts a
great philosophical rapprochement, “the limitation of knowledge... in the service of faith”
(CPR, 117), or rather, the employment of the speculative ideas of reason in a
“problematic” or “regulative” sense (in the interest of practical reason), such that they
serve the purpose of grounding his moral world view. Stated otherwise, philosophy can
become a Fachwissenschaft or “specialized science” (Zamitto, Kant, Herder, 1-14),
under the condition it recognize the limited nature of what can be known “a priori” by
way of synthetic judgments. Philosophy can deduce (and clarify) the categories of the
understanding in relation to the “transcendental unity of apperception” and the forms of
sensibility, or “intuition” (CPR, 210-4, 245-8, 153-85), but it cannot speculate idly, nor
become needlessly obsessed with its own problematics. Reason as a faculty is granted a
speculative, though limited purview as its “higher ideals”—such as the existence of God
and the immortality of the soul —are granted a “practical interest” (Deleuze Kant, 6-7).
Speculation beyond the bounds of possible experience can be efficacious, provided it
regulatively grounds the greater science of morality (or “practical reason”).
Within Kant’s highly bureaucratic and a priori unity of reason, the empirical, or
“nature” more generally, cannot be known in-itself, nor can it reciprocally influence the
transcendental.265 Instead, nature can be comprehended only “formally”; that is,
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By this I do not mean to rehearse the tired criticism of Kant as some Berkleyian Idealist who denies
wholly the existence of the external world. Such a view is intellectually ungenerous and is critically dealt
with throughout the “B Edition” of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (see. CPR, 326-337). There is much
evidence to support a reading of Kant as a “direct realist,” and such a view has been extensively defended
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according to the a priori necessary laws which govern its appearance in the epistemic
subject. Nature, as a site of sensuous experience essentially drops out. Even in the
Critique of Judgment, the manifold complexity of the natural world is reined in by the
regulative imposition of an “organic whole,” and nature is thus granted a merely
subjective place within the transcendental architectonic. However, Kant’s regulative
governance of the natural world unwittingly weakens his attempt to repress the
complexity of nature, as “empirical chaos” continually remains a threat to the Kantian
project (Allison, Taste, 38; Ng, 31-6).266
The divergent “interests of reason”—particularly between ethics and speculative
philosophy— pose evident problems for Kant’s desire to construct a unitary
“architectonic of pure reason” (CPR, 387-8, 691-701), a tension which is explicitly
figured in his “Third antinomy of Pure Reason” (CPR, 484-9). Here Kant presents “the
chasm” between a deterministic vision of nature, understood as subservient to causal
laws, and the ethical “spontaneity” of the autonomous subject: its ability to judge for
itself coupled by its capacity to act ethically by “giving the law to itself.” Kant’s
“transcendental freedom” (CPR, 486) responds to such a dilemma by severing the world
into the “sensuous” realm of nature (understood as subservience to phenomenal laws of
appearance), and the “intelligible” (or noumenal) realm of ethical and epistemic
autonomy. Kant’s critical philosophy is another instance in which the lushness of nature
is sacrificed for the generalizable level of the concept and the stability of the
philosophical system.
Given Kant’s commitment to a “transcendental” mode of explanation—that is, an
immanent deduction of reason according to its own laws—his splitting of world into
phenomena and noumena begets intractable problems from the standpoint of genesis:
how can the world be at once causally determined, while also giving rise to a “free”

by Henry Allison, see Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (4-6, 20-49). Deleuze echoes such sentiments,
asserting: “Empirical realism is a constant feature of [Kantian] critical philosophy” (Kant, 14).
266
Allison defines “empirical chaos” or “disorder at the empirical level” as a scenario in which the
uniformity (of the organic whole) that the transcendental imposed upon nature does not hold, as situations
in which nature’s empirical unruliness continually threatens Kant’s transcendental deduction (Taste, 3738). As Allison writes, “it is a scenario in which the uniformity of nature that necessarily exhibits in virtue
of its conformity to the transcendental laws imposed by the very nature of the understanding does not
translate into an empirically accessible uniformity...” (Taste, 38).
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subject which is capable of transcending givenness through self-determinate ethical
maxims? Put otherwise, though Kant can provide a consistent transcendental account of
nature, along with a rational-practical system of ethics, he is unable to mediate between
the two domains. Kant cannot articulate the transition from the realm of nature to that of
Spirit within the confines of his subjective epistemology; that is, unless he begs a
plethora metaphysical questions which his philosophy so ardently attempts to limit.
Kant’s 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment (CPJ) attempts to “mediate”
between the realms of “freedom” and “necessity” (or the determinate laws of nature),
through the newly “discovered” faculty of judgment which, “makes possible the
transition from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom”
(CPJ, 82, 8, 44-45, 60-3, 80-3). Specifically, Kant’s notion of “reflective judgment”—
distinguished from “determinant judgment” in which “the particular” is schematized
under “the universal”— generates a universal out of a particular, as in teleological and
aesthetic judgments, and allows Kant to think nature and its relation to the subject in a
more dynamic, though “regulatively” limited, manner (CPJ, 15-20, 26; Matthews, 69).
After the elucidation of reflective judgment by way of the aesthetic (of the beautiful and
the sublime), in the second part of the CPJ Kant undertakes a critique of “teleological
judgment,” which entertains questions regarding the cognition of nature “as a whole”
(CPJ, 231-283). In considering nature and thinking natural purposiveness, Kant allows
that the faculty of judgment posit (“problematically”) the existence of an “organic
whole,” or “organism,” which allows for the thought of reciprocal relations between “part
and whole,” and for the thought of the unity and diversity of the natural world as a “selforganizing being” (CPJ, 245, 244-7).
Though the idea of such an organism exists nowhere in nature, nor can one
experience its existence, thinking nature “organically” allows for “a system of possible
empirical cognitions,” a “unity of kinship” amidst the “multiplicity and diversity of
empirical laws” (CPJ, 13). That is, the Kantian organism figures the possibility of a new
science of nature grounded in the architectonic of reason. Kant permits himself such
speculative excesses under the proviso that his analysis remains “regulative”— it ascribes
no ontological “constitutive” existence to its impositions— one must think nature “as-if”
its polyphony progresses teleologically within a self-organizing whole (CPJ, 234).
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Though Kant opens a new discussion of nature—performing a “great service to
philosophy” (Hegel, SOL, 654; Ng, 23-27)—he simultaneously autopoietically tames the
unruliness of natural spontaneity within his merely regulative understanding “natural
purpose.” The Kantian idea keeps the unruly autogenesis of nature in check, attempting
to put its dynamic fecundity to work within the system of reason. In post-Kantian
Idealism-Romanticism, this notion of organism will be liberated from its Kantian
confines and will allow Schelling to think “nature as subject” or “productivity,” in an
autogenetic manner, that is, as unbound from its regulation within the economy of an
autopoietic system, permitting nature to be seen in a disruptive and unruly relation to any
possible system of philosophy.

5.3

Schelling, from Naturphilosophie to Theodicy (or Nature and System)
“To philosophize about nature means to heave it out of the dead mechanism to which it seems
predisposed, to quicken it with freedom and it set it into its own free development.” Schelling,
First Outline,14.

Schelling’s Naturphilosophie (1797-1800), along with the broad outlines of his
“identity-philosophy” (1800-9), arose in direct dialogue with the antagonisms opened by
the Kantian understanding of nature and the epistemic position of the philosophical
subject. As a thinker of nature, Schelling radically critiques many stalwart assumptions
regarding the relationship of the epistemic subject to the natural world, and as such, is a
theorist of immense contemporary efficacy in an age of increased ecological
consciousness, providing valuable concepts, ideas, and thought models through which
one can meta-critically reflect on potential models for the thought of nature. As will be
demonstrated throughout the following sections, the question of nature quickly leads to
questions of the philosophical system: what form should philosophy take such that it can
do justice to the complexities of nature in-itself? The following sections will present
Schelling as a thinker of the negative dialectic, that is, as one who attempts to incorporate
the “original duality of nature,” into the philosophical system, providing a tensioned,
though genetic, understanding of the philosophical system. Schelling transfers the
abysses and contradictions of nature into philosophy, such that the possibility of
philosophy as a self-identical system is existentially troubled. As such, Schelling will be
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seen as a thinker who provides the mechanisms to think the philosophical system, along
with its transgression, in vibrant and autogenetic directions.
Given the current prevalence of a techno-scientific world view, along with its
imposed positivist understanding of the history of philosophy, the movement known as
Naturphilosophie in Germany is generally regarded as anathema and summarily relegated
to the dustbin of history as a mystical relapse to pre-Kantian “dogmatic” metaphysics, as
yet another attempt to dress up a transcendent pantheism for the philosophical public.
With respect to Hegel (in the Anglosphere), it is commonplace to excise—or simply
disregard—the entirety of his philosophy of nature as a remnant of a “metaphysical
Hegel,” which must be eradicated if he is to be seen as the “Staatsphilsoph” of
normativity (Furlotte, 1- 9; Hammer, “Introduction,” 3-5). With respect to Schelling, such
pre-scientific associations have led many historians of philosophy to downplay the
dynamic qualities of his thinking, leading him to be seen as a mystical intuitionist—for
whom “all cows are black” (Hegel, PS, 9)—one who was summarily dismissed and
overcome by Hegel (Žižek, Indivisible, 5-8). Against such dismissals, Beiser asserts that
one must see Naturphilosophie as “inseparable” from the “absolute Idealism” of
Schelling and Hegel (Idealism, 506), providing a coming philosophy of Spirit with its
naturalistic “living ground.” Bowie, Grant, and Žižek go further, stressing the continual
relevance of Naturphilosophie in the formulation of a “post-empiricist” philosophy of
science, thus seeing Schelling as a “vanishing mediator” (to refashion Žižek) between
German Idealism and contemporary concerns (30-1; vii-iii, 3; Indivisible, 8). Following
such commentators, I present Schelling’s Naturphilosophie as a dynamic space in which
innovative metaphysical thought models are elaborated in response to the antinomies and
limitations of the Kantian understanding of philosophy as epistemology. In Adorno’s
terms, Schelling moves philosophy, “against epistemology,” commencing with the
“primacy of the object”: with the autogenesis of nature which troubles any stable
epistemic subject (Adorno, Epistemology, 1-8, 22-28; ND, 183-88). Naturphilosophie is
inextricably linked with the practice of metaphysics, though not of a pre-Kantian
dogmatic variety. The metaphysics in question is one which places the transcendental in
continual dialogue with its outside (empirical nature), opening up a multiplicitous
interplay between the form and content of knowledge, and the “real” and “ideal”
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moments of philosophy (FO, 194; STI, 199).267 Such an energetic interchange allows
Schelling to “naturalize” traditionally ideal philosophical concepts—such as God,
freedom, good-evil, and the philosophical system – allowing nature in-itself, to “arise
philosophically” (FO, 14), continually troubling any ideal philosophical artifice erected
upon it.
In seeking to parse the relationship between Schelling’s early Naturphilosophie
(1797- 1800) and the remainder of his oeuvre, one enters into vexing periodization
debates regarding Schelling’s corpus as a whole, specifically the status of his
Naturphilosophie in relation to his middle work (1809-1821) and later positive
philosophy of mythology and revelation. I follow Grant and Matthews in recognizing the
continual importance of Naturphilosophie throughout Schelling’s corpus as its “real
basis” (3-5; 7-20), though I also follow Bowie (13-14), and McGrath (2), who articulate
Schelling’s work in terms of “overlapping stages”; thus his “ideal” philosophy should be
seen as grounded in—while reciprocally influencing—his early thinking of nature. If
Naturphilosophie remains “the ground” of Schelling’s thinking, then, as in the Freedom
essay, it is a dynamic ground that remains generative and productive, an Ungrund at the
heart of nature that incessantly problematizes any possible philosophy of spirit.
In Schelling’s First Outline (exemplary of his Naturphilosophie), Schelling
attempts to theorize nature in terms of a series of self-organizing stages in progression
towards the absolute, but “life”—or the ceaseless fecundity of the natural world—
struggles against the normative concept of nature (5.3.1). In his middle FE, the ruinous
and generative abysses of nature are probed by way of the transgressive force of evil,
though Schelling covers over this negativity in the service of his theodical narrative, and
in an attempt to salvage a transition from nature to Spirit (5.3.2). In the 1815 Ages of the

In the “Introduction” to his First Outline, Schelling defines the “real and ideal” moments of philosophy
as two converging perspectives on the same absolute: “According to this view, since Nature is only the
visible organism of our understanding...it follows that therefore...the ideal must arise out of the real the real
and admit of explanation from it....If it is the task of transcendental philosophy to subordinate the real to the
ideal, it is, on the other hand, the task of the philosophy of nature to explain the ideal by the real. The two
sciences are therefore but one science, differentiated only in the opposite orientation of their tasks” (FO,
194). Such sentiments are mirrored in the System of Transcendental Idealism, which sees “the ideal”
perspective of philosophy as articulating “consciously” what is merely “unconscious” in (“real”) natural
processes (3-4, 11-12).
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World, this theosophical closure collapses, and Schelling is led to confront the history of
nature as a primal scene of ruin and trauma, one reminiscent of Adorno and Benjamin’s
notion of natural history, or the negative dialectic (5.4.1).
5.3.1 Schelling’s “First Outlines” of Naturphilosophie (1797-1800)
“The greater the scientific advance, the more primitive the fear.” Don DeLillo, White Noise, 73.

Naturphilosophie seeks to deduce a “naturalistic yet non-mechanistic foundation”
for philosophy in which subject and object, ideal(ism) and real(ism), and transcendental
and empirical are seen as emanating from an “original duality” between universal
“productivity,” or “nature as subject,” and “products,” or “nature as object” ( Beiser,
Idealism; 508; FO, 6-1; Grant, 2-3).268 The main contours of Schellingian
Naturphilosophie are worked out between 1797 and 1800 in his Ideas for a Philosophy of
Nature (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, 1797), On the World Soul (Von der
Weltseele, 1797), and his, First Outline for a Philosophy of Nature (Erster Entwurf eines
Systems der Naturphilosophie, 1799).269 Fundamental motifs from his Naturphilosophie
resurge in his “middle work” (1809-23), notably in the Freedom essay, and The Ages of
the World (Die Weltalter, particularly the 1815 version), whereby nature provides the
“living ground” out of which any possible philosophy of sprit must arise, as systems of
thought are speculatively tested against the “productivity” of nature (FE, 26). Originally a
disciple of Fichte, Schelling initially positioned his thought of nature as supplementing
the Fichtean modification of transcendental philosophy, though very soon
Naturphilosophie attained its own autonomy, and Schelling came to see the Fichtean
Wissenschaftslehre as being completed within the broader envelope of Naturphilosophie,
the latter serving as the “real ground” from which transcendental inquiry should

Schelling describes an “original duality that must simply be presupposed in nature” between “nature as
subject” or nature thought in terms of productivity, and “nature as object” referring to the individual
“products” of nature (FO, 16-1).
269
In foregrounding Schelling’s Naturphilosophie in this manner, I follow Rajan and to some extent Krell.
Rajan gives primacy to Schelling’s First Outline as a plenitudinous “text” (in the Barthesian sense) rather
than “a work.” My focus on the Stufenfolge and natural history is indebted to her (“Lecture” (2020);
“Evolution,” 153, 162-5; “Immunitary,” 40, 42, 44, 48-51; “Natural History,” 1-10). Krell (in Contagion),
takes up Schelling’s discussion of disease, elevating it as the apex of the text, and reading it as anticipating
many of Schelling’s “middle” themes in his Freedom essay (73-114).
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commence (Beiser, Idealism, 489- 505). In this section I foreground a reading of
Schelling’s First Outline in terms of “natural history”—in the sense elaborated by
Benjamin (4.3.2) and Adorno (1.3)—such that an autogenetic transience is given primacy
against the autopoietic systems of the Kantian epistemological subject. That is, though
Schelling attempts to contain the dynamism of nature by way of the “series of stages”
progressing towards the absolute (FO, 53), the empirical chaos of the natural world
struggles against his normative attempts at closure.
Though Schelling is evidently critical of Kantian-Fichtean subjective Idealism, it
is essential to comprehend the extent to which Schelling continually tarries with the
Kantian question of the transcendental, along with its architectonic conception of
philosophy. In this way, Schelling should be seen as providing what Malabou, writing on
Kant, calls an “epigenesis” of the transcendental (Malabou, Epigenesis 16): examining
possible extensions and expansions of the transcendental program of philosophy in a
manner akin to the early Benjamin (as I have shown in 3.0). In working through the
Kantian program Schelling forwards an absolute Idealism which sees “reason” as
manifesting in natural processes, along with the epistemological subject, the latter
coming to be seen as a “fold”—or as the “highest potency”— within the broader
productive unfolding of the absolute (Ideas, 30, 42, 49-50; FO, 14; Beiser, Idealism 533;
Bowie, 38).270 That is, Schelling experimentally tests the regulative ideas of reason by
way of a speculative invasions from the dynamics of the natural world, opening the
transcendental by way of “empirical chaos” (FO, 5-6; Allison, Taste, 37-38). Schelling’s
Naturphilosophie is not some mystical-empiricism, materialism, or vitalism that
dispenses wholly with the mediatory role of the transcendental subject; instead,
Schelling’s thinking seeks to “quicken nature with freedom” (FO, 14), undertaking
thought experiments by way of natural processes, which are then allowed the space of
dialogue, reciprocally influencing the “ideal” moment of philosophy. Merleau-Ponty
describes Schelling’s Naturphilosophie as not a particular theory, but rather, as an
“attitude with respect to Being,” one which tries to think the “excess of Being over the

Schelling can be thought of as (re)connecting epistemology with its metaphysical-ontological “living
ground,” as Hegel would likewise attempt with his SO. As Hegel writes, “the dead bones of logic [must] be
quickened by spirit and become substance and content” (SOL, 32, 11-22, 40-3. See further, Ng, 8-13).
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consciousness of Being” (48, 47). Hence, notions such as “freedom,” “God,” “the
system” are thought within the broader organic fold of “nature” that allows for the
creation of hybrid, “natural-historical,” concepts (Rajan, “Lecture” [2020]). Not only are
ideas, concepts, and intuitions seen in a material natural sense as immanent to nature, but
throughout Schelling’s oeuvre history (or Spirit) can be viewed allegorically as
articulating, and participating in, the same forces latent in nature. Natural processes
prefigure philosophy as “the original, as yet unconscious poetry of the spirit” (STI, 12,
199-200). It should be stressed that, contra Kant and other Romantics, Schelling does not
view nature and the subject as united by a shared immunitary autopoiesis, but rather, by a
more pathological model of autogenesis, in which disease and the calamity often prevail
over immunity and unity. Nature can be read as history, while history (as an exercise of
human freedom) continues natures generative unfolding, though not in any fixed, or
teleological manner.271
Conceptually speaking, Schelling’s Naturphilosophie dispenses with several key
assumptions of Kantian-Fichtean subjective Idealism. Most notably, the Kantian “thingin-itself” (Ideas, 49), along with Kant’s cautionary border between “regulative” and
constitutive ideas; while Schelling also enlarges the speculative role played by intuition
in theoretical cognition (US, 46-49; Wirth, Conspiracy, 102-129). Schelling contributes
to the post-Kantian “fate of reason” in which a generation of thinkers—such as S.
Maimon, A. Schultz, Fichte, and K. L. Reinhold— “meta-critically” worked through the
Kantian project, experimentally articulating alternative relations between the various
Kantian faculties (Beiser, Reason, 4-15; Deleuze, Kant, 68).
Instead of the Kantian dualism (or “the great chasm”) between “appearances” and
“things-in-themselves,” Schelling parses nature in terms of the “original duality” between
general “productivity” and finite “products”: the former, as pure process or universal
becoming, cannot appear as such, except through its various manifestations in particular
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In such a manner, Adorno (following the Freud of Civilization and its Discontents) develops
pathological readings of the historical process, in which history can be seen as the manifestation of
traumatic natural developments (NH, 163-5; ND, 307).
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“products” (FO, 16, 5-6, 197-206).272 The whole of Schelling’s First Outline circles
around the difficulty of thinking nature in terms of this “universal duality”: of conceiving
nature simultaneously as originary and constant productivity, alongside the “inhibition”
of this ur- productivity by “actants,” such that it manifests as particular entities (FO, 197,
18-9, 31, 35). Schelling describes this duality via the leitmotif of “a stream,” which when
“resisted” or “inhibited” forms “whirlpools”:
Example: a stream flows in a straight line forward as long as it encounters no
resistance. Where there is resistance—a whirlpool forms. Every original product of
nature is such a whirlpool, every organism. The whirlpool is not something
immobilized, it is rather something constantly transforming—but reproduced anew
at each moment. Thus no product in nature is fixed, but it is reproduced at each
instant through the force of nature entire...nature as a whole co-operates in every
product...Nature is originally pure identity—nothing to be distinguished in it. Now,
points of inhibition appear, against which, as limitations to its productivity, Nature
constantly struggles. While it struggles against them, however, it fills this sphere
again with its productivity. (FO, 18, 206; cf. Benjamin, OT, 24-5)

Schelling repurposes natural (or “real”) processes to make a philosophical (or “ideal”)
remark. The ur-productivity of nature is figured as “the stream,” which is not visible in
itself, but only in terms of its “products,” which are “constantly transforming” and
“reproduced anew at each moment.” Such individual products “struggle” against the
fundamental productivity of nature, and in so doing constitute themselves as
“whirlpools,” or points of “inhibition,” only by standing in contradiction to productive
nature as a whole. Further, “productivity” does not cease in individual “products,” and
via the Idealist philosophical perspective, as with Leibniz’s “monads” (FO, 20-1), one is
able to intuit the presence of the absolute productive whole continually working itself out
in individual products.273 Schelling’s text presents an experimental thought environment
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This duality can be thought in terms of the Kantian distinction between noumena (productivity) and
phenomena (products), though, for Schelling, the noumena (or natura naturans) remains deeply diremptive
and cannot be hypostasized or reified.
273
As with Leibniz’s monads, individual “actants” should be seen as mirroring the broader trajectories of
nature, with individual “products” elucidating universal “productivity.” See, Leibniz, “Monadology” (767). Schelling describes the necessity of a monadological perspective for research into nature: “To grasp
Nature as the universal production of Ideas, we must go back to the origin and significance of Ideas
themselves. Their origin lies in the eternal law of the Absolute, i.e., that it is its own object. In virtue of this
law, God’s productivity is the process by which the universal essence of the whole is embodied in
particular forms. Thereby, these forms, though particular, are at the same time self-contained worlds-what
philosophers call Monads or Ideas” (US, 115).
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in which ideas, intuitions and hypotheses are continually tested; and, while there is no
subject in the text (thus no “experience”), there is the more fundamental notion of
“experiment,” in which Schelling assesses various thought experiments as speculative
means to order the productivity of nature (Rajan, “Immunitary,” 46). Describing the
experimental thought environment of his Naturphilosophie, Schelling writes, “From now
on there is no longer any separation between experience and our mind, and only now,
once the great synthesis [between mind and nature] has been accomplished, does our
knowledge return to analysis (to research and experiment)” (Ideas, 30).274
Schelling’s refashioned conception of “intellectual intuition” (or “intellectual
perception,” Intellektuelle Anschauung), allows one to grasp the manifestation of the
infinite absolute (“productivity”) as it presents in finite entities (“products”). Such an
apparent division is grounded in the fundamental “identity” (or organic whole) that is
“nature,” which can be grasped directly, without the aid of a concept or sensation (FO,
136). As he describes in his “Erlangen lecture” (1821), “intellectual perception” forces
the subject “outside of itself, into a relation of “ecstasy,” such that philosophy can begin
with an intuition of the whole in “amazement” (228-9).275 Schelling emphatically
proclaims, “Without intellectual intuition no philosophy!” speaking to the centrality of
intuition for both his Naturphilosophie and philosophy of identity (US, 49; 73-5). In fact,
“speculative philosophy” as a philosophical task is conditioned by this expanded role for
intuition (Cerf, xi). Such a “new hope” conferred on the “productive intuition,” mirrors
that accorded to “the imagination,” which Schelling elevates to a new role beyond its task
of schematization in the Kantian CPR (Beiser, Idealism, 579-80, 582; Wirth, Conspiracy,
86-88, 102). Through intuition one can (non-discursively) presuppose an organic image
of “the whole,” in which manifold parts can manifest themselves and be ordered,
allowing for an organization of the world that radicalizes Kant’s conception of “the

In this manner, Schelling’s “experiment” should be seen as a transformative “experience” [Erfahrung]
in the Adorno-Benjamin sense.
275
In the lecture, Schelling asserts that philosophy “is not a demonstrative science,” but rather a
“surrender” to a “free act of the spirit” (227). That is, as Schelling describes (227-9), the absolute (subject)
cannot be grasped conceptually (via “knowledge”), but only via “intellectual perception,” which intuitively
sees the absolute in all things. Schelling assertions regarding such an intuitive starting point for philosophy
should be seen in contradistinction to Fichte’s Idealist provisos at the outset of his Wissenschaftslehre (see
Fichte, 20, 17-20).
274
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organism” (against his own architectonic image of philosophy): providing a more
dynamic and self-reflective interplay of parts and whole. In asserting the primacy of
intuition against discursive conceptual cognition, Schelling contests the architectonic
stability of philosophy by allowing alternative logics (to the concept) a constitutive
philosophical role (Wirth, Conspiracy 102). In the course of Schelling’s oeuvre,
intuition’s non-discursivity forms an affinity with a duplicitous (though nonetheless
critical) mysticism, a site which allows the “phantasm,” or the night of consciousness into
the thought of philosophy, a trauma which, I will argue, becomes more pronounced in the
middle Freedom essay and Weltalter project.
Schelling’s ontological suppositions remain transcendental in that they provide a
“real deduction” of the conditions of possibility for the appearance of any finite product
in nature out of the originary flux of productivity (Peterson, “Introduction, “FO, xxii).
Schelling stresses the Kantian elements of his philosophical enterprise: philosophy must
present both the conditions of possibility for nature itself, along with our experience of it
(through the various physical sciences). Philosophy must explain the genesis of our
categories of cognition, alongside the ontological genesis of the natural world. Schelling
describes this dual transcendental task for philosophy: “the Philosophy of Nature ought to
deduce the possibility of nature, that is of the all-inclusive world of experience, from first
principles” (Ideas, 9). In this way, the distinction between mind and matter—or the
Kantian “form and content” of knowledge—is rethought in favour of a model which
understands mind as the highest “potency” of the productivity of nature: “Nature should
be Mind made visible, Mind the invisible nature” (Ideas, 42, 49; STI, 10-12, 199). The
epigenetic processes of nature are mirrored by Schelling’s novel “genetic method” of
philosophy, which sees “organic” and “anorganic” processes as united under a shared
“schema of freedom” (Matthews, xii, 1-9).276 Further, it could be argued that Schelling
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Describing his genetic model of thought, which mirrors the autogenesis and diremptive productivity of
nature, Schelling writes: “Philosophy, accordingly, is nothing other than a natural history of our mind.
From now on all dogmatism is overturned from its foundations. We consider the system of our ideas, not in
its being, but in its becoming. Philosophy becomes genetic...it allows the whole necessary series of our
ideas to arise and to take its course, as it were, before our eyes. From now on there is no longer any
separation between experience and our mind, and only now, once the great synthesis has been
accomplished, does our knowledge return to analysis (to research and experiment). But this system does not
yet exist” (Ideas, 30). Such a sentiment is echoed in Schelling’s 1815 Ages, though in a darker cast:
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embraces a certain parallelism between subject and object, though in a much darker,
mortuary manner, as the same abyssal ground of nature subtending the absolute is latent
in the philosophical subject as its “unconscious” (STI, 12).
Curiously absent from the labyrinthine productivity of the First Outline is a
substantial account of the epistemic subject (even as a regulative unity), as the subject is
seemingly de-individualized, becoming merely one potency amongst others, a particular
“monadological fold” within the broader absolute production of nature (Deleuze, The
Fold, 3-23; Rajan, “Lecture,” 2020). Schelling refashions the doctrine of “irritability” to
describe the immunological relationship of the subject to its outside—thought as an
equilibrium between “irritability” and “sensibility”— while also providing a
monadological mirroring of the broader (dis-) equilibrium between “nature as subject”
(or “productivity”) and “nature as object” (or “product”) (FO, 126, 133, 142-50; Rajan,
“Excitability,” 316; “Margins, 317-8).277 The epistemic philosophical subject is
dethroned from its central Kantian place as the “transcendental unity of apperception,”
instead becoming the “highest potency” of natural processes: mind, body, and nature
should be seen as differing degrees of organization of the same principles latent in the
productivity of nature (Beiser, Idealism, 533-7; US, 103). Likewise, the static Cartesian
understanding of matter as a mechanical res extensa (inherited by Newton and Kant), is
surpassed within a larger organic whole, which restores an immanent teleology to
nature— a fundamental gesture of absolute Idealism (Ng, 5-6; Beiser, Idealism, 466-8).
Such a vital understanding of nature—as a continual process of strife, in which “nature
struggle[s] against everything individual” (FO, 8; 54)—begs the obvious question as to
why nature appears as a particular in the first place: what compels the ur-productivity of
nature to cessation in individual products (FO, 50, 53-4)? Further, what obliges this
process to commence, why does productivity come to exist out of the “nothingness” of
the abyssal ground?

“Certainly one who could write the completely the history of their own life would have, in a small epitome,
concurrently grasped the history of the cosmos” (AW, 3).
277
For a genealogy of “irritability” and related terms as they appear in Schelling’s work, see Rajan,
“Excitability” (316).
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Schelling’s First Outline attempts the (a priori) “deduction of nature” in terms of a
“dynamically graded series of stages” [Stufenfolge] (53-70, 141-58; Rajan, “Immunitary,”
44-45; “Margins,” 329-30). In order for Naturphilosophie to become a “physiogony” of
nature, it must elevate itself above Kantian “natural history,” moving beyond any
analysis of nature that does not proceed by way of the intuition of the organic whole,
remaining a mere empirical aggregate, a “description of nature” which deals with nature
in terms of its “externality” (FO, 53). 278 Opposed to such aggregations, authentic
Naturphilosophie grasps nature as a productive “subject,” commencing with the
“continuity of organic functions as principle of organization,” describing how this urproductivity, “gradually brings forth the whole multiplicity of its products through
continuous deviations from a common ideal” (FO, 53). Through such an elevation,
“natural history” is able to become a “history of nature itself,” that is, a demonstration of
how nature can be thought simultaneously as “product” and “productivity,” showing how
nature is at once individual, yet also “directed toward an absolute organism” (FO, 53,
138; STI, 199; Wirth, Conspiracy, 3-29). As does Deleuze (following Spinoza and
Nietzsche), Schelling reverses the traditional relation between entity and ground (or the
ontological difference): the task is not to explain the universal order of “Being” by way
of a particular “being,” but rather, in a reversal of the traditional “method of distinction,”
one must endeavour to show how the universal organism of difference, or becoming,
limits itself in a particular entity (Deleuze, Difference, 66-9). Or put more drastically,
“How can individual nature hold its own against the universal organism” (FO, 54): why
does nature “inhibit” its original productivity, or state of indifference, in the
manifestation of particular entities?

Rajan (in “Immunitary,” 44-5; “Natural History,” 190-2; “Lecture (2020)”) has drawn attention to a
constellation of terms employed by Coleridge’s Germanophile friend, Joseph Henry Green to describe
Schelling’s project as a temporalized or self-assembling graduated series of stages, a “Stufenfolge,” or a
temporalized “great chain of being.” For Green, “physiography,” as the lowest form of analysis, studies
various entities in nature (natura naturata), while “physiology” analyses the laws and powers of nature
which bring about products (natura naturans). Finally, “physiogony” teleologically studies the manner in
which nature labours in the birth of the human, seeing the graduated series of stages as working itself out in
terms of increasing complexity. Rajan further asserts that such a speculative paradigm is fundamental to
Idealism, a framework shared by Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature; however, the plethora of detail and
complexity Hegel and Schelling attempt to incorporate troubles any possible teleological hypothesis, and
such a tension remains unresolved for them both.
278
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This tension between nature as “subject” (or “productivity, natura naturans,
becoming”), and “object” (or “product, natura naturata, being[s]”), is worked out
throughout Schelling’s First Outline, which strives to figure nature as an unending
productivity which ascends upwards along a series of stages, constantly annihilating (or
effecting an Aufhebung of) individual entities as it moves up the ladder of Being (FO,17,
53). Yet the text also describes the autogenesis of various stages, as individual products
proliferate in biodiversity (FO,53-4), disease, and various “misbegotten [or botched]
attempts to achieve the absolute” (FO, 36; Krell, Contagion, 96-99). Such a ceaseless
proliferation of particularities and spheres results in a situation in which “the details of
the Stufenfolge unsettle the paradigm” (Rajan, “Immunitary”, 50). As with Leibniz, the
further one explores nature, the more monads seemingly proliferate, folding within
further folds: “Each portion of matter can be conceived as a garden full of plants, and of a
pond full of fish. But each branch of a plant, each limb of an animal, each drop of its
humours, is still another such garden or pond” (#67, 78; “Rajan, “Immunitary,” 40;
Lecture,” [2020]).
Read in a more radical direction, Schelling is unable (or perhaps unwilling) to
resolve this inherent, though productive, duplicity of nature within the borders of the text.
Despite his desire to think nature in terms of the unity of the absolute (as a Stufenfolge),
the destructive character of nature resists such resolution:
Visible nature, in particular and as a whole, is an allegory of this perpetually
advancing and retreating movement. One generation comes, the other goes. Nature
goes to the trouble to develop qualities, aspects, works, and talents to their pinnacle,
only again to bury them for centuries in oblivion, and then start anew, perhaps in a
new species, but certainly only to attain the same peak. (AW, 21)

Given the speculative character of the FO, and the fact that formally it remained merely
an “outline-projection” [Entwurf], Schelling was unable to definitively resolve these
antinomical trajectories of nature: between nature as a self-organising series of stages,
and nature as constant autogenetic proliferation and speciation—a productivity of “life”
that is constantly threatening to override any attempt at systematic closure. The essayistic
style of Schelling’s text ostensibly collapses under the speculative excesses of nature’s
processes, coupled with the amount of material Schelling attempts to theoretically
potentiate. Schelling’s detours create countless folds within folds, worlds within worlds.
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More radically, perhaps such a desire for definitive resolution misses the important
“negative dialectical” struggle at the core of Schelling’s thought, as the constant motif of
“struggle” recurs throughout his early to middle corpus (FO, 36; FE, 63; AW, 90). In his
Naturphilosophie, Schelling allegorizes the primordial unity-in-opposition of nature via
the image of the “Magnet,” which contains within itself the opposition of “positive” and
“negative” polarities, both of which only exist via their participation in the whole that
defines the “indifference point” (or equilibrium) between oppositions (FO, 83-84, 152;
Bowie, 40; Beiser, Idealism, 532; Pinkard, Hegel, 129-32). Such an allegory is continued
in Schelling’s refashioning of the doctrine of “irritability,” which employed galvanic
metaphors to describe disease as a disequilibrium of “sensation,” or an upsetting of the
“indifference point” between the individual organism and its environment (FO, 68, 123147, 152, 159-72).
Schelling repeatedly stresses this agon at the heart of nature—the “original
diremption in nature itself,” the “universal duplicity” (FO, 205, 88-9, fn87, 114, 116-7)—
at the center of “life,” which drives the motive processes of nature continually on,
“contesting” any static “individual” (FO, 36). Schelling’s uniqueness lies in his refusal to
shelter negativity or disease from nature, and life more broadly, which is itself won by
way of “struggle”: “Activated selfhood is necessary for the rigor of life; without
[struggle] there would be sheer death, a falling asleep of the good; for, where there is no
struggle, there is no life” (FE, 63).279 In this way, one can see the divergent trajectories of
nature—its unending struggle with itself—as the very essence of life. Such a sentiment is
echoed by Habermas: “Catastrophe is ontologically normalized” (“Dialectical,” 70). As
will now be argued, such a troubled ground for philosophy would have severe
consequences for any philosophy built on the possible transition from nature to Spirit, as

Describing the centrality of “struggle” to the Schellingian conception of “life,” Love & Schmitt write:
“Schelling’s theodicy is one that sees struggle as the end of creation and the very wellspring of life.
Imbalance and dissonance are of the essence and, without them, all turns into meaningless indifference, the
unground, a rejection of the constant interestedness that is life, its tirelessly changing fusion of contraction
and expansion” (FE, xxviii). Such a sentiment is echoed in the 1815 Ages of the World, wherein the
“annular drive” of the absolute (or Godhead) must brought out of the “standstill” of “rotary motion,”
becoming actualized (as “Being”) via the struggle that is existence (AW, 21-22, 12). Habermas echoes such
sentiments: “Schelling joins Hegel in opposing those who play down the conflict in life, because life itself
essentially involves conflict” (“Dialectical,” 51).
279
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Schelling is seemingly unable to definitively figure nature in terms of an upwardly
organizing Stufenfolge. One is left with a realm of what Žižek terms, “sheer antagonism,”
a “traumatic core” of instability and constant deferral, a baroque horizon akin to that
explored in Benjamin’s Trauerspiel, in which nature and fate rule with a brute necessity
(Žižek, Plague, 216; Rajan, Romantic Narrative, 141; cf. Habermas, “Dialectical,” 55).
Relying on Schelling’s own stated intentions for his project, this
Naturphilosophie, once properly understood, and set apart from mere “natural history”
(FO, 53; Rajan, “Immunitary,” 44-45; “Margins,” 320-21), would provide the “real
ground” of philosophy, which would be counterposed by an “ideal” project of
transcendental human freedom, thus grounding the possibility of a historical theodicy on
the organic ascendency of nature (STI, 203, 210-1). Schelling’s 1800 System of
Transcendental Idealism presents a Fichtean model of the ideal movement of philosophy,
which freely manifests “consciously” what is merely “unconscious in nature,” eventually
appealing to art as a site of mediation between the two sides of philosophy (STI, 11-12,
199, 219-36). As in the Kantian discourse of “Genius,” nature manifests and comes to
know itself through human creative acts, or human freedom expresses the free
productivity of nature (CPJ, 186-196). Thus, subject and object, real and ideal, freedom
and necessity, are grounded in a more primordial “Identity,” from which they are
severed: “The all is before the one. Necessity is before freedom” (AW, 44). That is,
Schelling postulates the Stufenfolge as a regulative ideal towards which nature (and
philosophy) must strive.
However, the empirical chaos and autogenetic proliferation of nature troubles any
such final unity, as Schelling is unable to execute this absorption of nature into Spirit. In
anticipation of the contradictory dynamism of his middle work, throughout the 1790s and
early 1800s, the “ideal” and “real” polarities of Schelling’s thinking remain locked in a
struggle for domination, and as he gradually moves away from, and eventually breaks
with, Fichte in 1801 (Beiser, Idealism, 500-5). These ideal and real principles become
unmoored from any stable reconciliation in “identity philosophy,” thus entering into a
negative dialectical tension, which sets the stage for the antinomies presented in his 1809
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Freedom essay and middle work.280 Given the dynamic picture of nature already present
in these early texts, one might question if nature remains an “indivisible remainder” for
Schelling: too diseased, too anarchic, too productive, to be the stable ground of any ideal
philosophical project (Beiser, Idealism, 524-7). Thus, Schelling’s own “feral natality” as
a thinker: he is, as Benjamin later termed it, a “new constructor” who constantly sought
to “start from scratch” (SW 2: 732; cf. Wirth, Wild, 23). Or with Adorno, Schelling
conceives of nature as a “non-identical” autogenetic productivity, which continually
contests the stability of the epistemic subject, along with any possible arrangement of
concepts and categories. Schelling’s thought seeks to do justice to the contradictory
vigour of nature by incorporating its diseased and contingent elements into a philosophy
of Spirit. Nowhere is this transgressive vitality more evident than in the positivity
accorded to “evil” in Schelling’s 1809 Freedom essay, in which the unruly negativity of
God’s divided essence continually threatens any theodicy (or philosophical project).

5.3.2 The Freedom Essay (1809): Evil and Theodicy (or Negativity and System)
“An individual body part, like an eye, is only possible within the whole of an organism; nonetheless, it has
its own life for itself, indeed, its own kind of freedom, which it obviously proves through the disease of
which it is capable.” Schelling, FE, 18.

Schelling’s 1809 Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human
Freedom (FE) engages in a “meta-critique” of both the “real” and “ideal” moments of his
earlier thinking: seeking to articulate a dynamic conception of nature, alongside a
naturalistic ground of freedom, and mediating both by way of their identity-in-difference.
Responding to “the abyss”—or “incalculable chasm” (Wirth, Wild, 13)—opened between
freedom and necessity by Kant’s “third antinomy,” Schelling demonstrates that such an

Describing the dynamism between “ideal” and “real” that occurs with the 1809 Freedom essay, Bowie
will write that in the Freedom essay “and more coherently in the 1811-15 Ages of the World, Schelling
breaks with the tendency towards a static, balanced relationship of the ‘ideal’ and ‘real’...and becomes
concerned with...the ground of which the conflicting principles which constitute the manifest world are the
consequence” (Bowie, 13-14). McGrath describes the Freedom Essay as a “hinge” (following Derrida)
which allows Schelling to open out from his early Naturphilosophical concerns into the domains of history,
theology, and revelation (2). Such a reading is confirmed by Schelling’s own stated intention for the work,
which he intended to introduce further Ideal considerations: “The current treatise is the first in which the
author puts forth his concept of the ideal part of philosophy with complete determinateness.” (FE, 4).
However, what this “complete determinateness” is, and how it could relate to its prior “real basis,” deserves
to be further speculated upon.
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opposition is merely apparent, as both terms are shown to be united by a shared “living
ground” (FE, 26). As Merleau-Ponty asserts, “what appears to Kant as an abyss
(Ungrund) appears to Schelling as the definition of God” (37-8). That is, Schelling
incorporates the fraught duality of nature into the very essence of the Godhead (or the
absolute), and God’s dark theodicy allows Schelling to think the philosophical system in
an anxious and negative direction. What emerges forcefully in the Freedom essay is
Schelling’s “tragic” notion of the absolute, one which doubts the possibility of the
philosophical system as a means to realize freedom (Krell, Tragic, 72-3). Schelling gives
“freedom” a transgressive autonomy with his positive definition of it as a capacity to “do
evil,” and his further refusal to sever evil from God’s essence; instead, evil is given a
positive and material force, becoming a vital moment in the “ground of being” (FE, 329).281 Habermas describes evil as a form of autonomous negativity: “evil arises out of the
self-willed sovereignty of a ‘barbarian principle’ which conquered but not annulled, is the
true foundation of everything great” (“Dialectical,” 56, 55). What is staged in the
Freedom essay—an “essay” in the Adornian sense (1.2 & 1.4.1)—is Schelling’s emergent
negative dialectic: not only between “ideal” and “real,” or “freedom” and “necessity,”
which are mediated in difference without synthesis, but more fundamentally between the
philosophical system and its possible “diseased” transgressions. What is prefaced in the
FE and continued in the Ages is the possibility of an “unbounded negativity” (to follow
Bataille), an un-recoverable model of negativity which threatens the restricted economy
of philosophy, untethering negativity from its position of subservience, and forcing
philosophy to consider alternative repressed and phantasmatic logics.282 In the FE,
though Schelling gazes into the ruinous-generative abyss that is nature—via his dynamic
understanding of “evil”—he ultimately puts this negativity back to “work,” employing it
in the services of theodicy, or the positive unfolding of philosophy.

Love & Schmidt describe the deficiencies of the Kantian and Leibnizian theodical conception of “evil,”
as a form of lack or deficiency (x-xix). This positivity of evil can also be thought in terms of Bataille’s
notion of transgression, see “The Notion of Expenditure” (116-130).
282
Differentiating Schellingian unbounded negativity from Hegelian negation—in which negativity is
sublated into the universality of the concept—Habermas writes: “the negative [in Schelling] gains the
substantial character of a contraction that is both less destructible and more forgiving than [Hegel’s]
diremption of life into the abstract universal and isolated individual” (“Dialectical,” 63).
281
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Such a (negative) dialectical mediation without Aufhebung, or conceptual
resolution, becomes possible by way of Schelling’s revised notion of the copula “is,”
which he deconstructs in relation to vulgar understandings of pantheism. Pantheism,
broadly understood, refers to the belief in the immanence of God in all things, such that
God loses his transcendent status. Schelling commences his FE by estranging the reader
from conventional understandings of pantheism, allowing for new potential relations
between God and nature, while shattering the equation of pantheism with atheistic
fatalism, or utter necessity (FE, 11-16). Such vulgar conceptions rest upon a “general
misunderstanding of the meaning of the copula in judgment” (FE, 13).283 Specifically, in
the context of the pantheist equation that says God “is” all things, or freedom=necessity
(and perhaps ideal=real), the copula should not be understood to express an identity
between the two terms “through and through,” but instead, should be understood
“dialectically,” such that subject and predicate are set in opposition and then mediated by
way of their difference, with the subject expressing a stable identity that persists through
the modifications of predication. Or as Schelling puts it, “subject and predicate are set
against each other as what is enfolded to what is unfolded (implicitum et explicitum)”
(FE, 13-14). One could say that freedom expresses itself by way of its opposition to
necessity, or one comes to understand the value of freedom only by way of working
through necessity (physically or intellectually).
Though originally couched in relation to the vexing “Pantheism controversy,” 284
Schelling’s revision of the copula provides a powerful armature through which to rethink

Describing his revised notion of the copula in relation to the proposition, “The body is blue,” Schelling
will write, “The body is blue, does not mean the body is blue ‘through and through’” rather “only the
meaning that the same thing which is a body is also blue, although not in the same respect” (FE, 13), he
goes on to elaborate a new form of relation by which difference persists even in tautology, “[in] which
subject and predicate are set against each other as what is enfolded to what is unfolded” (FE, 14).
Describing his new speculative understanding of the copula, Schelling asserts, “Whoever says ‘the body is
body’ [or is blue], surely thinks something different with respect to the subject of the sentence than with
respect to the predicate; with respect to the former namely, unity, with respect to the latter, the individual
properties contained within the concept of body that relation to it as antecedens to consequens” (FE, 14).
284
The immediate occasion Schelling’s reflections was the “Pantheism controversy” surrounding Spinoza’s
work (and its reception), which captivated much of the post-Kantian generation. For a detailed gloss on the
Pantheism controversy between Jacobi and Mendelsohn, see Beiser, The Fate of Reason (44-108). Within
the dispute, Spinoza serves as a cipher for many social, political, and religious trajectories of the early
enlightenment, such as the limits (and consequences) of rational inquiry (or the limits of skepticism), the
role of faith in enlightenment, and the possibility of a rational natural religion.
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theodicy—or the philosophical system—in relation to a substantial account of evil, or
negativity. One of Schelling’s key aims throughout the Freedom essay, along with his
later Weltalter Project (1811-15), is to attempt to think a revised conception of theodicy
which gives full weight to the existence of evil, or the negative, within the philosophical
system. Theodicy, which was given its modern cast by Leibniz, saw God’s providence
manifesting itself throughout nature and history, with all evil, death, and negativity being
eventually contained within the final revelation of the “best of all possible worlds” (FE,
36). Stated in the terms of Goethe’s Mephistopheles, evil (or the negative) may exist,
“provided it work for good” (Faust, 1334-1340). Modulations on theodicy should be seen
as one of the key motifs of German Idealism, reaching their apex in Hegel, who sought to
create a secular and natural theodicy of reason, which, to quote Bataille, is one in which
“man has taken the place of God” (“Hegel,” 281), completing the revelation of reason by
ascending to absolute knowledge.285 Moving in the opposite direction, Schelling develops
a naturalized conception of the absolute in which “God is a life, not a being” (FE, 66).
Within the Freedom essay, Schelling examines the extent to which God’s
providential omniscience and benevolence are contradicted by the existence of evil, or,
the degree to which negativity threatens the philosophical system. How could a
benevolent and all-knowing God allow the existence of evil? Schelling sidesteps the force
of this dilemma by splitting the Godhead into “being in so far as it exists and being in so
far as it is the ground of existence,” with evil residing in the “ground of existence” (or
“nature”), and God’s benevolence in “being as it exists” (FE, 27). With such thought
experiments regarding God’s splitting of himself, Schelling moves to think the problem
of “beginning,” or the emergence of the “productivity” of both nature and freedom from
primordial nothingness, a project continued in his Weltalter project (Žižek, Indivisible,
14). Following Boehme, Schelling seeks God’s originary act of creation, “the birth of

Glossing the providential nature of Hegel’s thinking in contradistinction to the negativity of Schelling,
Wirth will write: “Hegel’s spirit always lives to tell of its encounter with alterity and profits anew from it. It
will not die of its own antinomies” (2003, 164). Echoing these sentiments apropos of evil, Žižek will write:
“This surplus which eludes notional self-mediation can be discerned exemplary apropos of the problematic
of Evil: Hegel reduces Evil to the subordinated moment in the self-mediation of the Idea qua supreme
Good, whereas in Schelling Evil remains a permanent possibility which can never be fully ‘sublated’
(Aufgehoben)” (Žižek, Indivisible, 6).
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darkness into light,” the “yearning of the eternal ground to give birth to itself,” or God’s
splitting of himself such that the reign of providence may begin (FE, 29; Wirth,
Conspiracy, 189-90).286 God, as benevolent and omniscient, must have the ground of his
existence in himself, but this ground is not God “considered absolutely,” but rather, “as
nature,” encompassing “everything that lies beyond the Absolute Being of absolute
identity” (FE, 28). As always already ontologically differing from himself, God
transposes his inherent duality into both nature and the human. The origin of reality lies
in this splitting of God with himself into ideal and real, being and ground, and such a
contradiction in the Godhead comes to manifest itself over all reality as its dark
precursor. Describing the persistence of such a tensioned duality, Schelling will write:
After the eternal act of self-revelation, everything in the world is, as we see it now,
rule, order and form; but anarchy still lies in the ground, as if it could break through
once again, and nowhere does it appear as if order and form where what is original
but rather as if initial anarchy had been brought to order. This is the
incomprehensible base of reality in things, the indivisible remainder, that which with
the greatest excertio cannot be resolved in understanding but remains eternally in the
ground. The understanding is born in the genuine sense from that which is without
understanding. Without this preceding darkness creatures have no reality; darkness is
their necessary inheritance. (FE, 29)

Despite attempts to contain the “anarchy” or restless negativity at the ground of all
things, it persists, continually threatening to break through and ruin any stable notion of
theodicy or the philosophical system. Nature as ground remains an “indivisible
remainder,” which constantly endeavours to transgress the whole. Thus Schelling’s
formulation of the “Ungrund,” a ground that precedes all grounding, or a recognition of
the abyss or groundlessness of all grounding: “there must be a being before all ground
and before all that exists, thus generally before any duality—how can we call it anything
other than the original ground or the non-ground (Ungrund)... the absolute indifference of
both...indifference is its own being, separate from all opposition, a being against which
all opposites ruin themselves” (FE, 68-70). Such an un-groundedness “continues to
remain active in evil as health continues to be active in disease,” relentlessly threatening

Describing the necessity of God’s division with himself, Schelling will write: “But God himself requires
a ground so that he can exists; but only a ground that is not outside but inside him, and has in itself a nature
which, although belonging to him, is yet different from him...for the ground must be active so that love may
exist.” (FE, 42).
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to overrun any stable philosophical reconciliation (FE, 66). As with Adorno’s doublet of
“natural history,” Schelling’s notion of the “Ungrund” provides a transient –volatile
starting point for thought: an “abyss of freedom,” out of which philosophy begins (Žižek,
“Abyss,” 3-7, 14-21).
Despite the un-grounding of metaphysics in the middle of the text, because of the
final segment which prophecies the birth of light from darkness, one can legitimately
question the extent to which Schelling shies away from the dynamism of his
understanding of evil, sacrificing the full force of his notion of freedom to a conventional
notion of theodicy that culminates in God’s revelation-manifestation as “Love” (FE, 72).
For all its energy, anarchy, and groundlessness, evil seemingly still brings forth, and
negatively accentuates, the manifestation of God’s love and providence.287 Despite this
onto-theological closure, one can question if the heart of the text does not lie earlier,
especially given that Schelling accords far more space to speculations on pantheism (FE,
11-26) and the Ungrund (FE, 26-66) than the theodicy of God’s love (FE, 70-77).
Schelling’s transition to theodicy comes by way of a “decision” (Entschluß): a repression
of, or a radical break with, the past (in nature) in order to move upward to theodical
closure (AW (1813), 168-9).288 As Žižek has pointed out, whatever absolute is arrived at
with the FE’s closure is still shot through with the “contingency of necessity”
(Indivisible, 45, 15): the productive ground remains eternally active, threatening to
override the system which tries to contain it. Any “ideal” philosophical system will
remain threatened by its anarchic “real” ground. Schelling himself seems to welcome
these sorts of transgressions, or moments in which the negative (that is, evil, death, or
disease) breaks free and gains a certain autonomy.

Ultimately, Schelling seems to favour a notion of freedom in accord with divine providence: “True
freedom is in harmony with holy necessity, the likes of which we perceive in essential cognition, when
spirit and heavy, bound only by their own law, freely affirm what is necessary” (FE, 56). Wirth also
describes “Love” as “highest point of the whole investigation” (Conspiracy of Life, 186). Though Schelling
onto-theologically closes the text in the service of revelation, the FE essay can be read against the grain, as
a resistant and anarchic text, which provides the negative (or “evil”) resources to transgress any possible
system of thought.
288
Schelling describes such a “decision” with respect to nature as conditioning the emergence of history:
“We thus see everything ready for a decision; and for the eternal, this last stage in which it becomes aware
of itself marks the boundary between the past state and one to follow” (AW [1813], 167).
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Describing the autonomy of an individual member within an organic whole,
Schelling writes: “The same is valid for the containment of one thing within another. An
individual body part, like an eye, is only possible within the whole of an organism;
nonetheless, it has its own life for itself, indeed, its own kind of freedom, which it
obviously proves through the disease of which it is capable” (FE, 18; cf. AW, 67). In
considering freedom as the capacity for evil, Schelling appears to invite such violent and
diseased transgressions of his system, and as such beckons one to consider the
philosophical system (and its relation to negativity) in more radical ways than are
allowed for by the steadiness of Hegel’s labour of the negative. Writing in the delayed
aftermath of the Revolution and Terror, Schelling provides substantial resources to think
philosophy (as a systemic enterprise) after the immense historical dissonance and evil of
the twentieth-century, anticipating projects such as Adorno’s.289 In this way, regardless of
the text’s apparent onto-theological closure—which, textually speaking, has a
performative, optative, and hypothetical quality— Schelling should be seen as a thinker
who gives the resources to think both a revised notion of the philosophical system (or
theodicy), along with its possible transgression through the dynamic space Schelling
accords to the existence of evil. Ultimately, within the text, Schelling is unable to resolve
this tension between evil and theodicy, constituting philosophy atop an “abyss of
freedom”, an Ungrund of negativity that could potentially overturn any fixed system.
It is also worth emphasising that in turning to “the ideal portion of philosophy”
(FE, 4) in a proto-existentialist manner, Schelling now gives a privileged position to
human freedom as an explication of what is merely implicit in nature’s productivity. As
the highest “potency” of nature, humans unfold and continue the destiny of nature,
participating in its “original duality,” via the ethical choice between good and evil: “Only
in man, therefore, is the word fully proclaimed which in all other things is held back and
incomplete...The same unity that is in-severable in God must therefore be severable in
man—and this is the possibility of good and evil” (FE, 33). The human is constituted by
the same “abyss of freedom,” the anarchy of the ground, over which any sovereign
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Comay has glossed Hegel as a thinker of the French Revolution (Mourning, 1-8), which can be extended
to describe Schelling’s thought as well, which is more obliquely related to political historical events (see
Habermas, “Dialectical,” 43-7).
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decision is conducted, which allows one to transgress the absolute absolutely: “Through
this act the life of man reaches to the beginning of creation; hence through it man is
outside the created, being free and eternal beginning itself” (FE, 51, 46; Žižek,
Indivisible, 63-7; Krell, Tragic, 107-108). The human faces the same void of sovereignty
which God confronted at the origin of creation, hence is free by way a capacity to do evil
and thus has the potential to constitute a theodicy (or system), or to transgress such
edifices absolutely. This productive defiance subtending both the human and natural
world—what Wirth has termed “the conspiracy of life”—should lead, as in Bataille, to
the expenditure, or “liquification” of the “the great clot that is the ego” a final free act of
self-destruction, an absolute alliance of freedom with necessity (Wirth, “Conspiracy,”
186, 73; Bataille, “Expenditure,” 116-123, 128-9). Echoing such “acephalic” sentiments,
Habermas asserts, “absolute control over everything” can only be “completed by
removing the domination” via the “production of another absolute...in the union with
something that is utterly uncontrollable” (“Dialectical, 60).
Much remains to be said regarding this speculative affinity of Schelling with
Bataille: both are thinkers of disease and transgression, who repeatedly strive to derange
the constitutive stability of philosophy by way of its repressed phantasms (Bataille,
“Sacrifices,” 130-6; “Hegel,” 286-92). As in Benjamin’s Baroque, freedom comes not
through some subjective act of sovereignty, but rather, through the melancholic
affirmation of transience, a recognition of “the veil of dejection that is spread over all
nature, the deep indestructible melancholy of all life. Joy must have suffering, suffering
must be transfigured in joy” (FE, 63; cf. Habermas, “Dialectical,” 50). This suffering
negativity at the heart of life has the potential to deeply unbind and trouble the
philosophical system, as it does in in Schelling’s Weltalter project, to which I will now
turn.
5.3.3 Soliciting Divine Madness: Schelling’s Negative Dialectic (The Ages of the
World, 1815)
“All life must pass through the fire of contradiction. Contradiction is the power mechanism and what is
innermost of life. From this it follows that, as an old book says, all deeds under the sun are full of trouble
and everything languishes in toil, yet does not become tired, and all forces incessantly struggle against each
other. Were there only unity and everything were in peace, then, forsooth, nothing would want to stir itself
and everything would sink to listlessness. Now, however, everything ardently strives to get out of unrest
and attain rest.” Schelling, Ages of the World, 90.
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The tensions within Schelling’s Freedom essay remain bounded within the
economy of theodicy. However, throughout his 1811-1815 Weltalter project [Ages of the
World], the negative, or diseased kernel of Schelling’s thought—the duplicity or “inner
self-laceration of nature, that wheel of initial birth spinning about itself as if mad” (AW,
103)—becomes increasingly unbound from any stable containment within the
philosophical system. Thus, it is within the 1815 version of the Weltalter that Schelling
emerges forcefully as a thinker of the negative dialectic, one for whom the identity and
stability of the philosophical system is called into question by the forces of contradiction
and negativity: “Everything, even the most precious being, must perish in collision with
nature” (Habermas, “Dialectical,” 66).290 As such, Schelling’s middle thought does not
culminate in some stable transition from nature to spirit, but rather, in an affirmation of
the “divine madness” or “original diremption” at the heart of the Godhead and nature.
Schelling moves away from the “economy of plenitude” of his early philosophy of
nature, into a natural historical philosophy of “crisis” or “psychosis” (Rajan, “Margins,”
334; Žižek, Indivisible, 31).291 God’s self-abdication—which can be thought in terms of
Bataille’s self-sacrifice—stages the fatal power Schelling bestows on negativity, or the
phantasm, such that alterity overruns the stability of thought: “God’s omnipotence is
complete only when he lets something like himself come into existence, something to
which...God can also lose his own power: with him, the first man, God puts his own fate
in jeopardy” (Habermas, “Dialectical,” 57).292 Within this text, Schelling confronts the

Žižek has argued that Schelling’s Weltalter should be seen as “one of the seminal works of materialism”
(7), given the negative dialectical fracturing of Idealism his work undertakes (6). Put otherwise, Schelling
stages the auto-deconstruction, or self-critique without synthesis, latent in German Idealism. Thus,
Schelling’s work is at once “within the universe of speculative Idealism,” and “already encroach into the
post-Hegelian universe of finitude-contingency-temporality” (Indivisible, 7). Žižek goes further, asserting
that Schelling hypostasizes negative dialectical tension into the essence of reality: “what we experience as
‘reality’ is constituted and maintains itself through the proper balance and tensions between two
antagonistic forces, with the ever-present danger that one of the two sides will ‘be cracked,’ run out of
control and thus destroy the ‘impression of reality’” (Indivisible, 24).
291
Describing the pathological nature of “beginning” (or the transition from nature to sprit) in Schelling’s
WA, Rajan writes: “Spirit cannot begin, because it cannot break out of the rotation between expansive and
contractive drives that binds it into its psychoanalysis. It begins, nevertheless, by transferring this psychosis
into history as the psychogenesis...of the absolute” (“Natural History ,” 195).
292
In a Bataillesque manner Habermas will write: “Absolute control over everything, even over this
absoluteness itself, is completed by removing the domination that is made possible by the production of
another absolute and thus in the union with something that is utterly uncontrollable...For the sake of love,
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history of nature as a primal scene of trauma and ruin, an “indivisible remainder,” or urnegativity that cannot be recouped by philosophy.
Broadly speaking, Schelling’s Weltalter project can be seen as continuing the
speculative theodicy of his Freedom essay, endeavouring to think the problem of
“beginning”: God’s original decision of creation, along with his continual emanation
through the various “ages” of creation (AW, 37, 51, 80; Žižek, Indivisible, 14; Krell,
Tragic, 107, 149). Each age still contains within itself remnants of “the universal magic
that permeates all things,” as a vital ground which continues to act and create,
manifesting as nature and human history (AW, 64-65, 75-78, 90-1). The text stages the
“crisis of the science of reason” as the various “ages of the world” “put god at the mercy
of history” (Habermas, “Dialectical,” 76). In this manner, the 1815 AW should be read as
a document of “natural history” in Adorno’s and Benjamin’s sense (Rajan, “Abyss,” 2;
“Margins,” 320-1), that is, the text’s fraught abstractions should be seen as allegorizing
the pathological and autogenetic forces latent in both natural and historical processes. Of
the three currently published versions of the text,293 the third, 1815 version is the most
discordant and negative: with its Dionysian descriptions of the “Bacchic...divine
madness” at the origin of creation (WA, 103), through to the “orgasm of forces” (WA,
101), unleashed by the “original negation” of God’s originary act (WA, 30).
Seen in constellation with his Freedom essay, the 1815 Ages of the World
provides valuable resources to think the philosophical system differently, presenting
models of continual negative dialectical tension without resolution in which “the
antithesis can as little surrender to unity as unity can surrender to antithesis” (AW, 10, 19,
16). That is, philosophy is thought in a natural-historical sense, as being allegorically

God must take on the risk that his counterpart might refuse him—and dissolve the unity of principles that
was indissoluble in God himself.” (“Dialectical,” 60; see further, Bataille, “Expenditure,” 116-123, 128-9).
293
Much remains to be said regarding the complex intertextual relationship between the three (currently)
published versions of the text, as many passages are redeployed within the economy of each “version” such
that they resound in fundamentally differing ways. This is particularly evident with respect to “negativity,”
which, though it occurs in both the 1811 (68, 112) and 1813 version (175-82), is put to work, serving the
manifestation of divine providence and the theodicy of the philosophical system (160-1). By contrast, the
1815 version of the text culminates in the orgiastic description of the “divine madness” of the Godhead at
the origin of creation (AW, 102-3), though a similar passage occurs in the 1811 version (101-2), this
dissonance becomes merely a negative moment in a broader positive unfolding of God’s theodicy. For
more on the various editions of the WA, and the specific negativity of the 1815 version, see Rajan,
“Margins” (321-6).
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subservient to the same transience in nature it describes: thought must put itself at risk.
Throughout the text, Schelling makes several meta-critical comments on philosophy,
deriding the “so-called enlightenment,” which has lost its feeling for substance and for
the “barbarian principle” at the heart of “life” (AW, 106).294 Modern philosophy, with its
lack of a “living ground,” emerged only “yesterday” (AW, 50; FE, 26); that is, it remains
either one-sidedly “realist” (Spinoza) or “Idealist” (Leibniz), and thus was unable to
grasp the “universal magic that permeates all things” (AW, 65). Spinoza and Leibniz
should be seen as dialogical characters through whom Schelling works out his own
philosophical views. Spinoza, despite his “dark feeling of that primordial time,” remains
a one-sided realist, bound by a mechanistic-geometrical world view, “hence the lack of
life and progression in his system” (AW, 104; FE, 59-62; Ideas, 16, 27). Leibniz is
chastised as a similarly “one-sided” “Idealist,” whose doctrine consists in the “denial and
non-acknowledgement of that negating primordial force,” the dynamic ground of nature
(AW, 7). Schelling describes the “main weakness of all modern philosophy,” as its “lack
of an intermediate concept”; thus “everything that is not spiritual in the highest sense is
material in the crudest sense” (AW, 64; US, 7, 16). Schelling does not aim for some
conciliatory concept (or idea) that would eradicate the difference between terms, but
rather a mode of thought—following Schelling’s vision of the copula” (FE, 13-14)—that
recognizes the identity in opposition between the ideal and real moments of
philosophy.295
In this section I will position Schelling’s agonistic theodicy as providing the
resources to think the system and its “diseased” transgression simultaneously, a tension
which is bound together through the model of “organism” inherited from Kant, though
refashioned towards Schelling’s own doctrine of “potencies” (AW, 19, 55-9, 82-4).
Schelling’s draft-like essayistic thinking refuses any definitive closure, staging a
speculative auto-deconstruction of Idealism, whereby its notions (of identity, dialectic,
and system) are wrecked through an exposure to the “living ground” of thought. As such,

294

As I have argued, both Benjamin and Adorno are similarly critical of the limited epistemological
mythology of the enlightenment.
295
Such a “negative dialectical” motif is evident throughout Schelling’s AW, particularly particularity in the
tensions of “the third potency” (A3)” which cannot occupy the position of “synthesis” (see AW, 19, 36).
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Schelling’s thought provides the means to think nature, along with any supposed
philosophy of spirit, in a dark and negative direction, articulating a fractured model of
Idealism which prioritizes parataxis and dissonance over unity. Specifically, in the
Weltalter, Schelling presents an absconded and pathological absolute, mirroring that
articulated in Benjamin’s early writings, specifically his Trauerspiel. Schelling’s protopsychoanalytic figurations (Rajan, “Abyss,” 1-3) develop a negative dialectical model of
thinking, through which the “originary diremption” inherent in both the Godhead and
nature continually contests the stability of the enlightenment project—or any possible
system of philosophy. That is, instead of enlightenment providential narratives of the
progressive unfolding of freedom, one confronts the transient abyss of natural history,
tarrying with the fact that “all evolution presupposed involution” (WA, 83). Schelling’s
text figures a psychoanalytic “working through” of the traumas of the past (of the various
“ages” of the world), leading thought to the ur-trauma, or the “original duality” at the
origin of creation, and in the heart of the absolute.
Schelling’s 1815 text recapitulates the Freedom essay’s problems of beginning (of
moving beyond “the abyss of freedom” to history), evoking a parallelism between the
Ungrund against which God’s sovereign “decision” at the origin of creation is conducted,
and that which subtends the human “decision” between good and evil:
Man is in the initial creation, as shown, an undecided being...only man himself can decide.
But this decision cannot occur within time; it occurs outside of all time and, hence, together
with the first creation (though as a deed distinct from creation). Man, even if born in time,
is indeed created into the beginning of creation (the centrum). The act, whereby his life is
determined in time, does not itself belong to time but rather to eternity: it also does not
temporally precede life but goes through time...as an act which is eternal by nature. (FE,
51)

In a similar manner, Schelling opens the AW by speculatively placing “man” atop the
same abyss confronted by the Godhead: “Certainly one who could write completely the
history of their own life would have, in a small epitome, concurrently grasped the history
of the cosmos” (WA, 3, 20, 102; WA [1813], 178). The psychoanalytic valences of such
an onto- and cosmo-genetic parallelism are highly evident, and Freud evokes a similar
analogy between the individual consciousness and the macro-drives which manifest as
the destructive pathologies or “discontent” of civilization (Civilization, 17-21, 38-52). Or
with Bataille, “the ebullition I consider, which animates the globe, is also my ebullition”
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(Accursed, 10). Rajan has aptly charted the psychoanalytic motif throughout Schelling’s
text: from his explicit figuration of “the unconscious”— “all consciousness is grounded
on the unconscious and precisely in the dawning of consciousness the unconscious is
posited as the past of consciousness... there is no consciousness without something that is
at the same time excluded and contracted” (AW, 44- 45)— to his depiction of the primal
drives subtending divine nature and the human (AW, 68-9, 98, 100, 102-3; Rajan,
“Abyss,” 1-2; “Psychoanalysis,”1-10).296 Yet in Schelling’s proto-psychoanalytic vision
one is not led to some palliative equilibrium of primal forces (via some triangulated
Oedipal scene), but rather, thought is led to probe the depths of “nature... an abyss of the
past,” the “traumatic core of spirit” (AW, 31; Rajan, “Abyss,” 1). Schelling chastises the
“Idealism” of his day as a naïve doctrine which “consists in the denial and nonacknowledgement of that negating primordial force” (AW, 7),297 a system which idealizes
human action, shying away from disease, death, and “the abysses of the human heart”—
the material forces of evil latent in the Ungrund of nature (AW, 48).298 Thus, Schelling

Rajan’s “The Abyss of the Past” provides an excellent entry point for interrogating Schelling’s Weltalter
in relation to psychoanalysis. Specifically, in his discussion of mesmerism and “magnetic sleep” (AW, 689), Schelling anticipates many elements of the psychoanalytic process (Rajan, “Abyss,” 7-8): “All the force
of the person during the waking state are apparently governed by a unity that holds them together...but if
this link is dissolved, then each force retreats back into itself and each tool now seems to be active for itself
and in its own world” (AW, 68). Further, with passages such as, “this intellect is an intermediary between
the utter night of consciousness and levelheaded spirit” (AW, 102) and “the past state is not comprehensible
from the present state. Rather, the past state lies at the basis of the present state” (AW, 100), Schelling
anticipates psychoanalysis’ fracturing of consciousness by way of its constitutive “unconscious”
processes.” Habermas further draws attention to the parallelism between cosmogenesis and transcendental
thought (see “Dialectical,” 71).
297
Echoing this critique of Idealism’s repression of its dark ground, or negativity, Schelling writes,
“Indeed, humans show a natural predilection for the affirmative just as much as they turn away from the
negative...Most people would find nothing more natural than if everything in the world were to consist of
pure gentleness and goodness, at which point they would become aware of their opposite. Something
inhibiting, something conflicting, imposes itself everywhere: this Other is that which, so to speak, should
not be and yet is, nay must be. It is this No that resists the Yes, this darkening which resists the light, this
obliquity that resists the straight, this left that resists the right, and however else one has attempted to
express this eternal antithesis in images.” (AW, 6). For Schelling, one must linger and tarry with the
negativity at the heart of being, “Whoever wants knowledge of history must accompany it along its great
path, linger over each moment, and surrender to the gradualness of the development. The darkness of the
spirit cannot be overcome suddenly or in one fell swoop. The world is not a riddle whose solution could be
given in a single world” (AW, 4).
298
In a similar manner, Adorno is critical of mere enlightenment for forgetting this naturalistic basis.
Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944/7) describes the “disenchanting” character of
western reason: enlightenment seeks to dominate its “other”—nature, mythology, and all particularity—by
way of determinate categories, thus turning the natural world into what Heidegger termed a “standing
reserve”—a natural world deprived of autogenetic and telic capacities (“Technology” 324-326, 329; DE,
296
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positions philosophy as a base material “counter science” which continually contests
ideal philosophical doctrines by leading them back to the “auto-castration” at the heart of
nature (AW, 103).
Such a “traumatic core” of spirit is none other than the “divine and holy madness”
(AW, 102), the “original negation” of God in creation which “is still the mother and the
wet-nurse of the entire world that is visible to us” (AW, 30, 15-16). As Žižek has pointed
out, this negation, or withdrawal at the origin of creation transfers a fundamental “gap”
into the constitution of reality, the Lacanian “trauma of the Real”—of “sheer
antagonism”—that can never be fully recuperated by thought (Indivisible, 24; Plague,
216). As in Benjamin’s refashioning of “origin” (OT, 24-26), which articulates a transient
natural-historical starting point for philosophy, “origin,” or “beginning,” comes to be
thought in a historically reiterable sense.299
God’s “beginning” does not occur “once upon a time,” but rather, “it persists,” as
an originary act still dormant in all creation. As Schelling writes: “the primordial deed
becomes a beginning that can never be sublimated” (AW, 85; 63, 96, 98), and further, “a
true beginning is not one that constantly begins again, but persists” (AW, 20-21). This
beginning, which transfers God’s fraught duality into the world, allows for history, and
more radically, for “historical materialism” and “psychoanalysis,” modes of thought
which un-work the positivity of knowledge, putting both God and the stability of thought
into question (Habermas, “Dialectical,” 75-85; Rajan, “Margins,” 325). As in Benjamin’s
Baroque, nature languishes in suffering due to its transient character, as God’s original
suffering is imparted universally to creation:
Suffering is universal, not only with respect to humanity, but also with respect to the
creator. God leads human nature down no other path that that down which God
himself must pass. Participating in everything blind, dark, and suffering of God’s
nature is necessary in order to elevate God to the highest consciousness. Every

xvii, 6, 11). Adorno and Horkheimer employ Idealist and psychoanalytic motifs in a meta-critical
confrontation of enlightenment with its own pathologies: reason is forced to tarry with its disregarded
“phantasms,” specifically, “nature,” that abject other repressed by enlightenment narratives of progress (13; 6-8; 10; 18-22).
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Krell (in The Tragic Absolute) sees Schelling’s text as presenting a strife ridden model of Idealism, in
which thought is unable to reach its own “origin,” thus remaining constitutively fractured, a “tragic” model
of Idealism (183). For Krell, the problem of the text “whole and entire” entails the questioning, “How one
can give an account of what one has never seen” (149), or as Schelling put it, “what kept God busy before
God created the world?” (AW, 80).
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single being must get to know their own depths and this is only possible with
suffering. All pain comes only from Being. (AW, 101)300

One is immediately reminded of the Freedom essay’s splitting of the Godhead into
“ground” (or nature, the Ungrund) and “being,” though in the later Weltalter, the
manifestation of “Love” is not enough to quell the primordial fire of negativity emanating
from the ground. That is, nature—or the ground of being—with its destructive parturition
constantly threatens the possibility of theodicy: “in God, there would be no life and no
joy of life were the now subordinated forces not in constant possibility of fanning the
flames of the contradiction against unity” (AW, 47, 32-33, 50, 100-1). God also has an
unconscious: a dark ground in nature that contains self-destructive “drives,” which
relentlessly threatens the stability of his own benevolent theodicy. Schelling’s Weltalter
stages God’s confrontation with his own divided essence, a Trauerspiel in which God has
“become a life not a being” and comes to realize that “without the contradiction, there
would be no movement, no life, and no progress. There would only be eternal stoppage, a
deathly slumber of the forces” (FE, 66; AW, 12, 70).
Returning to Schelling’s proto-psychoanalytic vision, one could see his discourse
as harnessing the same “self-lacerating” “rotary dialectic” it posits in nature: “The
ancients did not speak in vain of a divine and holy madness. We even see nature, in the
process of its free unfolding, becoming, in proportion to its approaching spirit, even
more, so to speak, frenzied.... all things in nature are found in an insensate state” (AW,
102). What is figured in the AW is not some straightforward coming to consciousness of
unconscious pathologies by way of reason, a palliative that would allow for a transition
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Continuing this motif of struggle, Schelling describes how the suffering of the Godhead is imparted to
all creation in the form of “anxiety”: “It is futile to attempt to explain the diversity in nature by the peaceful
eisamplasy of various forces. Everything that becomes can only become in discontent. And just as anxiety
is the fundamental sensation of every living creature, so, too, everything that lives is only conceived and
born in violent struggle.... are not most of the products of inorganic nature manifestly the children of
anxiety, or terror, nay, of despair? And so we also see in the individual cases in which we, to some extent,
are permitted to be witness of an original creation, that the first foundation of future humans is only formed
in deadly struggle, terrifying discontent, and anxiety that often extends in despair. If this happens in
individuals and in the small, could it be any different in the large, in the creation of the first parts of the
world system?” (AW, 91-92). Schelling imparts a similar tension to the philosophical system in his “On the
Nature of Philosophy as Science,” with his notion of “asystasy,” the “inner conflict” which generates
“knowledge” (210-12).
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from nature to spirit, but rather, a continual solicitation and affirmation of the
phantasmagorical ground, a favouring of disease and transgression, over and against the
unity of system. Schelling ends the text in a proto-Nietzschean fashion, affirming the
Dionysian madness endemic to any authentic act of creation: “nothing great can be
accomplished without a constant solicitation of madness, which should always be
overcome, but never be utterly lacking...where there is no madness, there is also no
proper, active, living intellect” (AW, 103). Schelling’s naturalistic ground of philosophy
necessitates an organic understanding of thought in which negativity (or “disease”)
continually threatens the autarky of reason: “If an organic being becomes sick, forces
appear that previously lay concealed in it. Or if in the copula the unity dissolves
altogether if the life forces that were previously subjugated to something higher are
deserted by the ruin of spirit and can freely follow their own inclinations...then something
terrible becomes manifest...which was held down by the magic of life” (AW, 48).
As a negative dialectical thinker, Schelling is immensely skeptical of any
straightforward transition from nature to Spirit. In fact, he describes the destructive
character of history as a pathological eruption of the same forces dormant in nature which
can never be “worked through”:
If we take into consideration the many terrible things in nature and the spiritual
world and the great many things that a benevolent hand seems to cover up from us,
then there could be no doubt that the godhead sits enthroned over a world of terrors.
And God, in accordance with what is concealed in and by God, could be called the
awful and the terrible, not in a derivative fashion, but in their original sense...the
Forces of that consuming fire still slumber in life, only pacified and, so to speak,
exorcised by that word by which the one became the all. If one could remove that
reconciling potency, life would immediately again fall prey to that life of
contradiction and consuming desire. But nature...catches itself and overcomes its
own necessity by way of the forces from above, abandoning itself voluntarily to the
scission and thereby to the eternal pleasure and joy of life of the Godhead. (WA, 49)

Indeed, Schelling presents “A Baroque worldview, exaggerated to the point of absurdity”
(Habermas, “Dialectical, 55). Schelling’s middle work fails to provide any stable
changeover from nature to Spirit, nor does it provide any generalizable understanding of
the philosophical system. Schelling provides a counter-providential and negative
dialectical relationship between the domains of nature and Spirit, holding the ideal and
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real moments of thought together in strife ridden identity-in-difference.301 In a quasi
Benjamian fashion, Schelling describes nature as longing to be “redeemed” from its
“mute and inactive unity” (AW, 72), towards the “acting unity” of freedom (AW, 46-7,
31). However, Schelling equally demonstrates a theurgy of spirit, whereby ideals are
made to descend into the maelstrom constituted by the processes of nature, becoming
exposed to the dark ground of spirit by way of the contradictions inherent in the
Godhead. Schelling’s middle work thus exemplifies a mode of “theory” in which “even
as nature is thus re-described as spirit, spirit is exposed to nature” (Rajan, “Margins,”
319). Hence the difficulty of thinking a positive philosophy with Schelling: one is not led
up the great chain of being to some stable thought of Spirit—to a conciliatory and
grounded normative space. Instead, one is beckoned downward, into the “trauma of
creation” (Krell, Tragic, 148, 183), to the dark forces of the Ungrund, and the “original
diremption of nature itself” (FO, 205). With Schelling, what is presented is a continual
exposure of reason to its own phantasms, a model of Idealism which is constantly opened
and troubled via contact with the “living ground” of nature. Such a space allows Idealism
to be conceived of as continually active and dynamic, sanctioning new possible
constellations between nature and history, freedom, and necessity, and ideal and real.

Statements such as “Natural life [is] the echelon towards spiritual life,” and “the same creative forces
that lie in nature are in the being of the spiritual world” (AW, 64), demonstrate the reciprocal articulation of
nature and Spirit. Schelling also speaks of a desire, or need, for nature to be liberated from its own
“muteness” (AW, 32-4): “Left to itself, nature would still lead everything back into that state of utter
negation” (AW, 31). This sentiment is further reinforced by Schelling’s repeated reference to Romans 8:
“For the creation waits in eager expectation for the children of God to be revealed. For the creation was
subjected to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the
creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the freedom and glory of the
children of God. We know that the whole creation has been groaning as in the pains of childbirth right up to
the present time” (NIV, 1758). Despite this parallelism, Spirit (or the Godhead) is continually drawn to
nature, in order to understand “the contradiction,” or negativity of its own essence, the yearning for being
to understand its ground (AW, 32-3).
301
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Hegel as a Ruin: Avenues of “Phantasmatological” Inquiry
(Aesthetics, Nature)

6

“It [vulgar intellectual history] makes the impudent claim that because one has the dubious good fortune to
live later, and because one has a professional interest in the person one is to talk about, one can sovereignly
assign the dead person his place, thereby in some sense elevating oneself above him. This arrogance echoes
in the loathsome question of what in Kant, and now Hegel as well, has any meaning for the present—and
even the so-called Hegel renaissance began half a century ago with a book by Benedtto Croce that
undertook to distinguish what was living and what was dead in Hegel. The converse question is not even
raised: what the present means in the face of Hegel; whether perhaps the reason one imagines one has
attained since Hegel’s absolute reason has not in fact long since regressed behind the latter and
accommodated to what merely exists, when Hegelian reason tried to set the burden of existence in motion
through the reason that obtains even in what exists.” Adorno, “Aspects of Hegel’s Philosophy,” Hegel:
Three Studies 1.

6.1

Hegel as a Ruin (Idealism without Absolutes)

“We should not attempt to bring about a rebirth or renaissance of the University, but think its ruins as the
sedimentation of historical differences that remind us that thought cannot be present to itself.” Readings,
The University in Ruins, 171.

How does one evaluate, or even confront, a thinker such as Hegel? How can one
begin to determine “what is living and what is dead in Hegel’s system,” what moments in
his interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of all the philosophical sciences are too speculative,
too negative, too much, too “German,” too “statist” (Russell, 737- 738, 741-2; Popper,
229-82)? Recently, it has become fashionable to “deflate” Hegel, generally through a
narrow textual focus (on the Phenomenology of Spirit or The Science of Logic), in order
to illuminate him as a “post-Kantian” thinker of normativity, who (supposedly) attempted
to work out a normative “space of reasons,” along with linguistic deliberative
justifications in a way that anticipates the later Wittgenstein or Habermas.302 Against this
stand the “metaphysical” or “conciliatory” readers of Hegel, those who attempt to redeem

Such a view can be ascribed to the “Pittsburgh Hegelians” specifically, R. Pippin, R. Brandom, J.
MacDowell, along with post-Kantian readers such as T. Pinkard, who regard Hegel as “both accepting
and extending Kant’s critique, ultimately turning it against the residual dogmatically metaphysical aspects
of Kant’s own philosophy” (Redding, “Hegel,” Stanford). Against this view stand the “revised
metaphysical” readers of Hegel, most notably C. Taylor, and Beiser, along with R. Stern and S. Houlgate,
who see Hegel as inhabiting a metaphysical-transcendental space informed not only by Kant, but by a
critical refashioning of the metaphysical theses of Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Herder, and Schelling. My
own approach follows the latter, “metaphysical-holistic” reading of Hegel, though fractured in a “ruined
direction.” One can also locate a “deconstructive” approach to Hegel, following thinkers such as Derrida
(of Glas [1974] and “The Pit and the Pyramid” [1972]), Nancy (The Speculative Remark [2001], Hegel:
The Restlessness of the Negative [1997], and C. Malabou (The Future of Hegel, 1996). These thinkers take
a linguistic approach to the Hegelian project, recognizing Hegel as someone who anticipates many
elements of the later theoretical linguistic turn. As I argue, such deconstructive approaches to Hegel are
prefigured in Adorno, though I follow their general recognition of the linguistic elements of Hegelian
thought.
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some conception of totality, or “the whole,” from Hegel’s oeuvre, viewing him as
providing a metaphysical—though nonetheless transcendental—way forward for
philosophy.
Between such conciliatory attempts to redeem some “rational” Hegel out of his
metaphysical shell, or to rescue some holistic sense of the Hegelian project, I advocate a
reading of Hegel which understands his work at the outset as a “ruin.” Hegel’s
Encyclopedic project is a ruined cathedral to “the absolute”: a failed (and perhaps naïve
or even tragic) attempt to unify all of knowledge under the rubric of philosophy (EO, 51,
53). Though Hegel aims at “a whole” rationally articulated by way of the “freedom” of
the philosophical concept (SOL, 17), such a meta-conception of philosophy ultimately
fails according to Hegel’s own standards as Spirit is seemingly unable to “digest” or
“work through” the vast array of natural-historical detail in order to arrive at the triumph
of Spirit (Rajan, “(In)Digestible” 217-18; cf. ND, 300-20, 326-7, 334-8). However, as in
Kafka’s “Imperial message,” though the emperor’s communique fails to arrive at its
“final” (or “absolute”) destination, it arrives in its own way, through a constant deferral
which exceeds the original journey (4-5).303 That is, despite—or more radically, because
of—its failure to complete its own task, Hegel’s corpus provides a polyphony of thought
models and “prisms” through which to refract philosophy, politics, nature, and art in
productive directions. Following the prefatory assertions of Adorno, placing Hegel’s
thinking in constellation with contemporary concerns can estrange present day thought
from its own quotidian assumptions, providing a meta-critical space through which to
reflect upon the purview of philosophy and its relationship to its own “margins” (that is,
to other disciplines along with its own aporias and blind spots). As a self-fracturing, or
self-troubling, thinker, Hegel provides the resources to think an “Idealism without
absolutes,” that is, a model of Idealism opened towards “heterogeneity, materiality and
différance”: moments which “disturb all absolutes” (Rajan “Introduction,” 2). In this
prefatory section (6.1), I will methodologically elaborate my own “ruined” reading of

As Kafka concludes, “Nobody could fight his way through with a message from a dead man. But you sit
at your window when evening falls and dream it to yourself” (5). Though the message of Hegelian thought
fails to arrive definitively, one is able to speculatively “dream” new possible ways of reading his corpus
without absolute completion.
303
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Hegel, following which I will argue for nature and the aesthetic as potentially critical
moments through which to speculatively invade the Hegelian project (6.2).
For Hegel, philosophy is necessarily systematic, or “encyclopedic” (EO, 51-3).
Hegel is emphatic, “the true is the whole” (PS, 11, 14); that is, “truth” entails the coming
to (self-) consciousness of the “organic unity...of mutual necessity...[which] constitutes
the life of the whole” (PS, 2). Such a “whole” presents the unity of all the philosophical
sciences, grasping “the absolute,” as it progresses through the various “patterns or shapes
of consciousness” [Gestalten des Bewußtseins], and as “Spirit” [Geist] comes to know
itself, gaining the freedom of “self–consciousness” and the autonomy of selfdetermination (PS, 56; PG, 80). The Hegelian sojourn of Spirit can be broadly glossed
corresponding to Hegel’s tripartite dialectical schema (PS, 40, 49-57). After moving
through the prefatory domain of “consciousness” treated in the Phenomenology, Geist
arrives at “self-consciousness,” where it is able to grasp the absolute “in itself” by way of
“Logic” (or Metaphysics [EL, 7-8; SOL, 7-11, 28-9, 42]), “for itself” in the “philosophy
of nature,” and finally, after the completion of its journey of self -formation (or Bildung,
[PS, 50]), “in and for itself” in the “philosophy of Spirit,” the result being that Geist is
able to self-consciously and “freely” shape the world (Mind, 292-3, 302, 313-5). Upon
reaching “absolute knowledge,” Geist is “resolved” of external relations, overcoming the
distinction between subject and object and allowing philosophy to become a practice of
“ontology,” that is, an analysis of “Being” itself, independent of its intermediating
transcendental conditions—the mediation of the epistemic subject (SOL, 42-3). The
Kantian distinction between the “form” and “content” of knowledge is overcome as
philosophy passes from epistemology to ontology (or from “subjective” to “absolute”
Idealism, [SOL, 40-1]).
As in Schelling’s philosophy of nature, Hegel’s thinking suffers under the weight
of two opposing trajectories: one pulling towards self-unification and gradual ascendency
(the coming to consciousness of Geist via the overcoming and historicization of its earlier
“shapes,” or moments); another towards fecundity and proliferation, as Geist takes
countless detours through various disciplines and idiosyncrasies, which continually
multiply via his countless additions and supplements (exemplified by Hegel’s speculative
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“Zusätze” and the continually evolving lecture form of his texts).304 Though Hegel
continually speaks of the “overcoming-sublation” [Aufhebung] of various forms—such
as, nature, “sense certainty,” aesthetics, religion— his work also immerses itself with
painful detail in the particularities of various spheres. One sees Hegel “lingering over”
(PS, 17) the peculiarities of crystals (PN, 160-78), planets (PN, 86-103), parsing the
nuances of Zoroastrian religion and art (A, 323-331), along with the dazzling descriptions
he provides of particular aesthetic forms. Each “shape” or “sphere” presents a “moment”
of the holistic “truth” that is Geist’s self-realization (PS, 56), yet if seen in itself, each
sphere provides a Leibnizian “world within a world,” a semi-autonomous sphere that
resists and troubles the triumph of absolute spirit (“Rajan, “Immunitary,” 40). As Hegel’s
journey of Spirit progresses, the avenues and detours that Spirit takes likewise proliferate,
placing doubt upon its triumphant arrival at absolute knowing.
Hegel seemingly invites such “diseased” transgressions of his own system when
in the “Preface” to his Phenomenology, he describes “the tremendous power of the
negative” as “an accident as such, detached from [the “self-enclosed circle” of the whole
that] circumscribes it,” seemingly sanctioning the enduring potential for “a moment” to
gain “a separate freedom” (PS, 18-19; cf. Schelling, FE, 18). As Hegel writes:
The circle that remains self-enclosed and, like substance, holds its moments together, is
an immediate relationship, one therefore which has nothing astonishing about it. But
that an accident as such, detached from what circumscribes it, what is bound and is
actual only in the context with others, should attain an existence of its own and a
separate freedom—this is the tremendous power of the negative...but the life of Spirit is
not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather
the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter
dismemberment, it finds itself...Spirit is the power only by looking the negative in the
face, and tarrying with it. (PS, 18-19; cf., EL, 39; EO, 51)

Occasioned by “the Remark that the Science of Logic devotes to the Aufhebung” (13), Nancy (In The
Speculative Remark) examines a subterranean “economy of remarks” (48) subtending Hegel’s thought,
such that each Hegelian text “gives rise to a multiplication of texts” (60). In this manner, though Hegel is
often characterized as a thinker of subsumption and conceptual imperialism, Nancy demonstrates the
complex negative network of deferral operating within the Hegelian encyclopedia, such that Hegel can be
seen (equally) as a thinker of negativity and speculative proliferation. Describing this phantasmatolgocial
economy of remarks, Nancy writes, “From its first paragraph the Remark carries us off course or makes its
own conceptual reading slide, disturbs or forbids the grasp of meaning...one is obliged to follow the remarked and persistent trace of the text’s singular slipping economy...An economy of Remarks seems to
double up the economy of logical discourse...a subordinated, ‘detached’ dispersed economy that does not
obey the strict progression of the concept” (46-48, cf. 7-19, 75-101). Hegel himself describes the
‘speculative’ character of the German language (SOL, 12).
304
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Hegel’s project attempts to theorize philosophy as a holistic (organic) system, while
nonetheless giving a dangerous degree of autonomy to its individual members, striving to
create a system that does not shy from “death...and devastation,” from “the negative,” nor
from contingency or empirical particularity, domains which constantly trouble the final
triumph of (conceptual) philosophy. For Hegel, the Faustian bargain of “modern
philosophy”—of becoming truly “mature” in the Kantian sense of enlightenment—
necessitates embracing such transcendental finitude: “looking the negative in the face,”
and accepting the inherent instability, or even the necessary volatility, of any
philosophical system. The possibility that an “accident” could gain a certain freedom is,
and must remain, a possibility for the Hegelian project.
Treating the Hegelian project as a ruin, or failure, at the start allows one to probe
the immense complexity of the “detritus,” or “excrement” left behind in the wake of
Geist’s conceptual sojourn (Rajan “(In) Digestible,” 218, 232). In reading Hegel “against
the grain” in this manner, one can, following Benjamin’s “Angel of History,” sift through
the “pile of wreckage” left in the wake of the Hegelian “storm of progress” (SW 4: 391392).305 The figure of the “ruin” has several obvious Romantic affinities, and my own
refashioning of the term owes much to Readings’ “ruined” understanding of the
contemporary university—seen in the broad sense as the organization of knowledge. For
Readings, the “university in ruins” is not animated by nostalgia for a past golden age, for
a moment of national unity, or for the capitalist “university of excellence,” but rather, it is
a model which affirms the continual self-fracturing of thought (166-79). This prefatory
section will position my own ruined reading in relation to two prominent immanently
critical approaches to the work of Hegel, that of Marxist critical theory (culminating in
the Frankfurt School) and that of Bataille’s (or Gasché’s) “phantasmatology.”306
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Echoing such sentiments, Duque presents a reading of Hegel centered on failure in which logic (or
“subject”) is unable to master “substance,” and thus one is compelled to recognize that “the wounds of
Spirit do not necessarily heal without leaving any scars. The Hegelian system, impressive as it is, ultimately
reveals itself as a miscarried attempt to reconcile nature and theoria, individuality and collective praxis”
(x).
306
I define “immanent critique” via Adorno (Prisms, 27-34), as a mode of criticism which judges, and
unfolds, a work according to its own internal logic(s), as opposed to “transcendent critique” which judges a
work according to pre-conceived static criteria. For Adorno, “To read Hegel experientially is to judge him
by his own criterion” (Hegel, 145), and further, no “reading” is complete without historical-critical
reflection, and marginal supplementation, or destructive critique: “No reading of Hegel can do him justice
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Following this I will demonstrate that nature and the aesthetic can be read as
“phantasmalogical” sites through which to refract Hegel’s thinking in productive
directions (6.2). These thinkers illustrate the fundamental plasticity of the Hegelian
project, rupturing it by way of its accidents and productive offshoots, demonstrating the
historical malleability of his concepts and categories.
Marx was a forerunner in recognizing the plastic character of the Hegelian
project, seeing Hegel as a thinker of the failed absolute, while nonetheless critically
employing a Hegelian method. Despite his materialist veneer, Marx should be considered
a post-Idealist thinker. As a “left Hegelian,” Marx rejected Hegel’s political-theological
conclusions regarding the Prussian state, critically severing the Idealist “German
Ideology”: a holy family of speculative Idealism, religion, and capitalist politicaleconomy, all of which served to uphold the material status quo (Marx, German Ideology,
147-9 172, 149-51 172-3; Marcuse, Reason, 252, 258-62). Despite such critiques, Marx
self-consciously employed a Hegelian method in his analysis of the capitalist totality
(Lukács, Consciousness, 234-9, 16-20). Marx’s immanent extrapolation of “dialectics”
from its Hegelian logical Idealist origin, in the creation of an unconditioned model of
Hegelianism, is a common gesture of twentieth-century theory, explicitly undertaken by
many in the Marxist tradition (Rosen, 23-54; 153-8), and that of twentieth-century French
theory. Bataille drastically asserts, “I imagine that my life—or better yet, its aborting, the
open wound that is my life—constitutes all by itself the refutation of Hegel’s closed
system” (“Letter to X,” 296). But Bataille’s thinking nonetheless remains eminently
within the force-field of Hegelian thought, and should be seen as attempting to create a
“phantasmatology” of “unemployed negativity”: a Hegelianism rid from the confines of
“the concept,” such that one can adequately probe “the limits” of “both thought and
being” (Bataille, Eroticism, 238). Both Marxism and French theory are united in their
immanent refashioning of the Hegelian program: both traditions use one Hegel to move
beyond another, elevating a particular moment (or “accident”) to rupture his “self enclosed circle of totality.”

without criticizing him...it is not the worst reader who provides the book with disrespectful notes in the
margin” (Hegel, 145).
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This “ruined” reading of Hegel is also (pre)figured in the work of Adorno, as seen
in the prefatory quotation for this chapter in which Adorno challenges fundamental
intellectual historical assumptions regarding the “evaluation” of a thinker. At the outset
of his (under theorized) Three Studies on Hegel (1963), Adorno inverts the conventional
model of intellectual history that would attempt to evaluate past thinkers in light of
contemporary concerns. Instead, Adorno forwards his own historical-philosophical model
(informed by Benjamin), which seeks to distance one from one’s own suppositions by
way of the “shock” of the past. For Adorno, the question becomes not what we—as
somehow apt judges—deem “living or dead” in Hegel, but rather, how Hegel, or his
texts, might see our time: “what our present means in the face of Hegel” (Hegel, 1). How
might Hegel judge our “reality” in relation to his encyclopedic understanding of
“rationality”? How might he respond to the unexpected and pathological turns Modernity
has taken since his death (in 1831)?307 The model for such a jarring and reciprocally
reflexive confrontation with the past is provided by Benjamin’s notion of “the
constellation,” in which disparate elements are arranged in a “tensioned mosaic,” such
that their desperate parts form a “constellation saturated with tensions” (OT, 34; SW 4:
396; Arcades, 14-15). Benjamin later elaborated this method in relation to surrealist
montage techniques and a Brechtian-materialism, whereby the philosopher attempts to
elaborate formal techniques that “estrange” readers from their quotidian attitudes, forcing
them to question their everyday assumptions, along with the ideological distributions of
the sensible subtending them.308
For Adorno, Hegel’s corpus performs these gestures of estrangement

Schnädelbach locates the “end of Idealism” with Hegel’s death in 1831 (and Goethe’s in 1832). As the
“end of Idealism,” the following period was one of intellectual decline, splintering, and a broader crisis of
European humanism, all of which were accelerated by the forces of modernization. Such tensions
eventually culminating in the crises of the early twentieth-century (see, 1-16).
308
With respect to Hegel’s philosophy of nature, it is easy to deride Hegel’s understanding of nature as
simply false, or worse, emblematic of metaphysical excesses, especially when one views Hegel from our
twenty-first-century perspective. It is precisely such a vulgar developmental view of history that Benjamin
sought to overcome with his model of the constellation, in which the present is estranged from itself and
“opened up” by way of an encounter with the past, that is “read against the grain” (SW 4:391-5). Thus, with
respect to Hegel’s philosophy of nature, one might examine new possible relationships between philosophy
and the physical sciences in light of Hegel’s inter-disciplinarity. More remains to be said regarding
Benjamin relationship with dialectics, particularly his Brechtian-Hegelian notion of “dialectics at a
standstill” (Arcades, 462-468; SW 4: 396).
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predominantly through its turgid prose, which functions as a form of “parataxis,”
distancing the reader from their conventional hermeneutic assumptions (Adorno,
“Parataxis,” 133-5, 143; Hegel, 136-7, 101-2). In this way, despite (or because of)
Hegel’s “lack of sensitivity to the linguistic medium,” he unintentionally broaches the
proper dissonant relationship of thought to language (Hegel, 121). Hegel’s repeated
stumbling, stuttering, stammering, repetition, his circling and continually beginning
again, all refract negatively (in a modernist sense) the proper self-troubling philosophical
comportment to language: “all philosophical language is a language in opposition to
language, marked with the stigma of its own impossibility" (Adorno, Hegel 100). Such
sentiments are echoed by Derrida, who proclaims Hegel to be “the last philosopher of the
book and the first thinker of writing” (Of Grammatology, 26). Adorno continues his
linguistic analysis by proclaiming Hegel’s works to be “anti-texts” (Hegel, 119),
annotated lectures, or “films of thought” which constantly unwork themselves so as to
describe “the substance of philosophy as process,” and as such should be read with the
“speculative ear” (Hegel, 121, 122-3).309 Via his performative textual unworkings, Hegel
provokes a metaphysical experience in his readers—in which one “reads,” or reflects
upon, oneself reading— provoking meta-reflection and “supplementation” via the reader
(Rajan, Supplement, 52). For Hegel, “we learn by experience that we mean something
other than we meant to mean; and this correction of our meaning compels our knowing to
go back to the proposition, and understand it in some other way”: philosophy must move
away from the conventionally deductive “ratiocinative proposition” towards the
“speculative proposition,” which engages actively with questions of “plasticity,” or form
(PS, 39, 66; Malabou, Futures, 11-12). In resisting the dogmatic equation of “clarity”
with “truth,” Hegel’s texts strive for “intelligibility without confusing it with clarity,”
employing language (or concepts) in a speculative way to move beyond language: “If
philosophy can be defined at all, it is an effort to express things one cannot speak about,
to help express the non-identical despite the fact that expressing it identifies it at the same
time” (Adorno, Hegel, 105, 101-102).

For the complexities of Adorno’s understanding of “listening” see “Types of Musical Conduct” (1-20)
in Introduction to the Sociology of Music. For Adorno’s positive theory of language as a “resistance” to the
demand for “understandability,” see “Theses on the Language of the Philosopher” (35-39).
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Hegel’s corpus, considered as an “organic whole”—in which the “parts” refract the
“whole” in various ways—provides a “monadological” (Benjamin, OT, 27) likeness of
Hegel’s historical-political world, one that is eminently divergent from our own, with
very different political-economic, scientific, and philosophical assumptions.310 It is far
too easy to simply cast aside Hegel as one who has little to say to our contemporary
reality: as some Prussian apologist who dwelled excessively in meaningless dialectical
abstraction, or one who attempted to re-import metaphysics into the study of nature.
Upon closer examination, one sees in Hegel the origin of a properly “modern”
philosophical sentiment, a thinker who sought to understand philosophy as “its own time
comprehended in thought,” depicting the emergence of philosophy as an interdisciplinary
dialogue with its own historical contingencies (PR, 21).311 Following Aristotle, Hegel
began with the particular worldviews and assumptions (or Vorstellungen) of his own
time, which he sought to test and elevate via the properly universal tribunal of “the
concept” [Begriff], seeing the working out of the broader “infinite” absolute from within
a “finite” historical-empirical world. If one attempts to evaluate Hegel’s
Naturphilosophie, aesthetics, or politics, according to our contemporary standards, of
course they will be found deficient. However, if one sees them in relation to Hegel’s own
time, to Hegel’s quotidian assumptions and debates, one sees a truly unique and
unparalleled conception of philosophy as an interdisciplinary dialogue with its historical
era. Understood in this way, Hegel’s thinking provides a “prism” through which we can
view another possible relationship to the world, presenting alternative models of
philosophy, politics, and self-consciousness (Adorno, Prisms, 7-9). Hegel, along with
many other German Idealists and Romantics, provides “meta-critical” perspectives
through which to understand the evolution of philosophy, and by which to confront our
current conceptions of what philosophy is and should be as a discipline.

For Benjamin, the task of criticism entails “monadologically” capturing a particular historical epoch via
“Ideas” As Benjamin asserts in his “Epistemo-Critical Prologue”: “The idea is a monad—this means, in
nuce: each idea contains an image of the world” (OT, 27).
311
In this way, Hegel can be considered a “philosophical modernist,” as defined by Bernstein (“Political
Modernism,” 56-8): that is, one who self-reflexively employs “modern” philosophical notions.
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In the philosophical literature, it has become far too commonplace to simply cast
off Hegel wholesale as some “panlogicist,” who attempted to define all of “the real” by
way of “the rational” (PR, 20-21).312 Hegel is often cast as an “absolute Idealist”
according to whom “everything happens of necessity according to reason” (Beiser,
Hegel, 76). For Beiser, the status of “contingency,” or finitude, is one of the central
questions raised by Hegel’s oeuvre (Hegel, 76-9), and one already explored in Hegel’s
lifetime via the “Krug’s pen” objection, with regard to the relation of Logic (or Idealism)
to the multiplicity and variety of the natural world (PN, 25; Beiser, Hegel, 78).
Ultimately, Beiser concludes that there is evidence for both interpretations of Hegel’s
project (Ibid, 78); however, as I will be show throughout this chapter, the fecundity of
Spirit’s detritus, along with its constant detours, through “worlds within worlds,” should
at least warrant skepticism to the final triumph of Geist in absolute knowing. As Žižek
has pointed out, Hegelian “necessity” is always already (dialectically) shot through with
“contingency” (Less than Nothing, 123-4, 136, 143-51).
Further, in light of the prefatory quotation by Adorno, one can question why such
a logical-totalitarian reading of Hegel is seemingly so needed: what does the desire to
strawman Hegel as a totalitarian logo-centrist say about our time and philosophical
context? Such a panlogicist caricature is shared by many in the analytic tradition, who
scapegoat Hegel as a thinker of metaphysical bombast so as to justify their own
impoverished epistemic view of philosophy. Such readings are exemplified by the
(analytic) post-Kantian interpretations of Pippin, who vastly abridges the force-field of
Hegel’s influences, focusing solely on simplified versions of Kant and Aristotle (Pippin,
Shadows, 1-37; Houlgate, “Review,” 765-6). Ironically, such a view is shared by many in
the tradition of post-structuralism, particularly Deleuze, who explicitly positions his

Hegel’s “Doppelsatz” (or “double-dictum”)— “What is actual is rational and what is rational is actual”
(PR, 21)—is perhaps the most misunderstood in his oeuvre and has been the subject of various
misreadings, commencing already in Hegel’s own lifetime (Pinkard, Hegel, 493-4, 497). In the context of
the post-Napoleonic Prussian state, such statements were taken as Hegel’s apology for the Prussians state
as an “end of history,” an “actual” endorsement of what philosophy had “ideally” articulated. However, in
actuality, such a statement should not be seen as endorsing some particular historical moment, but rather, as
opening an explicitly objective Idealist dialogue between reality and thought (or the empirical and
transcendental).
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Kantian-Nietzschean transcendental empiricism “against the dialectic.”313 As Hegel so
aptly asserts in the Phenomenology, “enlightenment” and “superstition” are coconstitutive, dialectically expressing themselves in relation to each other (PS, 329-55);
thus much of so-called anti-Hegelian thought actually justifies itself “negatively,” via its
opposition to the supposed metaphysical caprice of Hegelian speculation. Paraphrasing C.
Schmitt, oftentimes in politics (and in philosophy), who one’s enemy is will tell you
much about who they are (26-27).
It may be objected that there does exist a “reconciliatory” or totalizing teleology
of “identity” in Hegel’s work in which individual particularity is sublated in favour of the
general level of the concept—an understanding of the “truth as the whole” (PS, 11).
Though his philosophy does undeniably progress upward towards “absolute knowing,”
such an “absolute” does not herald some final triumph of philosophy, but rather, it is a
scene of immense pathos and negativity, a passage Hegel describes as the
“Golgotha/boneyard of absolute knowing” [die Schädelstätte des absoluten Geistes] (PS,
493; PG, 591). It is a scene of ruin and continual transient progression: “a gallery of
moving images” (PS, 492). The Phenomenology, despite its seeming triumphant arrival at
“absolute knowing,” perhaps has more in common with a text such as Joyce’s Finnegans
Wake (1939): a work which begins in medias res, only to (re)arrive at its own beginning,
a stuttering conclusion that does everything but proclaim the triumph of the logos (see
further, Comay & Ruda, The Dash, 30-31, 34-36).314 Hegel’s difficulties with
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At the outset of Difference and Repetition (1968), Deleuze defines his work—in which he would finally
“do philosophy in his own name” (xv)—as part of a “generalized anti-Hegelianism” (xiv), a sentiment
which seemingly animates much of his Nietzschean-Spinozistic conception of thought. For more on
Deleuze’s Nietzchean rejections of the dialectic see, Nietzsche and Philosophy (8-10, 195-8). It should be
noted that (specifically in Difference and Repetition, 26-7, 42-55) Deleuze does not wholly dismiss Hegel;
in fact, his analysis of Hegel’s “infinite” conceptual model of cognition is generally sympathetic,
paralleling the “negative dialectical” interventions of a thinker such as Adorno. Much more remains to be
said about the relationship(s) between Deleuze and Hegel, especially given that both thinkers seek to
intervene upon and trouble the stable Kantian transcendental subject. Both thinkers’ stage innovative and
experimental dialogues between empirical and transcendental.
314
Hegel describes the cinematics of “absolute knowing” in a manner that affirms transience against some
final static realization of absolute knowledge: “History is a conscious self-mediating process— Spirit
emptied out into Time; but this externalization, this Kenosis, is equally an externalization of itself; the
negative of the negative itself. This Becoming presents a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of
images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Self has to
penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance” (PS, 492).
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“beginning” are admitted and self-evident (SOL, 45-9); less recognized are his difficulties
with “ending,” or with the transition from one encyclopedic domain to another. Hegel
cannot logically describe the transition from “nature” to “Spirit” other than through the
metaphor of “the phoenix” (PN, 444-5; Rajan, “Cultural Idealism,” 65); a similar “Deus
ex machina” conditions the “end of art,” and the transition to the sobriety of the concept
(Rajan, “Writing,” 141).315
In these ways, anyone who wishes to deride Hegel as an imperialist totalizer must
also account for his immense negativity, for those dissonant moments in his encyclopedia
which gain a certain autonomy, “a separate freedom” (PS, 18), and which threaten the
absolute closure of the system (cf. Schelling, FE, 18). Though Hegel chastised Schelling
for continually “beginning again” (History of Phil 3, 515), his own thought suffers from a
similar agony (or embarrassment) of beginning: from continual and pathological
repetitions which constantly try to reiterate the project as a whole, each time (re)casting it
in a slightly different light (EO, 48-9). As Iversen & Melville write, “All Hegelian
beginnings are in some sense middles” (156), as Hegel’s thinking progresses according to
the form of the “circle,” with the completed encyclopedia being described as a “circle of
circles” (EL, 39): an organic and reciprocally reinforcing system, which mediates nature
and history, and outside of which, no “sense certainty” exists (PS, 58-66).
In what follows, I will elaborate the immanent critique of Hegel’s work
undertaken by Marx and continued in Hegelian Marxism, Bataille (mediated by Gasché),
and Adorno. To read Hegel as a “ruin” entails seeing his project as constitutively
incomplete and thus perpetually supplemented by way of its “post–history” (Benjamin,
OT, 25-7). This ruined reading of Hegel follows in the footsteps of the interventions of
Marx and Bataille (and Gasché), along with Adorno, thinkers who recognize the selftroubling, plastic, and critical power of Hegel’s oeuvre such that it can be short-circuited
and read beyond itself by way of its post-histories.

Hegel’s History of Philosophy also ends strangely, with Schelling (not Hegel’s own system) as the apex
of modern philosophy (512-554). “Modern philosophy” begins with the ambiguous doublet of Bacon and
Boehme, the latter of which inaugurates the beginning of “genuinely German” philosophy (191, 193, 197).
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6.1.1 Marx, Materialism, Critical Theory: Dialectics Beyond Hegel
“The mystification which the dialectical suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means prevents him from being the
first to present [political economy’s] general forms of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner.
With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the
mystical shell.” Marx, Capital, 103.

A critical figure in the post-historical reception of Hegel’s thought is Marx, along
with the broader tradition of “historical-materialism” and Hegelian infused currents of
Marxism stemming from Lukács and K. Korsch. This tradition culminates in the writings
of the Frankfurt School, particularly Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, though is
continued—though within a broader theoretical economy—by the more recent
scholarship of Žižek and Jameson. Marx’s interventions disclose the fundamental
plasticity of Hegelian thought, representing a moment in the post-historical “gallery of
shapes” (PS, 492) that is the reception of Hegel, or with Esposito, the German “thought
from the outside” (5-8, 88). The Frankfurt School should be seen in line with these
Hegelian-Marxist developments, explicitly following Lukács’ return to the Hegelian basis
of Marx’s method, that is, to the “ideal” theoretical moment—specifically the Hegelian
analysis of totality—that serves as the transcendental basis of Marx’s thought
(Consciousness, 16-20, 223-4). The Frankfurt School continues the early Lukács’
theoretical Marxist interventions with the notable rejection of the messianic role Lukács
accords to the “proletariat” as the resolution of world history (Lukács, Consciousness, 83209; Buck-Morss, Origin, 28-32). Adorno is unique in his commitment to reading Marx
and Hegel in a negatively dialectical conjunction, as both thinkers are presented in
constellation with neither attaining primacy: Adorno criticizes the excessively Idealist (or
“ideological”) moments of Hegel via Marx; and the excessively materialist (or economic)
moments of Marx via Hegel (ND, 354-8). Adorno refuses the vulgar historical materialist
culmination of philosophy with Marxism, instead positioning Marxism as a “specter”
which continually haunts and problematizes any final realization of philosophy (ND, 3-4;
cf. Derrida, Specters, xx, 3-4, 10-13). Marx, and the tradition which arises in response to
his work, should be seen as an important immanent “post-history” of the Hegelian
project, another “reading” of Hegel which allows his project to “live on” [Sur-vivre] and
be experimented with in productive directions (Derrida, Specters, xvii-xx).
Marx’s “historical materialism”—along with the political application of such a
world-view —is inextricably linked to a Hegelian understanding of the world, an
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immanent refashioning of Hegelian Idealism, not a wholesale rejection of it: “Marx’s
critique of Hegel is the direct continuation and extension of the criticism that Hegel
himself leveled at Kant and Fichte...Marx’s dialectical method continued what Hegel had
striven for but had failed to achieve in a concrete form” (Lukács, Consciousness, 17).316
Just as Fichte saw himself as continuing (and completing) the Kantian project in the
“spirit and not the letter,” Marx saw himself as extending Hegel’s dialectical analyses of
totality into the domain of political economy—an immanent critique employing Hegel
beyond himself. Lukács (and Korsch) locate Marxism as an application and realization of
the main tenets of the German Idealist program. For Lukács, “orthodox Marxism” does
not “imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx’s investigations,” nor “the
belief’ in this or that thesis, nor the “exegesis of a ‘sacred’ book,” but rather, “refers
exclusively to method,” that is, the dialectical understanding of the relations of
production in terms of an organic social “whole” (Consciousness, 1, 9, 15-18; cf. Korsch,
35-37). Thus, contra V. Lenin, or L. Althusser, the essence of Marxism does not lie in
some set of political principles, nor some fundamental “essence,” but rather, “Marxism”
is thought as a historically informed material-philosophical perspective, eminently shaped
by the Hegelian worldview.
When Marx describes his materialist method at the outset of Capital (1867) as the
“inversion” of Hegel’s dialectic—which in its Idealist formulation is “standing on its
head”—such assertions should be seen as an intrinsic application of Hegel’s dialectical
method to the sphere of “political economy” (Capital, 102-103). Though Hegel takes up
political economy in several instances, notably in the Philosophy of Right, such analyses
are not undertaken in a genuinely critical manner, as Hegel cuts short his own dialectical
historical understanding of philosophy, hypostasizing many elements of his specific
historical reality, most notably elements of the Prussian restoration and his historically
specific post-Napoleonic conception of the state (see, Right, 329-332, 383-89, 467-72;

For Lukács, “The primacy of the category of totality is the bearer of the principle of revolution in
science” (27, 28-9); that is, the true “revolutionary” element of Marxism lies in its critical appropriation of
the Hegelian conception of totality or “system.” As Lukács continues, “It is at reality itself that Hegel and
Marx part company” (17); that is, Marx sought to employ the Hegelian framework to analyze the actual
existing (or material-historical) structures of “Capital.”
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Marcuse, Reason, 182, 189-223). For Marx, Hegel presented a further instance of the
distinctly “German Ideology,” an Idealist “holy alliance” between the nefarious forces of
capital, religion, and Idealist thought, all of which sought to sedate the masses through
idle intellectual abstraction, occluding insight into the real historical-material conditions
of class subjugation. For Marx, Hegel’s “grotesque and craggy” methodological Idealism
distracted intellectuals from real-material relations (“Discovering Hegel,” 7). Despite
Hegel’s opiating Idealism, Marx is adamant that Hegel is no “dead dog”—an explicit
reference to Lessing’s defense of Spinoza in the “Pantheism controversy”—but rather,
one who provides the philosophical armature to articulate the encyclopedic “whole,”
allowing one to chart the “social whole,” or the “vast automaton” that is “Capital” (Marx,
Capital, 102, 502; Lukács, Consciousness, 27). As Schelling chastised Leibniz and
Spinoza respectively for merely articulating the “ideal” and “real” moments of
philosophy separately, Marx saw Hegel as providing the “ideal” basis of thought, which
must be supplemented by a “real” analysis of “practical” material social forms: a
theoretical “interpretation” that would lay the groundwork for practical “change” (Marx,
“Theses,” 143-4). Marx illuminates the pliability of the Hegelian method, employing
dialectics and an encyclopedic form of analysis beyond Hegel in the formulation of his
own “Hegelianism without reserve.”
The essence of Marx’s materialist intervention upon the Hegelian program can be
summarized as follows: “the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind
of man, and translated into forms of thought” (Capital, 102; cf. German Ideology, 172-3;
Lukács, Consciousness, 18).317 For Marx, one cannot begin with some abstract
conceptual notion of “freedom,” but rather, one must chart the working out of freedom
from within a particular political-historical situation. In his Critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right (1843), Marx contrasts the “radical” theoretical advancements of
German Idealist philosophy, with its lofty ideas of freedom and self-actualization, to the
backwardness of the German political-material situation (59-60, 62-3). Such Baroque
circumstances must be dialectically “abolished by the realization of philosophy,” which

This animus is echoed throughout Marx’s corpus, most notably in his 1859 “Preface”: “It is not the
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines
their consciousness” (“Preface,” 4).
317

256

can only take place via thought’s actualization in praxis by the “proletariat” (Ibid, 65;
Lukács, Consciousness, 149, 205). The practical consciousness of the oppressed
proletariat enacts in praxis what philosophy could only speculatively articulate in theory
(Marx, “Theses,” 144-45).
On the ontological-anthropological level Marx is in accord with the Hegelian
dialectic of recognition, by which “man” comes to know himself through “estrangement”
[Entfremdung] in the “alterity” of nature, which is in turn reciprocally shaped through
practices of “social labour” (1844, 125). Historically, Marx subscribes to the upward
trajectory of the Hegelian project, in which, through “mindful” practices of selfrealization, humans come to self-consciousness of themselves, and are thus able to erect
increasingly complex social-political-normative frameworks. However, for Marx, Hegel
prematurely enters into the domain of “absolute spirit” (of art, religion and philosophy),
revealing his allegiance to a Prussian infused “constitutional monarchy,” and cutting
short his own dialectic of history (Adorno, ND, 334-7). For Marx, Hegel refuses to
consider the emergent tensions of the capitalist market along with the degree to which
new political forms (such as communism) might be imagined as a response to new
historical developments (Marcuse, Reason, 258-262, 273-322). Marx immanently
extends, while criticizing, the main tenets of Hegelian thinking, using one Hegel to move
beyond another Hegel, as after all, there are “many Hegels” (d’Hondt, 207-10).
6.1.2 Bataille’s Phantasmatology: Towards a “Hegelianism without Reserve”
“Therefore, to begin with, I do not as of yet have full command over the images slumbering in the mine or
the pit of my inwardness, am not as yet able to recall them at will. No one knows what an infinite host of
images of the past slumbers in him; now and then they do indeed accidentally awake, but one cannot, as it
is said, call them to mind.” Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 453, cf. 205.

In his 1978 text on the work of Georges Bataille (Georges Bataille:
Phenomenology and Phantasmatology), Gasché elaborates Bataille’s logic of the
“phantasm”: a “scientific myth” (1), or a constellation of abject elements left out of
Hegel’s sojourn of Spirit, moments that, via their expulsion, constitute the limits of the
Hegelian encyclopedia. If for Hegel, “Knowledge works” (or “labours”) to gradually
complete the “circle of thought,” Bataille sought to probe those unproductive (or
“wasteful”) domains— “poetry, laughter, ecstasy”—with all the rigors of the Hegelian
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encyclopedia (Inner Experience, 111; cf. Adorno, ND, 8-10). By negatively traversing the
Hegelian phenomenological method, Bataille “aims at the development of a
phantasmatology that passes through the different stages of the becoming of the Spirit in
an order contrary to that of the Hegelian encyclopedia” (Gasché, Phantasmatology, 23).318 Bataille strives to develop a “Hegelianism without reserve,” in which “negativity”
is “no longer determined in a process or system” (Derrida, “Without Reserve,” 259-60).
Such an unrestrained Hegelianism is arrived at via an immanent reconfiguration of the
Hegelian program, in which the “restricted economy” of the Hegelian system is fractured
by the abject “general economy” of elements which remain outside the “circle” of
thought (Accursed, 19-28). Bataille should not be seen as simply criticizing or
disregarding Hegel in favour of some irrational Nietzscheanism (though Nietzsche also
remains central for Bataille). In fact, Bataille continually expresses his reverence for the
Hegelian program: “No one more than [Hegel] understood in depth the possibilities of
intelligence (no document is comparable to his—it is the summit of positive
intelligence)” (Inner Experience, 109). Bataille’s aim is to immanently fracture Hegel by
way of Hegel’s own negativity, via “the introduction of a lawless intellectual series into
the world of intellectual thought” (Visions of Excess, 80), such that “one Hegel exceeds
the other” (Gasché, Phantasmatology, 255-56).319

Gasché mentions that his original intention for the project was to articulate a base materialist “pineal
logic” operative throughout the Hegelian encyclopedia that would require “a traversing of the Hegelian
philosophy of nature, a confrontation with the weak link in the dialectical chain...nature as the fully
exteriorized idea” (2-3). Despite this original intention, Gasché does not deal with Hegel’s Philosophy of
Nature within the text. Taking Gasché’s lead, I take nature to be a fundamental phantasm through which to
trouble and probe the Hegelian project, one which I elaborate in greater depth in the following section.
319
Gasché is adamant that Bataille’s phantasmatology is not simply some rejection, or opposition to Hegel,
instead, glossing the particularity of Bataille’s critical “disagreement” with Hegel, Gasché writes: “Bataille
conducts his disagreement with Hegel through the perspective of materialism, psychoanalysis, and
anthropology, which shake themselves to their own scientific foundations through their mutual interactions.
Such a disagreement with Hegel can no longer simply be called negative: Hegel is in no way the victim of
the attack. The contact of particular ‘scientific’ discourses with the Hegelian text will, rather, disturb his
philosophy in such a way that it brings forth the form within itself that it cannot master: One Hegel exceeds
the other. What takes place in this debate with Hegel and the simultaneous shattering of the invoked
scientific discourses is not the birth of a new science resting on reinforced foundations, but rather the birth
of what we call Phantasmatology” (Phantasmatology, 255-56). However, Gasché’s employment of
“phantasmatology” is apocalyptic: Hegel is exploded from within, and one is left to wonder what “future”
of Hegel can be recovered from such detritus. My own employment of the “phantasm” seeks to similarly
immanently fracture Hegel by way of the alternative logics present in his corpus (notably aesthetics and
nature), demonstrating a “plasticity” inherent in his thinking (Malabou, Future, 5-12).
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Bataille (and Gasché) are correct to see within the Hegelian program a polyphony
of slumbering “mystical,” “imagistic,” or “esoteric” logics, which are “still not thought
raised to the form of reason” (Gasché, Phantasmatology, 210).320 Such logics,
anticipating the imagistic associations of the Freudian “dream work,” can be employed to
short circuit the Hegelian project, forcing a confrontation between Hegel’s conceptual
system and its abject “phantasms.” Bataille’s confrontation with Hegel takes the form of
parody, a recasting of the Hegelian tragic sojourn as a farce— Bataille undertakes to
“‘mimic’ absolute knowledge...” (Inner Experience, 108-9)—a “laughter” at philosophy,
which continually exposes thought to its outside. Bataille parodies the “becoming God”
that the subject of The Phenomenology supposedly undergoes upon reaching “absolute
knowledge,” and “amidst the throes of laughter and parody,” exposes the possibility of
(unproductive) logics other than Hegelian “labour” or “work” (Inner Experience, 43, 111,
x). In Malabou’s terms, Bataille imagines a plethora of “plastic futures” for the Hegelian
program (Future, 5-16), providing a speculative “epigenesis” of new possible
arrangements of the Hegelian encyclopedia (Epigenesis, 36-8).321
Bataille should not be seen as some reactionary irrationalist out to wholly
disregard the Hegelian-Idealist program, nor one who sought to dispense with reason (or
philosophy) wholesale. Instead, Bataille negatively harnesses the energies of the Hegelian

The broad question of “mysticism,” or the mystical motivations of Hegel’s thought —along with the
presence of hermetic, Böhmean, Kabbalistic, alchemic, and theosophical motifs throughout his oeuvre—is
dealt with extensively by G. Magee, in Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition (see, 1-3, 36- 51, 127-138, 150166). Benjamin provides a sardonic gloss on Hegel’s mysticism (though more disparagingly) in a letter to
Scholem, “If we were to get into [Hegel’s] work for just a short time, I think we would soon arrive at the
spiritual physiognomy that peers out of it” that of an intellectual brute, a mystic of brute force, the worst
sort there is: but a mystic, nonetheless” (BC, 113).
321
Malabou locates the “promise of plasticity”—understood as a constellation of meanings relating to the
synthetic “plastic” potential of materials and concepts—as providing the horizon for new “futures” of the
Hegelian program (Future, 5-9). Malabou’s text charts the centrality of plasticity to the Hegelian project:
from the plastic arts, through to the “plastic individual” of the Greek polis, and finally, the plastic nature of
the Hegelian speculative proposition (or “philosophical plasticity,” 12) and dialectics more broadly (9-12).
This plastic promise names “the excess of the future over the future” (6), providing a vibrant post-history
for the Hegelian program, which can now be understood “as the relation which subjectivity maintains with
the accidental” (12). In, Epigenesis, Malabou philosophically re-appropriates the biological notion of
epigenesis—which, opposing pre-formation, describes the growth of embryos through the gradual
differentiation of cells (14, 36-40)—as a model through which to redeem the Kantian transcendental amidst
calls for its “relinquishing” (18) within the horizon of speculative realism (particularly by Meillassoux, 1718). Thinking the transcendental in terms of “epigenesis” allows Malabou to theorize an evolutionary
model of transcendental grounding and a priori thought, securing the possibility of a “future” for the
Kantian program, based in her experimental re-appropriations (16).
320
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project in the creation of a negative or counter-encyclopedia of perversions, most aptly
exemplified in his two-volume methodical study of Eroticism (1957). Describing his
“phantasmatological” aim for the collection, Bataille writes with a pathos and texture
clearly reminiscent of Hegel’s Encyclopedia:
I wanted a mode of thinking that would measure up to those moments—a thinking
that was removed from the concepts of science...yet rigorous in the extreme, as the
coherence of a system of thought exhausting the totality of the possible...we need a
thinking that does not fall apart in the face of horror, a self-consciousness that does
not steal away when it is time to explore possibility to the limit. (Eroticism, 238)

Bataille’s “phantasmatology” is such a mode of thinking, one “removed from the
concepts of science...yet rigorous to the extreme,” a counter-encyclopedia capable of
charting the “general economy” of surplus phantasms, those moments at the extremes of
thought and being. One is reminded of Hegel’s declarations that Spirit must “look the
negative in the face” and “tarry with it” in order to win itself for “truth” (PS, 18-19). In
such a manner, one could imagine a scandalous, negative phenomenology (a
“phantasmatology”) parodying Hegel’s sojourn of Spirit. For Bataille, such a tarrying is
taken to the extreme in an attempt to create a model of thought for “the limits” of the
possible, and perhaps the possibility of their overcoming. Bataille views the Hegelian
system from the perspective of “the accident” (PS, 18): those abject phantasmatological
moments—imagistic and sensuous domains beyond the purview of the concept— which,
by their expulsion, constitute the boundaries of Hegel’s philosophical encyclopedia.
Following Adorno’s negative dialectical interventions (ND, 8-11), if troubled, or tarried
with, as Bataille’s phantasmatology does, Hegel’s thought is shown to be self–fracturing
and readable in experimental plastic directions. It becomes, with Derrida, an incomplete
“specter,” a “hauntology,” of deferred logics, and incomplete ideals which can never
fully be articulated (Specters, 3-10).
It is essential to see how Bataille, along with many other of his generation in
France (Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, Sartre), do not simply cast away Hegel for some
Nietzschean logic, but rather, they seek to immanently work through the Hegelian
program, exposing it to its own marginalized phantasms and attempting to rupture the
Hegelian “circle of consciousness” from within (Gasché, Phantasmatology, 238; PS, 18-
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19). Bataille is one who—in light of Foucault’s proclamations—understood the price that
had to be paid to think against Hegel:
[O]ur age, whether through logic or epistemology, whether through Marx or through
Nietzsche, is attempting to flee Hegel...to truly escape Hegel involves an appreciation of
the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. It assumes we are aware of the
extent to which Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to to us; it implies a knowledge in that
which permits us to think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian. We have to
determine the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of the tricks directed
against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us. (Foucault, Archeology,
235)

In relation to many in his generation, the uniqueness of Bataille’s phantasmatological
approach lies in its situating of the Hegelian “restricted economy” of the concept within
the broader phantasmatological “general economy”: presenting Hegel’s system alongside
other “non-identical,” or non-useful logics, such as those of eroticism and transgression
(Accursed, 19-28). Bataille invites a consideration of the other logics “slumbering in the
mind or the pit of...inwardness” that is the Hegelian program (Hegel, Mind, 453). The
following sections will consider art and nature as phantasmatic sites that contain
lucidities other than the concept. These abject specters continually expose Hegelian
philosophy to its own un-thought, allowing for the formulation of a mode of Idealism
without absolutes.

6.2

Art and Nature: Abject Moments in Relation to the System

“Do I intend to minimize Hegel’s attitude? But the contrary is true! I want to show the incomparable scope
of his approach. To that end I cannot veil the very minimal (and even inevitable) part of failure.” Bataille,
“Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” 293.

In parts one and two of this dissertation, I examined Adorno and Benjamin’s
inhabitation of the Idealist space of philosophical “meta-critique”: investigating how both
thinkers developed novel conceptions of philosophy by immanently “working through”
the German-Idealist Romantic tradition. In part three of this project, which focuses on
Schelling and Hegel respectively, it is argued that such a deconstruction, or self-troubling
of thought, is already at work in both Hegel and Schelling such that different moments of
their corpus can be read against each other, “short circuiting” their work in provocative

261

directions.322 In Schelling, the fraught dynamism—or “original diremption”— of nature
continually troubles the stability of thought with its incessant propagation and unending
productiveness. In Hegel, the sheer volume of material that Geist needs to “digest,” or
labour through, en route to the absolute (Rajan, “(In) Digestible,” 221)—from the entire
history of world religion, art, and philosophy (the three domains that constitute the realm
of the absolute), along with the whole of the natural world, and the political economic
sphere—casts doubt upon Geist’s final triumph in “absolute knowing.” According to
Hegel, Geist progresses from its latency in nature, coming to consciousness in the human
realm, eventually becoming actualized in politics and other normative undertakings, until
it finally arrives at the realm of the “absolute,” in which humans, via a self-conscious
understanding of the movement of Geist, finally rise to “maturity” and are able to
participate in the conscious actualization of freedom (Hegel, Mind, 292). Hegel’s oeuvre
presents the same dual trajectories that Schelling posits in nature: of ascendency through
a Stufenfolge or “self-organizing series,” that gradually forms itself into a “logic,” in
tension with the seemingly needless fecundity of nature as it proliferates in various
branches—forming “worlds within worlds.” The extent to which this tension can be
resolved within Hegel’s corpus is the subject of intense debate, and such an ambiguity is
transferred into the very notion of “Aufhebung,” or “sublation,” which means at once
preservation (as something higher) and negation or destruction (EL, 154). Despite the
supposed final triumph of the concept in the sphere of philosophy in the Science of Logic
(14-22), Hegel is a thinker who stutters, lingers, and cannot move on in a straightforward
or linear sense: “Hegel cannot decide the past is past” (Rajan, “Writing,”140). As Comay
has rightly pointed out, Hegel’s work is shot through with the ambiguities and traumas of
the psychoanalytic “work of mourning”: how does one move on, how (or what) does one

In his introduction to Ruda and Comay’s The Dash (and the “short circuit series” more generally), Žižek
articulates his (Lacanian) “short circuiting” of philosophy, one which disrupts thought’s “smooth
functionality,” providing an “inherent decentring of the interpreted text, which brings to light its “unthought,” its disavowed presuppositions and consequences” (VII). Though Žižek generally relies heavily on
Lacanian psychoanalysis to undertake such interventions (from the outside), I argue that German
Idealism—as embodied by Hegel and Schelling—is always already short circuiting itself, fracturing its own
attempts at completion by way of ceaseless proliferation.
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remember (to forget)?323 How does one know when a form of life or sphere has passed
such that “Owl of Minerva” may fly, and philosophy may utter its summations of the
day’s events, painting its “grey on grey” (Right, 23)?
Two notable sites of such lingering and proliferation are the aesthetic and nature,
both of which occupy a curious position with respect to philosophy (or Geist). With
respect to aesthetics, Hegel is adamant that “art…is a thing of the past” (A, 11), standing
against many of his generation (such as Friedrich Schlegel, Schiller, or the early
Schelling), who position art above philosophy as the final culmination of human spirit.324
By contrast, for Hegel, art has been overcome by philosophy, the new modern form of
life, which will describe the complex social networks of the modern individual. With
respect to nature, Spirit is challenged to overcome its latency and alterity in the natural
world, leaving behind its antiquated merely sensuous form, in its becoming autonomous
and rational “in-and for itself.” As a philosophical modernist, Hegel is not nostalgic for
past golden- ages—for the lost unities of Greek culture (between art, beauty, and
philosophy), nor for the sensuous immediacy of spirit with nature. Instead, he spurs one
to recognize the dawning of a new “modern” age: “a birth time and a period of transition
to a new era” (PS, 6; EL, 2). From the endless and repetitive birth-disease-death cycle of
nature, “Spirit” emerges “as a phoenix,” departing nature for more (supposedly) refined
realms (PN, 445). For Hegel, culture has become “rational”: it has entered the domain of
philosophy, or “the concept,” [Begriff], leaving behind the lower immediate and sensuous
“representations” [Vorstellungen] of nature, art and religion. According to Hegel, before
such domains, “we bow the knee no longer” (A, 103).
This constellation of nature and aesthetics is perhaps first (philosophically)
articulated by Kant in his CPJ (1789), where Kant elaborates the shared logic of
“reflective judgment” subtending both domains. In the first part of the CPJ, Kant

For Comay, Hegel’s thought returns and confronts one with the nature of experience as always already
“missed” or “lapsed,” a latecomer on its own scene (Mourning Sickness, 153, 5-7). Via a reading of Hegel
on the French Revolution, Comay (in a Benjaminian fashion) extrapolates that political projects which fail
to master this traumatic kernel of experience—its always already delayed, or “untimely character” (6)—are
doomed to failure, trauma, and perpetual repetition.
324
It should be noted that after his 1803-4 Philosophy of Art and On University Studies, Schelling makes no
mention of art, despite its importance in his early writings. This early, absolute position of art is illustrated
most forcefully by his STI, which makes art the culmination of Spirit’s development (219-36).
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articulates this “pseudo-faculty” of (reflective) judgment in relation to questions of
beauty and sublimity, while in the second part, Kant attempts to approach the
comprehensibility of nature as “a whole” by way of a further extension of “reflective
judgment,” which speculatively generates a universal out of a particular moment.325 Kant
seems to deny substantial cross-pollination between these two domains, though in a
Rousseauesque spirit, Kant does castigate “fine art” as a “deficient” mode of the beautiful
in comparison to the “free beauties” of the natural world (CPJ, 114-116). In my previous
chapter on Schelling, I argued that though Kant’s Third Critique continues the subjectiveIdealist excision of nature from the philosophical system, it also revolutionizes the
ground upon which philosophy is undertaken, such that Kant’s terminology (specifically
his regulative notion of “Organism”) provides the means to move beyond the epistemic
subject into the objective-Idealist domain. Likewise, with respect to art and aesthetics,
though Kant seemingly denies art any meaning in itself326—independent of the
“judgment” of the subject—the CPJ provides the beginnings (specifically with notions of
“reflective judgment,” “genius,” and “Sensus Communis”) of another logic, through
which art is able to contest “our standard epistemological and moral vocabulary,”
providing the means to “(re) connect... the modern subject or self with an order beyond
it” (Bernstein, Fate, 8, 7; Hammer, Modernism, 23-4; Lyotard, Sublime, 1- 50, 191-8).
Aesthetics and nature share a similar “fate” in the history of philosophy: both domains
are generally subsumed to the autarky of philosophy and are thus denied any meaningful
existence in themselves. However, if positioned in phantasmatic confrontation with
philosophy, these domains speculatively short circuit thought, forcing a consideration of
logics other than those of the concept.
If Post-Kantian Idealist-Romanticism, provides an experimental un-binding of
these spheres from within their place in the Kantian architectonic, Hegel presents a
provisional attempt to re-territorialize these spheres within his own organic

Crudely surmising Kant’s necessary presupposition of an organic whole for the comprehension of
nature, Nietzsche quips: “We need ‘unities’ in order to be able to reckon: that does not mean we must
suppose that such unities exist” (Will, 338).
326
For Kant, “the Beautiful” and “the Sublime” are not properties of art objects in themselves, but rather,
things which the subject takes away from them via the (dis)harmony of the faculties in each judgment.
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encyclopedia.327 In many ways Hegel rehearses the traditional repression of these
domains in favour of the freedom of the philosophical concept. However, despite their
inadequacy these moments are viewed by Hegel as “reciprocally necessary moments” (or
stages) in the “progressive unfolding of truth” (PS, 2). As with all “sublated” domains in
the Hegelian system, these should not be seen as simply “overcome” once and for all, but
as necessary shapes through which Spirit must progress “to the goal where it can lay
aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing” (PS, 3). Though these lower
spheres are “overcome,” elements of them persist, and sometimes trouble Geist’s higher
realizations. For Hegel, Geist aims at becoming “absolute knowledge,” or Geist cleansed
of external relation: an overcoming of subject-object dualism via the unity of form and
content, whereby philosophy, hitherto understood as a transcendental epistemology
(articulating the possibility of knowledge), becomes ontology, which investigates the real
conditions of knowledge as Being.
The specific spheres of nature and the aesthetic are central moments in Hegel’s
ongoing and contradictory dialogue with Schelling and Romanticism, and as such, should
be seen as sites in which Hegel makes a sovereign decision in differentiating himself
from their respective conceptions of philosophy. He contests the Frühromantik
culmination of philosophy with aesthetics (as is exemplified in thinkers such as Schlegel
and Novalis), along with the central place accorded to Naturphilosophie in the early
Schellingian program (to 1800). In this manner, the aesthetic and nature remain central
domains with which philosophy must continually tarry, part of an ongoing dialogue
carried out throughout Hegel’s life. In Hegel’s corpus, these two sites have vexing textual
histories: both are adapted from Hegel’s prolific lectures on the subjects, such that the
“texts” have a vibrant afterlife, filled with Zusätze and student annotations, such that one
cannot tell where Hegel ends and his post-history begins.

Hegel conceives of philosophy as an organic and self-supporting system—in which “the whole presents
itself as a circle of circles, each of which is a necessary moment” (EL, 39)—marking a definitive entry into
the “organic paradigm” of thought. Thus, Hegel distinguishes himself from the Kantian “architectonic”
understanding of philosophy (for a description of this in Kant see, CPR, 691-701; CPJ, 252-55). Both Ng
(3-4) and Iversen & Melville (155-6) both underscore the importance of organic metaphors and life in the
Hegelian program.
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In this chapter, I speculatively experiment with an unbinding of the stable
reconciliation between art, nature, and philosophy, examining the alternative (nonconceptual) logics latent in these territories, while speculating as to what an expanded
form of reason might look like which seeks to incorporate, or learn from, these domains.
In deciding on a different relation to these spheres, how might philosophy imagine new
forms of (inter)disciplinary collaboration within the “ruined university”? The immediate
motivation for these reflections comes from the late work of Adorno (specifically
Aesthetic Theory, 1969), which undertakes a post-Idealist meta-critique of aesthetics,
which it then positions in a dialogue with philosophy, utilizing art as a “prism” through
which to refract and reflect upon philosophy. As I have argued in 2.3 of this dissertation
Aesthetic Theory is not simply a minor work of art theory, but rather, a direct
continuation of the program of Negative Dialectics (1966), attempting to think through a
sensuous and embodied notion of truth, that would attempt to fulfill the preconditions
Adorno lays down for philosophy after Auschwitz. Art and aesthetics provide new “ways
of seeing”—to employ J. Berger’s phrase (8-11, 32-33)—new models through which to
organize our experience that pay greater heed to non-discursive (mimetic or sensuous)
logics, while striving to relate to the natural world in a less dominating manner. Adorno’s
work allows the aesthetic to pose questions to philosophy, providing “a running
commentary on Reason,” spurning philosophy to reflect on its blind spots and downcast
moments (Hammer, Modernism, 44). Adorno rejects both the absolute status bestowed
onto art by many Romantics, along with the Hegelian subjugation of aesthetics to
philosophy; instead, he opens a dialogue in which the two domains are seen on equal
footing, dialectically reflecting upon each other in a negative dialectic.
Adorno repeatedly employs the motif of the “prism” to describe great works of
art: they negatively refract their contemporary world through their extreme and
kaleidoscopic distortions of reality. For Adorno, the works of Kafka and Beckett depict
the world “as hell seen from the perspective of salvation,” making visible one’s
“objective estrangement” (Prisms, 269). I wish to argue that Adorno’s notion of the
“prism,” supplemented by Benjamin’s “Idea as Monad” (OT, 27), can be applied to
Hegel’s aesthetics and philosophy of nature: viewing them as para-phenomenological or
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“phantasmatological” sites of proliferation, they provide a refraction of the Hegelian
program such that it can be read in new and experimental directions.
This endeavor follows those already undertaken by Rajan, who positions both
nature and the history of art as a “tangle” or “indigestible remainder” with respect to
Hegel’s triumph of philosophy (“(In)Digestible,” 217-18; “Writing,” 119-121). Both
domains can only be overcome by way of the “Deus ex machina” of the “Phoenix from
the ashes,” a metaphor—not logically by way of argumentation— which reveals Hegel’s
desperation to leave such troubling spheres behind (Rajan, “Cultural Idealism,” 65).
Following Schelling, nature remains an indivisible “dark ground” repressed by Spirit,
which continually troubles it, upsetting the constitutive stability of any philosophical
project. After an analysis of the contours and problematics of Hegel’s philosophy of
nature (6.2.1), I will examine the extent to which the Hegelian aesthetic can be read as a
similarly self-troubling site with respect to the Hegelian project (6.2.2). Finally, via
Adorno’s dialectical image of “natural-beauty,” I will speculatively unbind the domains
of art and nature from within their place in Hegelian project, examining the possibility of
alternative arrangements and configurations of philosophy (6.2.3).

6.2.1 Nature: The Alterity of Spirit
“[Knowledge of nature] must not be a simple aggregate but arranged in orders and classes, it must present
itself as an organism.” Hegel, PN, 6.

In the Introduction to his Philosophy of Nature (1830 [PN]) Hegel ambiguously
glosses nature as a “riddle and a problem, whose solution both attracts and repels us:
attracts us, because Spirit is presaged in Nature; repels us, because Nature seems an alien
existence, in which Spirit does not find itself. That is why Aristotle said that philosophy
started from wonder” (PN, 3). “Nature” is thought as a problematic duality: on the one
hand, it represents an unconscious precursor to Geist, yet on the other, it manifests as an
“alien existence,” in which Spirit cannot find itself, and one is left to “wonder” at the
plethora of (non-conceptual) logics latent in the material-natural world. Despite the
notional complexity Hegel accords to nature, there is perhaps no more neglected site in
the Hegelian corpus than Hegel’s philosophy of nature, which attempts to come to terms
with the “Idea in the form of otherness” (PN, 13; Furlotte, 7-9). Perhaps much of the
disregard of Hegel’s philosophy of nature stems from Hegel’s own stated desire to

267

overcome—or “digest”—the ambiguous complexity of nature into the sober “freedom” of
the concept (PN, 402; Rajan, “(In)Digestible,” 217, 224). Within the Hegelian
Encyclopedia, a philosophy of nature was to form the “second part” of the project,
bookended by the Science of Logic (1812/13/16) and the Philosophy of Mind (1817/20),
and would, in the Schellingian parlance, demonstrate the “real aspect” of philosophy, of
which the science of logic, as a doctrine of the concept, would express the “ideal”
aspect.328 As an “absolute” Idealist, Hegel sought to move beyond the “external
formalism” (PN, 1, 274), of subjective Idealism, seeing reason (or Geist) working itself
out objectively (and unconsciously) in the being of nature. Hegel describes the working
out of such an “absolute Idealism” as the central aim of the conceptual sojourn of his
Phenomenology, while differentiating his approach from Kant and Spinoza (via Aristotle)
respectively: “everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as
Substance, but equally as Subject” (PS, 10). This is to say, Hegel’s Bildungsroman of the
absolute commences with “consciousness” (or the “subject”), which must come to itself
by way of its other (“substance”)— “its self-othering with itself”—via an understanding
of the “pure, simple negativity” conditioning both terms” (PS, 11).329 Such a “circular”
process, “that presupposes its end as its goal” (PS, 11), necessitates that the “subject”
become other to itself through an encounter with the fraught dynamism of substance, that
is, through a struggle with the “Idea in the form of otherness” as it presents in nature.
Though “nature” is understood by Hegel as an “organic whole...totally pervaded by

In many respects, the relation between Hegelian philosophy of “Spirit” and that of “nature” can be
thought in terms of Schelling’s distinction between the “ideal” and “real” moments of philosophy. As
Hegel writes in the finale to his Philosophy of Nature: “the aim of these lectures has been to give a picture
of nature in order to subdue this Proteus: to find in this externality only the mirror of ourselves, to see in
Nature a free reflex of Spirit: to know God, not in the contemplation of him as Spirit, but in his immediate
existence” (445). Hegel repeatedly glosses nature as an “alterity” or “unconscious” precursor to Spirit;
however, as with Schelling, Hegel seemingly allows nature a threatening degree of autonomy (or
negativity), such that it undermines and troubles the stability of his thought—or the final triumph of Spirit
(PS, 18-19; PN, 2).
329
Hegel’s assertions regarding “substance as [or is] subject” can be clarified in the terms of Schelling’s
revision of the copula, or Hegel’s “speculative proposition,” whereby what is aimed at is not an “identity”
between the two terms, but rather a mediation by way of difference between the two moments (FE, 14; cf.
PS, 36-40). Thus, one could say that “subject” articulates and defines itself by working through the
complexities of “substance” (and vice versa). With respect to Aristotle, at several instances, Hegel positions
Aristotle’s “rational physics” (or The Physics) as anticipating his own philosophy of nature (PN, 2, 6). As
Beiser notes, Aristotle provides a means to recover a notion of the “immanent teleology” of nature banished
by Kant’s supposed restriction of teleology to the domain of the subject (CPJ, 388-9).
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reason” (PN, 11), one cannot simply grasp this whole immediately via some Spinozistic
intuition. Instead, Geist must labour through nature’s baffling biodiversity in effort to see
a refracted image of itself.
Though nature manifests the Idea (of Geist), it is the “Idea in the form of
otherness,” an “unresolved contradiction” between the drives of nature and “the Idea[s]”
of the subject (PN, 13, 17). Hegel may eventually subsume nature to philosophy, taming
the “tangle” of nature by way of the freedom of the concept, arriving at a moment in
which “the rustle of Nature’s life is silenced in the stillness of thought” (PN, 7, 444-5).
But nature remains a troubling domain, “a necessary yet problematic material condition
in the genesis of freedom’s actualization,” a phantasmatic site which “retains the ability
to destabilize, even undermine, Spirit’s autarkic agency” (Furlotte, 8, 9). Hegel at once
laments the ever-increasing wealth of detail” which Spirit has to “deal with,” in order to
find the form of the concept which “lies concealed beneath nature’s scattered and
infinitely many shapes” (PN, 444-445); while at the same time, Hegel unrelentingly
speculates down the idiosyncratic avenues of nature’s burgeoning fecundity. As such, I
advocate that one view the Hegelian program as a continual dialogue with nature. In spite
of Hegel’s desire to “subdue” the “Proteus” that is nature (PN, 445), it continues to
trouble Hegel’s final triumph of philosophy, and as such provides a meta-critical “prism”
through which to refract the Hegelian project. Speculatively, one can read Hegel’s
Philosophy of Nature as providing a “base-materialism” for new potential philosophies of
Spirit (Rajan, “Writing,” 130). One could imagine potential diseased philosophies of the
absolute, which follow the accident and the plethora of detours spirit takes en route
through the natural world.
In the scholarly literature, Hegel’s philosophy of nature has long been the “object
of ridicule and disdain,” taken as evidence of a deranged “arrogant and ignorant”
metaphysical thinker who denied evolution, defended Goethe’s “colour theory” against
Newton (PN, 195-217), and derived (a priori) the existence of seven planets (Houlgate,
“Introduction,” xi). In fact, following Hegel’s death, his philosophy of nature was often
upheld as a straw man through which to reject his philosophy wholesale as pseudoscientific or un-falsifiable (as in, Popper, 229-82). Not only are such derisions extremely
ungenerous, but they also demonstrate “a profound ignorance of Hegel’s philosophy and
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its relation to science and nature” (Houlgate, “Introduction,” xii; Stone, xi-xvii). Hegel’s
philosophy of nature should be seen in a lineage commencing with Aristotle’s Physics,
which examines the ways in which nature “is,” through to Leibniz, Spinoza, Schiller,
Schelling, and the Kant of Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Ironically,
many analytic “post-Kantian” interpreters of Hegel (such as Pinkard, and Pippin) are
eminently more sympathetic to Kant’s speculative excesses than they are to Hegel’s,
generally neglecting to even consider Hegel’s Naturphilosophie.330 In fact, as Houlgate
and Beiser have argued, such dismissals occlude the fact that Hegel could be considered
the first Modern philosopher of science (in the mode of T. Kuhn and Popper), one who
was exceptionally in tune with the philosophical and scientific disputes of his time.
Further, Hegel does much to eradicate any substantive opposition between philosophy
and the natural sciences, striving instead to think through a mode of philosophy which
presupposed the natural sciences (PN, 10; Houlgate, “Introduction,” xiii; Beiser, Hegel,
82). Put otherwise, Hegel thinks the distinction between philosophy and the natural
sciences not as one of kind (i.e., no hard disciplinary distinction), but of degree, seeing
each discipline as providing a different perspective on the same object. Reiterating his
criticisms of the mere epistemology of subjective Idealism, Hegel (according to Beiser)
“insisted that metaphysical questions are inevitable in the natural sciences themselves,
and that a properly critical methodology would acknowledge and discuss them rather than
attempt to conceal them”; thus, as Beiser goes on to argue, those (such as the NeoKantians) who scorn Hegel for importing metaphysics into the study of nature simply
“beg the question,” as this is precisely what he intended to do (Beiser, Hegel, 109). In this
way, Hegel provides a continual reminder that “physics” (and other empirical sciences)
“contains much more thought than it admits and is aware of” (PN, 3). And further, Spirit,
or philosophy, must think itself with nature, seeing in physical processes an unconscious
(or para-conscious) mode of organization.

Beiser argues emphatically against such “a reductionist or non-metaphysical reading of Hegel” [which]
would attempt to limit his organic metaphysics to one part of his mature system (Part 2).” Against such
deflationary positions, Beiser formulates his own holistic-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel, which
accords a central place to Naturphilosophie within Hegel’s absolute Idealist system: “For the Organic view
of the world appears throughout Hegel’s system. It plays a fundamental role in his logic, ethics, politics and
aesthetics” (Hegel, 80).
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Regardless of how one views Hegel’s metaphysically infused considerations of
nature, one must grant that Hegel opens a dialogue—hitherto unseen with the exception
of Schelling—between the empirical and the transcendental moments of philosophy.
Many may contend, as Alison Stone, that Hegel’s interpretation of nature is a “strong a
priori” reading such that philosophy articulates the conceptual frame which is merely
“filled in” by a posteriori scientific inquiry (xii, 57-9).331 Others argue that the empirical
is able to reciprocally influence, and shape the transcendental such “that the scientific
discoveries themselves condition, and perhaps even determine, the development of
Hegel’s conceptual account of nature” (Houlgate, “Introduction,” xiv). Between these
two readings is W. Furlotte, who in his The Problem of Nature in Hegel’s Final System
(2018), argues for a “weak a priori” reading of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. Such a
model asserts a privileged position for thought as the construction of open conceptual
systems, which are constantly liable to being revised by encounters with nature, the
radical other of thought. It is a mode of thinking “constantly held in dialogue with
experience” in which “the world...has the ability to frustrate and surprise the conceptual
schemas generated by thought itself” (Furlotte, 25). Put otherwise, philosophy is
positioned in a recurrent and reflexive dialogue with the (natural) world which prompts it
to constantly revise its methods and concepts, in a manner akin to Adorno’s
“metaphysical experience.” It should be emphasized that the idea of a pure “givenness”
of experience, of “sense certainty”—as one would encounter it in something like
twentieth-century phenomenology—is strictly denied by Hegel; in fact, it is the first thing
that Spirit dispenses with in the Phenomenology (58-67; Pippin, Shadows, 183-216). As
already noted, for Iversen & Melville, “All Hegelian beginnings are in some sense
middles” (156), a sentiment echoed by Adorno’s assertions that for Hegel there is no such
thing as some pure “natural” beginning, there is “nothing between heaven and earth that
is not mediated,” one must instead commence with the “immediacy of mediation” (Hegel,

The term “petrified intelligence” appears in the “Introduction” to Hegel’s PN, and is employed to
describe Schelling’s philosophy of nature, which Hegel appears to glosses in a sympathetic manner (PN,
14-15). For more on Stone’s “strong a priori” view, specifically with regard to the relationship between
Hegel’s logic and philosophy of nature see Stone (52-55). However, as Furlotte attests, Stone’s view seems
to be contradicted by the plethora of empirical detail Hegel includes in the text (20-22).
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57; Hegel, SOL, 46, 49). In this manner, any investigation into the “givenness” of nature
is always already mediated by the concepts of Spirit: one must inquire into the disciplines
which frame (and shape) one’s encounters with the natural world. In his PN, Hegel
considers several emergent scientific disciplines (notably mechanics, chemistry,
galvanism), and one could imagine how such a study might commence today: how would
one begin to map the plethora of scientific branches and mediations which traverse nature
in the twenty-first century?
Though it is common to locate the origin of Hegel’s mature system in his early
encounters with religious-mysticism at both the Tübinger Stift and Jena, exemplified by
his early essays on Christianity and its historical essence (1795-1800), a more apt origin
lies in Hegel’s early engagement with Naturphilosophie, specifically that of Schelling,
which commenced in 1800 and culminating in his defense of Schelling in his 1801 The
Difference Between Fichte and Schelling’s System of Philosophy (Furlotte, 155-174; Ng,
65-76).332 Echoing the importance for the philosophies of nature in Hegel’s intellectual
development, Beiser locates the presence of “ubiquitous organic metaphors throughout
Hegel” such that “all of Hegel’s thinking essentially proceeds from an organic vision of
the world, a view of the universe as a single vast living organism” (80).333 As Hegel
himself asserts, “the perpetual action of life is Absolute Idealism” (PN, 274). Like
Schelling’s “beginning,” which is continually active throughout creation, “nature” lies at
the origin of the Hegelian encyclopedia, and “continued to perplex, provoke, and engage
Hegel over the course of more than three decades” (Furlotte, 4). Hegel is reported to have
lectured on the philosophy of nature eight times, twice in Jena (1801-8), and six times
during his final Berlin period (1818-1831), testifying to the persistence of his concern

These sentiments are echoed by Ng, who underscores the importance of “life” to the entirety of the
Hegelian program, specifically in relation to the Science of Logic, which according to her, attempts to
elaborate a “logical conception of life” (3-4). For Ng, Hegel’s SOL should be seen in line with Kant’s CPJ,
which elaborates a “critique of judgment” via an elaboration of the intimate connection between
(reflective), judgment, purposiveness, and life-nature (9, 61-4). Ng, also presents a defense of Hegel as a
philosopher of science (see 63).
333
Beiser goes further, locating an organic-pantheistic pathos animating Hegel’s early view of
Christianity—such that Naturphilosophie could be seen to predate, or at least be co-constitutive with,
Hegel’s considerations of religion —, sentiments he likely picked up from the mystical- proto theosophical
Tübinger Stift (Beiser, Hegel, 88). One can see a similar theosophical pathos in the early writings of
Schelling (see Mathews, 39-64).
332
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with issues surrounding Naturphilosophie (PN, vi; Furlotte, 4). This obstinacy of “nature”
throughout Hegel’s oeuvre frames Hegel’s Jena years as an “indivisible remainder”
which can never be fully incorporated into a final philosophy of Spirit, while
demonstrating an important point of sovereign decision with respect to Schelling and the
Frühromantiker. As such one can speculatively reflect upon the precise status of
Naturphilosophie within the Hegelian program, experimentally questioning how it might
be positioned otherwise, and what new philosophies of Spirit could arise which take
nature into account.
“Nature” stands as both the origin and the goal of the Hegelian program: “Spirit is
no less before than after nature ...Spirit just because it is the goal of Nature is prior to it”
(PN, 444). Both the Phenomenology and the Logic are said to arrive at a final moment in
which Spirit “freely discharges (entläßt) itself” into the world (SOL, 753). Spirit is thus
free of “externality” or the distinction between form and content is sublated, and
philosophy becomes an exercise of ontology. However, as has already been emphasized,
such an arrival at nature should not be seen as the recovery of some lost immediacy, or
“sense certainty.” Instead, Spirit (supposedly already complete in itself after the
Phenomenology and Logic) goes forth into the mediated immediacy of the natural world.
In this way, Hegel’s interrogation of “nature” is an explicit examination of the various
disciplines, and conceptual discursive networks, that always already frame “nature.”
However, Hegel does little to explicate the precise relationship between “the Idea” (or
speculative thought), and the empirical realm probed by the natural sciences. Clearly one
should be able to prove a posteriori—via the natural sciences—what philosophy posits a
priori, though Hegel seemingly bestows upon the empirical the ability to shape and
fracture the transcendental.
The most prescient question confronting one who wishes to read Hegel with
nature is the precise relationship between nature (or the empirical) and logic (or the
transcendental). Though such a relation has been decided in various ways (by Stone and
Furlotte, and Houlgate et al.), I wish to suggest that the exact relation between the two
domains cannot be decided precisely within Hegel’s “philosophy of nature,” and as such,
remains a phantasmatic site from which to trouble and critically refract the Hegelian
project as a whole. Within the PN itself, Hegel ostensibly attempts to organize nature as a
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gradual ascending series of stages, or spheres, moving from simple “mechanism” (PN,
28-30), up through dynamic “physics” (PN, 85-87) culminating in the animal “organism”
(PN, 356, 377), along with the “disease” of which it is capable (PN, 428, 433).
Describing nature as a progressive “series of stages,” or “spheres” (PN, 20, 22), each of
which progress upwards through various manifestations of the Idea, Hegel writes:
Each stage is a specific realm of Nature and all appear to have independent
existence. But the last is the concrete unity of all the preceding ones, just as, in
general, each successive stage embodies the lower ones, but equally posits these, as
its non-organic nature, over and against itself. One stage is the power of the other,
and this relation is reciprocal....The eternal life of Nature consists in this: first, that
the Idea displays itself in each sphere so far as it can within the finitude of that
sphere, just as each drop of water provides an image of the sun, and secondly, that
the Notion, through its dialectic, breaks through the limitation of this sphere, since it
cannot rest content with an inadequate element, and necessarily passes over into a
higher stage. (PN, 27)334

Hegel is emphatic that “Nature is, in itself, a living Whole” (PN, 24): nature is the
progression of natural processes through various “stages” or “spheres,” each of which (as
in Leibniz’s monads) provides a refracted image of the whole: “as each drop of water
provides an image of the sun.” The philosophical armature for this understanding of
nature as a dynamic relation between “part and whole” comes via Hegel’s refashioning of
Kant’s notion of “organism” (PN, 337; Ng, 8-12, 24-32). At first glance, Hegel may seem
to repeat Schelling’s presentation of nature as a Stufenfolge in his First Outline, in which
nature is understood as a fraught duality between “productivity” and “product” (FO, 5370). However, while Schelling wishes to test and un-work philosophy by way of the
“original diremption in nature itself,” Hegel attempts to move beyond the tangled
fecundity of the material world, entering the free realm of Spirit.335 At the PN’s finale

Hegel’s tripartite allusion relates to the three “stages” of dialectical unfolding: “in itself, “for itself,” and
“in and for itself.” In a similar manner, elsewhere in the text Hegel writes: “Nature is, in itself, a living
Whole. The movement through its stages is more precisely this: that the Idea posits itself as that which it is
in itself; or what is the same thing, that it returns into itself [for itself] out of its immediacy and externality
which is death, in order to be first a living creature, but further, to sublate this determinateness also in
which it is only Life, and to give itself an existence as Spirit, which is the truth and the final goal of Nature
and the genuine actuality of the Idea [in and for itself]” (PN, 24).
335
The relationship of Schelling to Hegel’s philosophy of nature is perhaps one of the most curious within
the PN. At the outset of the text, Hegel laments the “charlatanism” (PN, 1), with which the philosophy of
nature has been treated by followers of Schelling, which has led to its scholarly disrepute. Given Hegel’s
own intellectual debt to Schelling, and the textual similarities of their respective versions of
Naturphilosophie, it is curious to see such scant mention of Schelling throughout the text, as Hegel’s
334
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Hegel attempts to leave behind the “diseased” waste that is nature via the image of the
“Phoenix from the ashes,” a desperate attempt to heal the “wounds of spirit”: to ascend
upwards, beyond the unending squandering of the “proteus” that is nature (PN, 444;
Malabou, Changing Difference, 72-88). In this way, the entirety of Hegel’s
Naturphilosophie is itself a “sphere” contained within the broader “circle” of the
philosophical encyclopedia, “in which each member has an antecedent and a
successor...the Philosophy of Nature appears as only one circle in the whole” (PN, 2; EL,
39). Yet nature also presents an “accident” that is able to attain a separate “freedom” with
respect to the whole which endeavors to contain it (PS, 18-19), a disease that
contaminates the broader circle that is Hegelian thought, threatening to win autonomy for
itself.
Rajan has aptly described the self-troubling, or “indigestible,” character of
Hegel’s philosophy of nature, such that, as a member of his encyclopedia it does not
simply reflect philosophy back to itself (exemplifying Hegel’s “omnivorous
interdisciplinary”), but rather, it “exposes philosophy to the remainders that result from
its attempt to reflect itself, and reflect on itself, through its disciplinary others”
(“(In)Digestible Material,” 220; “Encyclopedia,” 6-11). Hegel’s continual presentation of
the “refractory” detail of nature (PN, 444), coupled with his recurrent subdivision of
nature into “spheres” that spiral “into infinite reflection and self-complication,”
repeatedly “inflect[s] scientific descriptions with a pathos that bespeaks his inability to
digest nature” (Rajan, “(In)Digestible,” 221, 218). Hegel’s text does not present some
smooth progression up the scale of phenomena, nor a logical deduction of the disciplines
which frame the natural world. Instead, Hegel undertakes continual detours—many in
speculative Zusätze —through the complexities of plants (PN, 303-304), the ambiguities
of crystals (PN, 160-177), planets (PN, 103), eventually culminating in the triumphant
negativity of “disease” (PN, 432). “Digestion” shares a family resemblance with “the
negative” (or negativity), understood as a “self-reflexive “system of assimilation,” in
which Geist endeavors to “work-through,” or digest alterity into itself (Rajan,

references are generally limited to minor clarifications or insights related to electricity, magnetism, and
gold and silver (PN, 131, 215, 251-2, 343, 386), with far greater theoretical space devoted to admittedly
important figures such as Goethe (PN, 26-7).
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“(In)Digestible,” 218, 224, 229). Thus, if nature is “indigestible”—a point further
emphasized by the contamination of The Philosophy of Mind by motifs from the
philosophy of nature (Mind, 29-41, 65-75; Rajan, “(In)Digestible,” 231-2)— it presents
an important site by which to trouble and refract the Hegelian corpus as a whole: it stages
the “autobiography of the encyclopedia’s failure,” providing “a mise-en-abyme of the
very system of assimilation at the heart of his encyclopedia” (Rajan, “(In)Digestible,”
224). In conclusion, Rajan (following G. Canguillieum), explores how one might think
Hegelian “waste,” or “disease” in productive or “phantasmatological” directions, opening
up a subterranean underworld of possibilities for reading Hegel (Ibid, 232).
Echoing these sentiments, Furlotte positions nature’s “brute facticity” and “radical
exteriority” as disconcerting moments with respect to “spirit’s autarkic agency” (35, 7-8,
9). The materiality of nature remains a persistent “indivisible remainder” with respect to
philosophy, ensuring that whatever “necessity” is arrived at by way of Hegel’s
conceptual sojourn will be shot through with “contingency” (Furlotte, 47-8). As such, the
tangle of detail that is the Hegelian natural world—the “not whole of nature” (Furlotte,
47)—traumatizes Geist’s return to itself such that, “facile proclamations of the ensured
‘triumph of spirit’ become problematic, if not untenable” (Furlotte, 1).336 Against
“speculative realists” such as Meillassoux who accuse Hegel of “correlationism,” a view
ironically shared by many analytic Hegelians—that is, of finding in nature a simple
repetition of conceptual thought —Furlotte presents Hegelian nature as “a radical
exteriority that fundamentally limits the material realization of conceptuality” (48). In
Chapter 1 and 2, Furlotte provides a close reading of the first “mechanical” sphere of
Hegelian nature, a domain which short-circuits Hegel’s discursive ascent, demonstrating
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Continuing this train of thinking, while elaborating his own naturalist-materialist interventions on the
Hegelain project, Furlotte writes: “It is not that nature has a contingent element that is sublated in terms of
the whole’s rationality, but, instead, much more radically, it is to maintain that nature displays a
fundamental contingency at its core that proves a perpetually problematic epicenter of reticent facticity that
destabilizes speculative thought’s demand for comprehensible and encompassing systematic necessity”
(Furlotte, 47-48). Furlotte is not attempting to wholly reject the Hegelian realization of philosophy as
Spirit, but rather, to fracture thought such that nature can be seen as “a necessary yet problematic material
condition in the genesis of freedom’s actualization” (8). In rethinking Hegelian nature (according to
Furlotte), one is able to “develop a distinct sense of the fundamental materialism permeating Hegel’s
conception of freedom” (1), which has important political implications (for “second nature”), allowing
insight into the “precise ways in which the natural register disrupts, destabilizes, and traumatizes Sprit’s
hyper-reconstructive activity in terms of a second nature” (27).
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that Hegel presents “a sophisticated conceptual lexicon that allows us to think the
indeterminate volatility operating at the genetic level of the natural domain” (43). That is,
Hegel presents an attempt to understand (and systematize) the “abortive indeterminacies
displaying minimal structuration,” allowing insight into the “barren chasm of underdetermination,” at nature’s structural level (Furlotte, 37). Nature is not a “smooth a
priori” re-articulation of the “reestablished conceptual field” (Furlotte, 38), but rather, for
Hegel, nature is a tangled domain which continually “bypass[es] precise conceptual
boundaries” (Furlotte, 7), opening a fraught dialogue between the empirical and
transcendental domains. Both Rajan and Furlotte’s work demonstrates the extent to
which Hegel’s Naturphilosophie can be read “against the grain,” fracturing his corpus in
interesting directions, while presenting Hegel’s encyclopedia as always already selftroubling, as a site which provides problematic and contradictory self- articulations or
self- (re)readings.
Though Hegel is often seen as one who overcomes the “external formalism” of
subjective Idealism—historicizing Kant’s transcendental and unifying the “form and
content” of knowledge (PS, 35-40)—this dialogue between empirical and transcendental
moments is not adequately staged in his Phenomenology, which demonstrates the
immanent contradictions inherent in forms of consciousness. Hegel’s various “shapes of
consciousness” are shown to collapse via their own internal inconsistencies, not from the
empirical outside. It is in the Philosophy of Nature that a radical exchange between the
empirical and the transcendental domains is staged, and as such, the PN can be read as a
cipher to Hegel’s broader epistemology (which contains metaphysical suppositions). As
has already been noted, “sense certainty” or the pure empirical given is immediately
dispensed with by Hegel (PS, 58-67); instead thought must recognize the “mediated
character of all immediacy” (SOL, 46, 49; cf. Adorno, Hegel, 57-9). In Hegel, thought
never encounters some pure outside or “givenness,” but rather, such an outside is always
already mediated by the discursive conditions through which it manifests itself.
As Rajan has argued, Hegel’s journey through the various spheres of nature
(“Mechanics, Physics, Organics”) is also a traversal of the various disciplines
(mathematics, physics, chemistry, the life sciences [biology]), which always already
mediate the natural world (Rajan, “Blake, Hegel,” 22). However, against Kant and
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Newton, who would uphold mathematical physics as the apex of such a disciplinary
progression and as providing a model for philosophy, Hegel turns to the dynamic
understanding of the “organism,” with its reciprocal relationship between “parts and
whole,” to deliver a model for philosophy (Hegel, PN, 356; SOL, 654; Ng, 24-26).
Philosophy, understood as the encyclopedic ordering of various sciences (EO,53; PN, 6),
“takes up the material which physics [and the other sciences] has prepared for it
empirically...and reconstitutes it” according to “the notion” allowing the insights of the
sciences to be ordered in relation to “an intrinsically necessary whole,” or “organic
totality” (PN, 10, 22). Thus, “the origin and formation of the Philosophy of Nature
presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics” (PN, 6). For Hegel (as for
Schelling), any hard disciplinary distinction between philosophy and the empirical
sciences is eradicated: “Physics and the Philosophy of Nature, therefore, are not
distinguished from each other as perception and thought, but only by the kind and
manner of their thought; they are both a thinking apprehension of Nature” (PN, 3; Beiser,
Hegel, 82). However, this should not be taken in some “panlogicist” direction, as if Hegel
were attempting to replace empirical-experimental scientific inquiry with a priori
philosophy. Instead, the philosophy of nature should be seen as a way of philosophizing
with nature by “organizing and systematizing the results of the empirical sciences,” with
the distinction between a priori and a posteriori “depend[ing] entirely upon the state of
our knowledge, on whether a judgment could be given a place in the system” (Beiser,
Hegel, 108).337 That is, the distinction between empirical and transcendental is not one of
content, but one of form, with philosophy enacting a “absolutizing” of particular
empirical moments.

Related to the question of “panlogicism” is the famous “Krugs Pen” objection to Hegelian-Schellingian
absolute Idealism raised within Hegel’s lifetime, which objects that such an absolute Idealism sets itself the
impossible task of deriving the whole of contingent reality from its abstract formulations. At the outset of
his Philosophy of Nature (PN, 22-24), Hegel ardently refuses such a challenge, arguing that his
Naturphilosophie, does not strive to give such an exhaustive account of the entirety of the natural world,
but rather to explore its main encyclopedic contours. This is echoed in Hegel’s description of his
“encyclopedic” understanding of philosophy, which he differentiates from vulgar (British) attempts to
bring the empirical into philosophy, thinking via “wood, iron or other materials” (EO,49-50, 53-4). For
more on the “Krugs Pen” objection in relation to the question of contingency in Hegel’s thought, see
Beiser, Hegel (77-8).
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Hegel is explicit in defining the destructive negating power of thought as a
“universalizing”—akin to the romantic gesture of “poeticizing,” “potentiating” (in
Novalis’s terms) or “absolutizing”—of particular phenomena. However, such
universalizing gestures paradoxically remove humans from nature, such that it (or “she”)
appears “alien” or “foreign” to Spirit, resulting in the seeming divide between subject and
object (or empirical and transcendental). As Hegel writes:
Instead of leaving nature as she is, and taking her as she is in truth, instead of simply
perceiving her, we make her into something quite different. In thinking things, we
transform them into something universal; but things are singular and the Lion as
such does not exist...for natural objects do not think, and are not presentations
[Vorstellungen] or thoughts...The theoretical approach begins with the arrest of
appetite, is disinterested, lets things exist and go on just as they are...Our intention,
however, is rather to grasp, to comprehend Nature, to make her ours, so that she is
not something alien and yonder...How do we, as subjects come into contact with
objects? If we venture to bridge this gulf and mislead ourselves along that line and
so think this Nature, we make Nature, which is an Other than we are, into an Other
than she is. (PN, 7-8)

As a philosophical modernist, for Hegel, there will be no return to the immediacy of “first
nature,” “sense certainty,” nor to the “lion as such”: one must recognize that “the fall”
from immediacy has always already occurred, and thought is condemned to alienation
from nature, such that it will present as an “other,” or “alien existence in which Spirit
does not find itself.” Though philosophy may leave nature “as a phoenix from the ashes”
(PN, 444), it leaves in desperation, in an attempt to refract nature (negatively) from a
higher sphere. As Hegel writes, “the healing of this breach [between subject and object]
must be in the form of the knowing Idea, and the moments of the solution must be sought
in consciousness itself” (PN, 9), a sentiment echoed forcefully by Adorno’s refashioning
of a phrase from Wagner’s Parsifal: “Only the spear that inflicted the wound can heal it”
(Hegel, 74). For Adorno, “Hegel’s philosophical consciousness suffered more from the
estrangement between subject and object, between consciousness and reality, than had
any previous philosophical consciousness” (Adorno, Hegel, 74). Paradoxically, it is this
mindfulness of one’s conscious separation from the natural world, of the realization that
there is no such thing as “givenness”—no “thing-in-itself” behind “appearances” (PS, 889)—that allows humanity to progress onward towards the freedom of the absolute
(Moland, 24; cf. Pinkard, Naturalism, 19).
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6.2.2 The Aesthetic: The Sensuous Experience of the Idea
“Aesthetics presents philosophy with the bill for the fact that the academic system degraded it to being a
mere specialization. It demands of philosophy precisely what philosophy has neglected to do: that it extract
phenomena from their existence and bring them to self-reflection; this would be the reflection of what is
petrified in the sciences, not a specialized science located beyond them.” Adorno, AT, 262.

Notwithstanding Hegel’s assertions that “art, considered in its highest vocation, is
and remains for us a thing of the past...it has lost for us genuine truth and life,” along with
the minimal space accorded to art in his Encyclopedia (A, 11; Mind, 292-7), Hegel’s
lectures on aesthetics provide a dynamic and under-theorized sphere of inquiry, a stage
on Geist’s journey of self-realization that can be fractured in productive directions,
creating new domains and disciplines (such as art history). For Hegel, art and the
corresponding practice of aesthetics provides “a specific way of expressing and
representing the true,” and as such it “belongs to the same province as religion and
philosophy” (A, 91, 94, 100). Art promises nothing less than the “sensible appearance
(Scheinen) of the Idea,” a first instance of Spirit liberating itself from the precipitous
externality of nature (A, 111; Moland, 23). As the first moment of “absolute spirit,” art
provides a means “to strip the external world of its inflexible foreignness” (A, 31), a
mode of “social labour” (Adorno, Hegel, 68-9), which moves beyond the merely desiring
unreflective “animal” relationship to nature, into a more “mindful” or rationaldeliberative sphere of normativity (Pinkard, Naturalism, 80).338 In line with the project of
Modernity to which Hegel is often committed, aesthetics presents a moment in which
“spirit [is] born again” (A, 2): emerging out of its mere latency in nature and progressing
upwards through art and religion, and culminating in Geist’s arrival at self-consciousness
in philosophy. Hegel is emphatic, Spirit’s highest realization comes by way of
philosophy, which expresses, “point-blank, Freedom” (A, 97). However, one has to
“prepare the way for a vision” that will see the “concept in everything” (A, 100), and such

As Hegel writes, counterposing the “practical” (unreflective) consciousness of the animal to the fraught
negativity of self-consciousness which besets the human: “Animals live in peace with themselves and their
surroundings, but in the spiritual nature of man duality and inner conflict burgeon, and in their
contradiction he is tossed about” (A, 97). This sentiment is echoed in the Phenomenology, where Hegel
describes the animal as “teaching the truth of sensuous things” (PS, 65), through its practical engagement
with the natural world, a perspective of “sense certainty” immediately denied to the human. Much more
remains to be said regarding the question of the animal in Hegel’s work, specifically the co-determination
(or identity-in-difference) of animal consciousness in relation to human consciousness, or “mindfulness”
(Pinkard, Naturalism, 19).
338
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a preparation is undertaken via a memorial sojourn through the “passed” protoconceptual realms of “art and religion,” spheres which provide Geist with its Bildung
such that it may become conscious of itself while self-actualizing in projects of freedom
(Mind, 292-302). Though such pre-philosophical domains are “sublated,” or overcome,
they nonetheless serve as fundamental “vehicles for the self-realization of Geist” (Taylor,
Hegel, 465). In this way, Hegel’s aesthetics is Janus-faced: in one sense, looking forward
in anticipation of philosophy, while at the same time, looking backward, lingering over
the supra-fecund history of art, its various detours and proliferations as it seeks “the
adequate embodiment of the Idea” (A, 77).
At first glance, Hegel’s theses on art appear to be Eurocentric and dismissive of
the philosophical relevance of art and aesthetics. Within Hegel’s encyclopedia, art is
downgraded as a “lower” level of Spirit’s self-consciousness (Iversen & Melville, 3): yet
another instance of the common “fate of art” throughout the western tradition, a repetition
of the “subordination thesis” in which art is derided as being a “confused perception,” an
inferior medium of truth compared to the free clarity of conceptual philosophy (Beiser,
Hegel, 286-91; Bernstein, Fate, 1-5).339 Following Plato’s condemnation of art as a
sophistical exercise of imitation, art (and aesthetics) are banished from meaningful
philosophical discussions of “truth and morality” (Bernstein, Fate, 3; Sontag,
“Interpretation,” 95-7).
Against this, one hears of Hegel as a passionate devotee of the arts and all things
beautiful: one who allegedly raced through his Berlin lectures so as to dash across the
street to the theatre, one who continually traveled based on his own artistic Bildung, and
seemingly never encountered an aesthetic object he did not appreciate (Pinkard, Hegel,
594-5, 507-14; Beiser, Hegel, 282). Further, at key junctures in his Phenomenology of

Describing the “subsumption thesis,” in which art is considered a subordinate form of thought to
philosophy, Beiser will write, “what art glimpses through the obscure medium of the senses philosophy
captures through the transparent medium of thought” (Hegel, 283). Iversen & Melville note that despite
Hegel generally favoring Western art forms and patronizingly deriding Eastern forms of art as naively
“abstract,” Hegel was also one of the first to consider eastern forms of art (and aesthetics) in a systematic
manner (2-3): a sentiment which Rajan echoes by positioning Hegel’s method as providing the
transcendental conditions for A. Riegl and W. Worringer’s re-evaluation and legitimation of Egyptian art
(“Cultural Idealism,” 63-5). Further, within the general context of the Hegelian encyclopedia, in which art
as a whole is an alterity to conceptual clarity “there is no form of art that properly speaking is not foreign”
(Rajan, “Writing,” 120).
339
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Spirit—itself an artistic achievement rivaling the Bildungsromane of his age— Hegel
turns to art to elucidate the historical-consciousness of a certain “shape of
consciousness.” One will recall his remarkable discussions of Antigone, which illustrates
the emergent tensions between the individual and society of the Greek “ethical order”
(PS, 261, 284-91), through to his employment of Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew, which is
read to depict the strife of “culture” in post-revolutionary France (PS, 318, 332), and the
culmination of the PS with the (mis-)quotation of a passage by Schiller (PS, 493). The
Werkausgabe edition of Hegel’s lectures on Aesthetics totals 1500 pages (with Knox’s
two volume English rendition totaling 1237), more than the Encyclopedia project in total,
with the first half of the Aesthetics surveying the historical genesis of art as it passes
through seemingly every culture, with the second half charting the multiplicity and
variation of the specific arts (architecture, sculpture, etc.). A great amount of historical
detritus, only to be overcome: “Why... write a three-volume work [on the arts] if they are
inferior to philosophy and doomed to obsolescence?” (Beiser, Hegel, 283).
Despite Hegel’s seeming dismissal of art in favour of the more refined realm of the
concept, art provides a speculative sphere through which to refract and imagine the
Hegelian project differently. As will be argued via Adorno, those who wish to trouble the
final triumph of conceptual philosophy—while maintaining a Hegelian notion of system
or encyclopedic conception of philosophy—would do well to consult the plethora of
alternative logics contained in the “lesser” stages of “absolute spirit” aesthetics and
perhaps even religion. These domains can be thought as “prisms” through which to
reflect on Hegelian philosophy, and upon more general questions related to the
philosophical system. This “freedom” of art is reminiscent of Schelling’s statements
regarding an individual “member” (FE, 18) that is able to gain “an autonomy” with
respect to the whole; or with Hegel, a circle (or sphere) which becomes “detached from
what circumscribes it” and “attains an existence of its own...[a] separate freedom” (PS,
18-19). There exist monadological “worlds within worlds” hidden in the Hegelian
program, whole disciplines and novel speculative logics waiting to be unearthed. As in
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, one encounters dual trajectories in nature, one upwardly
organizing, the other ceaselessly proliferating via continual detours. For Hegel, though
Geist progresses upwards towards “the absolute,” one continually encounters
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“indigestible moments” of ceaseless proliferation, an excess of detail, and “lingering,” or
“tarrying,” as Geist attempts to incorporate all alterity into itself. Within Hegel’s
considerations of aesthetics, one encounters a “daunting array of detail” (Moland, 3; cf.
PN, 444), to an almost excessive extent, posing serious hurdles for a philosophy which
wishes to come back to itself in any stable “rational” manner.
From the perspective of the encyclopedia, aesthetics, as a reckoning with the
concept of “beauty,” seeks the “appearance of the Idea to sense” (A, 111), promising the
“sensuous experience of truth” (Moland, 2). Aesthetics provides a preliminary “intuition”
(Anschauung) of “absolute spirit,” only to be surpassed by the more refined forms of
representations (Vorstellungen) of religion and the rational clarity of the philosophical
concept (Begriffe) (Moland, 23). Within the particular sphere of the aesthetics, the
various forms of art (“symbolic, classical, and romantic”) provide formal genre markers
which describe “different ways of grasping the Idea as content...differing relations of
meaning and shape, relations which proceed from the Idea itself and therefore provide the
true basis for the division of this sphere” (A, 77, 75). As forms of “concrete universality,”
each Idea provides a representation of “the whole,” which organizes and mediates the
individual moments or particular artistic objects and practices (Beiser, Hegel, 289-90).
Likening this methodological aesthetic organization to Hegel’s “phenomenology” of the
various shapes of consciousness, Rajan describes Hegel’s Aesthetics as “a
phenomenology of art not only in the traditional sense of trying to grasp the spirit behind
the individual forms, but also the more contemporary sense of considering forms in terms
of their effect on the reader” (Rajan, Supplement, 52). In such a manner, one sees in
Hegel’s aesthetics the emergence of a new distinctly “modern” sentiment towards art, a
movement away from Kant, such that the work of art “is not an autonomous structure”
but is created instead “for a public” (Rajan, Supplement, 52), and, as such, should be read
in relation to a constellation of material-historical forces.
In the progression of absolute spirit (through art, religion and philosophy), one
will note Hegel’s standard tripartite dialectical structure of development. This is mirrored
in the evolution of art through its various “stages”: from the pantheistic revelries of “the
symbolic,” through art’s “end” with the “adequate embodiment” of the idea in “the
classical” Greek world, and finally art’s return and proliferation via many “romantic”
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manifestations (A, 76-9). However, Rajan has drawn attention to the negative (or
“inverted”) dialectic at work in Hegel’s progression through the phases of art: “the form
of the aesthetics [is] a disturbed dialectic where synthesis is displaced from the end to the
middle of history, as if speaking properly cannot exhaust thoughts aims” (Rajan,
“Writing,” 126, 122-3). That is, though art seemingly ends in the free clarity of “the
classical”—a clear homology with conceptual philosophical thought—art continues in the
“romantic” phase, as if to provide a meta-critique on the dogmatism of lucid conceptual
thinking. Hegel performs Adorno’s assertions regarding the unintentional truth of
philosophical language: “all philosophical language is a language in opposition to
language, marked with the stigma of its own impossibility" (Adorno, Hegel, 100). In this
way, Hegel’s three artistic moments can be seen as meta-critical prisms that are involved
in “a perpetual supplementation and rethinking of each other”: “classicism represents
thought as finished” while “the symbolic and romantic differently un-work [philosophy]
by circulating thought between its necessary and always premature hypostasis (in the
symbolic), and withdrawing thought as Spirit from the concepts that limit it so as to think
it once again” (Rajan, “Writing,” 142).
The first “symbolic” phase of art is associated with the pantheism of pre-Greek
non-Western art (A, 77), and presents the Idea “in its indeterminacy and obscurity” (A,
76). In such a sphere art proliferates—and the Idea “bubbles and ferments in [works],
does violence to them, distorts them and stretches them unnaturally... indeterminate[ly]”
(A, 76)— manifesting as a prose of the world that is unable to grasp the Idea other than
through “abstract characteristics,” wallowing in a “bad and untrue determinacy” (A,
76).340 Such “bizarre, grotesque, and tasteless” propagation is overcome by the
“classical” phase of art, which presents the “free and adequate embodiment of the idea”
over and against the “double defects” of the “abstract” determinations of the symbolic (A,

Rajan (in “Cultural Idealism”) has charted the “difference and opposition” (65) that lies at the heart of
the Hegelian symbolic phase of art (along with its return in the Romantic): notably the positivity Hegel
accords to Persian and Indian art, in tension with their sublime negativity (63-5). Such tensions cast doubt
on the possibility of a formative aesthetic education (Bildung), which would culminate in some clarified
notion of “freedom,” ensuring a logical transition to philosophy (66-7). Elsewhere, Rajan locates the
symbolic in a constellation with J. Boehme, and Hegel’s larger troubled relationship with pantheism,
domains which gain a separate freedom and are able to critically estrange one from the Hegelian program
(“Writing,” 127-30).
340
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77). The classical work of art is expressed in the world of Greek statue, in which the
highest ideals of society came to be personified in sensuous (often human) form,
culminating in the “unity” of form and content so striven for by Hegel (A, 78). Art thus
“ends,” with this coming to (self-) consciousness of itself as a unified practice, along its
central role in Greek spiritual-political life. However, such a becoming plastic of the gods
has the unintended consequence of eradicating the distinction between sacred and
profane, begetting its own negation in the “inwardness of self-consciousness” endemic to
the “romantic” era (A, 80-1), which “cancels again the completed unification of the Idea
and its reality and reverts...in a higher way, to that difference and opposition of the two
sides” (A, 79; cf. Iversen & Melville, 162, 6). For Hegel, the Romantic-Modern era
corresponded to the dominance of a (Christian-protestant) subjective individuality, and
one cannot return to the lost unities of antiquity, or what Lukács termed the age of the
“epic” (Novel, 29-40). In the romantic era, art seems to once again propagate along
idiosyncratic paths (as in the symbolic), though never again will it attain the “adequacy”
it once had within the Greek world, as meaning and shape are severed from each other in
the alienated condition of modern life (A, 81). Hegel’s dissatisfaction with Romantic art
arises from the new place of prominence Hegel accords to philosophy. Given that (in
Modernity) the world has become “rational,” a comprehension of modern life must
necessarily come from the rational form of life, conceptual philosophy.
Iversen and Melville locate art history—understood as the critical-discursive
presentation and analysis of art—as emerging in an “intimate dialogue with Hegel and
post-Hegelian thought” (specifically, H. Wöllfin, A. Riegl, A. Warburg and E. Panofsky,
[2]). That is, art history is a particular moment which escapes and ruptures the restricted
economy of the Hegelian system. As the historical “origin” of art history, Hegel provides
a means to think art history methodologically as a practice of “writing,” a much needed
palliative to the current (Kantian-Panofskyian) crisis of the discipline (2-3).341 In the
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Iversen & Melville attribute the decline of methodological reflection in art history to the dominance of
Panofsky and his Kantian infused “disinterested” method of contemplation, in which works of art are
evaluated by way of (supposedly) neutral spectatorship, providing little awareness of the complex of
mediations subtending every aesthetic experience. Thus, Iversen & Melville (re)turn to Hegel—specifically
his methodological critique of Kant—as a means to renew disciplinary questions of method, following after
Hegel’s destruction of any hard distinction between “method and content.” Via Hegel, Iversen & Melville
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epistemological domain, Hegel is seen as one who overcomes Kantian “subjective
Idealism,” by locating “reason” in a broader set of domains. Likewise, with respect to art,
Hegel moves aesthetics beyond the confines of the Kantian judging subject, considering
“reason” in the aesthetic realm in a broader manner, anticipating the later disciplines of
art history or cultural studies (Schulte-Sasse, 85-9). Hegel’s 1820-9 Lectures on Fine
Arts, held predominantly at the newly formed Humboldt Universität in Berlin, represent
the emergence of new distinctly modern relationship to art, one emerging out of a unique
constellation of questions regarding the museum and its role in centralizing “national”
knowledge (Iversen & Melville, 151).
Hegel moves beyond the narrow parameters of the Kantian aesthetic (of the CPJ),
which considered fine art a “dependent” [anhängende] mode of the beautiful in
comparison to the “free beauties” of nature; as such, Kant saw art as a mere occasion for
the judgments of the epistemic subject (CPJ, 114-116; cf. Hegel, A, 2; Adorno, AT, 63).
Hegel, like many others in his Idealist-Romantic generation, elevated art to a form of
thought in its own right, granting a primacy to the aesthetic object, while eviscerating any
hard distinction between method and content in the analysis of art, such that “Art history
happens, and matters, as writing” (Iversen & Melville, 3). However, against Kant, who
accords nature primacy, Hegel upsets the preeminence of nature in the aesthetic domain,
triumphantly favoring fine art at the expense of the “beauty of nature” (A, 116-129; Mind,
558; Moland, 33). As will be demonstrated via Adorno, in this instance Hegel is both true
and false: in one sense providing a radically “modern” model for aesthetics, while on the
other, representing another instance of the suppression of art and aesthetics by Western
philosophy, which favors the clarity of the concept at the expense of other more sensuous
logics.
In these ways, I wish to suggest that the “fate of art” in Hegel’s philosophy cannot
be settled simply—in fact, it is not settled amicably even within Hegel’s corpus—as
aesthetics provides a plethora of “prisms” through which philosophy is able to be
reflected upon: “present[ing] philosophy with the bill” (Adorno, AT, 262). Bernstein

speculatively question “what other shape could art history have?” (2), how can one employ the resources of
the Hegelian encyclopedia to write art history differently?
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argues that although Kant participated in the general subjugation of art (and the aesthetic)
to philosophy, his work also provides an abundance of models through which to think the
aesthetic in novel new relations (Fate, 17-18). I wish to argue that this is likewise the
case with Hegel, and perhaps even to a greater degree. Hegelian aesthetics, along with the
tradition of post-Hegelian aesthetic theory (which culminates in Adorno), provides
dynamic models by which to open a constructive exchange between philosophy and the
aesthetic, providing new “meta-critical” domains through which to reflect on both
spheres. As Rajan writes, “If philosophy does not supersede art, then perhaps one can ask
whether the Aesthetics, rather than being a philosophy, or history of art, might not also be
thought of as an art of philosophy” (“Writing,” 141). In such a manner, Hegel can aid in
the theorization of new arts of philosophy, providing new possible plastic models of
thought.
6.2.3 Art’s Necrology: Post-Hegelian Art and Aesthetics
“We may well hope that art will always rise higher and come to perfection, but the form of art has ceased to
be the supreme need of the Spirit. No matter how excellent we find the statues of the Greek gods, no matter
how we see God the Father, Christ, and Mary so estimably and perfectly portrayed; it is no help; we bow
the knee no longer [before artistic portrayals].” Hegel, A, 103.

There is no more infamous moment in Hegelian aesthetics than his assertions
regarding “the death of art,” which, “as a thing of the past,” no longer provides normative
directives for the rationalized context of Modernity (A, 103). Against many in his
Romantic-Idealist generation (notably Schiller, the Schlegels, Schleiermacher, and to
some extent Schelling), for Hegel, art will not play the cumulative role of unifying the
divergent strivings of Modern life as it did in the Greek “classical age,” or in medieval
Christianity. Instead, in Modernity such a task is reserved for the rational
conceptualizations of philosophy, with art providing an educative preface for “free”
conceptual thought. It should be clarified, Hegel is not asserting that art should be
abandoned wholesale, nor that the art of his contemporaries is wholly irrelevant, but
rather, that art no longer responds to the fundamental needs (and tensions) of modern
society: “it is of no help” (A, 103). Art is unable to provide a model of “the whole” that
will address the fragmentation of modern life. Anticipating Baudelaire, for Hegel, there
will be no “painter of modern life”; instead, art becomes “a latecomer on its own scene”
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(Iversen & Melville, 172): “It is self-evident that nothing concerning art is self-evident
anymore” (Adorno, AT, 1, cf. 3-4). At the moment of its “modern” emergence, it is
already too late— “une passante” (Baudelaire, Fleurs, 127). Hence art can only be
treated as a “thing of the past,” which can be historically interrogated through the
conceptual methods of aesthetics and art history.342 That is, despite the presence of other
logics, or modes of relating to the world contained within art, its fate in Modernity is that
its “truth” will always be articulated discursively via the conceptual “prose” of
philosophy. Art becomes its own “necrology” (Adorno, AT, 4): a specter living on after
its objective historical dissolution, haunting the supposedly rational unities of Modernity.
As Adorno ardently proclaims, “Hegel was the first to realize that the end of art is
implicit in its concept” (AT, 32).
Many thinkers and artists have simply cast off Hegel’s assertions as another
problematic modern “meta-narrative” which must be disregarded, and much of the art
which followed Hegel’s death has forcefully put his declarations to the test.343 Among
Hegel’s challengers a unique place should be accorded to “post-Hegelian” aesthetic
theory: a tradition which emerges in the work of Simmel and Lukács, and is continued
actively by Benjamin, culminating in Adorno.344 This constellation of thinkers should be
considered “post-Hegelian” not in the sense of rejecting Hegel (or his aesthetics)

As Rajan asserts, “to write the history of a domain in Hegel’s sense is to bring this domain into
modernity, given that modernity is the overcoming of the past, its sublation or re-description in present
terms” (“Writing,” 140). In this manner, art history entails a conceptual re-description of the sensuous logic
of art in conceptual terms (as aesthetics).
343
Clearly there have been meaningful artistic advancements since Hegel’s proclamation, along with
notable advances in reproductive technology (namely photography and film), which have fundamentally
altered the status of art. Iversen & Melville refashion Hegel’s “end of art,” to imagine other possible
endings for art in the twentieth-century, such as Duchamp, or Warhol, while also examining how artists
such as Donald Judd challenge Hegel’s degradation of certain mediums, such as sculpture or architecture
(154). One can see Benjamin as contesting Hegel’s death of art from the perspectives of film and
photography, and Adorno contesting Hegel’s proclamations from the domain of music, contestations about
which more remains to be said.
344
Both Lukács and Simmel conceptualize culture—and “forms” of art—from a broadly Hegelian
perspective. Simmel sees “culture” in dialectical terms as the dialectical interaction between “individual”
(or subject) and “society” (object). According to Simmel, within Modernity, culture takes on a tragic form
as the objective world of convention comes to dominate the individual (see “On the Concept and the
Tragedy of Culture,” 55-74, cf. “The Conflict of Modern Culture,” 75-89). For Lukács, culture should be
understood as a dialectic between “soul and form,” in which individual aesthetic forms (such as the novel)
can be read as ciphers to broader historical trajectories. For example, Lukács locates the development of the
novel in relation to the broader movement towards “individualism” in culture (Novel, 11-28, 70-96).
342
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wholesale, but rather, as immanently working through his central concepts, imagining
alternative uses and employments of Hegelian encyclopedic thinking. That is, they
demonstrate the possibility of “thinking philosophy’s labour of the negative through art,”
theorizing the possibility of “non-classical modes of art and aesthetics” (Rajan,
“Writing,” 121), and perhaps of philosophy as well.
In his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno engages in a meta-critique of Idealist aesthetics,
performing deconstructions which pave the way for his own critical interventions upon
philosophy more broadly. As has been argued elsewhere in this project, Adorno’s
aesthetics stages a critical confrontation between Kantian and Hegelian aesthetics,
examining the critical possibilities latent in each thinker (2.3). Via this doublet Adorno
forwards his own modernist understanding of art as a vestige of “mimesis,” providing the
means to think a more expansive model of rationality that would do justice to
particularity, “suffering,” and the natural world (ND, 17-18; AT, 61-72, 343; Hammer,
Modernism, 42-44, 57). Adorno’s attempt to combine (without definitive synthesis) the
aesthetic comportments of Hegel alongside those of Kant mirrors his broader negative
dialectical philosophical project, which strives to merge the epistemic modesty of the
Kantian subject with a Hegelian encyclopedic-historic understanding of philosophy.345
Such a return to art and aesthetics marks Adorno’s dissatisfaction with Hegelian
notions of “freedom,” specifically, Hegel’s culmination of philosophy with the “identity”
of the concept, and his leaving behind other, non-discursive ways of relating to the world.
For Adorno, Hegelian rationality came to fruition as an instrumental logic of domination,
an “iron cage” suffocating all of nature and humanity. The Hegelian thought of freedom
had become too “calculative and instrumental, too responsive to our desire for selfpreservation... an impediment to the actualization of freedom rather than an expression of
it” (Hammer, Modernism, 50, 35-6). However, art, as a moment in the realization of
“absolute spirit,” provides a provisional manifestation of the whole, and in a context of
instrumental domination offers a vestige for other logics and alternative relations to the

Adorno describes the need to redeem “through second reflection” (AT, 343) the (aesthetic) programs of
Kant and Hegel: “If the most powerful aesthetics—Kant’s and Hegel’s—were the fruits of systematic
thinking, the collapse of these systems has thrown them into confusion without, however, destroying them”
(AT, 353).
345
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world. Adorno’s early Kierkegaard study (1933)—subtitled “The Construction of the
Aesthetic”—redeems the aesthetic sphere in both Kierkegaard and Hegel as a voluptuous
site of potential meaning, a realm of natural-historical ciphers which can be critically read
(3-23). Through dialectical images such as “natural beauty,” Adorno explores new
“forms of significance and ways of mattering that are not immediately dependent on
rationally shaped commitments” (Hammer, Modernism, 50). Following Adorno, one
must envision a negative dialectical interaction between philosophy and the aesthetic, one
which does not eradicate the difference in favour of the final triumph of philosophy (as
Hegel tries to do), but rather, one in which art and its non-discursive elements are granted
“a continuing stake in imagining this [rational] unity” (Iversen & Melville, 159). Adorno
elevates the Hegelian aesthetic as a phantasmatic site through which to refract Hegelian
philosophy, providing a “running commentary on reason” (Hammer, Modernism, 44),
while envisioning new expansive and meta-critical models of rationality. If Adorno
contests the culmination of Geist’s progression in conceptual philosophy—continually
arguing that the supposed “freedom” of the concept is in fact a triumph of instrumental
reason—art (as a lower form of absolute spirit) provides an alternative model of
“freedom,” a site through which to imagine differing relationships between philosophy
and the natural world. The following section will explore Adorno’s constellation of
“natural beauty,” positioning it as exemplary of Adorno’s own immanent expansion of
the Hegelian project, an intervention which demonstrates the possibility of further critical
projects relating to the Hegelian aesthetic domain.

6.2.3.1 Natural Beauty
“The concept of natural beauty rubs on a wound, and little is needed to prompt one to associate this word
with the violence that the artwork—a pure artifact—inflicts on nature. Wholly artificial, the artwork seems
to be the pure opposite of what is not made, nature. As pure antithesis however, each refers to the other:
nature to the experience of a mediated and objectified world, the artwork to nature as the mediated
plenipotentiary of immediacy. Therefore, reflection on natural beauty is irrevocably requisite to the theory
of art.” Adorno, AT, 62.

Central to Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory is the reclamation of “natural beauty,”
which Adorno reads as a “dialectical image,” or “prism,” through which to deconstruct
Hegelian aesthetics, while also providing an occasion for Adorno to forward his own
aesthetically infused model of philosophy. The notion of natural beauty, or the “free
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beauty of nature,” is unconsciously central to Kant’s CPJ (114-116), though it was
“repressed” wholesale (AT, 61) by the post-Kantian Idealist tradition of aesthetics, with
the possible exception of Schelling and Goethe (AT, 72). For Adorno, such a repression
of the natural is a cipher to the broader “fallacy of constitutive subjectivity” endemic to
Idealism: the privileging of the mind and notions of unity and identity over and against
the multiplicities of the natural world, or what Adorno terms “the object” (ND, xx, 18397). Adorno broadly glosses Idealism in terms of the belief that “nothing in the world is
worthy of attention except that for which the autonomous subject has itself to thank” (AT,
62).346 It should be emphasized that in recovering “natural beauty” Adorno is not after
some auratic pure immediacy; for him, natural beauty “is historical through and through”
(AT, 65): it is a constellation in which “natural and historical elements interact in a
musical and kaleidoscopically changing fashion” (AT, 71). Thus, natural beauty—along
with nature more generally—is a dialectical cipher to certain material historical
trajectories: “Natural beauty is the trace of the non-identical under the spell of universal
identity” (AT, 73; Hammer, Modernism, 53). That is to say, the “wounds” of nature
testify to the domination of capitalist-enlightenment “identity- thinking,” with natural
beauty refracting a memorial image of a world without domination. In the DE, Adorno
and Horkheimer describe this possibility of reading enlightenment history negatively, or
natural-historically, from the perspective of nature: “A philosophical interpretation of
world history would have to show how...the systematic domination over nature has been
asserted more and more decisively and has integrated all human characteristics.
Economic, political and cultural forms would have to be derived from this position” (185;
cf. ND,11-67).
As has been emphasized, for Adorno, Hegel is both right and wrong: in one sense
Hegelian Idealism provides the dialectical armature through which Adorno will theorize

As Adorno continues, “Perhaps nowhere else is the desiccation of everything not totally ruled by the
subject more apparent [than in aesthetics], nowhere else is the dark shadow of Idealism more obvious, than
in aesthetics,” which posits art as the “tumbling mat” of “the true, the beautiful, the good” (AT, 62). For
Adorno, such a primacy of the subject results in the oppression of “animal, landscape, woman” (AT, 63),
moments left behind by the imperialism of the concept. In a similar manner, Hammer asserts, For Hegel
“mere Nature plays no direct role in the autonomous subject’s self-affirmation and self-authorization”
(Modernism, 48).
346
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his own historical critical understanding of philosophy, while in another sense, Hegel
participates in the conventional Idealist domination of particular “non-identity” by way of
conceptual “identity” (ND, 24-28). With respect to aesthetics, though Adorno endorses
Hegel’s movement of aesthetics away from the subjectivity of Kantian judgment (AT,
41), he also wishes to maintain elements of Kantian aesthetics, notably (natural) beauty
and sublimity, along with mimesis, which Hegel summarily dismisses (AT, 75; Hammer,
Modernism, 50). This negative dialectical mediation of Hegelian and Kantian aesthetics
together in a mosaic of tension gestures at Adorno’s broader attempt to reconcile Kant
and Hegel: specifically, the epistemic finitude of the Kantian subject, within the historical
encyclopedic framework of Hegel. With respect to aesthetics, Adorno experimentally
criticizes Hegel(ian aesthetics) primarily from the perspective of “nature”—that
“mediated plenipotentiary of immediacy” (AT, 62)—forwarding “natural beauty” as a
“prism” through which to refract the Hegelian program in speculative ways.347 If for
Hegel, art is a provisional manifestation of freedom, for Adorno, works of art are situated
“natural historically” at the intersection of nature and culture, and are thus able to
challenge our quotidian assumption, “proposing a different relation to nature altogether”
(Hammer, Modernism 63).348
Hegel, with a “polemical eye towards Schelling,” inaugurated the problematic
paradigm of “discursive aesthetics” which “casts natural beauty as more impoverished
than it is” (AT, 74). Such a discursive-aesthetic paradigm did not allow “nature” to be
seen in its own right, but only by way of its other philosophy (via conceptual discursive
aesthetics, the written practice of art history): as Hegel writes, “the beauty of nature is
beautiful only for another...for us, for the mind which apprehends beauty” (Hegel, A, 123;
Adorno, AT, 74). Illustrative of this, in his lectures on aesthetics (A, 116-123, 143-152)

Describing a potential parallelism between the downcast moments of art and nature in Hegel’s
philosophy, Adorno will write: “It can be argued immanently against Hegel that his own definition of
nature as Spirit in its otherness not only contrasts Spirit with nature but also binds them together without,
however, the binding element being investigated in his system’s aesthetics or philosophy of nature” (AT,
75). Adorno extents this immanent critique into the domain of Hegelian aesthetics, arguing that, “Hegel
arrests the aesthetic dialectic by his static definitions of the beautiful as the sensual appearance of the Idea”
(AT, 51).
348
As I demonstrated in 2.3, for Adorno, art presents a utopian model of social labour, a mode of relating to
“the object” in a non-dominating fashion.
347
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Hegel overcomes, without the conventional remainders of Aufhebung, the concept of
natural beauty “when it has scarcely been introduced”: the beauty of nature is
downgraded as an “indeterminate,” merely “subjective sentiment,” which has been
overcome by the cultivated culture of “fine art” (AT, 74-5, 76). Throughout his discussion
of the “symbolic” phase of art, Hegel makes similar disparaging remarks regarding the
naturalistic pantheism pervading “Eastern art,” symptomatic of what Adorno terms the
“Idealist disdain for what is not Spirit in nature” (AT, 75). For Adorno, such
denunciations betray the fundamental dialectical-historical promise of Hegelian thought:
in “rejecting the fleetingness of natural beauty, Hegel obtusely makes himself indifferent
to the central motif of art, which probes after truth in the evanescent and fragile” (AT,
76). Hegel gazes at transience throughout his aesthetics, though he represses such
evanescence in favor of the clarity of the philosophical concept. Though Adorno is
highly critical of Hegel’s degradation of natural beauty, he also reads such a subjugation
as historically emblematic of Idealist philosophy’s more general repression of nature:
“Natural beauty gains legitimacy only by its decline” (AT, 76); that is, the beauty of fine
art becomes possible only after the protean tangle of “nature” has been subdued and
categorized.
As Adorno argues, “natural-beauty,” if dialectically interrogated provides “the
unexpected promise of something that is highest,” a monument to a utopian impulse
“more than what is literally there,” sublimely transcending the subject and forcing it to
“shudder,” recognizing logics other than itself (AT, 75, 70). Here Adorno moves Hegel in
a Schellingian direction—despite Adorno’s assertions of the “irretrievable” character of
the experience of nature presented in Goethe and Schelling (AT, 72)— positing natural
beauty as fracturing the stability of thought by way of the dynamism of nature. Adorno
endorses a negative inversion of Schelling’s relationship between nature and aesthetics—
by which aesthetic genius participates in the ur-productivity of nature (STI, 219-236)—
for Adorno, it is via the complete withdrawal from nature, through the total embrace of
their constructed and mediated character that art works dialectically present an image of
reconciled nature (Prisms, 250; cf. NL I: 19). In a further move, Adorno argues that it is
Kant (specifically of the CPJ) who provides the theoretical means to bring nature back
into (aesthetic) thought, exhibiting a polyphony of inventive models by which the subject
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is able to relate to the world (AT, 10-18, 64-70, 116, 245). As has been argued, in the CPJ
though Kant positions the beauty of nature as superior to that of “fine art,” he also
provides several pioneering thought models through which philosophy can rethink its
interaction with the natural world (CPJ, 178; Hammer, Modernism, 50).
Central to Adorno’s aesthetics is the primordial “shudder” evoked by aesthetic
experience, a notion which has evident parallels with the Kantian sublime in that both
shatter any stable parallelism between the subject and the world, opening the subject to
its constitutive finitude, figuring a “noumenal subject [that] can be considered fragile and
mortal” (AT, 245-6, 67, 66). That is, the sublime contains the potential to reconnect the
subject with transcendence, with a “something more” that challenges its concepts and
categories. (Adorno & Bloch, 10-17). If in Kant, natural beauty and the teleological
whole of nature demonstrate the subject as fitting into the world (providing “a whole”
based on its ideas and categories), Adorno shows the primordial heterogeneity of subject
and object, a “not feeling at home,” which “challenges and upsets the subject in its
normal capacity for experience” (Hammer, Modernism, 65). For Adorno, one must
remain within Lukácsian “transcendental homelessness,” enduring the “abyss” opened by
the discordance between soul and form (Novel, 29-39). Adorno is also critical of Kant’s
monumental presentation of the sublime—in which the “infinitely great” one experiences
in nature points to the even greater moral capacity within the subject— reading it as
emblematic of the bourgeois domination of nature, the taming of the natural world via
discursive cognition and the evaluation of its processes according to anthropocentric
categories. As Adorno writes, “If nature is to be beautiful, it is because we are no longer
threatened by it” (AT, 65): there can be no spectatorship without domination (Hammer,
Modernism, 52), without the subjugation of the tangled complexity of the natural world.
As Hammer and Bernstein both emphasize, for Adorno, the aesthetic provides
models by which to open the “buffered self” of Modernity, ways of “(re) connecting the
modern subject or self with an order beyond it” (Bernstein, Fate, 8), while creating a
“different and more receptive form of subjectivity, thereby challenging the “buffered
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self” of modern reason” (Hammer, Modernism, 57).349 Hence the centrality of notions
such as mimesis, along with the experience of “semblance,” to Adorno’s aesthetics, sites
in which the subject is able to encounter non-discursive logics and alternative ways of
relating to the world. Great works of art evoke “a shudder,” or a “loss of the ground” (AT,
245, 220-4), exposing the subject to its own naturalistic genesis, charting its emergence
and mimetic ur-receptivity in relation to the natural world (Hammer, Modernism, 63-4).
In evoking such a primordial “experience of transcendence” (Bernstein, Fate, 220),
or in recognizing the “object’s primacy,” Adorno upholds the anti-foundationalism of the
Kantian subject within a Hegelian framework, (negative) dialectically mediating the two
by way of identity-in-difference. Following Hegel, Adorno is eminently modern: one
cannot go back to pure natural landscapes, either in art or reality, but rather, one must
seek to negatively refract “the guarded image of first nature” from within “second
nature,” or the realm of fine art: “In semblance, non-semblance is promised” (AT, 63; cf.
ND, 404-5). As Adorno writes, “Authentic artworks, which hold fast to the idea of
reconciliation with nature by making themselves completely a second nature, have
consistently felt the urge, as if in need of a breath of fresh air, to step outside of
themselves” (AT, 63). As Adorno continues, “Art is not nature, but art does want to keep
nature’s promise” (AT, 65). Through art’s self-negation, or total identification with its
made status, art keeps the promise of a reconciled vision of humanity. Art refracts the
possibility of a (natural) world without domination: “Art stands in for nature through its
abolition in effigy” (AT, 66).350 “Nature” does not yet exist, though art holds its
possibility open (AT, 74). The negativity, or dissonance, of such experiences are
essential, as Adorno is not after some sublime “hero worship,” but rather, a feeling for

Hammer employs Charles Taylor’s distinction between the “buffered” self of Cartesian subject-object
dualism that pervades much of modern philosophy. Taylor contrasts such a view with the “porous” notion
of the self developed by the Idealists (see, Taylor, The Secular Age, 38-41, 131-5; cf. Hammer, Modernism,
57-9).
350
Adorno continues, arguing that art holds open the promise for a fuller notion of “rationality”: “So long
as progress, deformed by utilitarianism, does violence to the surface of the earth. Rationalization is not yet
rational; the universality of mediation has yet to be transferred into living life; and this endows the traces of
immediacy, however dubious and antiquated, with an element of concrete justice” (AT, 64). Art does justice
to “nature” by expressing the violence done to nature by way of thought: “consciousness does justice to the
experience of nature only when, like impressionist art, it incorporates nature’s wounds” (AT, 68). Even
pessimistic art becomes rational in relation to the dissonance of reality: “the darkening of the world makes
the irrationality of art rational; radically darkened art” (AT, 19).
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nature’s “silence” (AT, 69). Nature’s transcendence lies not only in the grand experiences
of the breathtaking greatness of landscapes, but more often in the sublime stillness of
nature’s solitude. In a Benjaminian manner, Adorno tasks art-aesthetics with the
impossible task of making the “muteness” of nature articulate, which paradoxically
necessitates the self-negation of art: “If the language of nature is mute, art seeks to make
this muteness eloquent; art thus exposes itself to failure through the insurmountable
contradiction between the idea of making the mute eloquent, which demands a desperate
effort, and the idea of what this effort would amount to, the idea of what cannot in any
way be willed” (AT, 78).351 In this way, the “impossible possibility” of aesthetics—one
mirrored in Adorno’s philosophy— its failure to meaningfully “say” anything, presents a
negative image of the reconciliation with nature: a transient figuration of “being, nothing
else, without any further definition and fulfillment” (MM, 157). Art, along with the
critical practice of aesthetics, strives “with human means...to realize the language of what
is not human” (AT, 78). Such practices provide ephemeral “fireworks” (AT, 28, 81),
which figure transient outlines of utopia, holding out for the “impossible possibility” of
redemption. For Adorno, both the production and reception of works of art figure the
possibility of other non-discursive modes of relating to the world. As a mode of “labour,”
art shows that humans can shape and aid in the unfolding of nature in a productive nonoppressive manner (AT, 77). Adorno’s interrogation of “natural-beauty” in relation to
Hegelian aesthetics demonstrates the vast storehouse of critical possibilities within the
Hegelian project, and the plastic character of the Hegelian corpus more generally. Adorno
extracts a transient truth content from the Hegelian corpus, seeing him as one “who does
not have the absolute at his command,” though one who survives as a ruin (CM, 7). As
Adorno reminds us, “even those philosophers whose doctrines insist on the eternal and
timeless acquired [via historical critique] their temporal nucleus, their historical status”
(CM, 8).

Describing the almost messianic promise of the work of art, Adorno will write, “The being-in-itself to
which artworks are devoted is not the imitation of something real but rather the anticipation of a being-initself that does not yet exist, of an unknown that—by way of the subject—is self-determining. Artworks say
that something exists in itself, without predicating anything about it” (AT, 77).
351
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What further phantasmatic sites lie waiting to be unearthed within the Hegelian
program? As a self-fracturing thinker, Hegel provides immanent thought models through
which one may read his system against itself. Domains such as the aesthetic and nature
can be employed as “prisms” through which to refract the Hegelian program, reading his
oeuvre “against the grain” in the creation of new speculative models of Idealism, models
which resist the definitive closure of discursive philosophy. More remains to be said
regarding these domains, and one could imagine similar projects which take up the
immense detail in Hegel’s philosophy of history, religion, or his politics, examining the
fraught dialogue at work between thought and contingent empirical-historical moments.
Hegel’s ruined encyclopedia, along with the fraught duality of Schelling’s
Naturphilosophie, provide an excess of models by which to understand new possible
relationships with the world, and perhaps to ourselves, and as such, it remains continually
efficacious for our contemporary constellations of issues.
***
Happy are those ages when the starry sky is the map of all possible paths—ages whose
paths are illuminated by the light of the stars. Everything in such ages is new and yet
familiar, full of adventure and yet their own. The world is wide and yet it is like a home,
for the fire that burns in the soul is of the same essential nature as the stars; the world and
the self, the light and the fire, are sharply distinct, yet they never become permeant
strangers to one another, for fire is the soul of all light and all fire clothes itself in light...
‘Philosophy is really homesickness,’ says Novalis: it is the urge to be at home
everywhere.
Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 29.
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